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Abstract
This thesis investigates recent corporate restructuring trends among large non- 
financial companies from the UK and West Germany.
Following an introduction in chapter 1, chapter 2 examines the structure of firms, both 
historically, and from a transaction cost economic perspective.
In chapters 3 to 5, empirical evidence on corporate restructuring in large non-financial 
companies in the UK and West Germany is provided. Chapter 3 reports on the results 
of a questionnaire survey in which a total of 116 UK and West German companies 
took part. It is found that, from 1986 to 1996, companies from both countries have 
engaged in restructuring, but that corporate restructuring has started earlier, and has 
been taken further, among the respondents from the UK than among the respondents 
from West Germany.
Chapter 4 focuses on changes in the degree of diversification of companies. The 
measurement of diversification is discussed. Two data sets are used to calculate 
diversification indices for companies from the two countries. Evidence is found that 
companies from the UK have decreased their degree of diversification between 1988 
and 1995. West German companies have started to reduce diversification only after 
1992.
In chapter 5, a comparative case study of two large chemical companies, ICI pic in the 
UK and Hoechst AG in West Germany, is presented. It is found that corporate 
restructuring has started earlier at ICI than at Hoechst. Various reasons for the 
difference in the onset of corporate restructuring are discussed.
In Chapter 6, an interpretative approach to the cross-national differences in the timing 
and the extent of corporate restructuring in the two countries is developed. It is argued 
that country-specific institutional and economic factors account for these differences, 
and four sets of these factors are explored.
Finally, the findings of the investigation are evaluated and future directions of 
research outlined.
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1. Introduction
Over the past 10 to 15 years a wave of corporate restructuring has been under way in 
many industrialised countries. Evidence from the United States indicates that the 
1980s and early 1990s have been characterised by an unusually large number of 
mergers and acquisitions (Blair and Uppal 1993, p. 63; Steams and Allan 1996, p. 
700), by a significant reduction in corporate diversification (Lichtenberg 1990; 
Markides 1993, p. 3 and 1995, Ch. 4) and by a large number of divestments and 
leveraged buy-outs (Graebner 1991, p. 13 and pp. 37-39), to name but a few 
indicators of this restructuring wave.
Concomitant with these developments, public interest in corporate restructuring has 
risen. Between 1983 and 1996 the use of the term ‘corporate restructuring' in the 
Financial Times Newspaper increased sevenfold (Richter 1997b, p. 3). The business 
press reports daily about takeovers, divestments and buy-outs, but also about changes 
in the internal organisation of companies, such as de-layering. Much of the popular 
business literature takes a normative view on particular types or aspects of corporate 
restructuring. For example. Ries (1996), following Peters and Waterman (1982), 
strongly recommends companies to de-diversify and ‘refocus', while Sadtler, 
Campbell, and Koch (1997) think that a ‘break-up’ should be on the agenda of 66% of 
the top 100 UK companies. On the other end of the spectrum, Heuskel (1996) of the 
Boston Consulting Group argues that conglomerates should be maintained if potential 
synergies are managed carefully, and that a ‘break-up' of these ‘premium 
conglomerates’ may destroy rather than create value.
What is far from clear, however, is when and to what extent corporate restructuring 
has actually taken place, and how non-financial companies in the UK and West 
Germany compare in this respect. The popular literature provides hardly any evidence 
of the development of corporate restructuring over time. The academic literature so 
far refers primarily to the US. Less is known about the UK, and, with a few 
exceptions, very little about West Germany. This may be partly due to the fact that the 
corporate restructuring wave which is the focus of this study is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, and that -  as will be argued below -  West German industry in particular 
has only started very recently to restructure on a wider scale. Another characteristic of 
the academic literature is that it is primarily concerned with particular aspects and
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techniques of corporate restructuring, mainly from a financial point of view. Hardly 
any of this literature continues the line taken by Chandler, Channon, Hannah, Dyas 
and Thanheiser and others who analyse the overall development o f  corporate 
structure in the industrialised countries, focusing mainly on the US, Britain, Germany 
and France. Following their line of analysis, this study aims to give an overview o f  
corporate restructuring in non-financial companies in the UK and West Germany 
since the mid-1980s and to provide a partial explanation fo r  some o f the differences 
between the two countries regarding the extent and the timing o f  corporate 
restructuring.
The following section sets out the aims of this study in greater detail. Section 1.2 
provides a working definition of corporate restructuring. In section 1.3 the further 
course of the study will be outlined.
1.1 Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is not to develop a theory of corporate restructuring in order 
to test the predictions derived from such a theory, a method which could broadly be 
described as ‘deductive’. On the other hand, the study is not purely descriptive, 
although it contains a strong empirical, and largely descriptive, section (Chapters 3-5) 
on which thereafter, in an ‘inductive’ way, an interpretation of corporate restructuring 
is developed (Ch. 6). Drawing on both deductive and inductive techniques, the aim of 
this study is threefold:
(1) First, to set out a framework which makes it possible to analyse the structure o f  
firm s as a coherent whole and to identify the crucial dimensions o f  firm structure. 
Two perspectives on firm structure, the historical and the transaction cost theoretic 
one, are laid out (Ch. 2); these are mutually enriching. The rationale for doing this 
is that there is no commonly established definition of corporate restructuring (see 
section 1.2). The aim of the study is to spell out clearly which perspective of the 
phenomenon under consideration is adopted here. This aim is carried by the belief 
that empirical observation is directed and influenced by the perspective of the 
observer, so that the resulting observation can be understood only in the context of 
that framework.
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(2) Second, to analyse and compare corporate restructuring trends and developments 
in non-financial companies in the UK and West Germany between the mid-1980s 
and the mid-1990s, using the concepts developed before. The study aims to 
establish whether and to what extent the structure of large non-financial firms has 
changed, and which dimensions of firm structure have been particularly affected. 
If  general trends among firms within or across countries can be established, the 
‘timing’ of corporate restructuring (its onset, development, and possible slow­
down or end) is also of interest. Moreover, the study aims to establish 
commonalities and differences in the timing, extent, and character of general 
corporate restructuring trends among companies in the UK and West Germany. 
Overall, this part of the study endeavours to extend the historiography o f the 
structural development of large non-financial firms in the two countries to a very 
recent period.
Without detailing the results of this part of the study here, a major finding is that 
companies in both countries have restructured, but that this process (a) has started 
earlier and (b) has been taken further in Britain than in Germany.^ This forms the 
background for the third aim of this study, which is
(3) to provide a partial interpretation o f the cross-national differences in corporate 
restructuring. The factors that cause corporate restructuring can be decomposed 
into firm-specific, industry-specific, and country-specific factors. As this study 
consists of a cross-national comparison, its emphasis is deliberately on the 
country-specific factors that influence changes in corporate structure. The aim of 
this part of the study (ch. 6) is to establish whether any factors specific to the UK 
and to West Germany can be identified which could at least partially account for 
the differences in the corporate restructuring trends and developments in the two 
countries. In keeping with the earlier structure of the thesis, a framework in which 
this problem can be analysed is set out first. This framework draws on the 
institutional economics tradition represented by Douglass C. North. In this 
perspective, it is argued that a combination of country-specific institutional and 
economic factors influences the balance o f power among the parties who transact 
with a firm and who determine its structure. On this basis, four exemplary sets of 
institutional and economic factors are identified, and the differences between the 
UK and West Germany with respect to these factors are elaborated upon.
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It has to be emphasised that these country-specific factors may explain only a minor 
part of the corporate restructuring waves in the two countries. Many authors (e.g. 
Bowman and Singh 1990, pp. 9ff.) argue that corporate restructuring is primarily a 
result of industry-specific phenomena, in particular increased competition within 
those mature industries on which Britain and Germany have thrived for much o f the 
period since the industrial revolution (e.g. chemicals). On the other hand, Blair and 
Schary (1992, p. 178) provide evidence that from 1979 to 1989 in the US, industry- 
specific factors account for only 9-12% of the variance in various types of 
restructuring events, including private buy-outs of publicly traded companies, and 
leverage increases. They conclude that “a great many firm-specific, highly 
idiosyncratic factors were at work in addition to the industry-level and macro- 
economic factors” (Blair and Schary 1992, p. 184). Also, if industry-level factors 
were the only determinants of corporate restructuring, it is hard to see why cross­
national differences between firms within the same industry persist, as is evident from 
the results reported in chapters 3 to 5. With respect to firm-specific determinants of 
corporate restructuring which are emphasised by Mueller and Hall (in Blair [ed.] 
1993, pp. 195-197), it is obvious that a company’s history influences its subsequent 
development (see also Fligstein 1991, p. 311). For example, in chapter 4 evidence will 
be provided that a company’s degree of diversification at any point in time has a 
strong impact on subsequent changes in diversification. On the other hand, if only 
firm-specific factors were at work, it is unclear why corporate restructuring should 
take place in wave-like fashions, affecting many companies across many industries 
simultaneously. It is the general country-specific trends in corporate restructuring 
which are the focus of the literature reviewed in section 2.2 below, and in chapter 6.
Three aspects of this study’s scope require further explanation:
• With respect to the reference period of the study, the initial idea was to study 
corporate restructuring since the beginning of the 1980s. This consideration was 
driven by the fact that changes in industrial structures are often seen in relation to 
the political events during this period: The beginning of the Thatcher-, Reagan- 
and Kohl- governments in Britain [1979], the US [1980], and West Germany 
[1982] respectively, and the onset of more liberal economic policies at least in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. However, it became clear that a balance between the 
breadth and the depth of the study had to be struck. Moreover, the data base for
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the time before the mid-1980s proved thin, both with respect to the publicly 
available data used in this study (Chapter 4), and to the data from individual 
companies and managers (Chapters 3 and 5). As a result, it was decided to 
concentrate on the period from the mid-1980s, without, a fixed starting point. 
Information on the years before this period is provided insofar available.
• The study focuses primarily on large, non-financial companies. Again, this was 
partly driven by data availability, but partly also by the impression gained from 
the business press that financial companies may have undergone very different 
forms of restructuring than non-financial companies. However, some of the data 
used in this study (see in particular Ch. 4) do not allow a breakdown by industry, 
so that a few financial companies may be included in those instances where this is 
clearly indicated.
• Thirdly, the study is on large companies in the UK and West Germany^ i.e. 
companies whose head offices are located in these two countries, as opposed to 
British- or German-owned companies. Three reasons account for this decision, 
which has practical implications mainly for the sample selection for the 
questionnaire survey on which chapter 3 reports. First, through acquisitions and 
divestments, the ownership of large companies changes hands (and nationality) at 
an increasing pace (see for example section 3.3.5), so that a focus on German- and 
British-owned companies seemed inappropriate. Second, companies increasingly 
invest globally, so that corporate structures become more and more international. 
Third, information on particular restructuring phenomena -  such as mergers and 
acquisitions -  becomes more easily available, so that companies have a greater 
opportunity to emulate the structure of foreign firms, if they wish to do so.
1.2 Working Definition of Corporate Restructuring
^Corporate restructuring* is a broad, non-technical term, referring to changes in the 
structure o f firms. As a firm-level phenomenon, it has to be distinguished from 
industrial restructuring, i.e. changes in the composition of particular industries (Roe 
1984, pp. 3-4; Statt 1991, p. 124) and economic restructuring, i.e. changes in the 
industrial structure of countries or regions (e.g. Green 1989, p. 5). However, both 
terms are used occasionally to refer to firm-level changes (e.g. Smith and Walter 1990
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who describe corporate restructuring under the heading of economic restructuring; 
similarly Abercrombie and Warde ^1994, p. 18), in which case they are o f interest to 
this study.
In the literature, a variety of changes in the structure of companies are described as 
corporate restructuring. Bowman and Singh (1990, p. 9) and Bowman et al. (1996, p. 
5) distinguish between three forms of corporate restructuring^:
(1) Financial restructuring: changes in the capital structure of companies;
(2) Portfolio restructuring: changes in the composition of companies’ assets, 
activities or business lines;
(3) Organisational restructuring: changes in the organisation structure of 
companies.
Some authors (Weston et al. 1990, p. 3; Wright, Thompson and Robbie 1990, pp. Iff.) 
list changes in companies’ ownership structures as a separate form of corporate 
restructuring, while others subsume it under financial restructuring.
Most of the literature on corporate restructuring is concerned with the first or the 
second of these aspects (Donaldson 1994; Stewart and Glassman 1988a and 1988b), 
or a combination of the two (Bethel and Liebeskind 1993, p. 15). Far less evidence is 
available on the changes in the organisation structure o f  firms, Useem (1992; 1993) 
being an exception. Another aspect of much of the extant literature on corporate 
restructuring is that it is concerned with particular restructuring techniques or events, 
such as mergers and acquisitions, buy-outs and the like, rather than with the resulting 
changes in corporate structure. Some authors describe corporate restructuring simply 
by enumerating particular restructuring events, such as “the reshaping of a business 
through mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and internal reorganizations” (Ranter 
1989, p. 88). Others stipulate the restructuring events on which they focus (e.g. 
leveraged buyouts and acquisitions as in Hall 1991a) for the purpose of their studies, 
without putting these events into a wider context.
As indicated above, this study sees itself in the tradition of the literature that analyses 
the overall development of corporate structure from a historical and transaction cost 
theoretic perspective (see chapter 2). Within this literature, two crucial dimensions -  
each containing various elements - of the structure of firms are identified: The 
boundaries of firms and their internal organisation. For the purpose o f  this study,
19
corporate restructuring is therefore defined as changes in these two dimensions o f 
corporate structure. This means that, in contrast to much of the recent literature on 
corporate restructuring, the study is only to a secondary degree concerned with 
changes in the financial or ownership structure of firms. As an example, financial 
transactions such as acquisitions are not analysed as restructuring events or techniques 
on their own, but with respect to the resulting changes in the boundaries (and 
potentially also in the internal organisation) of firms. It would therefore be of interest 
whether such acquisitions have taken place on a vertical, horizontal, or diversifying 
basis, and whether they have led to a shift in the geographical focus of the company’s 
operations, if such data can be obtained.
When firms undergo corporate restructuring, substantial changes along the various 
dimensions of their structure occur within a compressed time frame (Cibin and Grant 
1996, p. 283), so that episodes of corporate restructuring stand out in the overall 
development of companies.
1.3 Further Course of the Study
The main purpose of the study is to give an overview of corporate restructuring trends 
and developments in non-financial companies in the UK and West Germany. At the 
heart of the study are, therefore, three chapters in which empirical findings on 
corporate restructuring in the two countries are presented.
Before that, chapter 2 develops the framework in which corporate restructuring is 
analysed more fully. The way in which business historians since Chandler have 
described the overall development of large companies is set out, and material on 
corporate development in Britain and Germany is presented. In addition, the 
transaction cost economic approach to the crucial dimensions of corporate structure is 
developed. This allows setting out the key elements of the structure of firms -  various 
aspects of their boundaries and their internal organisation - more clearly, which will 
be done in the concluding section of the chapter.
In chapter 3, an overview of corporate restructuring trends and developments in 
British and German industry is given on the basis of a questionnaire survey which 
covers the 1986-1996 period. The chapter also contains an additional section (insert 
3.3.4), in which data from public sources on a particular corporate restructuring 
technique (management buy-outs) are presented.
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On the basis of a statistical analysis of two data sets, chapter 4 focuses on a particular 
aspect of corporate restructuring, namely on changes in diversification in British and 
Germany industry. A literature review on recent changes in diversification is 
presented as well.
Chapter 5 consists of a case study of corporate restructuring in the German chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals company Hoechst AG and compares its case with the one of ICI 
pic in the UK.
Each of the three empirical chapters uses its own, distinctive methodology, and is 
based on self-compiled data sets from a variety of information sources. A copy o f the 
questionnaire used in the context of chapter 3 is presented in the appendix.
Chapter 6 provides an interpretative approach to the observed cross-country 
differences in the timing and the extent of corporate restructuring. The approach 
presented is supported by empirical data on the forces that are hypothesised to 
underlie corporate restructuring trends.
In the conclusion, the research questions are revisited, and future directions of 
research are identified.
’ For much of the study, the terms ‘UK’ and ‘Britain’ are used interchangeably, as the geographical 
distinction between the two does not affect issues such as sample selection etc. Also, for reasons of 
brevity, ‘Germany’ is often used instead of ‘West Germany’.
 ^Similarly Gibbs 1993, p. 51.
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2. Corporate Structure; Historical and Theoretical Perspectives
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to identify the crucial elements of corporate structure. These 
elements are developed in a twofold way.
First, taking a historical perspective, section 2.2 summarises the analysis of the 
development of corporate structure in the industrialised countries in general provided 
by Chandler (1962; 1977; 1990) and by business historians in his tradition. Chandler 
argues that the historical evolution of corporate structure involved changes with 
respect to
(a) the ‘boundaries’ of firms, 
and
(b) their internal organisation.
This approach has been adopted widely, although later authors do not always follow 
Chandler’s line of argument with respect to the reasons for changes in corporate 
structure. Section 2.2 also traces the development of corporate structure in large 
industrial companies in Britain and Germany, although the empirical evidence in
particular on the internal organisation of firms is patchy.
Second, section 2.3 outlines transaction-cost theoretic approaches to the key 
dimensions of corporate structure as developed in section 2.2.
Based on the historical and the theoretical approaches to corporate structure, the
chapter concludes by defining corporate restructuring as changes in the boundaries of 
firms and in their internal organisation and outlines five major elements of each of 
these two key dimensions of corporate structure. This provides the analytical tool set 
that is applied in the following chapters of the study.
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2.2 The Historical Perspective: Corporate Structure and Corporate
Development
2.2.1 Chandler’s General Argument
The business historian Alfred Chandler (1962; 1977; 1990; for a summary see Teece 
1998, pp. 281-317) identifies the improvements in production, transportation and 
communication technology in the 19* century as decisive factors for the emergence of 
large business organisations in the US, Britain and Germany. The increasing 
geographic reach of companies, the emergence of mass markets, and the invention of 
mass production technologies triggered the building of plants of hitherto unknown 
size. The examples given by Chandler include the railway companies, the emergence 
of mass distributors and retailers, and of mass producers in the refining, distilling, and 
chemicals manufacturing industries. According to Chandler (1990, p. 37), four 
dimensions of the growth process of business enterprises can be distinguished:
(1) horizontal growth, often through the combination of already existing 
operations via merger or acquisition;
(2) vertical integration;
(3) diversification;
(4) geographic expansion.
As a crucial reason for horizontal integration, i.e. the increase in the scale of a 
company’s already existing business line, Chandler regards the invention of 
production technologies which showed significant economies o f scale. Economies of 
scale occur where the average costs of production decrease as output increases. Put 
formally, economies of scale occur where the marginal costs (MC) of producing an 
additional unit of output are less than the total average costs (AC): MC < AC. Over 
the range of output for which returns to scale are constant, MC = AC, whereas over 
the range of output for which there are diseconomies of scale, MC > AC (see Besanko 
et al. 1996, pp. 3-10; pp. 77-79).
Chandler argues that the emergence of new production technologies, such as fijel- and 
electricity-powered engines, led to the substitution of capital intensive for labour 
intensive production. The new production facilities required large fixed investments, 
leading to high fixed costs relative to total costs. Increases in efficiency could be
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achieved by spreading fixed costs over larger amounts of output, resulting in 
economies of scale. In addition, the investments in transportation technologies had 
made it possible to exploit economies of scale in manufacturing by enabling 
companies to distribute and sell their products on a large geographic scale. The 
minimum efficient scale of production in many businesses increased, requiring 
entrepreneurs to build larger production facilities to compete effectively.
Vertical integration, according to Chandler (see Williamson and Ouchi 1981, pp. 
356ff), followed in part from horizontal integration. The new large-scale operations 
demanded a constant throughput (‘stocktum’) in order to avoid downtime and to 
maximise the return from investment in large production facilities. Therefore, the 
incentive increased for companies to integrate vertically, i.e. both ‘backwards’ into 
the procurement of supplies and ‘forward’ into distribution, marketing, retailing and 
related services such as insurance and finance. At the same time, the incentive for 
small and independent intermediaries to provide these services decreased because of 
the greater need for buyer-specific (and therefore risky) investments. From the 
perspective of the large corporations, in the oligopolistic markets in which they were 
mostly active it was also more dangerous to rely on the services of intermediaries who 
could work for their competitors and thereby exploit their strategic position. This left 
the bigger corporations little choice but to carry out intermediary services or to 
procure supplies on their own. Vertical integration also served as an insurance against 
unforeseen increases in supply prices which could severely affect producers that had 
made large capital investments into production processes dependent on particular 
inputs (e.g. reliance on coal in the steel industry). Large companies also integrated 
vertically into their own support activities, for example into the maintenance of their 
production facilities and into the provision of social services for their employees.
Another rationale for vertical integration, but more importantly for diversification, 
consists, according to Chandler, of economies of scope. These occur where the costs 
(C) of the joint production of given quantities of two or more types of output {qx and 
qj) are lower than the costs of their separate production (Teece 1980, pp. 223-225; 
Spulber 1992, pp. 544-545):
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C(9..9y) <% .0) + C(0,g^ )
In other words, economies of scope are achieved where unit costs decrease with an 
increase in total output across different production lines. Economies of scope may 
occur, for example, where two product lines share the same production facilities, 
leading to a greater spread of the costs for the production facilities.
According to Chandler, economies of scope in production increased in conjunction 
with increasing economies of scale. Large operations almost always involved some 
spare capacities in particular parts of the production process, which could then be 
used for the production of related products. Results of research could be applicable to 
a variety of production processes. Competencies and skills acquired in one area could 
be useful in other activities. An example of this phenomenon is the move of dyestuffs 
producers into pharmaceuticals (chapter 5). Many of the drugs developed during the 
late 19* and early 20* century were based on the compounds invented by synthetic 
organic chemistry producers.
In addition, the emergence of general managers who were needed to organise and to 
monitor the constant production of goods created an additional incentive to deploy 
any free managerial capacities on additional production processes. In the same way, 
product diversification created an opportunity to deploy existing facilities (R&D 
laboratories, warehouses etc.) and free personnel (sales staff, etc.) across a broad 
range of products. The emergence of conglomerates was also advanced by the fact 
that barriers to exit, such as sunk costs (i.e. costs that “cannot be recovered upon exit” 
[Schmalensee 1989, p. 969]), prevented companies from leaving their traditional 
activities even under unpromising market conditions. Furthermore, diversification into 
unrelated areas helped to pool the risks arising from cyclical downturns, price 
variations and the like. Empirically, Gort (1962) finds that between 1929 and 1954 the 
degree of diversification of 111 large American manufacturing companies increased 
substantially, in particular during the last 7-8 years of that period. During the 1960s 
and early 1970s, diversification by American firms - mainly driven by acquisitions - 
increased even further, as documented by Fligstein (1991, pp. 326-332).
The fourth dimension of corporate growth identified by Chandler is the increasing 
geographic reach of organisations. Three aspects of this process are important; First,
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the geographic size of the market which companies were able to supply increased due 
to improvements in transportation^ (railroads, ships) and communication (telegraph, 
telephone) technology. This put the companies into a position to exploit economies of 
scale and scope in production, by building large distribution and sales networks and 
employing staffs for sales and technical support services. These also served as 
providers of information about new technologies and customer demands and thereby 
helped to reduce transaction costs. Second, in particular since the end of WW n, 
production itself became geographically dispersed. Multinational corporations started 
to set up operations in various regions and countries (see Chandler and Tedlow 1985, 
Ch. 27), so as to produce ‘close to their markets’. Consequently, they developed 
corporate structures based on the geographically specialised division of labour. In 
doing so, they could exploit particular firm-specific assets (e.g. patent rights) on a 
wide geographic scale and take advantage of country-specific factors (e.g. resource 
endowments). Multinational corporations also benefited in other ways from their 
widespread presence, for example by circumventing import quotas and other national 
restrictions. Third, as companies aimed at integrating their supply functions in order 
to secure the procurement of raw materials and reduce transaction costs, they 
established operations in those countries where the raw materials were found. 
Stopford and Turner (1985, p. 47) argue that during the ‘cosmopolitan era’ before 
WWI, British manufacturing firms established operations in the countries of the 
empire in their move to integrate their raw material supplies; horizontal integration 
followed later and was driven by defensive motives (ibid., pp. 50ff). Vernon (1979) 
provides quantitative evidence for the establishment of international subsidiary 
networks by American- and European-based multinational corporations (MNCs):
Proportion of 
enterprises with 
subsidiaries in
181 US-based MNCs 135 MNCs based in the UK 
and Europe
1950 1970 1950 1970
1-5 countries 76.2% 5.0% 85.9% 23.0%
6-20 countries 23.8% 70.7% 11.9% 55.6%
> 20 countries 0.0% 24.3% 2.2% 21.4%
Table 2.1: The Foreign Manufacturing Subsidiary Networks of 316 MNCs in 1950 and 1970.
Source: Adapted from Vernon (1979, p. 258); see also Clarke (1985a, p. 13).
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These data provide evidence for the rapid establishment of large multinational 
subsidiary networks by both American and European companies. The process of the 
emergence of multinational corporations was related to the emergence of regional and 
global brands, such as in cars (e.g. VW Beetle), and consumer goods (e.g. Coca Cola). 
With respect to the relationships between companies, new transportation technologies 
enabled companies to trade over increasing distances and thereby to capture the gains 
from specialisation resulting from the division of labour.
In sum. Chandler finds that the emergence of large business enterprises since the 
second half of the 19^ and throughout the 20^ century has taken place along the four 
dimensions of corporate boundaries identified above.
According to Chandler, the growth process with respect to the ‘boundaries’ of firms 
was complemented by developments in their internal organisation. As a result of 
external growth, but also in order to facilitate this process, companies developed 
complex organisational hierarchies of professional managers to a hitherto unknown 
extent. The characteristics that Chandler identifies include the following:
(1) Increasing employment of professional, salaried managers, and the emergence 
of hierarchies with several layers of management;
(2) Increasing separation of distinct corporate functions, of line and staff, and the 
emergence of corporate headquarters;
(3) The emergence of distinct organisational forms, in particular of the 
multidivisional (M-) form, which increasingly replaced unitary (U-) form 
organisations;
(4) The development of administrative instruments for controlling, planning, and 
resource allocation.
In connection with the increased scale and complexity of operations as described 
above it became harder for individuals, families and partnerships to manage the firms 
in the way they had been used to. They had to employ professional administrators, 
with little or no ownership stake, who could specialise in control and decision­
making. This created a demand for professional managerial education which, in the 
US, was met relatively quickly by the emerging business schools which opened from 
1881 (Wharton) onwards.^
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In connection with the increasing number of salaried managers and supervisors, the 
need to manage and monitor their activities themselves increased. Organisations 
responded to this need by establishing administrative hierarchies with multiple lavers. 
Chandler and Daems (1980, p. 1) estimate that, by 1975, around 20% of industrial 
workers in the US and Europe worked in hierarchies with at least six management 
levels. As only a small proportion of the managerial personnel could occupy top 
positions, this development entailed in particular the emergence of large numbers of 
middle managers. It also implied an increasingly distant relationship between top 
management and shop floor employees, long communication channels, and the need 
for greater standardisation of corporate policies and rules. In sum, in connection with 
the increasing horizontal differentiation in companies (specialisation of labour and of 
production processes, departmentalisation of activities, etc.) a process of hierarchical 
differentiation took place.
Within the emerging administrative hierarchies, specialisation set in quickly to 
capture the economies of scale from investments in particular into managerial skills. 
In the geographically dispersed US railways, the distinction between ‘line’ and ‘staff 
functions was first drawn, which spread quickly to businesses in mass production and 
distribution. Line officers were responsible for the day-to-day running of the local 
operations, while staff managers were geographically concentrated to co-ordinate the 
various operations (e.g. train scheduling) and provide uniform standards (e.g. security 
standards, pricing decisions)^. Around the turn of the century, firms began to 
concentrate various functions within departments that would be managed and co­
ordinated from a corporate head office. In larger departments the line-staff distinction 
could be drawn within a department. This development marks the emergence of the 
functional or unitary (U-) form business organisation. Within the U-form, activities 
were ‘bundled’ and delegated to particular departments, but remained firmly under 
central control from the head office which by and large retained decision-making 
power.
As a result of the growth of organisations, and in particular of increased 
diversification and greater geographic reach, corporations became increasingly unable 
to cope with the amount of information that accumulated at their higher administrative 
echelons. Chandler describes the development of the multidivisional form (M-form)
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as an organisational response to this problem of ‘information overload’. In M-form 
organisations operations were assigned to the various divisions by product lines or 
geographic criteria. The divisions had their own management and administrative 
structures; they were divided into sub-divisions or were organised by functional 
criteria as U-forms. The first US companies to adopt the M-form in the late 1920s 
were Du Pont and General Motors (product line divisions) and Sears Roebuck 
(regional divisions). An aspect important to the discussion below is that, with the 
substitution of the U-form by the M-form, the functions of the corporate head office 
were redefined. Whereas in the U-form relatively many decision-making processes 
had remained concentrated on head-office level and only mundane functions had been 
pushed down to line managers, in M-form organisations decision-making became 
more decentralised as far as the relationship between the head office and the divisions 
was concerned. It then depended on the organisational structure of the divisions to 
what extent they were centralised or decentralised. Although the functions o f head 
offices varied, operational decisions became the prerogative of divisional 
management, and head offices did not get involved in the day-to-day operations of the 
divisions except for unforeseen or critical situations. The crucial functions of the head 
office included (a) strategy-making and planning, e.g. portfolio planning; (b) 
monitoring functions, mainly through accounting and financial controlling; (c) 
resource allocation, overseeing of internal transfers, and incentive provision for the 
various organisational units [Mintzberg 1983, pp. 222-224; Chandler 1996, pp. 348f. 
combines functions (b) and (c)]. In addition to these, head offices became involved in 
various functions which, in their view, would give rise to synergies and benefit the 
overall organisation. For example, personnel management and marketing became HO 
functions in many firms, and marketing managers came to dominate many American 
M-form companies during the inter-war period (Fligstein 1987, pp. 44ff). Also, the 
head office could install central functions (such as R&D) which may or may not have 
formed part of the HO, but which provided services for several of the firm’s 
operations. As a third organisational form apart from the U- and the M-form, the 
holding company structure (H-form) developed in which relatively small head offices 
controlled the activities of legally independent subsidiaries on a financial basis, 
without providing central services or attempting to create synergies between the units 
below head-office level. Head office managers in H-form organisations served
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primarily as portfolio managers, thereby substituting the function of the external 
capital market.
Central administrative control from geographically, materially, and hierarchically 
‘remote’ operations afforded the development of specialised analvtic tools. These 
were preferably of quantitative rather than of qualitative nature so as to allow easy 
communication and processing and to facilitate comparisons across departments or 
functions. A number of accounting and financial measures were developed which 
fulfilled these criteria. In accordance with the increasing need for a constant 
throughput of goods in capital-intensive productions, companies defined operating 
ratios (e.g. in the railways) and measures of ‘stocktum’ (e.g. in department stores). 
They also developed more sophisticated operating statistics and cost accounting 
systems and defined stringent performance criteria (Chandler and Daems 1979, pp. 
9ff). With increasing standardisation of such analytical tools, accounting and 
financial controlling became topics that could be studied at business schools, thereby 
supporting the development of a set body of knowledge for the emerging class of 
general managers. The 1930s also saw the development of group accounts in which 
the financial results of the constituent parts of complex corporate groups were 
consolidated (Hadden 1983, Ch. 1).
The changes with respect to the external boundaries of firms and to their internal 
organisation identified by Chandler are related to the wider development from fam ily 
or entrepreneurial towards managerial capitalism. The capital demands of larger 
firms increasingly exceeded the financial means of individuals, families or smaller 
partnerships. Companies were incorporated as joint stock companies and their shares 
traded on the stock exchanges. As a result, corporate ownership became more 
dispersed. In addition, professional managers were employed with little or no 
ownership stake in ‘their’ companies. This led to a greater division of ownership and 
control of companies as described by Berle and Means (1932; see also Berle 1954)"^ , 
with managers rather than owners controlling the firm. This overall development has 
been described by Burnham (1942) and Chandler (1977, pp. 484-500) as the 
‘managerial revolution’ of the 20^ century. It entailed the possibility of divergent 
interests between managers and owners. In order to reduce the effect of the resulting
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agency problems, governance structures were developed which aimed at mitigating 
principal-agent conflicts.
To summarise the argument so far. Chandler’s general account of the development of 
large firms since the later part of the 19^ and throughout the 20* century highlights 
reciprocal changes in the external boundaries of firms and in their internal 
organisation. He sets out various dimensions of both classes of changes: Horizontal 
and vertical integration, diversification and increased geographic reach with respect to 
the boundaries of firms; the establishment of extensive administrative hierarchies with 
features such as vertical differentiation, and the division of work between corporate 
head offices and operating businesses, with respect to the internal organisation of 
companies.
2.2.2 The Development of Corporate Structure: The Case of the UK
Focusing on the UK, Hannah (1983) documents the rise of large industrial companies, 
emphasising the relationship between corporate structure and size on the one hand and 
industrial structure and competition on the other. He identifies three big merger 
waves^ which brought about the modem industrial structure: The first one at the turn 
of the century, the second one in the 1920s, and the third one beginning in the 1950s 
and reaching its peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Reasons for the first merger 
wave include the advantage of full amalgamation over the formation of unreliable 
cartels which resulted from increased competition in the manufacturing industries in 
the late 19* century, and the factor that merged companies found it easier to raise 
capital in the stock market (“economies of scale in financing”; Hannah 1983, p. 20). 
The first motive in particular points towards increasing horizontal integration as the 
primary form of corporate combination during the first M&A wave. Payne (1967, p. 
524f.) also argues that, before 1914, many British firms pursued a policy of product 
differentiation and specialisation rather than diversification. Gourvish (1987, p. 24) 
contends that, as compared to the US, the adoption of large-scale organisation in 
British firms before WW I proceeded relatively slowly.
The second M&A wave in the 1920s took place in a climate of the ‘rationalisation’, 
an ideology rather than a coherent business policy, which favoured the concentration 
of production in large-scale producers over smaller and more fragmented businesses
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(Hannah 1974, p. 253). In addition, mergers were a reaction to the deep world-wide 
recession that culminated in the ‘Black Friday’ in 1929, and over-capacities in some 
industries. Horizontal combination was aimed at reducing price-eroding competition. 
Another reason for horizontal integration was the search for economies of scale in 
production, marketing and other corporate functions. Interestingly, Hannah regards 
not only Americans, but also German industrialists as influential in the British 
‘rationalisation movement’, suggesting that similar developments, possibly at an even 
larger scale, took place in Germany. For example, the merger of the four leading 
British chemicals companies in 1926 to form ICI - the largest merger in the inter-war 
years - mirrored the amalgamation of the two large chemical cartels to form IG 
Farben in Germany in 1925.
The years between 1930 and 1950 stand against the general trend towards greater 
conglomeration that characterises much of the 20^ century. For these two decades, 
Hannah finds actually a slight decrease in industrial concentration in the UK, the 
disruption caused by WW II being one of the influential factors. However, this trend 
was fully reversed during the period between 1950 and 1970. This may be surprising 
as the UK had established the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act in 1948 and 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act in 1956. However, these laws aimed at protecting 
the public interest against monopoly power and price-fixing agreements, but were 
permissive with respect to mergers, which were first regulated through the 
Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965. Census o f Production data (Kirby 1994, p. 
157) shows that during this period industrial concentration increased rapidly, mainly 
due to mergers and acquisitions (see also Geroski and Jacquemin 1984, pp. 344-347). 
The 1950s saw the emergence of the takeover bid as an instrument to force the 
amalgamation of companies even when incumbent management was not interested in 
combining (Wilson 1995, pp. 201-203). With respect to the character of acquisitions, 
Hannah finds that horizontal matches were increasingly complemented by 
diversification moves. This analysis is confirmed by Prais (1981, pp. 16-21) who 
finds that concentration and diversification in British industry rose significantly faster 
between 1958 and 1963 than between 1935 and 1951. Channon (1973, pp. 35-38) 
provides additional quantitative and qualitative information on the extent of this 
merger wave and on how it translated into rising diversification. He finds that from 
1957 to 1968, the 2024 largest British manufacturing companies were reduced to 
1253 by amalgamations. In the context of this process, the proportion of single
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the 100 largest industrial enterprises fell from 20% in 1960 to 
of related diversifiers on the Rumelt and Wrigley
business firms among
6% in 1970, while the proportion  ..........       —
scale (section 4.2.2) increased from 41% to 54%, as the following table shows:
UK
Year 1950 1960 1970
(n=92) (n=96) (n=100)
Single business 34% 20% 6%
Dominant business 41% 35% 34%
Related business 23% 41% 54%
Unrelated diversified 2% 4% 6%
Table 2.2: Diversification among the Largest Industrial Enterprises in the UK
Source: Channon 1973, p. 67.
Note: For an explanation of the diversification categories used here see
section 4.2.2, table 4.1.
This data shows that large British companies diversified substantially in the post-war 
period. Comparisons with the data for Germany (table 2.4) show that by 1970 big 
business in the UK was more diversified than German industry.
The 1970s saw a slowdown of the conglomeration and diversification wave o f the 
earlier post-war period. Companies became more cautious in their spending decisions 
after the first oil shock in 1973/74 (Hannah 1983, p. 152), and the effect of the 
remaining M&As was to some extent counterbalanced by a rising number of 
demergers and divestments. Nevertheless, the 'net effect' of these merger / acquisition 
and demerger / divestment movements was still a slight increase in diversification of 
big companies.
With respect to changes in the geographic reach of companies, the UK’s particular 
historical background as a colonial power has to be taken into account. This meant 
that many British companies had international trade connections to colonial countries 
at a very early point in time, and often they were sheltered from outside competitors. 
During the 20^ century, Britain’s former colonies became independent, and began to 
foster their own industries or to open their markets for competitors from other 
countries. Many British firms lost their privileged status in the former colonies. 
Broadberry (1997, p. 292) suggests that the UK’s belated entry into the European 
Economic Community in 1973 also limited the expansion of multinational enterprises, 
although some firms acquired continental companies in order to have better access to 
the European market. In fact, British direct investment into Western Europe increased
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throughout the 1960s to reach a peak in 1971, and declined thereafter (Stopford and 
Turner 1985, p. 70). With respect to trade, the United States, rather than the much 
closer continental countries, was Britain’s most important trade partner until 1973 
(see the statistics by Mitchell 1975, pp. 571-574).
Channon (1973, Ch. 7) and Hannah (1983, Ch. 6) also provide evidence for changes 
in the internal organisation o f British firms. Before WWI, head offices had been 
relatively small administrative units for individual factories and were mostly based at 
their sites, i.e. in the province. Hannah dates the emergence of extensive corporate 
head offices, and of larger managerial hierarchies in British firms in general, to the 
inter-war years. Whereas in 1907 only 7.6% of the total workforce in the 
manufacturing industries had been administrative or non-operational staff, this figure 
increased to 19.7% by 1948 (Hannah 1983, p. 72). In addition, the automation of 
routine information gathering and processing, the specialisation of managers in areas 
such as cost accounting, and the build-up of communication networks (through 
telephone lines etc.) set in (Hannah 1974, pp. 256-259). Many of the enlarged head 
offices moved to London, and thus became separated from the operational base of the 
company.
With respect to changes in the organisational form . Chandler (1990, Ch. IE) contends 
that until WWI British companies were much slower in investing into managerial 
hierarchies than their German and American counterparts. During the inter-war period 
and after WWE, however, this situation changed (Pollard ^1992, p. 254). One of the 
first British companies to follow the example of American firms in adopting the M- 
form was ICI during the 1930s. Other examples of British firms that adopted the M- 
form in the inter-war years include Spillers, Turner & Newall, and Dunlop (Hannah 
1983, p. 85). Other companies remained loose confederations of diversified 
businesses.
More generally, Franko (1974, pp. 493-495) shows that the switch from the U-form to 
the M-form was much slower in diversified European companies than in America, 
where this development had already started in the 1920s. Among the European 
countries, however, the UK was the fastest in following the American example and 
adopting the M-form, while Germany was much slower (Dyas and Thanheiser 1976, 
Ch. 8). Hadden (1983, Ch. 1-2) also provides evidence for the relative organisational 
complexity of many large British companies. As of 1976, the average number of
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subsidiaries of British multinational firms was 44, as compared to 19 in other 
European countries (Commission of the European Communities 1976, p. 29). As of 
1979, the number of subsidiaries of five large companies in the UK ranked between 
170 (Rank Organisation) and 1300 (British Petroleum^). In the case of Bowater, 200 
of its 420 subsidiaries were located overseas, while 100 were dormant. Hadden finds 
that for a variety of reasons - among them managerial self-interest^ - many British 
companies were inclined to leave dormant or functionally redundant companies 
incorporated, thus leading to highly complex corporate structures. He argues that 
divisionalisation represented an attempt to simplify corporate structures to some 
extent, but that this did not fully resolve the organisational problems of many British 
firms. Among the areas that he regards as problematic is the complex system of 
internal transactions and finance provision both among subsidiaries and between 
subsidiaries and their holding companies.
In sum, the available evidence suggests that the rise of the corporate economy in 
Britain involved many of the features identified by Chandler. Large industrial 
enterprises emerged since the industrial revolution and throughout the 20* century. 
One of their most distinct features was their high degree of diversification, which was 
fostered in particular through the post-WW II M&A wave that reached its peak in the 
late 1960s. While the evidence on internal organisation is sketchy, it suggests that 
large British firms adopted complex organisational structures. While the move 
towards greater professionalisation of management, in particular with respect to 
management education, was generally slower in the UK than in the US and in 
Germany, British companies evolved extensive administrative hierarchies and 
developed particular head office cultures.
2.2.3 The Development of Corporate Structure: The Case of Germany
With respect to Germany, Kocka (1980, pp. 77ff.) distinguishes between two 
industrialisation phases^. The first one began around 1840 -  i.e. about 50 years later 
than in Britain -  and ended with the German-French war in 1870/71 and the recession 
in the early 1870s. The second phase took place between 1873 and 1914. During this 
period, big German companies emerged in particular in technologically advanced 
manufacturing sectors such as the electro-technical (e.g. AEG) and chemical (e.g.
35
Hoechst, Badische, Bayer) industries. German industrialists invested heavily in their 
operations, thereby making up the large productivity disadvantage that had existed 
during the 1870s as against British manufacturing companies by the turn of the 
century (see Broadberry 1997, p. 68). The capital requirements for these investments 
could not be satisfied any longer by owner-families. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, however, it was not primarily the stock market which responded to this 
need, but banks which developed long-lasting relationships with their clients and 
became the main outside finance providers. Germany’s biggest banks, the Deutsche 
Bank and the Dresdner Bank, were founded in 1870 and 1872 respectively (Jaeger 
1988, p. 110). In addition, German companies relied more on internal finance than 
their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.
After the late start of the industrialisation in Germany, large German companies 
expanded relatively quickly (Pohl 1982, pp. 97-99)^. They integrated horizontally as 
well as vertically, for example by building their own sales networks. They also 
increased their degree of diversification, in particular to exploit their technological 
know-how in a wide variety of productions. Kocka (1980, pp. 95-110) estimates that 
shortly after the turn of the century, the 100 largest German industrial companies were 
more diversified than their American and their British counterparts. A further 
characteristic of German industrial development was the tendency towards 
cartelisation which was actively promoted by the state (Feldenkirchen 1988, p. 113- 
116). In a judgement in 1897, “the German supreme court explicitly determined that 
cartels were in the public interest and therefore enjoyed legal protection” (Jaeger 
1988, p. 112; translation A.R.). Until after WW II, cartelisation in Germany served as 
a partial substitute for full mergers, so that Germany did not see M&A waves to the 
same extent as her Anglo-Saxon counterparts.
It may be mentioned that the years up to WWI also saw the establishment of much of 
the social, legal and economic framework that remained highly influential in the inter­
war period and after WW II until today. Many of the trade associations and chambers 
were founded around the turn of the century (see Jaeger 1988, pp. 116-117). 
Economic concentration, cartelisation, and the formation of trade associations have 
been described as the basic pillars of Germany’s ‘organised capitalism’ that emerged 
between 1873 and 1914 (Jaeger 1988, pp. 107-118).
The period between the two world wars is described by Dyas and Thanheiser as one 
of consolidation and rationalisation, although James (1986, pp. 146-156) argues that
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rationalisation was confined to the automobile and the coal-mining industries. Various 
companies formed horizontal and vertical cartels, notably IG Farben (chemicals) and 
Vereinigte Stahlwerke (steel). However, Germany did not see a merger wave of the 
scale of the Anglo-Saxon countries.
German industry was deeply hit by the recession that started in 1927 (Balderston 
1993, p. 212) which led to sharply rising unemployment and thereby contributed to 
Hitler's election in 1933. Between 1933 and 1945 German industry was under the 
control of the Nazis, who favoured large-scale organisations over smaller and more 
fragmented ones (Pohl 1982, p. 100; for the war-related process o f ‘rationalisation and 
concentration’ between 1942 and 1944 in particular see Overy 1994, pp. 356-366). 
During the war, the German economy lost about 50% of its productive capacity, 
although this was due to a greater extent to the destruction of the infrastructure than to 
the destruction of plants (Jaeger 1988, p. 211).
After WW II, German industry in the zones occupied by the three Western allies was 
for several years in a state of paralysis. Economic reconstruction was helped between 
1947 and 1952 by the Marshall plan (Abelshauser 1991, p. 409; Kramer 1991, pp. 
148-156). At the same time, the allied forces broke up the German cartels. Economic 
recovery began after the German Mark had been introduced in 1948 and the Federal 
Republic of Germany had been founded in 1949. This recovery evolved into the 
‘economic miracle’ of the 1950s and 1960s (Giersch et al. 1992, Ch. 3). These two 
decades were characterised by the establishment and rapid growth of integrated mass 
producers, such as in cars, chemicals and the like, which “attempted to combine 
specialization with volume production” (Herrigel 1996, p. 153 with respect to the 
example of Daimler Benz). An important factor that allowed the adoption of 
‘American’ (Berghahn 1986, pp. 282ff.) mass production technologies was increasing 
demand due to the greater geographic scale of export markets following the 
foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) and the European 
Economic Community (1957). Herrigel (1996, Ch. 5) also argues that large German 
firms (e.g. MAN, Demag) integrated vertically to become more ‘autarkic’. However, 
others (e.g. Bosch) remained integrated in what he describes as a system of 
decentralised industrial order, in which supplies, in particular of investment goods 
(e.g. machine tools), were provided through regional networks of M ittelstand (SME) 
firms.
37
In the post-war period, German industry saw a slow increase in the number of 
mergers and acquisitions, but not at the speed experienced in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries (see Cable 1979). This slowness was not primarily due to policy restraints 
against M&As. The Act against Restraint of Competition (Gesetz gegen 
Wetibewerhsbeschrankungen), enacted in 1957, did not contain any specific 
regulations concerning M&As until its 1973 reform. Cable^° (1979, p. 5) provides 
data according to which the number of M&As increased from 15 in 1958 to just 65 in 
1968. The years from 1969 to 1971 saw a sudden increase in M&As which resembled 
the situation in the UK and the US. After that, the number of M&As receded first, but 
then increased again to reach a relatively stable number of between 450 and 650 in the 
years between 1975 and 1985. According to Cable, most of the mergers took place on 
a horizontal basis, and were heavily concentrated in particular industrial sectors 
(notably chemicals, electrical engineering, machine tools, and iron and steel), as 
opposed to the service sector. Around 12% of all M&As were conglomerate ones.
As a result of M&As and of organic growth, German companies diversified, but not 
as quickly as their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. Schwalbach (1990) tracks the 
development of 284 large industrial companies with respect to diversification. Using a 
count of 2-, 3- and 4-digit activities of companies in the German system of industry 
classifications'% he finds that diversification has increased significantly between 1950 
and 1980.
Average number of activities 
(on holding company level)
1950 1960 1970 1980
2-digit level 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1
3-digit level 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.4
4-digit level 3.7 4.3 4.9 4.9
Table 2.3: Average Number of Activities of 284 Industrial Companies 
in Germany 
Source: Adapted from Schwalbach 1990, p. 28
Table 2.3 shows that diversification has increased at about an equal rate during the 
two decades 1950-1960 and 1960-1970, but not between 1970 and 1980. With on 
average 3-4 activities on the three-digit level, Schwalbach regards German companies 
in 1980 as still not overly diversified. On the other hand, he points to a large 
divergence in the degree of diversification due to a relatively small number of 
companies which were operating in a large number of industries, notably those
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companies which had their base in chemicals (Hoechst, Bayer, BASF, Degussa) or 
steel and heavy machinery (MAN, Krupp, Linde, Brown Boveri, Deutsche Babcock, 
KHD). In the automobile industry he sees a relatively low degree of diversification (as 
o f 1980).
A direct comparison between German and British companies for the period 1950 and 
1970 is drawn by Dyas and Thanheiser (1976) who contrast their data on the largest 
German companies with Channon’s data on British firms (table 2.2).
Germany
(n=78; only German-owned firms are considered)
Year 1950 1960 1970
Single business 38% 26% 27%
Dominant business 22% 25% 15%
Related business 31% 38% 38%
Unrelated diversified 9% 12% 18%
Table 2.4: Diversification among the Largest Industrial Enterprises in Germany
Source: Dyas and Thanheiser 1976, p. 64.^ ^
Note: For an explanation of the diversification categories used here see section 4.2.2,
table 4.1.
These data suggest that while German companies started the post-war period with 
relatively diversified portfolios of activities (as compared to the British situation), 
their further diversification process was relatively slow and rather steady. The British 
companies in the sample diversified more rapidly, so that by 1970 big business in the 
UK was more diversified than German industry. The very low number of single 
business companies among British firms is particularly striking. On the other hand it 
is interesting that there were a number of highly diversified conglomerates, in 
Germany more so than in the UK at any of the three points in time.
It may be pointed out that Dyas and Thanheiser’s data do not contain those companies 
which were founded during the ‘economic miracle’ of the German post-war era, some 
of which (e.g. in the construction industry) now belong to the top 100 German 
companies. It should also be said that the industrial structure in Germany is 
characterised by the prevalence of mostly family-owned, medium-sized companies 
along with smaller craft workshops which are generally less diversified than the large 
corporations that Schwalbach and Dyas and Thanheiser investigate. Broadberry 
(1997, p. 136) provides evidence that median plant sizes in the German manufacturing 
industry have been persistently below the respective British figures.
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However, Channon's, Dyas' and Thanheiser's work permits to draw a first conclusion 
about the comparative development of diversification in German and British 
companies in the post-war period. While in British companies there was a widespread 
trend to diversify rapidly (starting at a relatively low basis of diversification), among 
German firms a ‘bifurcation’ with respect to diversification took place. A group of 
large companies diversified significantly to become conglomerates, while many other 
companies remained relatively specialised. This interpretation is consistent with 
Schwalbach's findings.
Concomitant with the relatively slow development towards greater diversification, 
organisational structures in German industry did not adopt the structure of managerial 
hierarchies as quickly as was the case in the Anglo-Saxon countries. For example, 
Dyas and Thanheiser find that German companies adopted the M-form structure more 
slowly than British companies. “Moreover, the structures which were put into place 
were less decentralised than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. German firms also 
tended to retain stronger functional hierarchies and to be run by a larger group of 
managers subject to internal checks and balances at all levels” (Gospel 1997, p. 31). 
Some of these checks and balances originated from the particular labour relations 
system that developed in Germany in the post-war period (see section 6.3.2).
To summarise, business historians including Chandler, Hannah, Channon, Dyas and 
Thanheiser and others have analysed the growth of enterprises since the late 19^ 
century in the industrialised countries. They find that the development of British and 
German companies has involved increases with respect to their boundaries as well as 
changes in their internal organisation. Changes on these two fi-onts were closely 
interrelated and involved a number of distinct characteristics, such as increasing 
horizontal scale and diversification with respect to the former dimension of corporate 
growth, and the establishment of complex administrative hierarchies with respect to 
the latter one. With respect to Anglo-German comparisons of corporate development, 
both similarities and differences are reported. British industry is found to have 
undergone a substantial concentration process, mostly through mergers and 
acquisitions, in the post-war period. In this context, companies diversified 
extensively, became more vertically integrated, and established substantial 
administrative hierarchies and large head offices. German companies had moved in 
this direction during the restructuring wave around the turn of the century, but after
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WWn were more reluctant to do so. Despite an increase in mergers and acquisitions 
at the end of the 1960s, many companies which had grown out of the M ittelstand 
remained relatively specialised and did not built up administrative hierarchies to the 
same extent as their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.
2.3 The Theoretical Perspective: The Transaction Cost Economic Approach 
to Corporate Structure
In the previous section, the development of the organisational structure of large 
companies was set out from a historical perspective, and evidence for this 
development in the UK and Germany was provided. However, the historical 
perspective does not provide a sufficient efficiency rationale for other than horizontal 
forms of integration of economic activities in firms. Chandler argues that firms 
integrated activities on a horizontal basis due to the emergence of relatively capital- 
intensive modes of production which provided economies of scale, coupled with an 
increase in geographic reach through the emergence of advanced transportation 
technologies. However, his explanation of vertical integration (as a means to avoid 
bottlenecks in production) and of diversification (through the exploitation of 
economies of scope) disregards the fact that such activities can take place through 
contracting in the market between independent parties, i.e. without necessitating 
integration within hierarchies. They can also take place in intermediate (‘hybrid’) 
modes of organisation between markets and hierarchies. Transaction cost economics 
(TCE), as developed by Coase and elaborated by Williamson, focuses on the choice 
among different governance modes for different types of transactions. Furthermore, 
although it has not yet provided a complete theory of the internal organisation of 
firms, TCE provides the tools to analyse the internal organisation of firms from an 
efficiency perspective. In the following, the general approach of TCE to the choice 
among various modes of governing contractual relations is set out first. Thereafter, 
this approach is applied to the various dimensions of firms’ boundaries and to their 
internal organisation.
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2.3.1 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)^^
The classical exposition of the transaction cost economic argument is contained in 
Coase (1937) where he considers the question why transactions are shifted out of the 
market into the institutional framework of production within firms, thereby 
supplanting the market’s price mechanism/"^ Coase defines transaction costs as the 
costs of using the price mechanism, which he sees in the costs of information (in his 
language, the costs of discovering what the relevant prices are), and the costs of 
writing (i.e. negotiating and concluding) contracts. In this way, Coase breaks with the 
neoclassical assumption of the availability of complete information at no cost, and 
introduces the notion of information asymmetries between the different parties. 
Secondly, implicit in Coase’s argument that the writing of contracts will be costly is 
the idea - albeit not clearly spelled out in the 1937 article - that contracting may suffer 
from subjective or objective limits on information or from self-interest seeking by the 
parties to an exchange. If  transaction costs were non-existent, the predictions of 
neoclassical theory would hold, and all contracts would maximise wealth regardless 
of the initial assignment of property rights (Coase 1960, pp. 15-19). In a world of non­
zero transaction costs, however, the integration of activities into firms can be more 
efficient than the use of costly transaction mechanisms in the market place. What 
checks the integration of activities into firms, then, is the cost of organising different 
activities within hierarchies. Coase (1937, p. 395) argues that “a firm will tend to 
expand until the costs of organising an extra transaction within the firm become equal 
to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open 
market or the costs of organising in another firm”.
Following Coase, Williamson (1991, p. 6) argues that the choice between different 
modes of governing contractual relationships follows cost-minimising criteria (see 
also Whittington 1993, Chs. 1-2). Less cost effective governance modes would be 
eroded over time by the pressure of competition (Williamson 1993c, pp. 27ff). He 
distinguishes between three principal governance modes: markets, hierarchies (firms), 
and hybrid forms of organisation between these two, such as networks, joint ventures 
and strategic alliances.
At the centre of the transaction cost economic approach is the notion that transactions, 
both within and among hierarchies, are costly to organise. This notion builds on three 
classes of assumptions which are discussed in turn.
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(1) Behavioural Assumptions
(a) Bounded rationality refers to the notion that human behaviour is “intendedly 
rational, but only limited so” (Simon ^1976, p. xxviii). This definition makes clear 
that bounded rationality has to be distinguished sharply from irrationality^^ which 
would obtain either if the bounds on rationality were absolute, or if the economic 
actors were not intending to behave rationally in the first place. On the other hand, 
bounded rationality marks a clear divergence from the neoclassical profit- 
maximisation assumption: While economic actors intend to maximise profits - i.e. 
they have an “economizing orientation” (Williamson 1985, p. 45) -, they are not 
always capable of doing so. Bounded rationality contributes to the difficulty of 
writing unambiguous contracts, due to which complex contractual arrangements 
are open to costly renegotiation and haggling.
(b) The notion of opportunism refers to the strategic, self-interest seeking of actors 
with guile (Williamson 1991, pp. 7f). While not all individuals may behave 
opportunistically in all instances, parties to a contract have to take into account the 
possibility that the other parties may misrepresent their intentions or even lie in an 
outright way, and that they may not honour their agreements. Ex ante and ex post 
opportunism leads to the possibility of adverse selection and moral hazard 
respectively, but also to outright cheating and stealing. The costs of information 
gathering about the true intentions of the parties to a contract, as well as of 
monitoring their performance during contract execution stage, are major elements 
of transaction costs. Opportunistic behaviour makes it particularly difficult to 
contract upon knowledge-intensive goods (e.g. patents) which suffer from 
‘information impactedness’, i.e. whose value cannot be disclosed without 
disclosing the information itself (Arrow 1970, p. 152). The danger is that the other 
party would opportunistically exploit the information gained upon disclosure 
without paying.
(2) Environmental Factors
While bounded rationality refers to cognitive, i.e. internal limits in dealing with 
information, complexitv and uncertaintv pose external limits on the ability of human 
actors to determine the full range of contingencies and the appropriate responses at 
any stage of the contracting process. While under uncertainty the full range of
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contingencies and options can simply not be generated, under complexity this range 
could be produced in principle, but doing so is prohibitively difficult (see Williamson 
1975, pp. 23ff). The argument also implies that information may be distributed 
asymmetrically across parties. While asymmetric distribution of information occurs 
frequently between the parties to an exchange in the market, it is also of major 
importance for the emergence of principal-agent conflicts within hierarchies (Arrow 
1986, pp. 1183-1195). This indicates that all of the conditions that render market 
transactions hazardous and costly also raise the costs of the internal organisation of 
economic activities in firms or in intermediate (‘hybrid’) forms of organisation.
(3) Characteristics of Contractual Relationships
(a) Asset specificitv refers to the extent to which contractual relationships require 
transaction-specific investment to be made, ranging from non-specific to 
idiosyncratic investments (Williamson 1979, pp. 240ff.). Of particular importance 
in the employment relationship is the acquisition of firm-specific skills (Becker 
^1993, pp. 40-51). In addition to such human asset specificity, Williamson (1985, 
pp. 95f.) distinguishes three other types of asset specificity;
• site specificity, proximity between different production processes economises 
on inventory and transportation costs;
• physical asset specificity, due to their physical design properties, certain goods 
have their full value only within a particular relationship;
• dedicated assets', general-purpose investments made explicitly in order to sell 
large quantities of output to a specific customer.
The particular problem associated with asset specificity -  most importantly human 
asset and site specificity - is that under such conditions the partners to a contract 
are effectively locked into their contractual relationship. Specific assets have their 
full value only within the contractual relationship into which the investment was 
made, so that a breakdown of the relationship will entail a partial or complete loss 
for at least one of the parties concerned. The party that bears the risk of being 
opportunistically exploited by the other party will ask for additional contractual 
safeguards, but these will be difficult and costly to devise, given the impossibility 
of full contingent-claims contracts in the face of uncertainty and bounded 
rationality.
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(b) Small-numbers conditions exist where the number of bidders on either side of a 
bargain is very limited. This restricts the ability of the other party to the deal to 
select the lowest cost supplier. The problem becomes severe when during the 
contract execution stage the number of bidders reduces even further, as the bidder 
who obtained the initial contract establishes a strategic advantage that is difficult 
to replicate for potential bidders in future deals. This is frequently the case where 
the current contract partner acquires information specific to the exchange 
relationship. Williamson (1985, pp. 61) calls the change in the character of the 
‘neutral’ bargaining relationship at the outset to a relationship of greater unilateral 
or mutual dependency during contract execution the ‘fundamental 
transformation’. Small-numbers conditions render opportunistic behaviour 
possible. If there were large numbers of bidders, opportunistic behaviour would 
not take place, because the opportunistic bidder would be excluded at the next 
contract renewal (Williamson 1975, p. 21)}^ However, long-term or frequently 
renewed contracts are in many cases desirable, in particular to render relationship- 
specific investments possible, but also to save the search costs resulting from 
incomplete information. Therefore, governance structures that check opportunism 
and allow for long-term contractual relationships are desirable.
(c) Transactions can also be characterised by the frequencv with which they take 
place, and by their duration. While the latter condition has already been discussed 
implicitly in the last paragraph, with respect to the former Williamson (1979, pp. 
246ff.) distinguishes between one-time, occasional and recurrent contract renewal. 
One-time contracts will usually not require any other governance mode than the 
market. Recurrent contracts, however, may require a relational governance mode 
(Kay 1993, pp. 55ff.; Williamson 1979, pp. 238ff.), as the identities of the parties 
matter to the contract. Generally, if parties transact frequently with each other, 
learning and reputation effects will decrease transaction costs; but the developing 
routine may also lead to incautious behaviour that can be exploited 
opportunistically, thus raising transaction costs. Partners to long-term contracts 
will aim at ensuring that the contracts are ‘watertight’ (i.e. that they take into 
account as many contingencies as possible), which -  ceteris paribus -  would 
imply high ex ante transaction costs. On the other hand, these costs may be 
regarded as investments which, with a certain likelihood, pay off in the form of 
lower ex post transaction costs for contract amendments and the like.
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(d) Regarded as a characteristic of contractual relationships, uncertainty and bounded 
rationality translate into the difficulty and costliness of monitoring and measuring 
the performance of contract partners. TCE argues that contractual arrangements 
will be made so as to reduce such c o s t s . I n  this vein, the new economics of 
personnel maintains that remuneration systems will be designed around those 
performance measures which are most easily and cheaply ascertained (Lazear 
1995, p. 21). Anderson and Schnittlein (1984, pp. 392ff.) find support for the 
derived hypothesis that firms are likely to integrate those particular categories of 
personnel whose performance is most difficult to measure.
Transaction costs can be conveniently divided into ex ante and ex post transaction 
costs, depending on whether they arise during contract preparation stage or after 
contract completion (Kreps 1990, pp. 743f). Another way of categorising transaction 
costs is to distinguish between external and internal transaction costs. The former 
refers to the costs of contracting between independent parties, while the latter is 
defined as the transaction costs associated with organising economic activity within 
identifiable organisational units. These costs may include the costs of supervisory 
activity, of benefits paid as motivating devices on top of the normal wage, and other 
types of agency and influence costs (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, pp. 57-89; Milgrom 
and Roberts 1992, pp. 192-194). The distinction between external and internal 
transaction costs is important to the discussion below.
2.3.2 The Boundaries of the Firm 
Vertical Integration
One of the main areas to which TCE can be applied is the extent to which firms 
integrate backward into materials procurement and supplies or forward into 
distribution, marketing, and retail, and into support activities. Decisions of this kind 
are often described as ‘make-or-buy’ decisions.
Earlier explanations of vertical integration have focused mainly on two factors. First, 
technological factors, particularly indivisibilities between two successive production 
stages, were held to render vertical integration necessary (as is the case when 
intermediate products cannot be transported to a remote stage of the production
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process) or, at least, more cost efficient than the production of the respective goods in 
two separate companies; for a critique of these explanations see Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1989, p. 66). Second, it has been argued that vertical integration serves to 
achieve a degree of monopoly power by creating barriers to entry for potential 
competitors and by allowing price discrimination policies, as analysed in the 
industrial organisation literature (for an overview see Perry 1989, pp. 190-199).
The main explanatory factor in the transaction-cost economic theory of vertical 
integration is the asset specificity of investments into successive stages of production 
under conditions of complexity, uncertainty and bounded rationality. Where 
transaction-specific investments are needed, the partners to a contract have to deal 
with the problem of lock-in due to the ‘fundamental transformation’ from large- 
numbers bargaining conditions ex ante to a relationship of mutual dependency ex 
post. The underlying difficulty consists of the complexity and costliness of writing 
contracts under conditions of uncertainty, complexity and bounded rationality. Ex­
post adaptations to a contract may not only be costly -  and the costs cannot be 
estimated ex ante - , they may even prove impossible to the satisfaction of both 
parties. TCE argues that, ceteris paribus (i.e. holding production costs constant), the 
risks associated with asset specificity may render the integration of successive stages 
of production more transaction cost efficient than their non-unified ownership. The 
relative advantage of unified ownership increases with the degree of asset specificity, 
if complexity, uncertainty and bounded rationality are taken as given. It is in 
particular site specificity and human asset specificity that call for vertical integration. 
Dedicated assets usually do not require common ownership, while physical asset 
specificity requires common ownership only if the two production stages are 
immobile (in which case the problem can be expressed in terms of site specificity). 
More formally, the costs of the three principal modes (market [M], hybrid [X], 
hierarchy [H]) of governing vertical transactions can be expressed as functions of 
asset specificity and uncertainty^® (denoted by k  and u respectively). For w=0, asset 
specificity does not raise contractual problems, as the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour by the parties to a contract would be anticipated and taken into account in 
writing the contract. Therefore, for z/=0 the governance costs of market procurement 
(Cm) would be a constant^\ For positive values of u (i.e. w>0), the governance costs of 
market procurement (Cm) are increasing in k. It is plausible to assume -  although this
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is not essential to the argument below -  that the governance costs of hybrid modes of 
organisation (Cx) and of hierarchical integration (Ch) are also positive functions of k. 
With respect to the latter governance mode, asset specificity between successive 
stages of production arguably increases the need for costly coordination within firms, 
thus raising internal transaction costs. Similarly, within hybrid modes of organisation 
(e.g. long-term supply relationships, joint ventures etc.) contract partners will also 
exert greater efforts to writing ‘watertight’ contracts, the greater the risks associated 
with the contract.
Assuming «>0, the marginal governance costs of market procurement will exceed the 
marginal co-ordination costs within hybrid modes of organisations, and these in turn 
will be greater than the marginal organisation costs in hierarchies. The reason for the 
latter inequality is that increasing co-ordination within hierarchies is less severely 
affected by self-interest seeking behaviour of the various parties (e.g. departments) 
which have little to gain, and may even lose, from contract re-negotiation. In contrast, 
in contractual relationships between independent parties lock-in due to asset 
specificity creates incentives to opportunistically alter the terms of the agreement to 
one’s own advantage, knowing that the other party cannot step out of the agreement. 
The same consideration applies to the comparison between hybrid and market modes 
of procurement. Partners to long-term contracts realise that the short-term gains from 
opportunistic behaviour will be lost when it comes to contract renewal, and that their 
contract performance is more easily observable than in a typical market relationship 
where partners are indifferent to each other. The partial derivatives with respect to k 
are therefore
X > 
Ju
dCH
dk
>0
dk
Furthermore, for completely general transactions (i.e. ^=0) market governance will be 
of relatively low cost as the spot contracts typical for market procurement require 
lower setup costs than administrative hierarchies or long-term contracts. Similarly, 
hybrid modes of governance will incur an intermediate degree of setup costs, whereas 
full integration requires substantial provisions to be made regardless of asset 
specificity. Therefore,
(2) CM(k=0, u>0) < Cy(A=0, w>0) < CH(k=0, u>0)
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F or any particular degree o f  asset specificity, the cost-efficient m ode o f  governing the 
transaction is the one for which C{k) is lowest. Graphically, the schem atic cost 
functions can be displayed as follows:
Graph 2.1:
Source:
The Costs of Market (M), Hybrid (X) and Hierarchical (H) Governance Modes 
as Functions of Asset Specificity and Uncertainty.^^
Adapted from Williamson 1991, p. 24.
To sum m arise the argument so far, if  complexity, uncertainty and bounded rationality 
are taken as given (t/>0), for low degrees o f  asset specificity (i.e. for 0 < k < k ^ ) ,  
m arket procurem ent will be the cost-efficient mode o f  governance. For interm ediate 
degrees o f  asset specificity {k^  < k  <k^),  d. hybrid mode o f  governing the contractual 
relationship will be efficient, while for high degrees o f  asset specificity ( k >  k^), full 
hierarchical integration will be optimal.
Furtherm ore, the above ceteris paribus clause (p. 47) can be resolved to  allow for the 
possibility that vertical integration may have production cost disadvantages against 
m arket procurement.^^ This may be so as a vertically integrated firm may be unable to 
exploit econom ies o f scale to the same extent as an independent supplier firm that 
pools the demand o f many buyers. On the other hand, the potential to pool the 
demand o f  several buyers decreases as the specificity o f  investm ents made into the 
relationship with a particular buyer increases. Therefore, the production cost
49
APC(A)=PCm{A)-PCh(A)
TC(A-)=Cm(A)+APC(A-)
C \i(A =() )+ A P C (A = l) )-
( îra p h  2.2; l’otaî Cost Kiinction l'C(A:)=Cvi(A:)+APC(A:)
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advantage (APQ of an independent supplier as against an integrated firm decreases 
with an increase in asset specificity (A). Aggregating the transaction and production 
cost functions of market procurement means that the resulting total cost curve 
TC{k) = Cj^{k) + M^C(k) will, for any particular value of k, be lower than Cw(A:) on 
its own, which shifts the degree of asset specificity up to which market procurement is 
cost efficient fi*om kj to a higher level k2 (graph 2.2).
Considering the transaction and the production cost effects of asset specificity jointly, 
it becomes clear that for high degrees of asset specificity { k >k ^ )  the potential cost
advantages of non-integrated production will not be enough to outweigh the 
transaction cost savings of integration. For low degrees of asset specificity - for 
example for standardised goods - the reverse is true, and the preferential mode of 
procurement is through market contracting. Intermediate degrees of asset specificity, 
around which the decision between the two modes of production is indeterminate, 
often make hybrid forms of organisations the most cost efficient modes of 
governance.
In sum, the degree of vertical integration can be analysed on the basis of joint 
consideration of transaction and production costs.
Diversification
In section 2.2.1, diversification was described as one of the main features of the 
growth of large companies since the late 19^ century. Traditionally, it has been 
argued that a crucial rationale for diversification consists of its risk-reducing effects 
through hedging (e.g. Ela 1982, pp. 21-24; Clarke 1985b, pp. 209-212). However, this 
argument does not represent an efficiency-based explanation of diversification. 
Investors can diversify their portfolios much more easily than firms (see Donaldson 
1994, Ch. 1). In addition, risk pooling raises the possibility of moral hazard by 
managers (Bhide 1990, p. 72).
An efficiency-based rationale for diversification must turn on svnergistic effects 
among two or more production processes (or among the production factors involved 
therein), so that their joint operation in an integrated firm is more efficient than their
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separate operation. In the following, two distinct sources of synergies are analysed 
with respect to their transaction-cost economic properties.
(1) Scale-effect Based Synergies: Seal e-effect based synergies among two or 
more production processes arise where the joint operation of these production 
processes allows to exploit economies of scale of the production factors involved to a 
fuller extent than their separate operation. For this to occur, the production processes 
concerned must share in the use of at least one input factor (Besanko et al. 1996, pp. 
242ff.). However, this condition on its own is not a sufficient rationale for 
diversification, as under perfect market conditions excess capacity in any factor could 
be sold freely in the market. Firms with shareable resources would sell surplus 
capacity in these resources to those other firms that could make the most efficient use 
of them. On the other hand, this may be difficult or impossible for firms which own 
assets
• that they cannot fully exploit profitably within their primary business line (Amit 
and Livnat 1988, p. 593);
and
• the excess capacity of which is not perfectly tradable due to market imperfections. 
This is most likely in the case of knowledge-intensive assets (e.g. research and 
development capabilities), which are hard to trade due to the problem of 
information impactedness.
Through the exploitation of such ‘synergistic’ factors across several production 
processes, firms can decrease their average costs, so that Besanko et al. (1996, p. 205) 
describe synergies among businesses as “economies of scale waiting to be 
exploited”.
In order for production processes to share in the use of particular resources, the 
businesses concerned must be interrelated. Porter (1985, pp. 323-325) distinguishes 
between tangible interrelationships (e.g. shared use of distribution channels, as in 
Scott 1993, pp. 14-18), intangible interrelationships where managerial knowledge is 
transferred across production processes, and competitor interrelationships. If excess 
capacities in assets that give rise to such interrelationships are difficult and costly to
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contract upon, firms may decide to integrate the activities in which they can be 
exploited, if the gains from doing so exceed the costs as detailed below.
The further a firm diversifies away from its initial ‘core’ business, the less tangible 
the relationships between its various businesses.^® Therefore, ceteris paribus^ the 
marginal returns to diversification decrease the further a firm diversifies afield from 
its existing business(es) (Montgomery and Wemerfelt 1988, pp. 623-632 and 
Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988, pp. 246-250). In the extreme case of completely 
unrelated (conglomerate) diversification, a firm can only exploit particular managerial 
skills across its diverse business lines. Williamson (1975, Ch. 9) analyses the 
advantage conglomerate firms have over external investors in running an internal 
capital market. This advantage does not primarily consist of consulting services that 
head office managers might provide to their operating units, but rather of their 
superior information that allows them to allocate capital efficiently, to provide 
appropriate incentives, and to adopt incremental solutions to problems as they arise. 
In contrast, the controlling function of the external capital market through board 
replacement and takeover involves significant displacement costs, often comes late, 
and causes substantial disruptions in the operations of the firm concerned. The 
transaction-cost economic rationale for conglomerate diversification consists, 
therefore, of capital market imperfections due to the difficulties associated with the 
trading of managerial information.
(2) Superadditivitv Based Svnergies: Synergies between two production processes 
also arise where at least one of the production factors involved raises the productivity 
of at least one other production factor involved in the other production process. More 
often, two production factors across different production processes are mutually 
productivity-enhancing. For example, the co-existence of two research teams in a 
company may be productivity-enhancing for both of them even if the two teams work 
on distinctly different projects, so that no exchange of directly applicable information 
takes place. This may occur where the existence of research teams gives rise to a 
particular ‘atmosphere’ which positively affects the motivation of other researchers, 
or where the two research teams vie for the fastest output of results (reputation and 
internal competition effects). Similar examples can be provided for the co-existence 
o f several management teams within organisations.
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The transaction-cost economic rationale for the integration of production processes 
which involve factors with such synergistic properties is that integration allows to 
internalise their externalities in form of productivity-enhancing spillover effects. 
Contracting upon such effects -  the alternative to integration - is extremely difficult 
for the following reasons. Ex ante^ limited foresight - due to uncertainty and bounded 
rationality - means that it is difficult to anticipate the emergence of such effects, or to 
estimate their value if their emergence is to be expected. Ex post, it is difficult to 
check the potentially opportunistic behaviour of contract partners who have benefited 
from such spillover effects, and may walk away without having paid an adequate 
compensation.
Against the potential benefits of diversification that may arise from either of the two 
sources of synergies outlined above, the disadvantages and costs of diversification 
have to be weighed. These costs arise firstly from the inefficiencies and internal 
transaction costs involved in the build-up of large organisations with extended 
managerial hierarchies: “The optimal level of product diversity is that which balances 
economies of scope with diseconomies of organizational scale” (Rumelt 1982, p.
363). Secondly, diversification strategies involve the danger of neglecting or diluting 
the firm’s ‘core competencies’ (Prahalad and Hamel 1990, pp. 79-91), if such 
strategies afford investments into secondary activities which are unrelated to the 
firm’s existing business lines. Thirdly, the co-existence of diverse production 
processes may lead to negative externalities, in which case the productivity of at least 
one production factor is diminished by another production factor involved in the other 
production process. For example, low productivity of a small research team may go 
undetected as managerial attention is focused on the superior productivity of a larger 
research team in the same organisation.
Empirically, the performance effects of diversification appear to be poor. Rumelt 
(1974) was early to caution against unrelated diversification (see also Rotemberg and 
Saloner 1994, p. 1347), while more recently Schiile (1992, pp. 160-163) has provided 
a meta-analysis of 43 empirical studies on diversification, finding no clear 
relationship between diversification and corporate performance. Markides (1995, Chs. 
2 and 7) suggests that for managerial reasons firms have often diversified beyond 
what he terms their ‘optimal degree of diversification’. Porter (1985, pp. 352f.)
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concludes that many “intangible interrelationships are forced, and represent more of 
an ex post rationalization of diversification moves undertaken for other reasons. [...] 
The difficulty of finding and implementing significant intangible interrelationships is 
one of the reasons synergy proved such a disappointment to many firms”.
The Geographic Boundaries of Firms
As with vertical integration, a purely historical perspective on the development of 
large firms does not provide a sufficient rationale for the increase in geographic 
boundaries of firms through the spread of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Firms 
can exploit country-specific advantages, such as low factor prices due to resource 
endowments (Ricardo [1817] 1973, Ch. 7), and capture the additional demand in such 
countries through trade, i.e. contracting, without establishing foreign subsidiaries. 
However, geographic integration can offer transaction cost advantages if  such 
contracting is hazardous or costly. The general idea is that firms will opt for 
integration across geographic boundaries if the associated transaction cost savings 
exceed the costs of integration. These costs consist of capital outlays for the 
establishment of foreign subsidiaries and the costs of the MNE’s internal organisation 
(control costs^^, costs resulting from the internal transfer of knowledge, etc.), as Hill 
and Kim (1988, pp. 93-104) argue. Following Caves (^1996, Ch. 1 and 3), this general 
idea can be applied to horizontal integration as well as to vertical integration and to 
diversification across geographic boundaries:
• Firms may horizontally integrate across geographic boundaries in order to 
exploit their proprietary assets as fully as possible. Proprietary assets are firm- 
specific assets that are difficult to contract upon, such as patents or brand names 
and intangible assets such as information and organisational routines (Nelson and 
Winter 1982, Ch. 5). The latter assets in particular suffer from information 
impactedness as described above. Contracts regarding the sale or lease of 
proprietary assets may be difficult to enforce and to monitor. In the face of such 
contractual difficulties, companies may decide to establish subsidiaries in foreign 
countries if the gains from exploiting their proprietary assets internally exceed the 
costs of geographic integration.
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• Firms may vertically integrate across geographic boundaries if the market for the 
intermediate good concerned is imperfect, for example in situations where 
contractual relationships with local suppliers or buyers would afford transaction- 
specific investments. Such situations can be analysed in the framework set out 
above, bearing in mind that in an international context the transaction costs of 
contracting may be particularly high (due to differences in languages^^, culture, 
national regulations and policies^^ etc.). On the other hand, such factors can also 
raise the costs of the internal organisation of MNEs. TCE does not neglect the fact 
that vertical integration may be favoured by location-specific advantages of 
foreign countries (e.g. low labour costs, etc.), but points out that for those factors 
to lead to integration, the alternative way of exploiting them (i.e. through 
contracting) must be beset by particular contractual difficulties.
• Firms may integrate diverse activities across geographic boundaries so as to 
exploit synergies among their various businesses if the particular assets that 
benefit these businesses are not or only imperfectly tradable. One such asset could 
consist of a firm’s superior managerial skills that allow it to run an internal capital 
market more efficiently than the external capital market. Caves (^1996, pp. 19ff.) 
also discusses the possibility of spreading risk through diversification across 
geographic boundaries.
In sum, the expansion of the geographic dimension of the boundaries of firms has to 
take into account the combination of firm- or ownership-specific advantages, which 
can be difficult and costly to contract upon, and the location- or country-specific 
advantages to which geographic expansion may give access. If  the transaction cost 
savings of internalising its firm-specific advantages between the home and the host 
country concerned exceed the costs of such integration, it is efficient for firms to 
extend their geographic boundaries to foreign countries (Dunning 1993a, p. 53).
H ybrid Forms o f Organisation
It has already been pointed out above that transactions can be carried out not only 
through market-mediated and strictly hierarchical relationships, but also through 
hvbrid forms of organisation. TCE permits to identify the extent to which firms 
engage in such hybrid modes of governing contractual relationships as a further aspect
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of their boundaries. In doing so, account is taken of the fact that the boundaries of 
organisations are becoming increasingly blurred.
Hybrid forms of organisation refer to commercial relationships among a limited 
number of independent organisations that are of a less formal, more open-ended and 
more stable character than pure market relationships, yet do not amount to full 
integration. Prototypes of such hybrids include inter-firm networks such as the 
Japanese and keiretsu (Gerlach 1992, Ch. 3; Ouchi 1981, pp. 17-22; Sethi et
al. 1984, pp. 21f.) and other supplier networks (Fruin 1994, Ch. 7), joint ventures 
(Hennart 1988, pp. 361-374) and strategic alliances (Bleeke et al. 1992, pp. 103-125; 
Henzler 1993, pp. 330-338).^° Drawing on the example of the inter-relationships 
between small manufacturing companies in Northern Italy^\ Powell (1991, pp. 265- 
276) argues that in networks, the relationships among the constituent firms are 
informal and open-ended. While any particular transaction is completed upon 
fulfilment of the respective contractual obligations between the parties, the 
relationship itself does not terminate with the transaction. Parties contract repeatedly 
with each other, and adapt to the others’ demands and preferences, thus deepening 
their relationship. While the relationships in a network allow for an occasional change 
of contractual partners, competitive bidding does not take place. Reputation, rather 
than the courts (as in the market) or the administrative fia t (as in the hierarchy) has 
authoritative power which helps resolve conflicts. Drawing on Granovetter (1985, pp. 
488ff), Powell (1991, pp. 265-276) and Casson and Cox (1997, pp. 177-180) argue 
that the reciprocity of relationships that characterises networks is underpinned by trust 
among the partners.^^
The rationale underlying hybrid modes of organisations can be analysed more 
succinctly using the example of joint ventures and strategic alliances. Sieker (1997, 
pp. Iff.) distinguishes between
• contractual jo in t venture: a wide array of joint undertakings by two or more 
partners, involving the fulfilling of the contractual obligations laid down in formal 
or informal contracts, without the foundation of an independent entity (example: 
franchising agreements).
• equity jo in t venture: the setting-up of a legally independent entity, in which two or 
more joint venture partners have an at least controlling ownership stake. While the
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legal structure of equity joint ventures generally simplifies the distribution of 
profits, the transaction cost economic analysis outlined below applies to both 
equity and contractual joint ventures.
The term ‘strategic alliance’ is used primarily for informal arrangements between 
companies, without a clear distinction to either type of joint venture. Inter-firm 
alignments may often start as strategic alliances, for example in an agreement to share 
in the results of research efforts, and then evolve into a more formal relationship of a 
joint venture.
The transaction cost economic rationale for the establishment of joint ventures is that 
they permit “to bypass inefficient markets for intermediate inputs” (Hennart 1988, p.
364), while simultaneously avoiding the problems inherent in full-scale integration. 
With respect to the avoidance of market failure, joint ventures are the more likely to 
be advantageous the more difficult it is to contract upon the input concerned. As 
discussed above, the difficulties associated with contracting are particularly great with 
respect to intangible goods (e.g. brand names) and knowledge-intensive goods that 
suffer from information impactedness.^^ On the other hand, joint ventures retain at 
least a greater part of the incentive intensity of market transactions that is lost in 
hierarchies, and therefore have lower governance costs (in terms o f losses due to 
bureaucratic inefficiencies) than the full integration of activities via merger. At the 
same time, they allow for more transaction-specific investments to be made than pure 
market transactions, as the risk of opportunistic exploitation of the weaker by the 
stronger party is alleviated in agreements which are struck in the expectation that (a) 
the undertaking will be of mutual benefit and (b) the venture will continue (Kay 1993, 
pp. 34ff). However, hybrid modes of organisation do not support large, highly 
transaction-specific investments, as in this case the gain to one party from 
opportunistically exploiting the dependence of the party that has made the 
investments is likely to exceed its loss from the resulting breakdown of the agreement.
In sum, TCE shows that, in analysing the ‘boundaries’ of firms, account has to be 
taken of the fact that transactions can be mediated not only through markets and full- 
scale hierarchies, but also through hybrid forms of governing contractual 
relationships. TCE argues that such hybrid forms will be chosen if the nature of the 
underlying relationship renders them the efficient mode of organising the transactions
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concerned. Table 2.5 summarises some crucial characteristics of contractual 
relationships and relates them to the market, hybrid and hierarchical modes of 
governance.
Maiicet Hybrid (e.g. joint 
venture)
Hierarchy
Duration of 
relationship
Limited (until contractual 
obligations are fulfilled)
Variable, although 
termination of joint 
venture should be 
planned at the outset
Open-ended; depending 
on human asset 
specificity and the extent 
to which ‘exit’ solutions 
to conflicts are mitigated 
through the existence of 
appropriate ‘voice 
mechanisms’^ '’
Degree to which 
contractual 
rights and 
obligations are 
specified ex ante
As fiilly (explicitly) as 
possible in order to avoid 
post-contractual 
problems
Medium: joint venture 
contracts should be 
flexible enough to take 
account of new 
developments, but in 
principle have attractive 
adaptability properties 
(Williamson 1993c, p. 
23)
Low; contracts are 
implicit rather than 
explicit; ‘content’ of a 
contract develops 
throughout the 
relationship
Identity of the 
parties to the 
exchange
Does not matter; prices 
alone are decisive
Does matter, as 
contingencies during the 
lifetime of the joint 
venture caimot be fully 
anticipated
Does matter, as 
contingencies during the 
employment relationship 
can hardly be anticipated
Administrative 
co-ordination 
and control of 
transactions 
(Williamson 
1993c, p. 23)
Low (co-ordination is 
through prices)
Medium (higher in 
equity joint ventures than 
in contractual joint 
ventures)
High
Asset specificity 
supported by the 
relationship
Low Medium High
Conflict
resolution
mechanism
Appeal to court or 
private re-negotiation
Private re-negotiation; 
appeal to the court only 
as an ultimate resort
Authority /
administrative fiat within 
a ‘zone of indifference’ 
(Barnard 1938, Ch. 12)
Table 2.5: Characteristics of Contractual Relationships in Relation to the Market, Hybrid
and Hierarchical Modes of Governance
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2.3.3 The Internal Organisation of Firms
TCE adopts a 'comparative contracting perspective’ (Williamson and Bercovitz 1995, 
pp. 7fF.) in that it examines, on the basis of their cost properties, the various 
contractual arrangements through which transactions can be carried out. This 
efficiency-oriented approach can be applied not only to decisions regarding the 
boundaries of firms, but also to decisions regarding the organisation structures within 
hierarchies. TCE analyses particular structural features of large firms as mechanisms 
to minimise internal transaction costs, arguing that, ceteris paribus, more cost- 
efficient arrangements will outstay less cost-efficient ones in competitive markets 
(‘weak-form selection’; see Williamson 1988, p. 573, following Simon 1983, p. 69). 
In the following, the reasons underlying the emergence of internal transaction costs 
are analysed firsts. Second, particular organisational arrangements are examined as 
responses to these inefficiencies.
TCE regards bounded rationality in particular, but also uncertainty and information 
impactedness, as the fundamental reasons for the existence of internal (i.e. intra- 
organisational) transaction costs. Due to these factors, communication processes 
between human agents involve distortion and loss of information. Time and effort is 
required to ensure that communication partners are well-informed about tasks, 
expectations, and standards, thus raising the costs of information and co-ordination. 
Bounded rationality also involves the ‘forgetful nature’ of humans, so that 
information needs regular updating. In the absence of complete information, 
information asymmetries can be exploited opportunistically. In order to limit such 
opportunistic behaviour, organisations incur costs for monitoring and sanctioning 
(punishing undesirable and rewarding desirable) behaviour. Williamson regards 
organisational structures as arrangements that emerge in order to minimise the costs 
of co-ordination, information transmission, monitoring and sanctioning behaviour 
within organisations.
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Complex Organisational Forms: Multiple Layers and the Span of Control
With the growth of large firms, as described by Chandler and others (section 2.2), the 
development of differentiated organisational structures was required that would allow 
to manage the increasing complexity of large firms in a cost-efficient way. As a 
starting point, Williamson (1975, Ch. 3) analyses the peer group (team) as a simple 
organisational form, out of which more complex organisational arrangements 
evolved. He regards teams as groups of human actors assembled for the purpose of 
collective activity, in which the members co-ordinate their actions amongst 
themselves without recourse to a common authority (figure 2.1). In comparison with 
markets, such groups (and the more complex organisational arrangements as 
described below) have several advantages. First, they allow for specialisation through 
the division of labour, without incurring the difficulties and costs of market 
contracting upon specialised knowledge and skills (e.g. lock-in that gives rise to 
opportunistic exploitation, etc.). Second, they make it possible to extract the gains 
from joint production (e.g. through higher productivity due to involvement in a 
group). Third, they help overcome the problem of indivisibilities, in particular the 
indivisibility of information, and thereby allow scale economies to be exploited. 
Fourth, for their members, they represent an insurance against risk.
On the other hand, given bounded rationality, the size of such teams is limited by the 
complexity of co-ordinating with multiple members and the distortion or loss of the 
information transmitted (which can be expressed in cost terms). The complexity of 
co-ordination in groups with n members is an exponentially increasing function of n, 
as the number of two-way communication channels between the team members is 
given by the formula ViirP'-n) (see Williamson 1975, p. 46; Besanko et al. 1996, p. 
663). Under bounded rationality, the ability of human actors to cope with complexity 
is limited. This places a finite, and relatively low, limit upon the size of organisations 
without a co-ordinating authority. More advanced structural features of organisations 
can be understood as means to overcome these limitations, if larger organisations are 
warranted for other reasons (e.g. economies of scale, etc.).
In simple hierarchies, co-ordination of activities is carried out from a single 
organisational centre (figure 2.2). If this is represented by the wth member of the 
organisation, the number of communication channels within the organisation is
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Figure 2.1: Schematic 
Model of a Team with 
Four Members
Layer 2
Layer 1
Span of control
Figure 2.2: Schematic Model of a 
Simple Hierarchy
Layer 3
Layer 2 G G
Layer 1
Figure 2.3: Schematic Model of a Complex Hierarchy
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{n - 1) All members except the wth one have to handle just one communication 
channel. Moreover, whereas the team as described above is not differentiated 
vertically by lavers. in the simple hierarchy^^ two layers (the higher one on which the 
wth member of the organisation is based, and the lower one where all other members 
are located), can be distinguished.
The progression from simple hierarchies to progressively more complex hierarchical 
arrangements is due to the limitation of the span of control of the co-ordinating (i.e. 
supervising, advising, arranging) organisational member(s). The term ‘span of 
control’ is defined as the number of units or the amount of resources over which any 
superior unit has control. The span of control is often expressed in terms of the 
number of subordinates reporting directly to their immediate super-ordinate (Blau and 
Schonherr 1971, p. 16; Robbins ^1990, pp. 87ff), although other expressions can 
validly be defined.^^
Bounded rationality means that any communication or co-ordination process between 
human actors involves a certain amount of control loss. As the number of units (e.g. 
workers) under the supervision of a super-ordinate increases, the problem of control 
loss becomes increasingly more acute. At a particular size threshold, the cost 
equivalent of the control loss incurred by a supervisor will outweigh the cost of 
employing an additional supervisor. As a result, the upper layer of the two-layer 
organisation will be staffed with several super-ordinates whose task it is to supervise 
their subordinates (vertical activity), but also to co-ordinate their own activities 
among their peers (horizontal activity). As the number of supervisors to be cost- 
efficiently employed increases progressively with organisation size, the activities of 
the supervisors themselves have to be co-ordinated and monitored. In consequence, 
further layers of management will be added, thus leading to the emergence of 
complex hierarchies (figure 2.3). Consequently, with increasing size organisations 
become increasingly vertically differentiated, although, as Blau and Schonherr (1971, 
Ch. 3) show, the rate o f increase in vertical differentiation declines with increasing 
organisational size.
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As stated above, complex hierarchies emerge as a result of the fact that the span of 
control of any individual is limited, due to the underlying problems of bounded 
rationality and uncertainty. The control loss that occurs when information is 
transferred from one layer of an organisation to another one can be reduced by 
narrowing the span of control of super-ordinates. However, at a given number of 
subordinates on the lowest level (/=1) of the organisation, the narrower the spans of 
control of the super-ordinates at level /=2, the greater the number of super-ordinates 
whose actions have to be co-ordinated and monitored in turn. This means that, ceteris 
paribus, the more managerial layers have to be added the smaller the span of control. 
The result is an inverse relationship between the span of control and the ‘depth’ of 
organisations, the latter referring to the number of managerial layers. Assuming a 
constant span of control (S) for all superiors in an organisation, the relationship 
between total organisational size (N), depth (L) and S  is given by the formula
i=L
S ’- - '
i=\
While the control loss occurring in any particular subordinate -  super-ordinate 
relationship could be minimised by narrowing the span of control of the super­
ordinate concerned, several factors make it disadvantageous to increase the number of 
layers in an organisation:
• First, the employment of managers as supervisors incurs direct costs. Supervisors, 
together with other administrative staff, belong to the ‘administrative component’ 
of organisations, which in many companies represents a substantial proportion of 
overhead costs.
• Second, control loss within hierarchies increases as information passes through 
the various organisational layers.Therefore, the total control loss incurred in an 
organisation is a positive function of the number of its layers.
Therefore, if organisation size is taken as given, a cost-efficient balance has to be 
struck between the span of control and the depth of an organisation. TCE-based 
organisation theory identifies the span of control and the number of hierarchical layers 
as crucial descriptors of organisations, arguing that the balance between these two 
parameters, ceteris paribus, can be analysed on the basis of efficiency considerations.
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Centralisation and Decentralisation
The development of large and complex organisations as described above entails the 
centralisation of co-ordination and decision-making authority in the hands of a super­
ordinate unit (e.g. chief executive), as compared to team arrangements without such a 
central authority. However, hierarchically organised firms differ widely with respect 
to the degree to which decision-making authority is devolved down the organisational 
hierarchy (decentralisation^^  of decision-making) or held closely at the top unit of the 
organisation (centralisation: see Pugh ^^ 1997, p. 18). TCE argues that efficiency 
criteria should be the basis upon which the degree of decentralisation in organisations 
is decided. Both centralisation and decentralisation have particular (dis-)advantages so 
that an optimal balance between the two has to be struck in order to maximise 
efficiency.
With respect to the centralisation of authority, its particular advantage lies in the 
coherence, efficiency, consistency and speed of the decisions made. The general 
advantage of hierarchies over groups in which decision-making takes place on the 
basis of constant bargaining processes among members is that hierarchical authority 
(administrative fla f^  within a ‘zone of indifference’; Barnard 1938, pp. 167ff; Simon 
1951, pp. 293-305; Williamson 1975, p. 101; Williamson 1993d, p. 8) avoids the 
inefficiencies of such bargaining and co-ordination processes. In the face of the 
comparative efficiency of hierarchy over bargaining, the question arises how 
hierarchical solutions can be implemented and what characteristics they should take. 
According to Arrow’s ‘impossibility theorem’ no non-dictatorial governance 
mechanism fulfils simultaneously all of the following minimally desirable 
characteristics of social choice that he identifies:
• Transitivity of preferences;
• Independence of any decision made from irrelevant alternatives;
• Pareto optimality;
• ‘Universal domain’ (i.e. any decision made through the social choice mechanism 
should be defined for any set of individual preferences) (Miller 1992, pp. 63-64).
Only a central authority (a ‘dictator’) can guarantee that hierarchical decisions are 
simultaneously unambiguous, non-contradictory, universally applicable, and efficient.
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As an example for the potential deficiencies of other social choice mechanisms. 
Miller (1992, pp. 60-62) points to the emergence of majority rule cycles in 
‘democratic’ (voting-based) systems.
Against the advantage of centralising hierarchical authority in terms o f decision­
making efficiency, one has to weigh the factual limitation of the decision-making 
ability of central authorities in the face of bounded rationality, complexity, and 
information incompleteness (see Hayek [1948, pp. 77-86] with emphasis on the latter 
factor, whereas Williamson and Bercovitz [1995, p. 7] focus on bounded rationality). 
The larger and the more complex an organisation, and the more varied the decisions 
to be made, the greater the need of the decision-making authority to rely on specialist 
expertise. Such expertise is required not only for the provision of factual knowledge 
(i.e. to counteract the problem of information incompleteness), but also for the 
handling of the decision-making process itself (i.e. to counteract bounded rationality). 
As a result, the growth and complexity of large organisations renders the 
decentralisation and delegation of decision-making authority necessary, so as to reap 
the efficiency gains of specialisation.
The behavioural literature (e.g. Morgan 1986, pp. 16If.) emphasises the notion that 
moves to centralise or decentralise decision-making in organisations represent power 
shifts which are effective only if backed by the transfer of resources as the sources of 
power. An important source of power in organisations consists of access to and 
control over financial resources. Shifts in the degree of autonomy o f middle managers 
in relation to the central office can therefore be expressed in terms of changes in the 
degree of discretion in financial matters that these managers have. The corresponding 
question in the questionnaire survey (section 3.3.10) is phrased along these lines.
H ead Office Size and Functions
In order to strike an optimal balance between the conflicting needs for centralisation 
and decentralisation of decision-making, firms also have to decide which particular 
functions they carry out from the corporate centre and which ones in the operating 
units or on some intermediate level (e.g. the division) between these two. Historically, 
the adoption of functional (U-form) organisation structures around the turn of the 
century represented a step towards greater decentralisation in the form of 
departmentalisation (Jennergren 1986, pp. 4 Iff), as compared to earlier arrangements
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where supervision and control had been exercised immediately by owner-managers 
(Chandler 1977, p. 3; Edwards 1979, pp. 25-27). While overall control in the U-form 
remained firmly with the head office, departmental managers received some 
autonomy with respect to issues such as the composition of teams within their 
departments. The close involvement of departmental managers in the day-to-day 
running of their functions also gave them specialist functional expertise on which 
head offices could draw. From an efficiency perspective, the advantage of the U-form 
structure as compared to earlier arrangements consists of the informational economies 
of scale that arise from pooling specialised functional knowledge. However, decisions 
with financial implications, as well as co-ordination and supervision of departmental 
activities, remained firmly in the hands of the head office.
Against this organisational set-up, the multidivisional structure (M-form) that 
emerged from the late 1920s onwards as a result of information overload due to 
increased corporate size and diversification (section 2.2) represented a further step 
towards decentralisation (Miller 1992, pp. 85f). Divisions and their managers 
received their own budgetary control, as well as autonomy with regards to the day-to- 
day operating decisions.
With the emergence of (semi-) autonomous units such as divisions in the M-form and 
independent subsidiaries in the H-form, but even of further developed organisational 
structures such as matrices (Besanko et al. 1996, pp. 675ff.), the question of which 
services should be carried out at the organisational centre and which ones at 
decentralised levels becomes more acute. From an economic perspective, the 
‘bundling’ of particular functions in head offices aims at alleviating the following 
inefficiencies that accompany the growth of large enterprises.
(1) The degree of incentive intensity tends to diminish with an increase in 
organisational size and complexity and with the degree to which an organisation 
is isolated from market pressures. This is because organisational hierarchies 
replace the high-powered incentive mechanisms of the market with hierarchically 
structured incentive schemes with a relatively low degree of flexibility 
(Williamson 1975, pp. 129-131). For example, high rewards for low-level staff 
are limited to the extent that they threaten the status of upper-level managers.
(2) In extended corporate hierarchies inefficiencies arise due to sub-goal (‘partisan’) 
behaviour by organisational sub-units, a form of opportunistic behaviour
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(Williamson 1975, pp. 125ff.), which - in the absence of costly control 
mechanisms - goes unchecked.
(3) As a result of bounded rationality, managers who are involved in operating 
activities face capacity constraints with respect to fonctions and decision-making 
processes which concern the organisation as a whole, such as strategy-making 
and planning (Williamson 1971, pp. 358ff).
(4) The creation of particular fonctions at sub-unit level (e.g. of departmental finance 
fonctions) in situations where other sub-units also require these fonctional 
services leads either to an inefficient duplication of these functions, so that 
potential economies of scale are not exploited, or to the need to cut across 
established organisational structures (Besanko et al. 1996, p. 670), thus leading to 
problems such as miscommunication, lack of unambiguous points of 
responsibility, and so on.
As a possible (albeit imperfect) solution to these inefficiencies, companies can assign 
particular managerial functions, e.g. strategy-making, financial control etc. to a group 
of managers who receive a superior position in horizontal and, more importantly, 
vertical respects. Furthermore, they are given an ‘elite’ staff charged with providing 
the information and the administrative resources necessary for an effective 
performance of the functions of the head office thereby created. Employees in the 
head office do not take on operational duties, so that the capacity constraints faced by 
operating staff can be circumvented, if head offices are staffed appropriately (problem 
3). Also, head office employees are unlikely to engage in partisan behaviour in favour 
of particular operations, thereby addressing the problem (2) of sub-goal pursuit by 
operative staff. They may, however, engage in sub-goal behaviour in favour of their 
own functions, leading to ‘blown-up’ head offices. Third, monitoring and control 
functions of head offices, if backed by the ability to reward performance and sanction 
failure, and if combined with appropriate organisational structures, can help reduce 
the problem (1) of low incentive intensity. In order to do so effectively, the head 
office can act as an internal capital market, allocating resources to those units that 
engage in behaviour most closely resembling profit-maximising principles. In this 
way, head offices can use their information advantage to bypass the transaction-cost 
economic problem of information impactedness and uncertainty that hinders the 
external capital market from allocating resources most efficiently.'*^ This is achieved 
most effectively if the operating units act in a quasi-autonomous way (regardless of
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whether they are called ‘profit centres’ or else), and if inter-organisational transfers 
are organised on the basis of market principles, thus avoiding internal subsidisation. 
The organisation then ‘mimics’ the market with its superior degree of intensive 
intensity. Fourth, the establishment of exclusive head office functions circumvents the 
problem (4) of the duplication of fonctions on sub-unit level and provides for the 
creation of scale-effect based synergies (section 2.3.2). It also implies the horizontal 
division of labour among managers, thereby capturing the efficiency advantages of 
specialisation.
Against the ‘positive’, inefficiency-reducing effects of head office management, their 
disadvantages and deficiencies have to be balanced. First of all, their direct costs have 
to be taken into account. This problem is particularly severe in that it is difficult to 
subject head office management to checks and balances from within the organisation, 
so that head offices can become the realm of ‘managerial empires’ with resulting 
agency costs (section 6.2.1), unless checked by the external (product and / or capital) 
markets. Secondly, the creation of a head office that is hierarchically superior to the 
operating units implies the addition of a further layer of management, which is 
accompanied by information and control loss as discussed above. This problem 
impedes the effective performance of the functions with which the head office is 
charged. It can be alleviated by reducing the span of control of head office managers. 
This, however, leads to additional head office staff and, beyond a certain size 
threshold, the hierarchical differentiation of the head office structure itself. Finally, 
while head office management can help reduce particular transaction costs that may 
occur in its absence (e.g. the costs of market information), it cannot solve the problem 
completely. For example, the allocation of resources and the provision of incentives in 
internal capital markets cannot be folly efficient as long as bounded rationality, 
uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour within organisations exist. Head office 
management cannot folly solve the agency problems that led to its creation in the first 
place.
To summarise the argument so far, the formation of head offices with distinct 
functions results from the size and complexity of modern industrial enterprise. 
Whether particular fonctions should be centralised at head office level, or carried out 
by lower-level organisational units, or whether organisations should be structured 
(e.g. limited in size) so as to avoid the need for the functions concerned, should be 
decided on the basis of efficiency criteria.
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In section 2.3.3, the principles of transaction cost economics have been applied to the 
internal organisation of firms. It should be pointed out that particular structural 
arrangements primarily serve the purpose of limiting or reducing the inefficiencies 
that accompany organisation size and complexity, which have to be weighed against 
the advantages that may arise from the integration of activities in hierarchies as 
analysed in section 2.3.2. In accordance with Coase’s (1937, p. 395) above-quoted 
dictum, the optimal shape"*^  of the organisation balances the transaction cost effects of 
integration against the transaction cost effects of internal organisation.
2.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, an overview of two approaches to corporate structure has been 
presented. In section 2.2, the historical perspective on the development of large 
industrial enterprise, as conceived by Chandler and by business historians in his 
tradition was outlined, and empirical findings on the UK and West Germany were 
detailed. In section 2.3, the transaction-cost theoretic approach to corporate structure 
was summarised. The two approaches are seen to inform each other.
Both in the historical and in the transaction-cost theoretic perspective, two key 
dimensions of corporate structure are identified: The boundaries of firms and their 
internal organisation. In the discussion of this chapter, the following major elements 
of these two dimensions are developed:
(a) Boundaries of the firm:
• Horizontal integration
• Vertical integration
• Diversification
• Integration of activities across geographic boundaries
• The degree to which a firm engages in hybrid modes of organisation (e.g. joint 
ventures and strategic alliances)"^
(b) Internal organisation of the firm:
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• Organisational complexity, e.g. through the division between operative and 
professional administrative staff (‘administrative component’)
• Vertical (or hierarchical) differentiation, e.g. through a multiplicity of 
managerial layers, and the establishment of head office management superior 
to the operating units of organisations
• Horizontal differentiation through managerial specialisation, e.g. build-up of 
specialised head office functions
• Span of control of super-ordinates or super-ordinate units at any particular 
level of the organisation
• Centralisation and decentralisation of decision-making
It should be pointed out that this chapter has focused on macro-organisational aspects 
of corporate structure, in contrast to substantive sociological and behavioural 
literatures which are concerned with micro-organisational issues such as team size, 
task standardisation and their effects on employees (e.g. alienation, etc.)."^  ^ The 
analysis has been confined to those features of organisation structure which have been 
the subject of the historical and transaction-cost literature discussed above.
Moreover, the approaches discussed in this chapter are selective in that some features 
of organisational structure are emphasised, while others are given less importance. 
For example, less attention than is common in the literature has been paid to the three 
‘basic’ organisational forms (U-, M- and H-form) and their derivatives (Hill 1985, pp. 
740-749 and 1988, pp. 72ff; Williamson 1970; Williamson 1975, Ch. 8). While the 
importance of these issues shall not be downplayed, it can be argued that the 
substantial empirical literature on organisational forms (e.g. Steer and Cable 1978, pp. 
13-30; Hill and Pickering 1986, pp. 26-50; Whittington et al. 1997), to which little 
will be added in this thesis, has in turn neglected other aspects of organisational 
structure which are the focus of chapters 3-5.
On the basis of the discussion of this chapter, corporate restructuring shall be defined 
as changes with respect to the boundaries and the internal organisation of firms, 
taking into account the various elements of the two dimensions of corporate structure 
as outlined above. Changes in at least one, but more probably in several of these 
interconnected elements provide evidence for corporate restructuring processes.
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Taking up the features of corporate structure elaborated so far, the following chapters 
provide empirical evidence on corporate restructuring in large non-financial 
companies in the UK and West Germany.
* Chandler and Tedlow 1985, pp. 173-309.
 ^In the German-speaking region, universities and technical colleges also supplied important skills, in 
particular in engineering. Specific courses in business administration, law and economics were 
developed as well (foundation of the Handelshochschulen [higher trade schools] in St Gallen, \fienna, 
Leipzig and Aachen in 1898 [Forrester 1993, pp. 78-82] out of the earlier accounting-oriented 
Handelsschulen [trade schools] that had existed since the second half of the 18* century [Penndorf 
1913, pp. 228ff.]), although the educational base of managers remained more technically oriented than 
in the US (Lane 1989, pp. 86-96). In Britain, professional management education, marked by the 
establishment of the British Institute of Management in 1947 (Alford 1996, p. 219) and of the London 
and Manchester Business Schools during the 1960s, developed relatively late, although already in the 
inter-war period accounting qualifications had been developed. The proportion of industrial managers 
with academic (and in particular with postgraduate) education remained lower than in the other two 
countries, and only over the past 15-20 years has this situation begun to change significantly (Hannah 
1992,pp.51ff.).
 ^For a definition of the concepts of ‘line’ and ‘staff see Gulick 1937, pp. 30-31.
 ^Herman (1981, Ch. 1) shows that similar analyses existed already since the later part of the 19* 
century, before they were made popular by Berle and Means. The concept of the division of ownership 
and control emerged first from the analysis of the American economy, whereas European economies 
have been generally slower to adopt managerial capitalism. Even with respect to the US, the Berle and 
Means argument of the coming of managerial capitahsm has not remained uncontested. As early as 
1940 an official report said that Berle and Means had overstated the division of ownership and control 
(Herman 1981, pp. 12-13).
 ^ The three M&A waves took place concomitantly in the UK and the US; for the latter country see 
Golbe and White (1988, pp. 265-309); Ravenscrafi and Scherer (1987, p. 21); Weston et al. (1990, pp. 
8-14).
 ^BP may be regarded as an exceptional case in that its subsidiaries included a large number of petrol 
stations, but even disregarding this particular case, Hadden shows that the number of subsidiaries of 
many large British companies was exceptionally high, as compared to continental European countries.
’ “There is [...] a strong desire among executives to retain or gain the status of director, which can be 
met by leaving lower level corporate subsidiaries in existence even if they are functionally redundant” 
(Hadden 1983, p. 10).
® Tilly (1998, pp. 129ff.) describes the period fi^ om the late 18* century to the 1830s as the ‘early 
industrialisation period’ in Germany, during which the institutional preconditions (Prussian agrarian 
reforms, customs unions between various German states leading to the Zollverein of 1833) for Kocka’s 
first industrialisation phase were created.
 ^See also the Anglo-German comparison of corporate size presented in Cassis (1995, pp. 216-217).
Cable claims to have his data from the German Federal Cartel Office. However, his data from 1973 
to 1975 is very different from the ones provided by the Cartel Ofiice in more recent publications (see 
Deutscher Bundestag, 13. Wahlperiode, 1995, p. 148).
For the current German system of industry classification see Statistisches Bundesamt (1995), pp. 9- 
37.
Due to the small size of the sample, the percentages should be regarded as rough approximations 
only. The data does not add to 100% in all cases because of rounding errors.
TCE is one of several approaches which fall under the category of the contractual theories of the 
firm. Other approaches in this category include the property rights approach (Grossman and Hart 1986; 
Hart 1989 and 1995), Klein‘s (1988) theory of vertical integration, and the approach by Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972).
See also Coase’s (1992) Nobel Prize lecture and Mueller 1986, pp. Iff. -  Predecessors of TCE 
include Knight (1933) who emphasises the relationship between uncertainty and the existence of profits
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(see Demsetz 1992, pp. 12f), and the legal theorist Commons (1934) who discusses the problems 
associated with any attempt to write complete contracts.
For an elaboration of this point see also the Introduction in March and Simon ^1993.
Hart (1990, pp. 696-702) contests the view that bounded rationality is an important part of the theory 
of organisations, but see Kreps (1996) for a reply.
Lyons’ (1994, p. 266) finding that ‘vulnerability’ (dependence on one or a few contract partners) 
raises the probability that formal, rather than informal, contracts are struck corroborates this argument.
Arrow (1986, pp. 1192fiF.) analyses the need for simple contracts firom a principal-agent theoretic 
perspective.
Coase (1991c, p. 73) terms only the former cost class ‘transaction costs’ and the latter one ‘costs of 
organizing’, but the basic consideration is as described above.
In the following, uncertainty («) is meant to include bounded rationality and complexity.
It has to be assumed that even without uncertainty some governance costs would be involved in 
contracting, e.g. the costs of writing the contract. Therefore, in graph 2.1 CjJJc, t/=0) is assumed to be a 
constant aX).
“  This is a schematic depiction in which -  following Williamson -  the three cost fimctions are assumed 
to be linear. It can be argued that the cost fimctions are more likely to be concave, but these 
considerations are not relevant for the above argument
^ In order to simplify the argument, in the following u is assumed to be a constant c>0, so that the 
various cost fimctions are displayed as fimctions of k only.
See Williamson 1989, pp. 158f. - It is not immediately plausible why a vertically integrated firm 
should not be able to do the same as an independent supplier by producing intermediate inputs at large 
economies of scale to satisfy both its own demand and the demand of outside buyers. However, selling 
surplus supply to outside buyers may be difficult as these may be reluctant to buy from their own 
competitor. - Vertical integration can also have indirect production cost advantages. For example, by 
integrating successive transactions, which are not priced in a way that is transparent to external parties, 
companies remove these transactions out of the taxation and supervisory authority of governments.
^ The scale-effect based explanation of synergies, according to which the diversification strategy is 
chosen to exploit excess capacity of productive factors for which market failure exists, is the ‘classical 
approach’ to diversification, which goes back to Penrose [1959] ^1995, pp. 68-71.
Following Arrow (1974, pp. 4Iff.), it is arguable that the opportunities for sharing resources will be 
the greater the more closely related two business lines are.
Hermart (1993, p. 174) points out that geographic distance raises monitoring costs (both between 
independent parties and within hierarchies), so that MNEs should design organisational structures so as 
to minimise such costs, e.g. through profit centres.
^  For the relationship between language and the costs of trade see Coulmas (1992) and the author’s 
review of Coulmas’ book (Richter 1993, pp. 119f ).
Henisz (1997) shows that the perceived political ability of governments to renege on promises to 
respect property rights has a strong influence on investment decisions by American firms to invest in 
foreign countries.
Ouchi (1991, pp. 246-255) suggests ‘clans’ as an additional hybrid mode of organisation.
A similar argument has often been made with respect to the network of manufacturing companies in 
Germany, notably in the region of Baden-Württemberg (Herrigel 1996, Ch. 5). However, Mueller and 
Loveridge (1995, pp. 555-582) argue that the importance of this particular and other regional networks 
is declining, as large buyers of industrial goods are increasingly using global rather than local suppliers.
Against this view, Williamson (1993b, p. 469) argues that “trust is irrelevant to commercial 
exchange”; see the discussion between Craswell (1993) and Williamson (1993a).
Nanda and Williamson (1995, pp. 119-128) argue that ‘exit joint ventures’ rather than 
straightforward disposals are often used in the context of corporate restructuring, as the continued 
involvement of the firm that wants to separate itself from a business makes it possible to pass on 
knowledge and expertise to the new owner.
Hirschmann 1970, Ch. 2-3; Freeman and Medoff 1984, Ch. 6.
Comparing the team with the simple hierarchy as described above implies that already for «  > 2 the 
number of communication channels within the former type of organisation exceeds the respective 
number in the latter arrangement -  The formula (/i-l) is true if one considers only the direct, two-way 
communication channels between the supervisor and the subordinates, neglecting potential 
interrelationships among the subordinates. If these are taken into account, it can be shown that the total 
number of relationships to be managed by the supervisor (the nth member of the organisation) is given
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by the formula (n— 1)
2 T I - 1
+ n - 2 (this is derived from Graicunas 1937, pp. 184-187), which
implies an extremely limited span of control.
Following Thompson (^1977, p. 58), hierarchy is here defined as a system of subordination, implying 
several hierarchical layers.
In the questioimaire survey (section 3.3.9), participants are asked about the span of control of the 
head office of their company, defined as the number of heads of operating businesses reporting directly 
to the head office.
Williamson (1967, pp. 130fF.) and others use the term 'cumulative control loss’. It has to be noted, 
however, that control loss is not an additive, but a multiplicative fimction of the number of 
organisational layers through which control is exercised.
The term ‘delegation’ is closely related to ‘decentralisation’, the former being slightly more concrete 
as it inq)lies specific tasks or decisions to be delegated (Jennergren 1981, pp. 39ff.).
This notion is criticised by Alchian and Demsetz 1972, p. 777; against their view see Williamson 
1994, p. 31.
See Arrow ^1963, pp. 59-60, where he formulates the ‘impossibility theorem’ as a ‘possibility 
theorem’, namely that a particular social choice fimction can be defined which satisfies the above 
criteria -  but that fimction is the dictatorial one.
Williamson (1975, Chs. 8-9) who puts forward the internal capital market hypothesis most 
prominently, associates it generally with the M-form organisation. The above argument attempts to 
generalise his conception, as other organisation forms with internal capital market properties are 
possible.
The persistence of manifold organisational arrangements even within industries suggests there may 
be many equilibria. For this reason, the above analysis does not follow Weber’s ([1922] 1978, pp. 956- 
1005) and Fayol’s ([1916] 1967, pp. 19-42) search for the ultimately best shape of the bureaucracy (for 
a critique see Hill 1981, pp. 77ff. and Dawson 1986, pp. 114-118).
^  These five elements of the corporate boundaries are also identified by N.M. Kay (1991, pp. 137- 
154), although his ‘resource-based transactional approach’ proceeds along very different lines than the 
analysis presented here.
For an overview of ‘macro-’ versus ‘micro-’organisational issues see Van De Yen 1981, pp. 253- 
258.
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3. Overview of Corporate Restructuring in Non-Financial
Companies in the UK and West Germany on the Basis of a
Questionnaire Survey^
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of the questionnaire survey on which this chapter reports is to provide a 
descriptive overview of corporate restructuring trends among large non-financial 
companies in the UK and West Germany for the 1986 to 1996 period. In chapter 2, 
corporate restructuring was analysed as a multi-faceted phenomenon which cannot be 
captured by a single indicator or measure. Therefore, published data -  which are 
available on particular corporate restructuring issues, e.g. diversification (chapter 4) -  
do not provide sufficient insight into corporate restructuring trends as a whole over an 
extended period of time. Original information from companies themselves has to be 
compiled in order to produce such an overview.
The use of questionnaire surveys in social science research has limits and 
disadvantages. It cannot be guaranteed that the responding individuals are well- 
informed and honest. In particular in questionnaires such as this one with closed, rather 
than open-ended questions, the responses are squeezed into predetermined boxes, and 
the resulting data are necessarily superficial (Robson 1993, p. 243). Moreover, the 
number of questions that can be asked without deterring the respondents from 
participating is limited. On the other hand, alternative research strategies (e.g. 
interviews) are susceptible to problems, too (for an overall discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of mail questionnaires and interview-based techniques 
see Moser and Kalton ^1971, Chs. 11-12). The results of this chapter can be compared 
with the findings of chapters 4 and 5, in which other research methodologies are used.
The survey was carried out in co-operation with the Financial Times Newspaper.^ 
While the questionnaire was drafted and designed exclusively by the author, the FT 
printed the questionnaires, and provided helpful points of contact. Moreover, the
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editor of the FT, Richard Lambert, was of great assistance in signing the covering 
letters jointly with Sir Geoffrey Owen.
Section 3.2 describes the survey, including the selection of the target group, analyses 
the respondents and non-respondents, and discusses the methodology used in the 
evaluation of the results. Section 3.3 presents the results of the survey in an order that 
follows the structure of the questionnaire. Section 3.4 provides a critique of the 
survey. Finally, a summary is given in section 3.5. A copy of the questionnaire is 
contained in appendix 8.1.
3.2 Description of the Survey
3.2.1 Survey Preparation, Target Group Selection and Data Collection
The aim of the survey is to provide information on the largest non-financial companies 
in the UK and West Germany. Initially, the intention had been to collect information 
for the entire 16-year period from 1980 to end-1995. The target group was therefore 
selected on the basis of lists of large companies from 1980 onwards as described 
below. Discussions with academics, senior managers and FT journalists led to the 
conclusion that it would be difficult to obtain information for any period longer than a 
decade. The results of the survey show that many respondents found it difficult to 
supply data, in particular on issues relating to the internal structure of their 
organisation, for the period prior to the 1990s. Extending the time period covered by 
the survey would have led to a serious reduction in response rates, as managers might 
have 'given up' on the questionnaire.
The aim was to identify the largest non-financial companies in the two countries, 
roughly 100 in each, over the period covered by the survey. To this end the 106 largest 
non-financial companies by turnover in both countries were identified for each year 
from 1980 to 1995^, using the TIMES 1000 1980-1995 lists of companies. At this 
stage of the selection process, it was decided to drop some companies that are listed in 
the TIMES 1000 as 'industrial' companies'^, but which were mainly concerned with 
commodity brokerage, merchant or financial services (e.g. trade insurance). In
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addition, a few personnel and marketing agencies were excluded, although their 
portfolios may have included some insignificant industrial activities.
The reason for using the TIMES 1000, which ranks the companies by the turnover 
criterion, is that this list both provides long historical coverage and covers both 
countries, using the same criteria.
As a further step, all companies which appeared at least once on any of the 16 annual 
lists per country were identified. The reason for this procedure was to avoid selection 
bias problems. The aim was to include not only the top companies in any one year, but 
also those firms which at any point in the chosen period had been among the largest 
but which may have decreased in relative size in recent years. This resulted in two 
consolidated lists of companies for each of the two countries, consisting of 174 British 
and 186 German corporations.
Not all o f these 360 firms could be expected to be in the position to cooperate in the 
survey, since some of them were no longer independent entities. While it was the aim 
of the survey to gain information even on those firms which had been taken over, this 
was difficult in cases where companies had been broken up, or where parts of them 
had been fully merged with a new parent company. Others had gone bankrupt, making 
it difficult to identify whether a successor company remained which had taken charge 
of the main business of its predecessor. In many cases it was a matter of judgement 
whether to approach a company which after successive reorganisations and changes of 
ownership was in some way related to a firm in the initial target group. Adapting an 
inclusive, rather than an exclusive approach, questionnaires were sent to 135 British 
and 171 German firms (306 firms in total). These figures exclude a few companies 
where the address of the head office could not be found, or where notice was received 
by the mail deliverer that the addresses - which had been taken from company manuals 
- were invalid.
The main reason why the group of British companies was somewhat smaller than the 
German one is that much more preliminary information had been available on the 
British firms than on the German ones. It was therefore possible to target the British 
firms rather closely, excluding those where a response could not be expected for the 
reasons stated above. This was particularly the case when firms had been taken over by 
foreign acquirers, which has been much more frequent in British than in German
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industry over the past 15 years. Secondly, in the light of the results of the survey, one 
may hypothesize that the corporate restructuring wave has started later and has taken 
place at a slower pace in West Germany than in the UK, so that the number of 
companies which lost their identity - and which therefore had to be excluded - was 
lower than in the British case.
In June 1996 a pilot study including 12 firms in each of the two countries was 
conducted. 15 of them responded positively, some with extensive comments on the 
survey. As a result of these suggestions, two questions in the questionnaire were 
modified slightly (see sections 3.3.8 and 3.3.12).
In September 1996, the questionnaires were sent out to the full group of companies. A 
covering letter, asking for the firms' participation, was signed by both Sir Geoffrey 
Owen and the Editor of the FT, Richard Lambert. In late November 1996 a reminder 
with another copy of the questionnaire was sent out to those companies which had not 
responded by then. Positive replies were received fi^ om 74 out of the 135 British firms 
(54.8%) and from 42 out of 171 German firms (24.6%), yielding an overall response 
rate of 37.9%. For a postal survey containing questions on events as far back as ten 
years ago this response exceeded the expectations of the author. Some respondents 
also attached helpful material, such as organisation charts and annual reports; others 
provided extensive comments on the questionnaire.
As a further step, for those companies which had taken part in the survey, data were 
collected on two size criteria, namely the number of employees (worldwide) and the 
total sales of the company, for all years between 1986 and 1996. These data were 
taken from the following sources:
(1) Electronic sources:
• Datastream
• FAME {Financial Analysis Made Easy, a CD ROM edited by JORDAN)
• Disclosure Worldscope
(2) Printed sources:
• Dun & Bradstreet: Business Register. Edition 1998
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• Dun & Bradstreet: Key British Enterprises. Editions 1988-1998
• Hoppenstedt: Handbuch der GroBuntemehmen, Editions 1986-1998
• Hoppenstedt: Hoppenstedt Aktienfuhrer. Editions 1997-1998
• Hoppenstedt: Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaflen. Edition 1994/95
• ICC Business Publications: Region^ Sales Leads. Edition ^°1997
• Reed Information Services: Kompass. The Authority on British Industry. Editions 
1988-1997/98
• Schmacke (1992)
• The TIMES 1000 Series. Editions 1986-1996.
In addition, where data were not available from these sources, the companies 
themselves were contacted and asked to provide the information sought. Through this 
procedure, data on the two size criteria was raised for most years and companies.
3.2.2 Description of the Questionnaire
The questionnaire is the result of an extensive refinement process, during which six 
versions were produced which were discussed with many researchers. Other 
questionnaires (e.g. the one used by Geroski and Gregg 1997, and various editions of 
the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey) were studied as well, and the questionnaire 
was tested through a pilot (see section 3.2.1). It consists of two main sections, in 
addition to a covering letter inviting the addressees to cooperate. The first section is 
entitled “changes in the corporate structure”, and refers primarily to shifts with respect 
to the boundaries of firms. The second section deals with “changes in the structure of 
the head office”.
The questionnaire contains closed, pre-coded questions, i.e. a number of alternative 
answers are provided from which the respondents were to select one or more as 
indicated, in addition to questions asking for quantitative information. While forced- 
choice questions have major advantages in terms of avoiding evaluator bias in 
interpreting open-ended questions and in facilitating quick responses, they can also 
have disadvantages. In attitudinal research, for example, forced-choice questions “can 
create false opinions by [...] prompting people with ‘acceptable’ answers” (de Vaus
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1984, p. 74). However, this problem appears unlikely to be serious in the current case, 
as the questions hardly address the personal opinions of respondents.
The questions are numbered, and are non-overlapping. Some of them have a 
conditional structure (‘if yes, . . . ’), others are clearly marked as follow-on questions. 
Negatively worded and double-barreled questions are avoided. Following Sudman and 
Bradbum (1982, pp. 207-208), the questionnaire starts with some questions which are 
deemed to be easy to answer, before moving on to issues which may require some in- 
house research.
Each question is introduced separately, giving advice as to how to answer it. In order 
to maintain the interest of the respondents, some questions describe and re-emphasise 
the importance of the matter concerned.
The covering letter names the FT and Centre for Economic Performance at the 
London School of Economics as joint sponsors of the project, and clearly directs the 
respondents to return the completed questionnaires to Sir Geoffrey Owen at the CEP. 
In line with the purpose of the study, it also describes the lack of tangible evidence as 
the reason for carrying out the survey, and guarantees that respondents and their 
companies will not be identified. Respondents are promised a fi'ee copy of the report 
that has emerged from this study, if they indicated on the questionnaire that they 
wished to receive one.
3.2.3 Analysis of Respondents
The questionnaire was sent either to the chairmen or to the chief executives of the 
companies in the target group. In a few cases, where company manuals or press 
information indicated that changes in the positions of the CEO or the chairman of the 
company concerned had taken place recently, the finance director, the personnel / 
human resource director, or the managing director were approached instead. The 
following reasons account for the decision to target these top managers of the 
organisations concerned. First, as the survey relates to issues which are usually dealt 
with by the administrative centre of companies, including information on corporate 
head offices themselves, it was necessary to target individuals in the corporate centre. 
Second, in order to minimise the general problem of postal questionnaires that
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addressees may not be the best-informed people to answer particular questions, one 
can at least make sure that individuals are approached who have the authority to 
delegate the task to those subordinates who are well-positioned to do so (e.g. the 
company secretary).
The respondents were asked to give their names and contact details on the first page of 
the questionnaire. In those cases where the respondents complied with this wish, it was 
sought to identify the positions and job titles of the individuals concerned by using 
company manuals or by calling their office. In particular, it was sought to establish
• whether the person was a member of the board (in Germany: Vorstand or, in private 
limited companies [Gmblfs], Geschaftsfiihrung) at the time of the survey;
• which particular function the individual respondent was carrying out;
• whether he or she was the 'head' of this fimction. Under 'heads' of functions all 
individuals were classified whose job descriptions indicated that they had chief 
responsibility in their respective activities, e.g. 'head of public relations', 'chief 
human resources officer', or, in the case of German companies, Ahteilungs- or 
Bereichsleiter. In addition, all board members and company secretaries were 
regarded as 'heads', making this category an inclusive group.
Table 3.1 details the breakdown of the respondent population by board membership.
British respondents
(n=74)
German respondents
(n=42)
Total group
(n=116)
Board member 47.3% 21.4% 37.9%
Not board member 47.3% 59.5% 51.7%
Not knoAvn 5.4% 19.1% 10.3%
Table 3.1: Board Membership of Respondents
Note: Differences between the two groups are statistically significant at p<0.01
In one German company the questionnaire was filled in by a member of the supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat) who had formerly been a member of the management board. In 
table 3.1, this respondent is included under 'board member' and in table 3.2 below 
under 'head of function'. In no British company was the questionnaire filled in by non­
executive directors.
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As table 3.1 shows, the number of board members and non-board members among the 
British respondents were equal. With respect to the German group, however, board 
membership was established for only one fifth of the respondents.
The breakdown by the 'head of function' - criterion is shown in table 3.2.
British respondents
(n=74)
German respondents
(n=42)
Total group
(n=116)
Head of function 82.4% 61.9% 75.0%
Not head of function 12.2% 11.9% 12.1%
Not known 5.4% 26.2% 12.9%
Table 3.2: Position of Respondents in the Organisational Hierarchy
Note; Differences between the two groups are statistically significant at p<0.01
The data in table 3.2 show that three quarters of the respondents were heads of their 
functions. This finding is particularly well-established for the British respondents, 
where in only a few cases it proved impossible to identify the position of the 
respondent. In about 62% of German firms the respondents were heads of their 
functional areas, while in more than a quarter of cases information was unobtainable. 
Based on the results from the data on heads of functions, it can be concluded that the 
survey was successful in targeting management in top positions in the organisational 
hierarchy of their firms.
An analysis based on the functional area in which the respondents were active suggests 
that virtually all of the 100 respondents for which this type of information could be 
obtained were active in a central corporate function, from which a good overview of 
historical and recent developments in the corporation concerned should be possible. 29 
of these were either chief executives, or chairmen, or held both posts. Another six 
were managing directors. 21 were active in strategic functions called 'corporate 
planning', 'corporate development', 'strategy' or, in German cases, 'Betriehsfuhrun^, 
'Unternehmensfiihrun^ or Betriebswirtschafl^. Taking all these categories together 
means that 56% of respondents were occupying generalist functions in a broad sense. 
Eleven out of 100 respondents were in a financial or accounting-related area, and ten 
in corporate affairs or public relations.
In sum, participants in the survey were, in the majority of cases, in top managerial 
positions, and active in some central corporate function.
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3.2.4 Analysis of Non-Respondents
Of the total number of 190 companies which did not take part in the survey, 131 did 
not respond to the questionnaire, whereas the remaining 59 (28 British firms and 31 
German jQrms) replied that they were not willing or able to take part in the survey. The 
reasons for not responding - if any reasons were given at all - can be classified into 
three broad categories:
British group
(n=28)
German group
(n=31)
Total group
(n=59)
Company policy not to take 
part in surveys
25.0% 9.7% 17.0%
Restructuring has been so 
drastic that a response would 
be misleading
10.7% 12.9% 11.9%
Lack of time / work overload 46.4% 35.5% 40.7%
Other / no specific reason 17.9% 41.9% 30.5%
Table 3.3; Reasons Given for Non-participation
Note: Differences between the two groups are statistically not significant.
Table 3.3 shows that the main reason given for not taking part in the survey was a lack 
of time or the amount of work with which corporate head offices deal. Many 
companies said that the number of questionnaires received has increased in recent 
years, so that they were unable to reply to all of them. Other companies decided to 
make it a matter of their general policy not to take part in surveys in general. 
Interestingly, seven companies (11.9%) said that restructuring had been so far-reaching 
that the questionnaire could not be filled in, either because the information on earlier 
years was no longer available after demergers, ownership changes and the like, or 
because it was felt that the overhaul of corporate structures had been so far-reaching 
that comparative data for as long as a decade ago would be misleading. This in itself 
can be understood as an indicator of the extent of the restructuring process that has 
taken place among large companies in the two countries.
Two of the British companies, but none of the German ones, mentioned their 
responsibility to their shareholders in their reply, stating that they would not take part 
in surveys "unless there was an obvious benefit to [the company; A.R.] and our
83
shareholders". In the UK, cost-cutting appears to have been perceived as an important 
duty vis-à-vis shareholders.
3.2.5 Description of Respondent Companies
In this section, the respondent companies are described in terms of size and sector 
affiliation. Before doing this, it should be pointed out that the group of respondent 
companies does not constitute a sample. The selection procedure described above is 
based on a population of companies, all of which were -  as far as possible - contacted 
and asked for their participation. Consequently, the group o f respondent companies is 
not expected to he ^representative* fo r  the total population o f non-financial 
companies in the UK and West Germany. The following description shows that the 
respondent companies employ a sizeable proportion of the workforce of the two 
countries. Taking this as an indicator, it is arguable that it is worthwhile to investigate 
restructuring processes in the respondent companies as they play an important role in 
the overall economy, but not as they ‘represent’ it.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 summarise employment data for the two groups of respondent 
companies.
British group
year n mean standard
deviation
median range
1986 66 49763 50700 28112 1199-236461
1987 63 51717 51512 30780 1834-235647
1988 62 50465 48535 29931 2040-242723
1989 66 49234 46633 31174 4387-247912
1990 70 48210 49152 28178 1408-237400
1991 68 43282 40237 27350 1706-219000
1992 70 44044 42526 26894 1851-201937
1993 73 39411 38255 25681 1757-212264
1994 71 36567 35966 22600 800-206967
1995 72 36873 33475 24863 1846-180910
1996 72 37883 35028 24699 130-191289
Table 3.4: Employment Data for Respondent Companies (UK)
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German group
year n mean standard
deviation
median range
1986 38 50450 82003 14550 272-319965
1987 39 50138 80469 14619 . 270-326288
1988 39 50856 79912 15890 269-338749
1989 39 52565 80150 17644 274-339875
1990 40 54186 84237 17727 276-374217
1991 40 64997 100300 17863 281-396152
1992 41 66971 106395 15080 278-382633
1993 41 65647 103560 14288 277-377471
1994 41 62554 94245 16886 271-342413
1995 40 62287 88566 19311 275-321222
1996 41 58429 82340 19239 271-291268
Table 3.5: Employment Data for Respondent Companies (West Germany)
As can be seen from both tables the sizes of the companies in the two groups vary 
widely, and the distributions of the observations are highly skewed. The median is 
therefore the better measure of central tendency than the mean.^
In the UK group, median company size increased from about 28000 in 1986 to about 
31000 in 1989, to decrease thereafter and reach its lowest level at 22600 in 1994. Test 
statistics (two-sided tests, using matched pairs of observations) reveal that year-to-year 
changes in the median are statistically highly significant for all years between 1990 and 
1994. This means that among the companies in the group a remarkable ‘downsizing’ 
process has taken place during the first half of the 1990s.
Among the group of West German companies, there are no obvious trends. Median 
company size increases continuously from 14550 in 1986 to 17863 in 1991, to drop 
back to about its initial level in 1993. Thereafter it increases again to reach more than 
19000 in 1995 and 1996. Therefore, in the (more limited) group of West German 
companies a downsizing process of the kind witnessed among the UK companies is not 
evident.
With respect to differences between the two groups, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the 
comparison of medians (see table 3.6) show that up to 1990 the typical size of the UK 
group of companies was significantly larger than the typical size of the companies in 
the German group. The ‘downsizing’ among the companies in the UK during the same 
period of time means, however, that from 1991 onwards the differences in median 
company sizes are not any longer statistically significant.
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Year Significance level
1986 p « 0.01
1987 p « 0.01
1988 p « 0.01
1989 p < 0.05
1990 p « 0.05
1991 n.s.
1992 n.s.
1993 n.s.
1994 n.s.
1995 n.s.
1996 n.s.
Table 3.6: Comparison of Median Number 
of Employees between Groups
As stated above, the survey targets the largest non-financial companies in the two 
countries. Judging on the basis of the employment data, it is clear that the respondent 
companies are extremely large organisations with up to 248000 and 396000 employees 
in the UK and West Germany respectively. In every year between 1986 and 1996, the 
companies in the UK group employ the equivalent^ of between 9 and 12% of the total 
UK workforce. For West Germany, with the smaller group of respondents in relation 
to a larger overall workforce, this figure lies between 6 and 9%. This means that the 
survey captures a sizeable proportion of the economy of the two countries concerned.
Table 3.7 gives an overview of the main industries in which the respondent companies 
were active as of 1996. The information was drawn from recent editions of company 
manuals, such as the Dun & Bradstreet Europa handbook, the Price Waterhouse 
Corporate Register, and the TIMES 1000. The final category in the table includes all 
firms which were active in several sectors, where no sector was identifiable in terms of 
sales, but also all other businesses which could not be classified into any of the other 
categories. Therefore, an inclusion into the final category does not necessarily mean 
that the company concerned had a particularly high degree of diversification.
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British group
(n=74)
German group
(n=42)
Total group
(n=116)
Consumer goods, including 
household items
21.6% 4.8% 15.5%
Retail, excluding petroleum 
retailing
6.8% 9.5% 7.8%
Mechanical and electrical / 
electronic engineering; motor 
industry
13.5% 33.3% 20.7%
Media 2.7% - 1.7%
IT and IT support services; 
telecommunications
5.4% - 3.5%
Construction and building 
materials
6.8% 7.1% 6.9%
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 8.1% 9.5% 8.6%
Transport 4.1% 2.4% 3.5%
Raw materials, including oil 
production
8.1% 2.4% 6.0%
Water / gas /  electricity utilities 6.8% 7.1% 6.9%
Metal and metal forming 1.4% 7.1% 3.5%
Other businesses / 
conglomerates
14.9% 16.7% 15.5%
Breakdown of Respondent Companies by Sector
 ^This category includes a number of integrated oil companies which were also 
active in the retailing of petroleum and derivative oil products.
Table 3,7;
Note:
Table 3.7 shows that among the British respondents manufacturers of consumer and 
household goods, together with raw materials companies, figure more highly than 
among the German respondents. In the latter group, engineering companies and metal 
manufacturers (such as foundries etc.) are much more prevalent.
The differences between the two groups reflect primarily the sector compositions of 
the country populations to which the questionnaires were sent, rather than a bias 
among the respondents towards specific sectors.
3.2.6 Methodology
This chapter provides primarily descriptive statistics on the results of the survey. The 
picture that emerges from these data is expanded, where appropriate, by more 
qualitative information supplied by the respondents, for example by their written or 
oral comments and by accompanying material.
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In addition to the descriptive overview the chapter also contains the results of 
statistical analyses that have been employed in order to test whether
• differences between the two groups of respondents - the British and the German 
group - are statistically significant;
• changes over time within the two groups yield statistical significance.
In order to test for the significance of differences between groups. Chi-square statistics 
are employed in many cases. Moreover, two further types of statistical tests are used in 
order to ascertain the significance of differences within groups over time and between 
groups with respect to two important measures of central tendency, i.e. the arithmetic 
mean and the median.
• /-tests are applied to differences in means over time and across countries. In order 
to ensure the applicability of this parametric test procedure for one- and two group 
comparisons, group size requirements are computed.
One of the insights that the survey yields is the observation that considerable 
differences exist between the structures of companies, both across and within 
countries. This finding often has its expression in great ranges of values and highly 
skewed distributions, when companies are asked for quantitative indicators of their 
organisational arrangements. Where this is the case, the power of /-tests often drops 
below acceptable levels, given the relatively small number of respondents. This 
indicates that the median is a better descriptor of the distribution of observations than 
the arithmetic mean.
• Where medians are the more meaningful measures of central tendency than 
arithmetic means, median comparison tests are applied. In the case of comparisons 
over time within groups, test statistics as explained in Snedecor and Cochran 
(*1989) are applied to matched pairs of observations, whereas in the case of cross­
country comparisons, where two unmatched groups are compared, Wilcoxon's 
rank-sum test (also known as the Mann-Whitney U  test) is used.
In sum, statistical tests are employed in order to clarify differences in corporate 
structures and their changes over time and across groups and thereby to qualify the
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results of the survey. In addition, the comments of respondents, or evidence from 
further material that they attached, are included where they help to detail the results 
further.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Changes in Diversification
The first question in the questionnaire addresses the issue of diversification and 
refocusing. The respondents are asked whether, and to what extent, they have changed 
their degree of diversification over the past ten years.
Q: “It is widely held that during the 1980s companies have become less diversified and 
have concentrated on 'core activities' which they know best. Do you feel that this is the
British group
(n=71)
German group
(n=41)
Total group
(n=112)
Substantial reduction in diversity 53.5% 29.3% 44.6%
Some reduction in diversity 25.4% 22.0% 24.1%
No significant change in diversity 7.0% 14.6% 9.8%
Some increase in diversity 11.3% 22.0% 15.2%
Substantial increase in diversity 2.8% 12.2% 6.3%
Table 3.8: Changes in Diversification
Note: Comparison between groups: p < 0,05
According to the responses, nearly 80% of the British respondent companies have 
reduced their degree of diversification, either substantially, or at least to some extent. 
This coincides with the results of chapter 4. In contrast, 14.1% of the British 
respondent companies have increased their degree of diversification.
Four of the British companies (representing 5.6% of the total British group) which 
increased diversity to some extent were former public utilities (mainly electricity 
companies) which were privatised during the first half of the period that the 
questionnaire refers to. Under public ownership these utilities had been constrained to 
operate mainly in their primary industries, resulting in a low degree of diversification. 
Their proneness to diversify subsequent to privatisation, particularly by acquisition, has 
been documented by Helm, Aveline, and Lawrence (1992, pp. 30-41).
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One British company remarked that they had increased their diversification during the 
(late) 1980s but decreased it since. Another company had only come into existence (as 
a highly focused firm) in the early 1990s as a result of a demerger. The manager stated 
that before the demerger, the parent company had refocused the business division, 
which now comprises the new company. Both companies, which are excluded fi-om the 
results in table 3.8, add weight to the finding that most of the British respondent 
companies underwent refocusing programs, at least during the 1990s.
The German respondents ofifer a less clear-cut picture with respect to diversification. 
•Refocusing' has taken place in slightly more than half of the German firms as well, but 
there is also a substantial proportion of firms (34.2%) which increased the diversity of 
their activities. One company, excluded fi*om the above data, stated that it began to 
refocus after 1994, while before that time it had increased its diversification. The same 
is true for another German company which, after heavy diversification during the 
1980s, has been pursuing a far-reaching refocusing strategy since about 1993. A 
former state-owned firm noted that they are refocusing currently, the implication being 
that little had happened during the earlier part of the period to which the questionnaire 
refers. These three cases suggest that the refocusing concept has taken hold in West 
Germany only recently. In addition, one company, which had grown out of the 
M ittelstand sector, remarked that they were "focused traditionally". Although such a 
single remark must not be over-interpreted, the remark coincides with section 2.2.3 in 
which many German companies were found to be traditionally specialised.
On balance, among the German respondents comparatively little has changed with 
respect to diversification; only a few more German companies have reduced rather 
than increased their diversity.
Statistically, the British and the German groups are different at p<0.05. However, it 
should be emphasised that the question asked about changes, rather than levels of 
diversification. The survey does not provide information as to whether industry in the 
two countries had the same 'starting points' in the mid-1980s. This will be investigated 
further in chapter 4.
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3.3.2 The Use of Outsourcing
In the questionnaire, the issue of changes in the degree of vertical integration of firms 
is addressed through a question about the extent to which outsourcing and 
contracting-out have been used since 1986. The use of these techniques shifts the 
make-or-buy -  decision of companies in favour of the latter.
Q: “Has your company since 1986 pursued a strategy of outsourcing and contracting 
out, i.e. substituting supply relationships with external suppliers for the production of
Outsourcing /  contracting 
out has been used ...
British group
(n=74)
German group
(n=42)
Total group
(n=116)
To a significant extent 25.7% 19.1% 23.3%
Somewhat 55.4% 42.9% 50.9%
Rarely 17.6% 31.0% 22.4%
Not at all 1.4% 7.1% 3.5%
Table 3.9: Extent of Outsourcing and Contracting-out
Note: Comparison between groups: p«0.108
According to table 3.9, outsourcing and contracting-out have been almost universal 
features of the British respondent companies during the past decade. Only one 
respondent among the British firms said that they had not done so at all. The majority 
of companies had resorted to these techniques to some extent and more than a quarter 
had made use of them ‘to a significant extent’.
The German respondent companies have used outsourcing as well, but to a lesser 
extent than their British counterparts. Almost 40% of them said that they had used 
outsourcing only rarely or not at all, while less than one fifth had used it to a significant 
extent. Nevertheless, even among the German firms outsourcing and contracting-out 
have been important features, with more than 60% of respondents having used 
outsourcing and contracting-out ‘somewhat’ or ‘to a significant extent’.
It was also sought to identify which business functions had been particularly affected 
by a greater reliance on outsourcing. For three reasons it was decided to ask whether 
outsourcing has included information technology (IT) services:
• As part of a company's infrastructure, IT services are usually regarded as 
overheads. It is widely held that restructuring during the 1980s was directed in
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particular to this type of cost (see section 6.3.5). Although computing power has 
become cheaper, shorter life cycles of IT products and the need to keep up with 
competitors' technology have driven up IT expenses sharply in recent years. In two 
econometric studies, Loh and Venkatraman (1991, p. 16, and 1992, pp. ISfif.) show 
that the level of IT costs are a significant determinant of firms’ decisions to 
outsource IT services, and that the [US] stock market generally reacts favourably to 
such decisions, in particular in cases where cost structures are high and performance 
low. The notion that greater shareholder power may have induced corporate 
restructuring will be discussed in ch. 6 below.
• As line operations differ substantially from company to company, it seemed 
appropriate to ask about the outsourcing of a support function which serves the 
various business functions across a firm's value chain.
• In the literature (Laudon and Laudon "*1996, pp. 462-468; Lacity et al. 1995, p. 84- 
93), IT services are widely regarded as a crucial target of the outsourcing 
movement since the 1980s. Market surveys show that the market for IT services in 
both the UK and Germany has been expanding rapidly in recent years.*
In the questionnaire, conditional on having pursued outsourcing at all, companies are
asked to identify whether this had included IT services or not.
Q; “If you have pursued outsourcing since 1986, has this policy included IT services?”
British group
(n=72)
German group
(n=36)
Total group
(n=108)
Outsourcing did 
include IT services
55.6% 36.1% 49.1%
Outsourcing did not 
include IT services
44.4% 63.9% 50.9%
Table 3.10: Outsourcing of Information Technology Services
Note; Comparison between groups: p<0.05
Among the British respondents, more than half of the appropriate companies (n=72) 
claimed to have outsourced IT services. Among the 36 German companies, around one 
third said that they had included IT in their outsourcing programs. The two groups are 
different at p<0.05, indicating that among those companies that did outsource the 
German companies have so far been more reluctant than the British firms to make use 
of IT outsourcing and contracting out.
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While it is not clear whether and to what extent other business functions may have 
been affected by outsourcing, it is obvious that, in particular among the British 
respondents, and to a lesser extent among the German ones, IT services have been a 
prime target for the move towards the out-of-house procurement of services and 
goods. 'Make-or-buy decisions' appear to have been made increasingly in favour o f the 
latter option.
Outsourcing not only shifts the boundaries of an organisation; it may also entail a 
devolution of business functions from corporate managers to outside providers, 
thereby reducing the number or the size of operations over which the administrative 
centre has control. Further evidence that this trend towards a devolution of functions 
away from the administrative centre has taken place is given in section 3.3.11 with 
respect to research and development. On the other hand, the devolution of activities 
can take place within organisations, without using out-of-house suppliers. This is 
illustrated by the comments of a British respondent whose firm had used outsourcing, 
although not with respect to its IT services: "A number of operations that were 
centralised and which formed part of the head office function have been devolved into 
the relevant businesses. The central information and computing department, which 
formed part of the head office function until 1993, was transferred to a newly formed 
fellow subsidiary that operates at arms length, hence IT has been outsourced but not as 
generally accepted. The two moves accounted for [...] almost 1000 of the reduction in 
head office staff between 1991 and 1996. That being said, these devolved operations 
have themselves seen significant reductions in numbers but organisational changes 
make it extremely difficult to quantify this with any degree of accuracy".
3.3.3 Management Buy-Outs
Management buy-outs (MBOs) are an important tool for the restructuring of the 
boundaries of firms. In particular, they are used to reduce the degree of vertical 
integration and of diversification of companies. They often represent a special form of 
outsourcing of in-house activities; this applies primarily to support functions.
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Table 3.11 reports the responses with respect to the proportion of companies which 
have experienced MBOs of any parts of their operations, while table 3.12 focuses on 
the number of MBOs involved since 1986.
Q: “Has your company since 1986 had management buy-outs of any
British group
(n=74)
German group
(n=42)
Total group
(n=116)
Yes 59.5% 21.4% 45.7%
No 40.5% 78.6% 54.3%
Table 3.11: Occurrence of Management Buy-outs
Note: Comparison between groups: p<0.001
Q: “If yes, how many?”
Number of MBO’s British group
(n=44)
German group
(n=9)
Not known 12 3
1 11 3
2 6 1
3 5 2
4 2 -
5 3 -
7 1 -
8 1 -
10 2 -
17 1 -
Table 3.12: Number of Management Buy-outs
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show that, over the past ten years, MBOs have been significantly 
more widespread among the British than among the German respondent companies. In 
the German group, only about one fifth of large corporations have been involved in 
MBOs, while this figure approaches three fifths in the British case. In addition, the 
number of MBOs in those British companies which did experience them is considerably 
higher than in the nine German companies which experienced MBOs. There are three 
British firms which, on average, sold at least one of their parts per year to former 
managers.
Of the total of 15 companies which were not able to give the number, the three 
German firms remarked that they had 'few' MBOs. One German car manufacturer 
further explained that MBOs were not typical for the group. Most of the 12 British
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respondents concerned did not give any indication of the number of MBOs, with only 
one company stating that it had 'several' MBOs.
In sum, the British respondent firms have had more MBOs than their German 
counterparts.
3.3.4 Insert: Management Buy-Outs in the UK and West Germany according 
to Published Information
According to the findings of the previous section, large British firms have used MBOs 
significantly more fi*equently than their German counterparts to divest themselves of 
unwanted operations. This result is confirmed by an analysis of data supplied by the 
Centre fo r  Management Buy-Out Research (CMBOR) at the University of 
Nottingham. These data are used in this insert to put forward a twofold argument: 
Firstly, it is shown that the total MBO market in the UK exceeds the West German 
market by far, both in terms of the number of MBOs, and in terms of their value. 
Secondly, and of greater importance in the context of this thesis, by analysing the 
various sources of such transactions it is found that in the UK far more MBOs have 
been used fo r  the purpose o f corporate restructuring than in West Germany.
A management buy-out is a special form of an acquisition, in which one or more 
managers of a firm buy the company or one of its parts and thereby become the owners 
of the firm. Generally speaking, the management will not have sufficient capital 
available to finance the acquisition, so that virtually all MBOs rely heavily on outside 
capital. The future cash flow of the bought-out company itself serves as a security for 
the debt with which it was bought. The -  at least initial - indebtedness translates into a 
high degree of leverage, so that MBOs are often regarded as a particular type of 
leveraged buy-outs (LBOs). While the latter term is somewhat wider, denoting all sorts 
of acquisitions where outside financiers supply an unusually high degree of debt to buy 
a firm, many LBOs are in fact MBOs, as the team of external financiers, the so-called 
LBO sponsors, usually can ill-afford to do without the experience and the know-how 
of at least some of the management of the company concerned.^
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MBOs can be used for five major purposes:
(1) An LBO sponsor can fund an acquisition of a company (or part of it) which until 
then had been quoted on the stock exchange, so that the acquired firm in its 
entirety ‘goes private’, i.e. it is taken off the stock market (for details see Graebner 
1991, pp. 17ff.).
(2) Buy-outs can be a way to 'lift' or rescue companies from receivership.
(3) MBOs have also been used as privatisation techniques for the sale of state-owned 
assets. This has been particularly the case in East Germany since unification (for 
details see the Bundesanstalt fur vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben 1995, p. 2; 
Freese 1995, p. 117; Hoffinann and Ramke 1992, p. 147; see also Randlesome 
1994, pp. 192-194).
(4) A buy-out can be used as an arrangement to secure the managerial succession in 
firms.
(5) Buy-outs can be used in the context of a corporate restructuring process, during 
which a company sells one of its parts to management. This type of MBOs, which 
in the following are called 'restructuring MBOs’ ®^, has been used mainly for two 
purposes. First, to reduce the degree of vertical integration of the divesting firm, 
and in particular the integration of support activities such as canteens and cleaning 
services, but also more 'advanced' operations such as information technology 
services. If the divesting company continues to purchase services from the divested 
unit, the MBO represents a particular form of outsourcing; i.e. in-house 
procurement is replaced by market contracting. Second, restructuring MBOs have 
been employed to reduce the degree of diversification of firms. Companies have 
used MBOs as divestment techniques so as to focus on their ‘core business’ and to 
reduce their peripheral (i.e. less closely related or even unrelated) activities (for a 
case study see Griffiths 1988, pp. 52ff; more generally see Wright, Coyne and 
Robbie 1987, pp. 7ff). Therefore, ‘restructuring MBOs’ form part of the overall 
corporate restructuring movement for which evidence is provided in this chapter.
In the US, MBOs have also been used as means of hostile takeover, but these cases
have been extremely rare in Europe. On the other hand, MBOs can be employed as
takeover defenses by an embattled management. Additionally, the use of MBOs is
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influenced by tax considerations. In particular, the fact that interest payments are 
regarded as expenses chargeable on income which relieves against taxable profits 
(whereas dividend payments, including dividends to preference shares, do not count as 
expenses) means that most tax systems treat debt better than equity (for details see 
Attwood 1988, pp. 67-82). On the other hand, tax considerations cannot be regarded 
as a sufficient rationale for conducting MBOs as there are many other ways of 
increasing the debt/equity ratio of companies than through MBOs.
The first MBO market to develop to a significant extent was the US market at the end 
of the 1970s, leading to the American MBO wave of the 1980s. The second MBO 
market that followed suit was the British one, which increased to a significant extent 
from 1981 onwards to reach its peak by aggregate value in 1989 and by numbers in 
1990 (see table 3.13). The UK has also an unusually large number of management buy- 
ins (MBIs). Between 1988 and 1997, the UK has seen between 374 and 490 MBOs 
per year. The total value of the buy-out market increased to more than £2bn in every 
year since 1987. The years between 1987 and 1989 are particularly remarkable for the 
size of the transactions, which reached an average of £9m to £10m per deal, up fi"om 
an average of £3m to £4m per MBO in 1985/86, before falling back to a figure of 
around £5m in the years after 1989. From 1995 to 1997 the MBO market has 
expanded significantly again. The MBO market in the UK is by far the largest one in 
Europe, both in terms of the number of MBOs, and in terms of its total value.
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MBOs in the UK
Year Total
number
Aggregate 
value (in £m)
1979 18 14
1980 36 28 .
1981 145 180
1982 . 237 346
1983 235 366
1984 242 408
1985 261 1135
1986 315 1179
1987 343 3132
1988 379 3795
1989 378 3889
1990 490 2447
1991 450 2162
1992 455 2550
1993 391 2162
1994 403 2513
1995 374 2822
1996 433 3651
1997 446 4449
Table 3.13: Number and Value of MBOs in the UK, 
1979-1997
Source: Centre for Management Bity-Out Research
Quarterly Review, Spring 1998, p. 68
The MBO market in Germany has started to develop only since about 1985 (Hoffinaim 
and Ramke, 1992, pp. 37ff.), and to a more significant extent only since German 
unification. While there are no year-by-year figures available for the period until 1987, 
Initiative Europe and the CMBOR estimate the total number of MBOs in Germany for 
the period from 1980 to 1986 to be around 45. In 1988, the number of MBOs in West 
Germany reached a total of 36. During the first half of the 1990s the market expanded 
significantly to reach a peak in terms of numbers of MBOs (at 74) in 1995 and, in 
terms of value, in 1996 (total market value of £1.148bn). This means that as of 1996 
the West German MBO market had 14.3% of the size of the UK market as measured 
by the number of MBOs, and 31.4% of its aggregate value. Even when discounting for 
the fact that there may well be a number of smaller MBOs in Germany which are not 
publicly known, it is clear that the West German MBO market has only a fraction of 
the size of the UK market (see also Wright, Thompson and Robbie 1990, p. 25).
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West Germany
Year Total
number
Aggregate 
value (in £m)
1980-1986 45 n.a.
1987 8 n.a.
1988 36 n.a.
1989 . 25 485
1990 36 292
1991 27 224
1992 52 322
1993 44 397
1994 59 733
1995 74 540
1996 62 1148
Table 3.14: Number and Value of MBOs in West 
Germany, 1980-1996 
Source: Initiative Europe and Centre for Management
Buy-out Research, University of Nottingham
The available data on the MBO market do not allow to determine the exact purpose of 
individual transactions; this would be possible only in case-study based research. 
However, the source of an MBO is a main indicator for the purpose it serves. Buy­
outs from families, for example, enable individuals or families to exit their investment 
in an enterprise, in particular in situations where managerial succession for a company 
is to be arranged. 'Restructuring buy-outs' in the above sense are buy-outs from 
domestic or foreign parent companies, which divest one or more of their activities to 
management, while continuing to conduct other businesses. In this way, data on the 
sources of buy-outs can be used to assess the importance of MBOs in the context of 
corporate restructuring in the UK and West Germany.
The information provided by the CMBOR on buy-out sources in the UK and Germany 
is based on more than 80% (in the recent years: more than 90%) of the total number of 
buy-out cases as listed in tables 3.13 and 3.14. For the remaining cases this type of 
information was not obtainable. However, these remaining cases of buy-outs are 
somewhat more likely to represent buy-outs from families, as information on these 
types of buy-outs are generally more difficult to obtain than is the case with the other 
sources of buy-outs.
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Pre-1982 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Receivership 12.1% 14.2% 7.0% 10.8% 1.7% 1.7% 0.6% 2.2% 0.8% 13.2% 19.2% 19.0% 16.0% 3.9% 5.1% 4.5%
Divestment (Local 
parent)
59.5% 62.4% 66.5% 62.1% 61.5% 58.8% 51.0% 51.7% 54.6% 44.1% 43.4% 46.7% 39.0% 41.3% 40.2% 38.8%
Divestment (foreign 
parent)
14.7% 10.2% 11.5% 11.8% 12.4% 13.7% 10.6% 9.5% 6.8% 7.7% 9.7% 7.0% 13.7% 12.6% 10.1% 8.2%
Family 11.1% 9.1% 11.0% 13.3% 20.9% 19.6% 26.1% 28.8% 30.8% 28.5% 24.0% 23.9% 27.6% 35.3% 39.9% 40.9%
Privatisation 2.6% 4.1% 4.0% 2.0% 3.0% 5.5% 10.3% 6.1% 4.6% 4.8% 2.3% 2.5% 3.4% 6.1% 4.2% 6.3%
Going private 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.7% 1.3% 1.7% 2.4% 1.7% 1.4% 0.9% 0.3% 0.8% 0.6% 1.3%
Table 3.15: MBO Sources in the UK (in % of the total number of MBOs in any particular year), 1982-1996
Source: Initiative Europe and Centre for Management Buy-Out Research, University of Nottingham
g
1980-1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Receivership 4.3% 3.8% 2.3% 7.5% 5.6% 1.6% 2.1%
Divestment (Local parent) 21.6% 46.2% 39.5% 37.5% 33.3% 58.1% 42.6%
Divestment (foreign parent) 36.2% 38.4% 23.2% 20.0% 18.6% 21.0% 21.3%
Family 37.9% 11.5% 32.6% 35.0% 40.7% 16.1% 34.0%
Privatisation 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 3.2% 0.0%
Going private 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 3.16: MBO Sources in West Germany (in % of the total number of MBOs in any particular year), 
1980-1996
Source: Initiative Europe and Centre for Management Buy-Out Research, University of Nottingham
As table 3.15 shows, divestments from domestic and foreign parents are the dominant 
sources of buy-outs in the UK (see also Wright, Coyne and Robbie 1987, pp. 1-22; 
Wright, Thompson and Robbie 1990, pp. lOff.; Wright 1992, p. 4). In every year 
between 1982 and 1996, between 78% (in 1983) and 47% (in 1996) of the total 
number of buy-outs were from divestments. While the ratio o f buy-outs from 
divestments to the total number of buy-outs has been declining, the expansion of the 
total MBO market means that the absolute number of buy-outs from divestments has 
remained on a high level of between 170 and 250 in every year since 1982. Among 
these divestments, most are from domestic rather than foreign parents. As compared to 
these ‘restructuring MBOs’, other buy-out sources contribute significantly less to the 
UK buy-out market, although the share of buy-outs from family-owned companies has 
been increasing in recent years.
In terms of transaction values, buy-outs from divestments account for about the same 
proportion of MBOs as indicated by their numbers. Divestments from foreign parents 
appear to be slightly larger than the average transaction, with 11.1% of all MBOs 
accounting for 14.1% of the total UK buy-out market (see Wright, Thompson, and 
Robbie 1990, appendix, table 9).
In sum, divestments from British and foreign parents are the most important sources of 
buy-outs in the UK. This holds true regardless of whether the number or the value of 
buy-outs is considered.
In West Germany, buy-outs from divestments also account for a substantial proportion 
of the buy-out market: In the years between 1991 and 1996, between 33 and 58% of 
all buy-outs came from German parents, in addition to 18-38% from foreign parents 
(table 3.16). Overall, between 52 and 85% of the total number of the buy-outs came 
from divestments from German or foreign parent groups, and according to Robbie and 
Wright (1996, p. 55) the importance of buy-outs from divestments is likely to increase. 
Between 1980 and 1990, divestments from foreign parents were actually a more 
important buy-out source than divestments from domestic parents, indicating the 
earlier reluctance of German corporations to use the MBO tool. The relative 
importance of foreign sellers of German operations to management has, however, 
decreased to about 20% of all buy-outs in recent years.
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However, the figures for the relative importance of divestments fi*om domestic and 
foreign sources have to be interpreted in view of the context of the underdevelopment 
of the German buy-out market in absolute terms. In the years between 1991 and 1994, 
there were 30 or less MBOs fi*om these sources in Germany. This figure has increased 
to approximately 59 in 1995, to recede again to about 39 in 1996, Although this 
indicates that corporate restructuring may play an increasing role in the future 
development of the German buy-out market, the volatility of this market means that it 
is difficult to establish a clear trend so far. However, even in 1995, when buy-outs 
fi*om divestments soared in West Germany, the number of German buy-outs fi^ om 
divestments was only 30.9% of the respective figure for the UK, while in earlier years 
such as 1991 the appropriate figure was only 10%. In sum, despite the larger size of 
the West German economy, there is a much lower incidence of MBOs fi*om 
divestments (‘restructuring MBOs’) in West Germany than in the UK. This confirms 
the finding fi-om section 3.3.3 that the West German respondent firms have been much 
more reluctant to divest themselves of operations through MBOs than their 
counterparts in the UK.
3.3.5 Mergers and Demergers, Acquisitions and Divestments
Mergers and acquisitions, together with demergers and divestments, are means to 
redraw the boundaries of firms with respect to their horizontal, vertical, diversifying 
and geographic dimensions. Aggregate data show that both countries have experienced 
acquisition waves during the 1980s and early 1990s (for the UK see the Annual 
Overviews in Acquisitions Monthly, which also provide information on the divestment 
wave in the UK, and Richter 1997b, pp. 6-7; for Germany see the reports of the 
Federal Cartel Office, e.g. Deutscher Bundestag 1995, pp. 148ff.; also Miiller-Stewens 
and Schafer 1997a, pp. 5-27 and 1997b, p. 32ff.). In the questionnaire, companies are 
asked whether their size has been altered by large-scale mergers or demergers, 
acquisitions or divestments. Table 3.17 details the results. At the right-hand side of the 
brackets the proportion of companies that had either mergers (demergers) or 
acquisitions (divestments), or both, is given.
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Q: “Has the size of the organisation over the last 10 years been significantly altered by
British group
(n=71)
German group
(n=42)
Total group
(n=113)
Mergers
Acquisitions 80.3%) 2|«:/»}86.7%
Demergers
Divestments 53.5%(**) 23.8% {* ♦) ) (*) 4l5%)45.1%
Proportion of 
firms expe­
riencing any 
of the above
93.0% 95.2% 93.8%
Table 3.17: Occurrence of Large-scale Mergers and Acquisitions, Demergers and Divestments
Note: Comparisons between groups: * p <0.01 ** p < 0.005
The last row of table 3.17 shows that virtually all respondent companies have 
experienced mergers, acquisitions, demergers or divestments which affected their size. 
Four of the seven companies which did not have any of these changes are either state- 
owned firms or companies that were privatised during the past decade. One of these 
remarked that they had made some small acquisitions.
More than four fifths of the respondent companies have engaged in mergers and 
acquisitions over the past ten years. While the proportion of mergers is considerable, 
particularly among the German group, it is clear that the main external growth strategy 
is via acquisitions, rather than mergers. Some companies, which are not included in the 
above figures, indicate that they have pursued minor acquisitions only. It is notable that 
the proportion of German companies which had large-scale mergers and acquisitions 
exceeds the comparable figure for the British group, although these differences are not 
statistically significant.
However, table 3.17 shows statistically significant cross-country differences between 
the extent of disposals. While few demergers have taken place, divestments were much 
more common in the British than in the German group of respondents. Whereas more 
than half of the large British companies divested businesses in a way that significantly 
altered their size, less than a quarter of the German firms pursued such disposals.
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Two follow-on questions address the issue of which particular dimensions of the 
companies’ boundaries were affected by these mergers and acquisitions. The question 
on which table 3.18 reports asks whether mergers and acquisitions were vertical, 
horizontal, or conglomerate in character. The questionnaire makes it clear that the 
expression Vertical M&A's' relates to the integration of companies which up to the 
time of the acquisition were among the suppliers or customers of the acquirer, while 
the integration of target companies which were competing in the same business line is 
called a 'horizontal M&A strategy'.
The respondents are given the opportunity to identify several directions of their M&A 
strategy; therefore the figures in table 3.18 add up to more than 100%.
Q: “If you have engaged in large-scale mergers and acquisitions, has your strategy
British group
(n=57)
German group
(n=38)
Total group
(n=95)
were your suppliers or 
customers (‘vertical’ M&A’s)
5.3% 23.7% " 12.6%
were competing in the same 
line of business (‘horizontal’ 
M&A’s)
93.0% 84.2% 89.5%
were pursuing a business 
unrelated to what you were 
doing (unrelated M&A’s)”
15.8% * 34.2% * 23.2%
companies with multiple 
M&A strategies
14.0%"' 39.5%*** 24.2%
Table 3.18: Horizontal, Vertical and Diversifying M&A Strategies
Note: Comparison between groups: *** p < 0.005 **p< 0.01 * p < 0.05
According to table 3.18, the British respondent companies showed a strong preference 
for horizontal acquisition strategies. While there are still a number of unrelated 
acquisitions across all industries, vertical acquisition strategies have been rare among 
the British firms. The exception to the latter observation are three companies in the 
consumer goods industries. Evidence from accompanying letters to the questionnaire 
responses, as well as from annual reports and press material, suggests that one of these 
three firms acquired its retail outlets, while the two others bought distributors for part 
of their product ranges. This indicates that the few vertical M&A strategies among the 
British respondents were geared towards downstream, rather than upstream activities.
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For the German companies, the results are more mixed. As in the UK group, the 
highest proportion of German respondent companies has pursued horizontal M&A's. 
However, a considerable number of companies, significantly more than in the UK 
group, have also pursued unrelated and vertical M&A strategies. Almost 40% of the 
German firms have pursued multiple acquisition strategies with at least two of the 
three strategic options given. These results are consistent with the findings on 
diversification and refocusing strategies detailed in section 3.3.1.
Secondly, the respondents are asked to identify the geographical direction of their 
merger and acquisition strategies. They are invited to endorse one of the three options 
available to them (table 3.19).
British group
(n=59)
German group
(n=37)
Total group
(n=96)
domestic M&A's 28.8% 32.4% 30.2%
overseas M&A's 50.9% " 29.7% " 42.7%
roughly equal weight 
between domestic and 
non-domestic M&A's”
20.3% * 37.8% * 27.1%
Table 3.19: Geographical Direction of M&A Strategies
Note: Comparison between groups: ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
In both groups, only about one third of the respondent companies had domestically 
oriented merger and acquisition strategies, and the two groups are statistically not 
different in this respect. However, differences do exist between the groups fi’om the 
two countries with regard to the emphasis with which international acquisition 
strategies have been pursued. Among the British companies, half of all M&A strategies 
were directed primarily towards overseas countries, and only about 20% towards 
domestic and overseas targets on a roughly equal basis. The British companies exhibit 
a predominantly international M&A strategy.
Among the German companies, on the other hand, predominantly international M&A 
strategies make up only about 30% of all M&A strategies. Most M&A's were directed 
towards a balanced mix of domestic and overseas strategies. It has to be taken into 
account, however, that German unification, which opened up a large domestic 
acquisition market to German companies, occurred in the period covered by the 
survey.
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3.3.6 Hybrid Modes of Organisation: Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances
In order to ascertain the extent to which companies in the two countries have engaged 
in hybrid forms of organisation, the respondents are asked to identify how strongly 
they have pursued joint ventures and strategic alliances (table 3.20). In addition, they 
are asked to detail the number of joint ventures pursued over the past decade and the 
proportion of sales generated through them as of 1996 (table 3.21).
Q: “Have you engaged since 1986 in a policy of joint ventures and strategic alliances 
with other companies?’
British group
(n=74)
German group
(n=42)
Total group
(n=116)
Strongly pursued joint 
ventures / strategic alliances
51.4% 42.9% 48.3%
considered joint ventures / 
strategic alliances as options, 
but did not pursue them 
strongly
35.1% 38.1% 36.2%
did not pursue joint ventures / 
strategic alliances
13.5% 19.1% 15.5%
Table 3.20: Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances
Note: Differences between groups are statistically not significant.
According to table 3.20, the use of joint ventures and strategic alliances has been 
widespread. Almost half of all respondent companies in the two countries have 
strongly pursued these forms of co-operation with other firms, and most of those 
which did not do so have at least considered them. The responses suggest that the 
British companies have pursued joint ventures and strategic alliances somewhat more 
strongly than the German companies, but these differences are statistically insignificant. 
A sector with particularly numerous joint ventures (in both countries) is the 
construction industry (including building material suppliers), where these 
organisational arrangements have been used for a long time. Similarly, companies 
involved in raw material and fuel exploration made heavy use of joint ventures. An 
executive of a big British oil company remarked on the questionnaire, the "normal 
form of business in upstream oil [i.e. crude exploration; A.R.] is joint venture".
In table 3.21, only those companies which had at least considered joint ventures and 
strategic alliances are included.
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Q: “[...] How many joint ventures/strategic alliances have you engaged in?’
Q: “[•••] What percentage of your sales is now represented by joint ventures?”
mean standard
deviation
median range
Number of i.v. & s.a.
7.5
9.7
9.8
18.8
4
5
1 - 5 0
1 - 9 0
fl986-1996I:
British group (n=49) 
German group (n=24)
% of sales reoresented by
10.1%
12.5%
0.137
0.132
6.5%
10%
0% - 80% 
0% - 50%
i.v. & s.a. in 1996:
British group (n=52) 
German group (n=27)
Table 3.21: Number of Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances and Proportion of Sales
Represented by Them
Note: Differences between the measures of central tendency for the two groups are
statistically insignificant. '^
As table 3.21 shows, the extent to which joint ventures and strategic alliances have 
been resorted to differs widely across companies, as indicated by the large standard 
deviations and the sizeable ranges. There are a few companies which have been 
involved in 50 joint ventures or more; again, these firms are concentrated in the 
construction industry. Asked for the number of its joint ventures, one German 
construction company responded in the questionnaire: "several hundr eds"whi le  a 
British building contractor noted that they were "too numerous to identify - joint 
ventures are commonplace in our industry". On the other hand, the majority of 
companies in both groups had only up to six joint ventures. The German companies 
seem to have pursued more joint ventures (consequently representing a larger fraction 
of sales) than their British counterparts, but these differences are statistically 
insignificant.
In companies which have pursued joint ventures and strategic alliances, these 
accounted for, on average, slightly more than 10% of turnover as of 1996. In both 
groups, however, there are a number of companies with joint ventures and strategic 
alliances which are insignificant in terms of sales; these are represented by 0% in table 
3.21.
It should be noted, however, that the figures for the proportion of sales attributable to 
joint ventures and strategic alliances can give only a very rough guide as to their 
importance. Firstly, these figures are distorted by the fact that, according to European
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law^ ,^ 50% of sales from 'joint undertakings' to third parties are consolidated at overall 
sales level, regardless of the shares of the various parties in these undertakings. This 
misrepresents the importance of the venture, if the share of a company in the joint 
venture differs considerably from 50%. Secondly, joint ventures do not necessarily 
involve joint sales activities. A British pharmaceutical company with as many as 30 
joint ventures and strategic alliances over the 1986-1996 period remarked that joint 
ventures accounted only for a small proportion of its sales as their "joint ventures and 
strategic alliances tend to be in research and development rather than sales and 
marketing". Similarly, an electricity generator with five joint ventures noted that these 
had taken place on a project basis, without resulting in tangible sales. Therefore, the 
first and the second questions on joint ventures and strategic alliances in the survey 
(tables 3.20 and 3.21) may offer a better guide to the importance of joint ventures and 
strategic dliances than the sales data taken on their own.
3.3.7 Managerial Layers
The remaining questions in the questionnaire survey address changes in the internal 
organisation of firms, starting with the number of managerial layers. Participants were 
asked for the number of managerial layers at three points in time (1986, 1991 and 
1996). In order to make the answers to the question comparable, the respondents were 
asked to consider only the main operating business of their company. If  the company 
had several businesses which they regarded as crucial, they were advised to consider 
the largest one in terms of turnover.
108
Q: “[...] Please consider the main operating business o f your company 
(if you have several that you regard as crucial, take the largest one in 
terms of turnover). We would like to know whether the number of layers 
of management from the top to the bottom in your main operating business 
has changed over the last decade. Can you please give the number of
Mean standard
deviation
median range
British 1986 (n=52) 7.0 3.0 6.5 2 - 1 4
group 1991 rn=58'l 5.8 1.8 6.0 3 - 1 0
1996 ('n=63'l 4.7 1.5 5.0 1 - 1 0
German 1986 (n=34) 5.4 1.6 5.0 3 - 9
group 1991(n=35) 4.6 1.4 5.0 1 - 7
1996 In=37) 4.4 1.5 4.0 2 - 1 1
Table 3.22: Number of Managerial Layers in the Main Operating Business
of Participant Companies
Table 3.22 shows that the average number of managerial layers in the main operating 
businesses of the British respondent companies has decreased from 7 to less than 5 
over the period under consideration. The rate of reduction has been roughly constant 
over the ten-year period. On average, it seems to haven taken between four and five 
years to reduce the number of managerial layers by one.
Among the German respondent companies, a reduction in the number of managerial 
layers has also taken place. However, this reduction started from a considerably lower 
level than in the British case. Consequently, the reduction has not been as strong as 
among the British firms. In 1996, the average number of managerial layers in the 
German companies was only slightly below the comparable British figure.
Both the changes over time (within groups) and the differences between groups can be 
tested for statistical significance. The following matrix shows the significance levels of 
year-to-year mean comparison tests.
British group German group
year 1986 1991 1986 1991
1991 p<0.0005 - p<0.0005 -
1996 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.001
Table 3.23: Comparison of the Mean Number of Managerial
Layers over Time
According to these results all reductions in the mean number of managerial layers 
within both groups prove highly significant. Therefore, the average number of
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managerial layers among the British and the German respondents in 1996 was 
significantly lower than it was ten or even only five years earlier.
The decreasing trend in the number of managerial layers, particularly among the British 
firms, is also confirmed by those companies which were unable to supply exact figures. 
Three companies active in the production and distribution of consumer goods 
remarked on the margin of the questionnaire: [number o f layers] "has decreased 
significantly", "reduced - number not known", and (as of 1996) "less than in 1991". 
Another company in the same industry had changed its entire business system, but 
stated that "there has been general 'de-layering'." One German respondent stated that 
the number of managerial layers as of 1996 was three, and that this number had been 
reduced from 4-5 in 1986, which confirms the decreasing trend for the German group. 
Mean comparison and Chi-Square tests can also be applied to the differences in the 
number of managerial layers between groups at the three points in time (table 3.24). 
However, it is important to point out that the results of the survey do not allow to 
control for the size of the main operating business, which may well have been different 
in the two countries at any of the three points in time.^ "^
Mean comparison test Chi-Square test
1986 p<0.005 p<0.1
1991 p<0.005 n.s.
1996 n.s. n.s.
Table 3.24: Differences in the Number of Managerial Layers between Groups
The results reported in table 3.24 show that in 1986 the British respondent companies 
had significantly more layers of management in the main operating businesses than 
their German counterparts. Due to the sharp decrease in the number of layers, the 
British firms became more similar to the German firms over the second half of the 
1980s and first half of the 1990s.
3.3.8 Administrative Costs
In section 2.2, the emergence of complex administrative hierarchies was described as 
an important characteristic of the historical growth process of large industrial 
enterprises. The development of administrative structures enabled companies to extend
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their boundaries so as to economise on external transaction costs and to pursue growth 
strategies. On the other hand, potential transaction cost savings of integration have to 
be balanced against the direct and indirect costs of administrative structures (section 
2.3.3).
The questionnaire addresses the issue of direct administrative costs in relation to total
1 ,  ^ . 1 j . j  . administrative costslabour costs. Participants are asked to identify whether the ra tio --------------------------
total labour costs
has changed over time (i.e. since 1986); in order to emphasise this, the word ‘ratio’ is 
printed in bold letters.
Q: “This question relates to the share of administrative costs of total
, ,  ^ . TT 1 1 administrative costslabour costs m your company. How has the ratio
total labour costs
changed over time (i.e. since 1986)?
British group
(n=67)
German group
(n=38)
Total group
(n=105)
Increase 23.9% 29.0% 25.7%
No change 10.5% 18.4% 13.3%
Decrease 65.7% 52.6% 61.0%
Table 3.25: Changes in the Share of Administrative Costs in Total Labour Costs
Note: Differences between the two groups are statistically not significant.
According to these results, in the majority of companies, administrative expenses 
account for a smaller fraction of total labour costs in 1996 than they did in 1986. 
Almost two thirds of the British respondents stated that they had reduced the ratio of 
administrative costs to total labour costs. According to another 10% of these firms, 
this ratio has not increased.
A similar picture emerges for the German response group. Although the proportion of 
British firms which has reduced the AC/TLC ratio is somewhat greater than the 
comparable German proportion, the differences are statistically not significant. 
Interestingly, one British company (an electricity generator) noted that the AC/TLC 
ratio had decreased between 1986 and 1991, but had remained constant since then.
The results of section 3.3.7 and 3.3.8 suggest that a far-reaching overhaul of the 
administrative structures of the respondent companies has taken place between 1986
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and 1996. The trend has been towards 'leaner* structures, both in terms of the number 
of managerial layers, and in terms of administrative costs.
3.3.9 Span of Control
The declining trend in the number of managerial layers raises the question as to what 
has happened with respect to managerial control. According to section 2.3.3, a 
'flattening' o f organisational hierarchies should occur with an increase in the span of 
control of managers.
In the questionnaire, the term ‘span of control’ is defined as "the number of heads of 
operating businesses (whether they are called divisions or groups or anything similar) 
who report directly to the head office". This formulation was chosen as the 
organisational units below head office level may have different names in different firms. 
Moreover, organisational structures often have mixed forms: In some large 
organisations (e.g. Hoechst) the broadest unit below head office level is the division, 
comprising a number of subsidiaries, while one or two large operating subsidiaries may 
report to the centre directly, rather than through divisional headquarters. The same 
may apply to operating subsidiaries which serve the different divisions within the 
company, or to joint ventures which, because of the stake that another company holds 
in them, may not fit into the 'normal' divisional structure of the company.
It is important to point out that the term 'span of control', as used in the questionnaire, 
is not an attribute of persons (i.e. superordinate individuals), but of a superordinate 
body, namely the corporate head office. Therefore, the prediction derived fi*om 
sociological theory, namely an increase in the span of control of managers due to a 
reduction in managerial layers, is not expected to apply necessarily in this case.
Given the trend towards reduced diversification and the use of outsourcing, 
particularly among the British respondent companies, one may expect the span of 
control, as defined here, to have decreased over the past decade. On the other hand, 
the tendency towards international operations might have counteracted this trend to 
some extent, as the breakdown of operations into divisions sometimes follows 
geographic criteria. Hence, in connection with their globalisation, companies might
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have set up additional area-divisions. This might have counterbalanced the reduction in 
the span of control to some extent.
Q: “The following question relates to the span of control of top management. In this 
context, ‘span of control’ means the number of heads of operating businesses (whether 
they are called divisions or groups or something similar) who report directly to the 
head office. Could you please give us, for the following three points in time, the
mean standard
deviation
median range
British 1986 (n=49) 14.7 20.0 8.0 2 -1 0 0
group 1991 (n=61) 10.0 14.4 6.0 1 -1 0 0
1996 (n=67) 9.9 15.8 5.0 2 -1 0 0
[n=66] [8.8] [13.0] [5.0] [2 -1 0 0 ]
German 1986 (n=27) 16.3 17.6 8.0 1 -6 8
group 1991 (n=27) 16.6 18.9 8.0 3 - 6 8
1996(n=30) 16.0 16.6 8.5 1 - 7 0
Table 3.26: Span of Control of Top Management
Note: Data in parentheses are based on the British response group excluding
BP, for reasons explained below.
Table 3.26 shows that in the British respondent companies the span of control has 
decreased by almost one third between 1986 and 1991. Since then the decrease has 
slowed down considerably. It is noteworthy, however, that in particular the British 
companies are extremely varied with respect to the span of control, as indicated by the 
large standard deviations and the sizable ranges. The distribution of values is positively 
skewed.
Among the German respondents, the span of control has not changed much in the 
decade since 1986. It has remained constant at, typically, eight to nine heads of 
operating businesses who report directly to the head office, i.e. at roughly the same 
median as in the British case in 1986.
One German respondent who was unable to provide exact figures remarked that his 
company had seen an increase in the span of control fi'om 1986 to 1991, but a decrease 
since then. What is even more notable, however, is his suggestion that movements in 
the span of control are driven by changes in diversification, the suggestion made earlier 
in this section. In addition, a second remark of the same respondent draws attention to 
an arrangement which - according to press reports - is becoming more widespread: the 
consolidation of different operating units, and the merger of major operating 
businesses with the holding company, i.e. the managerial centre. Both these forms of
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'internal mergers' are designed to reduce administrative costs, to cut out managerial 
layers, and to shorten the lines of communication. They also entail a reduction in the 
span of control, as defined in this section.
The slow reduction in the span of control between 1991 and 1996 in the British case 
appears somewhat surprising, given the large decrease that had taken place in the five 
years preceding 1991. This calls for a closer look at the data for the individual 
respondent companies. In doing so, it becomes clear that the 'slowdown' in the British 
case is partly due to one particular company, British Petroleum Co. pic (BP). In line 
with the general trend, BP had decreased its span of control fi'om I I  in 1986 to 4 in 
1991, but then increased the figure to 84 in 1996. As a rationale for this change, the 
manager who had filled in the questionnaire said that "BP has moved fi'om a business 
stream organisation to a business unit organisation over the last year. This has resulted 
in the removal of a tier of management - the business stream HQ [headquarter; A.R.]. 
Now the business units report directly into the Global Business Cen t re" .BP ' s  case 
represents the removal of the divisional level with the intention of decreasing the 
number of managerial layers in the overall organisation. This is consistent with its 
reported reduction of the number of managerial layers within its main operating 
business from 6 in 1986 to 4 in 1991 and to just 2 in 1996. On the other hand, this de­
layering process has meant a sharp increase in the span of control of the head office, as 
the operating units now report directly to the head office (which in itself has seen a 
reduction from 3000 to 500 employees over the decade under consideration).
As BP's restructuring over the past years is a clear exception from the trend shown 
above, table 3.26 gives the summary statistics for the British respondent group with 
the exclusion of BP in 1996 in parentheses. This shows that, on average, a further 
reduction in the span of control has taken place among the British respondent 
companies, although it is still true that the reduction in the second half of the 10-year 
period under consideration has taken place more slowly than in the 1986-1991 period. 
Over the entire period, the typical span of control has decreased by as much as 40% 
from 8 to 5 heads of operating businesses reporting to the head office.
More formally, median comparison tests can be applied to assess the significance of the 
cross-country differences and the over-time changes within the two groups. Mean
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comparison tests have also been applied, but due to the skewed distribution of values 
the power of these tests is, in many cases, unsatisfactory. Where they can be applied, 
mean comparison tests confirm the results of the median comparison tests reported 
below.
British group: median 
comparison tests
German group: median 
comparison tests
year 1986 1991 1986 1991
1991 p < 0.005 - n.s. -
1996 p < 0.05 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Table 3.27: Comparison of the Median Span of Control over Time within Groups
Table 3.27 confirms the magnitude of the over-time trends observed in table 3.26. The 
British respondent firms have significantly reduced the span of control, in particular in 
the 1986-1991 period and, consequently, over the entire ten-year period, whereas the 
changes in the German respondent firms are too small to yield statistical significance.
Year Significance level
1986 n.s.
1991 p < 0.05
1996 p < 0.005
Table 3.28: Comparison of the Median Span
of Control between the two Groups
The test statistics show that, while the median spans of control in the British and the 
German respondent firms were equal in 1986, the reduction that has taken place in the 
British group has led to significant differences in 1991 and 1996. The number of heads 
of operating businesses who report directly to the head office was, as of 1996, 
significantly smaller in the British firms than in the German respondent companies.
In a fiiither step, the results on the spans of control of corporate head ofiSces can be
used to ascertain the approximate average size of the operating businesses of the
respondent companies. The approximate^^ average size (S) of the operating businesses
of a company (i) is given by the formula
„ (totalemployment):-(head office size): . . . , , ^S: =  ---------------   — -------------------- —. Using the results on head office size
(span of control);
(see section 3.3.12 below), the results are displayed in table 3.29.
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Approximate average 
size of operating 
businesses
mean standard
deviation
median range
British 1986 (n=36) 4446 4545 2805 140-18388
group 1991 (n=47) 6262 7303 3945 106-39800
1996 (n=59) 6350 7867 3694 137-47797
German 1986 (n=20) 2955 5688 888 53-23182
group 1991(n=22) 4060 7354 997 71-24710
1996 (n=29) 4370 7054 1833 111-24386
Table 3.29: Approximate Average Size of Operating Businesses of Respondent Companies
Note: Results are rounded. Differences between the medians for the two groups are
statistically significant at p < 0.01.
The results displayed in table 3.29 indicate that, despite large variations in 
organisational set-ups within the two groups, the approximate average size of the 
operating businesses among the German respondent companies is typically significantly 
smaller than among their British counterparts. As of 1996, the median value o f S for 
the German respondents is approximately half the value for the British respondent 
companies. These differences help explain the lower number of managerial layers in the 
main operating business of the German respondent companies, as shown in section 
3.3.7. Over-time changes within the two groups are barely significant.
3.3.10 Autonomy of Line Managers
The changing shape of the administrative centre of companies, as well as changes in 
the number of managerial layers, raise questions about how far the balance of power 
has shifted between the head office and the operating businesses over the past decade. 
As argued in section 2.3.3, organisations have to strike an efficient balance between 
centralising and decentralising decision-making processes. It was also pointed out that 
the ability to make effective decisions is backed by the right to dispose of resources. 
While these include human and technological resources, shifts in the balance of power 
can be gauged by the discretion of line managers over financial resources. In the 
questionnaire, the participants are asked to assess whether, and in what way, the 
degree of line managers' autonomy in financial matters has changed. In view o f the 
reduced size of head offices, and in particular the reduced number o f financial 
managers at the centre of British companies (section 3.3.12), one may expect that a
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devolution of power away from the head office has taken place, thus increasing the 
degree of financial discretion of line managers. On the other hand, one might argue 
that de-diversification may have led to a reduction in organisational complexity, which 
in turn may have facilitated a centralisation of decision making.
Q: “We are interested in whether line managers now have greater auto­
nomy from the head office in financial matters than they had in earlier 
years. Has the discretion of the operating businesses of your company 
in financial decisions (control of cash, capital expenditure, etc.) increased 
or decreased since 1986?”
British group
(n=72)
German group
(n=42)
Total group
(n=114)
Increase 52.8% 42.9% 49.1%
No change 34.7% 45.2% 38.6%
Decrease 12.5% 11.9% 12.3%
Table 3.30: Changes in the Financial Discretion of Line Managers
Note: Differences between the two groups are statistically not significant.
The results show that in only about 12% of the respondent companies from both 
countries has the financial discretion of line managers decreased over the past ten 
years. The majority of line managers have either the same or a greater degree of 
financial autonomy than they had in 1986. The trend towards the increasing financial 
discretion of line managers appears to have been somewhat stronger among the British 
than among the German respondent firms, although these differences are statistically 
insignificant.
3.3.11 Position of Research and Development in the Corporate Structure
Beyond the issue of the balance of power between head offices and operating 
businesses it is also important to know where particular functions in the corporate 
hierarchy are carried out, so as to assess whether particular activities are managed 
centrally or left to the operating businesses. Research and development (R&D) 
provides a case in point, as one of the rationales for the emergence of diversified multi­
business companies has traditionally been associated with the opportunity to exploit 
technological capabilities across a range of activities (sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.2); this 
applies in particular to related diversifiers in research-intensive industries. If  this is still 
true, one would expect a majority of firms to locate R&D at the centre of their
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organisation. On the other hand, the widespread notion that companies have to be 
increasingly ‘close to the market’ points towards a decentralisation o f R&D (Casson, 
Pearce, and Singh 1992, pp. 122fiF.), as operating businesses generally have closer 
contact with potential customers and suppliers. A decentralisation of R&D activities 
would also be in line with the devolution of power in financial matters (section 3.3.10) 
and the decreasing trend in head office size (section 3.3.12). Granstrand and Sjolander 
(1992, p. 188) find that 76% of R&D, in a sample of 42 Swedish, American and 
Japanese multinationals in 1987, was conducted on a decentralised basis. The 
decentralisation of R&D was particularly marked in Sweden (92%). The authors do 
not observe significant changes in the organisational location of R&D between 1982 
and 1987.
In the questionnaire, respondents are asked where R&D was carried out in 1996, and 
whether any shifts had taken place over the ten years before that time.
Q: “If you devote significant sums to research and development, is this activity
British group
(n=63)
German group
(n=32)
Total group
(n=95)
In the operating 
businesses
65.1% 53.1% 61.1%
Equal balance 
between operating 
businesses and 
corporate centre
12.7% 12.5% 12.6%
At the centre of the 
company
22.2% 34.4% 26.3%
Sum 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Number of companies 
to which the question 
does not apply
8 (11.3% out of 
71 firms)
8 (20.0% out of 
40 firms)
16 (14.4% out 
of 111 firms)
Table 3.31: Position of Research and Development in the Organisational Structure
Note: Differences between the two groups are statistically not significant.
The results show that a clear majority of respondent companies in both groups carried 
out R&D in the operating businesses, rather than as a central corporate function. Few 
companies pursued R&D at both levels simultaneously; companies seemed to favour 
an unambiguous position of R&D in the corporate structure. The British respondents 
appeared to prefer decentralised R&D operations to an even greater extent than the
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German respondents, one third of which pursued R&D at the centre of their 
organisation. However, these differences are not large enough to yield statistical 
significance. From table 3.31 one British pharmaceuticals company is excluded which 
remarked that in its UK and US operations R&D was conducted at both corporate and 
operating business levels, but that a central R&D function was operating on behalf of 
its subsidiaries in other locations.
With respect to changes in the organisational position of R&D, the following picture 
emerges:
Q: “Has there been a significant change in the organisation of R&D in your company
British group
(n=64)
German group
(n=35)
Total group
(n=99)
Shift towards more 
decentralisation of R&D
42.2% 28.6% 37.4%
Shift towards more 
centralisation of R&D
18.8% 11.4% 16.2%
No change 39.1% 60.0% 46.5%
Table 3.32: Shifts in the Organisational Position of R&D between 1986 and 1996 
Note: Differences between the two groups are statistically not significant.
Table 3.32 shows that in the majority of respondent companies no changes in the 
organisational position of R&D have taken place. This stability has been particularly 
marked in the German group, where three fifths of the firms did not shift R&D 
between the operating divisions and the administrative centre. However, although the 
differences between the two groups are not statistically significant, more than 40% of 
the British firms have moved towards greater decentralisation of their R&D functions. 
Less than 20% of firms in both groups have shifted R&D towards the centre.
Some companies report 'mixed' developments in R&D positioning. A representative of 
a diversified German manufacturing company remarked that product development was 
carried out in the operating businesses, while research had become increasingly 
centralised over the past few years. A British producer of consumer goods said that, 
contrary to a decentralising trend about six years ago, the company had started to pull 
together R&D at the centre of the company in 1995.
Tables 3.31 and 3.32 above suggest that, as of 1996, a majority of the respondent 
companies, particularly in the British group, were carrying out R&D on a decentralised
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basis. Moreover, a considerable number of firms had moved towards greater 
decentralisation over time, while others did not see great changes. In a further step, the 
answers to these two questions can be cross-tabulated in order to analyse whether the 
current positioning of R&D in individual companies is due to changes over the past ten 
years, or to long-standing positioning decisions. In order to avoid too small cell sizes 
the data fi'om the two countries are aggregated.
Position of R&D as of 1996
SumDecentralised
R&D
(n=54)
"Balanced"
R&D
(n=ll)
Centralised
R&D
(n=25)
Changes
over
time
Decentralisation 46.3% 54.5% 20.0% 36
No change 44.4% 9.1% 52.0% 38
Centralisation 9.3% 36.4% 28.0% 16
Sum 100% 100% 100% 90
Table 3.33: Cross-tabulation of the Position of R&D as of 1996 and Changes in the Position
of R&D over Time^ *
The data presented in table 3.33 show that somewhat less than half of the respondent 
firms with a decentralised position of R&D as of 1996 had experienced 
decentralisation shifts in the position of R&D since 1986. In almost the same number 
of firms in this group there had been no movements in R&D positioning. This implies 
that the decentralisation of R&D is by no means a new concept, but that it has become 
more widespread since 1986.
Even more clear-cut are the data for those companies with a centralised position of 
R&D as of 1996. More than half of these did not see any change in the years before 
1996. Less than 30% of these companies took steps to centralise their R&D. For a 
majority of these companies, positioning R&D at the centre has been a long-standing 
organisational set-up.
Only one of the eleven respondent companies with a "balanced" position of R&D as of 
1996 has seen no change in its R&D positioning, while in the other ten firms shifts in 
one direction or the other have taken place. This contrasts sharply with the 
respondents with a clearly centralised or decentralised position of R&D, of which a far 
higher proportion had seen ‘no change’ in the positioning of R&D in the years before 
1996. The fact that almost all companies with a "balanced" position of R&D, as of
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1996, had experienced shifts in the position of R&D, suggests that such an equal 
balance of R&D between the operating businesses and the administrative centre is 
unlikely to be a permanent arrangement. The 'balanced' positioning o f R&D seems to 
be rather a transitional stage for those companies which move their R&D fi’om the 
operating businesses to the centre or, as seems to be increasingly the case, vice versa.
3.3.12 Head Office Size and Functions
As developed in section 2.2, head offices have played an important role in the 
development of the modem corporation. According to Chandler (1996, pp. 348f), 
corporate head offices in large multi-business organisations have two main functions, 
namely to devise strategies for the development of the organisation as a whole 
(strategic function) and to co-ordinate and control the activities of the individual 
divisions or business units (administrative and loss-preventive function). From an 
efficiency perspective (section 2.3), the benefits of centralised management through 
head offices (in terms of loss prevention, optimal resource allocation, etc.) should 
outweigh their costs.
Empirically, the activities of head offices vary substantially fi'om company to company. 
While all head offices employ staff to pursue some sort of financial control and central 
accounting (see below), corporate headquarters may or may not be involved in 
operating businesses, and in functions such as marketing, legal affairs and the like. 
Goold and Campbell (1987, chs. 1 and 13) and Goold et al. (1994, pp. 399-499), and 
Campbell et al. (1995, pp. 120-132) argue that these differences in head office 
activities reflect distinct corporate styles.
According to Useem (1993, ch. 3), a central aspect of the restructuring movement in 
the US during the 1980s has been the ‘downsizing’ of corporate headquarters. I f  these 
developments hold true for the UK and West Germany, one would expect the number 
of head office staff to have fallen sharply since the beginning of the corporate 
restructuring wave, and so too the number of managers at head office level. The 
questionnaire addresses these two issues for 1986, 1991, and 1996, asking for concrete 
numbers at the three points in time.
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The response rates to these particular questions show that many companies had 
difficulties in supplying exact figures for situations as long as a decade ago. 
Nevertheless, the findings yield an interesting picture of the structure of the head 
offices of the British and German respondent companies. The results are also related to 
total company size.
Q: “Please give the total number of employees in the corporate head office of
Head office size mean standard
deviation
median range
British
group
1986 (n=45) 
1991(n=57) 
1996 (n=65)
1163.7
1349.3
960.2
4621.2
5046.5
4813.1
187*
127
101**
20-31000 
20 - 33000 
12 - 38000
German
group
1986(n=27) 
1991(n=30) 
1996(n=36)
1512.0
1136.3
923.1
3208.7
2672.8
1654.8
300*
246.5
257**
5 -14148 
5 -  13834 
3 -8 3 1 4
Table 3.34: Number of Employees in tbe Corporate Head Office in 1986,1991 and 1996
Note: Comparisons of medians between the two groups: * p<0.1 ** p<0,01
The descriptive statistics show that the size of corporate head offices varies widely 
across the respondent companies. Some companies employ several thousand staff at 
head office level. The extreme case is represented by one British company with 
between 31000 and 38000 head office staff at the three points in time. This can only be 
explained by a centralised organisational arrangement by which the head office itself is 
involved in operating activities, so that there is little distinction between operating 
businesses and the corporate headquarters. This is confirmed by the following remark 
fi'om the respondent concerned: "As we are largely a single operating business and our 
head office is at our operational base, we do not distinguish between head office and 
operational staff in any structural sense. Of the above numbers, about 15% of the staff 
and 35% of the managers are involved in overhead functions".
On the other hand, the large standard deviations (of up to five times the arithmetic 
mean), together with the fact that the median is in some cases only one tenth of the 
mean or less, indicate that the distribution of values is highly positively skewed. 
Therefore, the median, rather than the arithmetic mean, is the appropriate measure of 
central tendency.
The data show that a 'typical' head office of the British respondent companies, as 
indicated by median size, had 187 employees in 1986 and has shrunk to about 100 in
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1996. In the case of the German respondent companies, median head office size has 
decreased from 300 employees in 1986 to less than 260 in 1996.
In 1996, the difference between the median head office sizes of the two respondent 
groups yields high statistical significance. This means that, as of 1996, the head offices 
of the British respondent companies had typically less staff than their German 
counterparts.
The over-time changes in median head office sizes can be tested for statistical 
significance^^. The test statistics are displayed in table 3.35.
British group German group
year 1986 1991 1986 1991
1991 n.s. - n.s. -
1996 p<0.01 p < 0.0005 p< 0 .1 p < 0.05
Table 3.35: Comparison of Median Head Office Sizes over Time within the two Groups
These results show that the reductions in median head office size in both groups over 
the 1986-96 period are statistically significant. The reductions appear to have been 
particularly marked in the second half of the ten-year period, so that the differences 
between the medians in 1991 and 1996 alone are large enough to yield statistical 
significance.
The findings become more pronounced if one disregards the magnitude o f change, in 
order to focus on the mere number of firms which experienced head office reductions 
or increases at all. There are two respondents - one from each country - who report 
that the size of their head offices had decreased, although they were not able to attach 
exact figures to these changes; these remarks are also taken into account in table 3.36 
below.
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Proportion of the
British group German group
1986-1991:
increase 28.9% 38.5%
reduction 51.1% 46.2%
no change 20.0% 15.4%
1991-1996:
increase 26.1% 28.6%
reduction 67.4% 67.9%
no change 6.5% 3.6%
1986-1996:
increase 19.3% 25.8%
reduction 71.9% 67.7%
no change 8.8% 6.5%
Table 3.36: Changes in Head Office Size
Note: Differences between the two groups are statistically
not significant.
Table 3.36 shows that more than two thirds of respondents from both groups have 
reduced the size of their corporate head offices during the 10-year period under 
consideration. In both groups the 'downsizing' of coq)orate head offices appears to 
have gathered pace over time, so that in the second half of the period considered, from 
1991 to 1996, this trend seems to have affected more companies than from 1986 to 
1991.
It is important, however, to note that the trend towards smaller corporate head offices 
has not been universal. While there are a few companies where no change has taken 
place, there are some 20 to 25% of companies in both groups which increased the size 
of their administrative centres.
In a further step, the results on head office size are related to total company size, as 
measured by the number of employees. In this way, it is possible to ascertain whether 
the decline in median head office size over time as reported above was accompanied by 
a concomitant decline in the total workforce. In order to achieve this, the ratio 
Total number o f employees
Head office size
is calculated. The results are presented in table 3.37.
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Total number of employees 
Head office size
mean standard
deviation
median range
British group 1986 (n=42) 
1991 (n=53) 
1996 (n=63)
358.8 
346.2
376.9
566.5
520.5 
540.0
142.7**
168.4
177.4**
1 .3-2705.7
1 .5-2698.8
1.5-2779.5
German
group
1986 (n=25) 
1991 (n=28) 
1996 (n=36)
158.6
220.7
184.7
378.4
377.6
265.1
55.6**
101.6
96.0**
1.0-1911.6
1.0-1905.5
1 .0 -  1332.7
Table 3.37: Rati. Total number o f employees ^  199*
Note:
Head office size 
Comparisons of medians between the two groups: ** p<0.01
The results presented in table 3.37 exhibit a similar positive skewness as the data given 
in table 3.34 above. There are a number of respondent companies (3 as o f 1996), 
namely those for which the ratio defined above is close to one, where the head ofiBce 
essentially coincides with the total workforce. For these companies, a meaningful 
distinction between the head office and the operating units does not exist. These 
companies operate in the utility, transport, and mail ordering industries, where 
scheduling and other coordination activities may have been carried out fi^om the centre 
of the organisation. Moreover, some companies in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
industries have relatively large head offices in relation to company size. These
companies reported earlier (section 3.3.11) that they had their R&D activities located
at the centre of their organisation, so that the size of their head offices may be 
explained to some extent by the fact that R&D was carried out from there. It should be 
pointed out that the companies with large head offices in relation to total size are more 
fi*equent among the German than among the British respondent companies.^® On the 
other end of the spectrum, there are companies from various industries, far more 
frequent among the British than the German respondent companies, where the head 
office is very small as compared to total firm size. The typical (median) ratio 
Total mmher o f  employees . ,----------------------------------- IS between 140 and 180 m the case of the Bntish
Head office size
respondent companies, as compared to 50 to 100 for their German counterparts, and 
these differences are statistically significant for 1986 and 1996. This means that, in 
relation to total company size, the British respondent companies typically had smaller 
head offices than their German counterparts.
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With respect to changes over time within the two groups, test statistics for differences
• xu j- X- Total number o f employees . . ^in the median ra tio -------------------   are given m table 3.38.
Head office size
British group German group
year 1986 1991 1986 1991
1991 n.s. - p < 0.001 -
1996 n.s. n.s. p < 0.0001 p < 0.05
^  ^  ^  ^  .  Total number o f employees
Table 3.38: Companson of Median Ratios------------------------------------ over Time within
Head office sizje
Groups
These data show that changes in the median ratio Total number o f  employees
Head office size
between 1986 and 1996 have not been significant in the case of the British
respondents, whereas this ratio has increased significantly in the case of the German
respondent companies. This means that, in the British case, the decrease in median
head office size (as reported in tables 3.34 and 3.35) has been accompanied by
reductions in total employee numbers of roughly similar magnitude (see section 3.2.5).
Among the German respondent companies, a general reduction in total company size
has not been reported in section 3.2.5, whereas table 3.34 reports a decrease in median
, j  „  • A ix r-xi. 1 XX , xi- X- Total number o f  employeeshead office size. As a result of the latter change, the ra tio ------------------- ----------------
Head office size
has increased over time. Between 1986 and 1996, head offices, in relation to total 
employment, have become typically smaller among the German respondents.
Furthermore, in the questionnaire the respondent companies are asked to identify the 
number of managers at head office level at the three points in time^\ The results are as 
follows;
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Q: “How many of these [i.e. of the total number of employees in the head
Managers 
office level
at head mean standard
deviation
median range
British 1986 (n=30) 218.1 632.5 60 6-3500
group 1991(n=38) 362.5 1263.7 50 6-7000
1996 (n=59) 163,4 570.4 36 5-3300
German 1986 (n=23) 214.5 481.7 30 5-2000
group 1991 (n=24) 124.3 277.6 25.5 5-1234
1996 (n=31) 100.6 173.5 30 3-806
Table 3.39: Number of Head Office Employees in Managerial and Executive Positions 
Note: Differences between medians for the two groups are statistically not significant.
Mests for the comparison of means are not applicable.
According to table 3.39, the distribution of the number of corporate managers has a 
strong positive skew.
The results show that the median number of managers in the head offices of the British 
respondents has decreased from 60 in 1986 to 36 in 1996. Management at head office 
level has experienced a 'downsizing trend' very similar to the reduction in total head 
office staff.
Despite the larger overall head office size, the German respondent companies seemed 
to employ typically less managers at head office level than their British counterparts. 
These differences are, however, not large enough to yield statistical significance.
The data suggest that the reduction in headquarters management, having started from a 
higher level in 1986, has been much more pronounced among the British than among 
the German respondent firms. Table 3.40 below, which reports the significance levels 
of median comparison tests, confirms these hypotheses.
British group German group
year 1986 1991 1986 1991
1991 p< 0.1 - n.s. -
1996 p<0.01 p < 0.0005 n.s. p < 0 .05
Table 3.40: Comparison of the Median Number of Head Office Employees in Managerial
and Executive Positions over Time within the Two Groups
So far, total head office sizes and the number of head office managers have been 
analysed separately. However, these results also make it possible to calculate the 
proportion of head office staff represented by managers. As a first step, it is useful to 
check how closely the number of managers is related to the total size of the head
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office. The correlation coefficients between the two variables for the three points in 
time lie between 0.83 and 0.99, and all correlation coefficients turn out to be highly 
statistically significant at p<0.0001 in all cases.
British
group
German
group
Total
group
1986 0.996 0.883 0.962
1991 0.851 0.890 0.838
1996 0.869 0.865 0.868
Table 3.41: Correlation between Total Head Office Size 
and the Number of Head Office Managers
Note: All correlation coefficients are statistically
significant at p<0.0001.
The magnitude of the correlation coefficients suggests that the number of managers in 
the head office is closely related to the total size of the head office. Consequently, the 
proportion of head office staff represented by managers should not be expected to vary 
greatly over time.
managers British group German group
total head office size mean median mean median
1986 30.8% 27.8%** 17.8% 8.9%**
1991 33.5% 30.0%* 19.2% 11.1%*
1996 36.5% 37.2%*** 19.3% 11.7%***
Table 3.42: Proportion of Head Office Staff Who Are Managers / Executives
Note: Comparisons of medians between groups: * p<0.005 ** p<0.001 *** p<0.0001
Over-time changes of medians within groups are statistically insignificant.
The results show that the proportion of head office staff who are managers in both 
groups is relatively stable over time. The ratio shows only a slight increase over time, 
and this increase is statistically insignificant. This means that the ‘downsizing’ of the 
head offices of respondent companies has affected managerial positions by almost as 
much as other staff positions in their head offices.
Great differences do exist, however, between the two groups with respect to the 
proportion of head office staff represented by managers. In the British respondent 
firms, about every third head office employee had a managerial position, whereas in the 
German companies less than a fifth of headquarters staff were recorded to be
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managers. Typically, around 10% of the German head office staff were managers. 
These differences between the two groups are statistically highly significant. This 
means that the 'configuration' of the British and the German respondent companies at 
their 'strategic apex' - to use Mintzberg (1979, pp. 24-26 and 1983, pp. 13-14) term - 
is very different: The German companies had larger headquarters than their British 
counterparts, but a smaller fraction of headquarters staff was in charge of managerial 
functions.
A possible explanation might be that the German companies employ more technical 
specialists such as engineers at head office level, who would only be regarded as 
managers if they supervise other staff. However, the data from the survey do not allow 
to test this argument.
The final question in the survey addresses the functions carried out by the corporate 
head office. In the questionnaire, nine specific functional fields are listed which, 
according to the literature and the advice fi*om practitioners, are regarded as the most 
prominent functions of corporate head offices. In addition, the participants had the 
opportunity to name additional functions carried out by their particular head office. In 
order to gauge the importance of different functions, the questionnaire asks for the 
absolute number of head office managers - referring back to the question before - who 
were working in these areas as of 1996.
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Q: “How many of the managers and executives in the head office today [reference to
Median ratio 
staff in a particular function
Percentage of head 
offices which had 
the function at all 
in 1996
total managerial HO staff 
in 1996
Function British
group
(n=59)
German
group
(n=26)
British
group
(n=59)
German
group
(n=26)
Accounting, Finance and Control 
including Treasury
28.0%* 20.8%* 100.0% 100.0%
Taxation 5.0% 4.8% 91.5% 84.6%
Information Technology 4.0%** 8.7%** 76.3%* 92.3%*
Strategy development
Devising an overall strategy for the company
6.5% 4.8% 86.4% 92.3%
Legal 7.5%* 4.8%* 88.1% 76.9%
Marketing
Developing market strategies for the company
0.0%** 8.8%** 42.4%** 69.2%**
Investor relations
Building up and maintaining relationships with 
investors of capital
2.0% 1.4% 74.6% 65.4%
Public relations
Representing the company to the wider public
5.0% 3.7% 84.9% 88.0%
Human Resources (HR) and Industrial 
Relations (IR)
9.3%* 10.0%* 93.1% 100.0%
Other functions 15.6% 9.9% 66.1% 61.5%
Table 3.43: Functions of Head Office Managers and Executives
Note: Comparisons between groups: *p<0.1 ♦* p<0.05
According to these results, there is only one function which existed invariably in the 
corporate head offices of all respondents from both countries, namely accounting, 
finance, and control. This function showed the highest management staff levels in both 
groups, with typically 20.8% of all head office managers among the German 
respondents and an even higher proportion of 28% among the British respondents 
working in this area. In the German group, human resource management and industrial 
relations were also represented in all head offices^ ,^ although staffing levels were 
significantly lower than in financial management.
Differences between the two groups also emerge with respect to three other functions: 
Firstly, the typical ratio of IT managers in the head offices of the British respondents 
was lower than in the German case, and the function was less widely represented in the
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British group. Secondly, less than half of the head offices of the British respondent 
companies were dealing with marketing, compared to about 70% of the German firms. 
However, the legal function in the British firms showed somewhat higher management 
staff levels than in the German firms. Public relations and investor relations were also 
somewhat more widely established in the head offices of the British than of the 
German respondents, although the differences are not statistically significant.
More than 60% of the respondents said that they had additional head office functions. 
The functions that were identified can be classified as follows:
• Property and real estate management, including office services, was mentioned by 
ten companies, most of them British.
• Eight companies specified technology management as an additional head office 
function, while three others identified research and development.
• Eight British firms said that head office managers were dealing with compensation, 
benefits, and pensions. In the German case, these functions might have been 
included in the human resource and industrial relations function, which would 
explain the slightly higher staffing ratio in this particular function among the 
German firms according to table 3.43.
• Health, safety and environmental issues were given by seven companies as head 
office functions, and the number of managers in these functions appears to have 
increased since 1986.
16 respondents assigned their executive directors and CEOs to the "other functions" 
category in the questionnaire. 13 said that head office managers were active in general 
administration or in a company secretariat. However, it is not clear in how far these 
managers were working in senior positions. On the head offices of four British 
respondent companies, executives of the operating businesses or divisions were 
represented. Other head office functions that were identified include internal audit (6 
respondent companies), economic analysis and forecasting (5), business development 
(5), insurance (4), supplies, transport and logistics (4), purchasing (3), production (3), 
sales and customer services (3), quality control (2), intellectual property (2), risk 
management (2) and security (2). The following functions were identified only once:
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Corporate analysis, privatisation (in the case of a former state-owned group), 
education and training, planning, investments, regulatory issues - identified by a 
privatised electricity generator -, international issues, performance management, and 
mergers and acquisitions.
Finally, the respondents were asked to identify whether the number of managers in any 
particular field had increased, decreased, or remained unchanged since 1986.
British Group
(n=59)
Function Increase Decrease No change
Accounting, Finance and Control 34.7% 51.0% 14.3%
Taxation*** 26.9% 32.7% 40.4%
Information Technology 36.0% 36.0% 28.0%
Strategy development** 30.0% 46.0% 24.0%
Legal* 30.0% 30.0% 40.0%
Marketing 24.0% 22.0% 54.0%
Investor relations 22.0% 16.0% 62.0%
Public relations 22.9% 29.2% 47.9%
HR and IR** 33.3% 51.0% 15.7%
Table 3.44:
Note:
Percentage of British Firms which have Experienced Changes in 
the Number of Managers and Executives in Particular Head Office 
Functions
Comparisons between British and German respondents (Chi-Square tests): 
*** p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
German Group
(n=26)
Function Increase Decrease No change
Accounting, Finance and Control 38.5% 34.6% 26.9%
Taxation*** 7.7% 7.7% 84.6%
Information Technology 34.6% 38.5% 26.9%
Strategy development** 28.0% 20.0% 52.0%
Legal* 9.1% 27.3% 63.6%
Marketing 30.8% 23.1% 46.2%
Investor relations 26.9% 7.7% 65.4%
Public relations 36.0% 12.0% 52.0%
HR and IR** 26.9% 26.9% 46.2%
Table 3.45: Percentage of German Firms which have Experienced Changes in
the Number of Managers and Executives in Particular Head Office 
Functions
Note: Comparisons between British and German respondents (Chi-Square tests):
*** p<0.001 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
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These data show that the overall reduction in head office stafif reported by the British 
respondents have affected different functions to a different extent. The human 
resources and industrial relations functions, alongside accounting, finance and control, 
have been reduced in more than 50% of respondent companies. Nevertheless, as of 
1996 accounting and finance was still by far the largest functional area in the head 
offices of the British respondent companies. The two head office functions which more 
respondent companies expanded than reduced over the past ten years are marketing 
and investor relations. In both functions, however, comparatively little overall change 
has taken place, with 54% and 62% of companies respectively reporting no change at 
all.
On balance, little has happened with respect to the legal and IT departments of the 
head offices of the British respondents, where the number of companies with 
reductions equals the number of firms with increasing staff levels.
The results look rather different for the German respondent firms. Firstly, the overall 
number of companies which reported changing managerial staff levels in specific head 
office functions is generally lower than is the case for the British respondent 
companies. This is indicated by the number of taxation specialists on head office level, 
which has changed (in either direction) in only 15% of the German firms, as compared 
to 60% in the British case. Only in the case of two head office functions have the 
German respondent firms experienced approximately the same level of change as their 
British counterparts, namely information technology and marketing. Secondly, in five 
out of the nine specified functions, more firms have increased than reduced managerial 
staff levels, in addition to two functions where the number of firms with increases and 
the number of firms with reductions were equal. The only head office function which 
has seen substantially more reductions than increases is the legal function. In 
comparison, investor relations and public relations have seen a significant increase in 
the head offices of the German respondent firms since 1986.
In sum, the results on the changes in head office fimctions between 1986 and 1996 
reveal marked differences between the British and German respondent firms. The 
effect of the decreasing trend in managerial staff at the head office level of the British
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firms has affected virtually all head office functions, including those - such as finance 
and accounting - which have traditionally been seen as crucial head office tasks. The 
slight increase in managers who deal with investor relations may hint towards a greater 
concern for shareholder interests in British corporations. Among the German 
respondent firms, changes have taken place with respect to much fewer head office 
functions, and the number of firms with reductions and increases in specific functions is 
in many cases relatively close.
3.4 Critique of the Survey
In this section, an evaluation of the survey is provided. First, the disadvantages and 
limitations of the survey methodology adopted here are discussed. Second, particular 
items on the questionnaire are identified which were criticised ex post or which in the 
process of response collection and data evaluation appeared to have worked less well 
than had been anticipated during the design and the piloting of the survey.
The aim of the survey was to provide evidence on changes in corporate structure, a 
phenomenon whose complexity and multidimensionality was analysed in chapter 2. A 
prime concern is whether this complexity can be captured by questionnaire surveys in 
general, and whether the current survey has succeeded in doing so.
In order to address many of the issues discussed in chapter 2, the questionnaire 
contains a wide range of topics, thereby limiting the depth in which particular topics of 
interest could be probed. A principle limitation of the survey lies in its focus on the 
‘strategic apex’ of organisations (head office functions; centralisation and 
decentralisation of activities, etc.), thereby neglecting restructuring processes on lower 
organisational levels. However, it is arguable that more in-depth research into these 
issues, which would also require a different set of respondents, is more adequately 
carried out in form of case-study research (ch. 5).
The respondents found it easier to answer the questions on the boundaries of their 
firms than on internal organisation. The aggregate response rate with respect to 
questions referring to the boundaries of firms (excluding follow-on questions) was 
98.9% of all responses, compared to 87.8% for the questions regarding internal
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organisation (excluding follow-on questions; taking into account only responses on 
structural features as of 1996). This is explained primarily by the fact that many 
questions on internal organisation asked for quantitative data (e.g. head ofiBce size, 
etc.), which seemed to be difficult to provide for some respondents. On the other hand, 
a more general, non-quantitative phrasing of the questions concerned would have had 
obvious disadvantages in terms of accuracy and comparability across the two groups. 
Compared with the general lack of quantitative data on issues relating to the internal 
organisation of firms in the writings of Chandler and the authors in his tradition 
(section 2.2), the evidence produced by the survey is rich. In view of this, it is arguable 
that the balance that had to be struck between the breadth and the depth of the survey 
was appropriate.
That the honesty and willingness of the respondents to provide meaningful 
observations is a requirement for any kind of questionnaire survey was already 
mentioned in section 3.1. No guarantee for the adequacy of the data can be provided. 
However, research attempting to provide evidence on life inside the ‘black box’ of 
firms generally relies on the assessments of members of the organisations concerned. 
An exception to this is the ethnographic approach often used in anthropology, where 
researchers participate in the life of the social entity studied, and thereby provide 
observations ‘from within’ (Judd et al. 1991, ch. 13; Atkinson and Hammersley 1994, 
pp. 248-261). While this approach enables one to gather in-depth information on 
particular companies, it is hardly applicable where an overview of developments in a 
substantial number of organisations across countries is required.
In the following, two items on the questionnaire survey are identified which were 
found to work less well than had been anticipated.
• Question on diversification (section 3.3.1): Two issues with respect to this
question require further discussion. First, the question was criticised ex post by 
fellow students for not providing a definition of the terms used, namely 
‘refocusing’ and ‘diversification’, in the way other terms (e.g. ‘outsourcing’ in 
section 3.3.2) are introduced. Although this criticism shall not be dismissed lightly, 
it should be pointed out that the addressees, top managers in their organisations
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(section 3.2.3) can be expected to be familiar with some basic concepts. The 
question elicited a high response rate, and no comments pointing to any lack of 
clarity was given on the reply forms. Also, it should be pointed out that other types 
of research on diversification, for example the supposedly more ‘objective’ line of 
business-counts, are even more susceptible to self-reporting biases by companies, 
as will be argued below (Ch. 4). Second, it was criticised that the introductory 
sentence to the question (“It is widely held that ...”) may be leading, thereby 
inducing respondents to give answers in line with the supposed trend. This 
weakness of the question has to be acknowledged, although it can be argued that it 
probably had little effect on the response patterns. In line with the argument put 
forward above, the respondents can be expected to be aware of the wider 
‘refocusing debate’, and the various response options allowed the respondents to 
express their views in a neutral and anonymous way. Generally speaking, the 
problem of leading questions is more serious in psychological and behavioural 
research (see Newell 1993, pp. 99-107).
• The results on the question about the number of managerial layers in the main 
operating businesses of companies (section 3.3.7) would have been more valuable 
if data on the size of the respective businesses would have been available. A future 
edition of the questionnaire should include a request for these data at the three 
points in time. It has to be taken into account, however, that any requests for even 
more quantitative data are likely to reduce response rates.
Further improvements in the setup and the phrasing of the questionnaire are possible. 
For example, a question on the span of control of line managers rather than (or in 
addition to) the corporate head office as in the current version (section 3.3.9) could be 
considered. However, this would shift the thrust of the questionnaire away from the 
relationship between the head office and the operating businesses, towards more 
micro-organisational topics.
It can be said that, despite the weaknesses and limitations of the questionnaire survey, 
the survey has proven a valuable instrument in collecting information on corporate 
restructuring in 116 large non-financial companies in the UK and West Germany. The 
findings are summarised in the following section.
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3.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to give an overview of the main trends in corporate 
restructuring in the largest non-financial companies in the UK and West Germany that 
have taken place firom 1986 to 1996. Questionnaires were received fi*om 37.9% out of 
a population of 306 British and German firms. The survey addressed changes in the 
two key dimensions of corporate structure as identified in chapter 2, i.e. the boundaries 
of firms and their internal organisation. According to the results of the survey, far- 
reaching changes with respect to both dimensions have taken place in the two groups 
of respondent companies between 1986 and 1996. The main findings of the survey are 
as follows:
(1) Restructuring of the boundaries of firms
• The majority of the British respondent companies have taken steps to refocus their 
activity portfolios and reduce their degree of vertical integration. A number of 
techniques have been employed to this end: More than half of the British respondent 
firms have demerged or divested unwanted businesses. Some 80% of the 
respondent firms have made at least occasional use of outsourcing and contracting- 
out. Around 60% of the British firms have sold parts of their operations to former 
management. Using information fi*om published sources, it has also been shown that 
the use of management buy-outs in the context of corporate restructuring processes 
has been considerable in the UK. The trend towards reduced diversification and 
vertical integration has been accompanied by a trend towards increased horizontal 
integration and greater multinational engagement, as indicated by the findings on 
M&A strategies.
• The majority of the West German respondent firms have also reduced their degree 
of diversification and vertical integration, but the ratio of firms who have done so is 
significantly lower than in the case of the British respondent firms. At the same 
time, more of the German firms have engaged in vertical and diversifying mergers 
and acquisitions (in addition to horizontal ones) than has been the case for the 
British respondents. The use of management buy-outs for the divestment of 
unwanted businesses from corporate parents has been generally lower in West
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Germany than in the UK, as has been the incidence of divestments from the German 
participants in the survey. In sum, the restructuring of the corporate boundaries 
appears to have been more far-reaching among the British than among the German 
respondent companies. Comments from participants (e.g. with respect to 
diversification), as well as the aggregate data on management buy-outs, seem to 
suggest that a restructuring of the corporate boundaries among the German 
respondent companies has started during the first half of the 1990s, whereas in the 
UK these trends were apparent already during the second half of the 1980s.
• The British and the German respondent firms have made similar use of joint 
ventures and strategic alliances, which were strongly pursued by more than 40% of 
the firms in both groups.
(2) Changes in the internal organisation of firms:
• A far-reaching overhaul of administrative structures has taken place. A majority of 
respondent companies from both countries report that they have reduced the ratio 
o f administrative costs to total labour costs. They have also decreased the number 
o f managerial layers and the sizes of their head offices. However, both the extent of 
these changes, and the respective starting points have been different in the two 
groups of companies. In general, the move towards ‘leaner’ structures has been less 
pronounced among the German than among the British firms. On the other hand, 
the German respondent firms were found to have had a lower number of managerial 
layers in their main operating businesses than their British counterparts already as of 
1986, which may be explained by the smaller average size of the operating 
businesses (but no definitive conclusion can be drawn at this point). Moreover, the 
results point towards marked differences in the administrative structures of the 
respondent companies in the two countries. Head offices were typically larger (both 
in absolute terms and relative to overall company size) in the German than in the 
British respondent firms, whereas the proportion of head office staff who are 
managers was significantly lower in the German companies. Some differences in the 
functions of head office managers were found as well.
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• The median number of heads of operating businesses who report directly to the 
head office has declined from eight to five in the British respondent firms, but 
remained virtually unchanged at around eight in the German firms.
• The autonomy of line managers in financial decisions has either increased or 
remained the same in almost 90% of the respondent companies in both groups. As 
of 1996, research and development was carried out in about 60% of the firms within 
the operating businesses rather than at the corporate centre. There is, however, a 
substantial number of companies where no change in the organisational position of 
R&D has taken place. The general trend over the ten-year period has been towards 
greater decentralisation of decision-making in both groups of companies.
In sum, fundamental changes have taken place with respect to both the boundaries and 
the internal organisation of the large non-financial companies in the UK and West 
Germany on which this chapter reports. In many respects, these changes appear to 
have been more far-reaching among the British than among the German companies 
which have taken part in the survey. However, as many questions in the questionnaire 
address changes rather than static features of corporate structure, it is not possible in 
all cases to ascertain whether the respective ‘starting points’ of the two groups of 
respondent companies have been comparable. Nevertheless, the survey has provided 
evidence for the extent of corporate restructuring among the largest non-financial 
companies in the UK and West Germany.
’ This chapter is a revised and substantially expanded version of Richter (1997a). Other publications 
which report on the findings of the survey include Richter (1997b), and Richter and Owen (1997a and 
1997b).
 ^ It can be argued that the association with a body that is connected in a positive way with the 
population under study has helped significantly to achieve a favourable response rate (Moser and 
Kalton 1971, p. 262).
 ^As the survey was conducted in 1996, the list of the largest companies for this particular year could 
not be included.
In the TIMES 1000 series, the term ‘industrial companies’ is used in a very broad sense to include 
all non-financial companies, e.g. utilities, retailers, media groups and other non-manufacturing 
companies. This is reflected in the composition of the responses (table 3.7). Also, it should be pointed 
out that the TIMES 1000 includes companies regardless of whether they are in private or public 
ownership.
 ^The term Betriebswirtschafi is rather general; it includes strategic fimctions, but may also refer to 
activities in the area of controlling, budgeting or other.
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 ^ Calculating group size requirements yields the result that arithmetic means are not adequate 
measures of central tendency in this case.
 ^ It should be emphasised that the employment data for the companies include their worldwide 
workforce.
 ^ The various surveys diSer in their comparisons of the UK and the German outsourcing markets. 
Reports by Datamonitor (1997, table 6 and table 10) and the International Data Corporation (1996, 
pp. 28-29) estimate the UK market to be far larger than any other market in Europe (with Germany 
and France coming at second place), whereas Ovum Ltd. (1996, Market Forecast M3, pp. 13-15) puts 
the German market ahead of the UK. However, all reports agree that the IT outsourcing markets in 
both countries are growing significantly, and that the manufacturing industries are the biggest buyers 
of IT outsourcing services (a detailed industry breakdown is given in a report by M.A.C.E. 1997, p. 
98).
® For a more detailed description of MBOs see Chiplin et al. 1988, pp. 2fif.
This term follows Thompson, Wright and Robbie’s (1992, pp. 5-7) discussion of ‘restructuring 
transactions’.
A mean comparison test on the difference between the average number of joint ventures across the 
two country groups has a low power of 0.85. Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test yields the same result of no 
significant differences in the median numbers of joint ventures in the two groups.
Answers of this sort are not contained in the figures in table 3.21. This fiuther explains the 
seemingly low number of responses to the questions on joint ventures.
See Commission Regulation 3384/94ÆC, on the notifications, time limits and hearings provided 
for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control o f concentrations between undertakings, 
Aimex; published in Butterworth's Company Law, para. 5362.
The employment data that was collected refers to total company size. Data on the size of the main 
operating business is not publicly available. Experimentally, the number of managerial layers was 
related to total company size, but the results were not meaningfiil, and are not reported here. -  The 
finding that median company sizes among the British respondents were significantly larger than 
among the German respondents until 1990 (see section 3.2.5) would suggest that the larger number of 
managerial layers among the British respondents may be at least partially accounted for by their 
larger businesses before they underwent a substantial ‘downsizing’ process during the early 1990s.
The interpretation of the responses to this particular question is complicated by the fact that this 
question was slightly rephrased following the pilot survey, as the earlier version of the question 
proved difficult to understand in particular for German respondents. In the pilot study, the
participants were asked to identify whether the ratio personnel changed since 1986.
direct personnel
This question was answered by 11 companies in the pilot sample. Two of these firms later answered 
the question in the revised questionnaire. The answers of the nine remaining firms are included in 
table 3.25 above as well, as the thrust of the two versions of the question is the same. Statistically, the 
inclusion of the nine answers from the pilot survey does not alter the distribution of the responses. 
This can be taken as additional evidence that the two versions of the question were understood to 
address the same issue.
Quoted from a letter from BP with permission.
The formula would produce exact values if the companies concerned had no units which are neither 
classified as operating businesses nor as part of the head office. If, for example, a company had 
sizeable non-operative units which were located at a central level in the organisation, without being 
part of the head office (e.g. central maintenance departments, etc.), the above calculation would 
overestimate S as defined above. The available data does not allow to take this possibility into account.
The five respondent companies with a decentralised position of R&D as of 1996 which had 
experienced a centralisation shift over the decade before must have had an extremely decentralised 
position of R&D at the beginning of the period under consideration. Similarly, there are five 
companies with a centralised position of R&D which had experienced a decentralisation shift; these 
must have had an extremely centralised position of R&D in the mid-1980s.
Due to the heavily skewed distribution, the power of mean comparison tests would not have been 
satisfactoiy.
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There are eight respondent firms for which the ratio employees lO; six
Head office size
of these are German companies, while two are British.
This question was partly changed following the pilot study. In the pilot questionnaire, the 
participants were asked to detail the overall number of head ofBce personnel in 1996 with respect to 
four categories, namely managerial positions, non-administrative support staff, secretarial and clerical 
personnel, and other staff. The results for the pilot sample suggest that, with about 65%, by far the 
largest group of non-managerial head office personnel in 1996 was secretarial and clerical staff. The 
two groups of non-administrative support staff and other staff account for only about 17% of non- 
managerial head office staff each. - Following the pilot study it was decided that an overview of 
changes in the number of head office managers over time was more important to the investigation 
into corporate restructuring than a very detailed breakdown of head office positions at a recent point 
in time only.
^  According to German co-determination legislation (Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG], para. 33), 
limited companies (GmbH's and AG's) with more than 2000 employees are obliged to include a 
personnel director (Arbeitsdirektor) on their management boards (Geschâftsfûhning and Vorstand 
respectively). This requirement does not apply to a particular type of limited partnerships 
(Kommanditgesellschajt auf Aktien), of which, however, there are few among the largest non- 
financial companies.
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4. Diversification and De-Diversification Among Large Companies
in the UK and West Germany
4.1 Introduction
As has been shown in section 2.2 above, increasing diversification has been an 
important characteristic of the development of large companies in the industrialised 
countries during the 20* century. From 1950 to 1980, the average degree of 
diversification of the largest industrial companies in the UK and West Germany has 
increased steadily, adding to the increases in diversification that had taken place 
already during the first half of the century. In particular the late 1960s have seen a 
wave of diversifying mergers and acquisitions. The extant literature suggests that, by 
around 1980, large British companies were, on average, even more diversified than 
German ones.
During the 1980s, the popular management literature^ (Peters and Waterman 1982; 
Pascale 1990, p. 46; more recently Ries 1996 and Sadtler et al. 1997) began to claim 
that companies should 'keep it simple' and ‘refocus’ their business on those areas they 
are best at (‘stick-to-the-knitting’ philosophy). Strategy theorists also became more 
critical of corporate diversification strategies (Porter 1985, p. 320; Baden-Fuller and 
Stopford 1992, pp. 63-67; Grant 1991a, pp. 322-324; Lynch 1997, p. 559; Rotemberg 
and Saloner 1994).
Empirical research on the issue of diversification and de-diversification has 
concentrated mainly on the United States. The extant evidence -  some of which is 
reviewed in section 4.3.1 below -  suggests that American companies have decreased 
their degree of diversification throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The evidence on 
the UK and West Germany is sparser, and in some respects inconclusive.
According to the findings from the questionnaire survey (section 3.3.1), nearly 80% of 
the British respondent companies have reduced their degree of diversification between 
1986 and 1996. The finding for the German companies is less conclusive. While 51.3%
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of the German respondents said that they had reduced their degree of diversification, a 
substantial proportion (34.2%) said that they had increased diversification, while in 
14.6% no change in diversification was reported. The German respondents also 
reported a higher proportion of diversifying mergers and acquisitions than their British 
counterparts (section 3.4.3).
What is unclear, however, is
(a) the respective starting points for these divergent developments;
(b) how large any changes in diversification have been; and
(c) at what time exactly any such changes have taken place.
In order to answer these questions, in this chapter two data sets assembled by the 
author are used to measure the degree of diversification of large companies fi"om the 
UK and West Germany. The first data set contains information on 476 companies fi*om 
the UK and 75 companies from West Germany for every year between 1988 and 1994, 
whereas the second data set offers more detailed information on the activities of the 78 
largest UK non-financial companies in 1989 and 1995.
In order to arrive at the empirical conclusions on diversification, the measurement of 
the phenomenon under consideration is discussed first in section 4.2, where a new 
diversification index is suggested. It is not the objective behind defining this new index 
to play any measurement concepts off against each other. To the contrary, it is argued 
that different indices can be used in a complementary way. The particular aim behind 
the new index is twofold. First, its strength consists of the fact that it expresses how 
closely the different activities in the portfolio of a company are related, while other 
indices take into account mainly the number and the relative size o f these businesses. 
Hence the new index appears to be particularly valuable in the analysis of the strategy 
and structure of companies. Second, the new index can be applied in situations where 
information on the type of firm activities is available, but not on their relative size. This 
is the case with respect to the second data set used in the empirical section 4.3.
That part presents a literature review on changes in diversification since the beginning 
of the 1980s. Thereafter, three different diversification indices discussed before are 
applied to the two samples of companies mentioned above.
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Section 4.4 summarises the findings of the chapter and presents a synopsis of the 
evidence on diversification in British and German industry.
4.2 The Concept of Diversification and Its Measurement
4.2.1 The Concept of Diversification
In order to discuss the appropriate way of measuring diversification a working 
definition of the phenomenon has to be given: Diversification denotes a process by 
which an organisation expands the range of its operations beyond its existing activities
(see Pass, Caves, and Davies 1988, pp. 139-142 and Cosh 1987, pp. 888fif. for similar
definitions). Three dimensions of such an extension of activities are crucial:
• First, any expansion of activities results in the production of new products (goods 
or services), which to some degree will be different fi*om the existing ones. If  a 
company would simply produce a larger quantity of its existing product(s), this 
would constitute a case of horizontal integration rather than diversification (section 
2 .2 . 1).
• Second, with this expansion of the range of activities, the market o f the firm may
shift to a greater or lesser extent. Different products are likely to be sold to
different customers, which in turn may require different distribution channels, 
marketing methods, and so on. Moreover, companies may face other competitors 
than they did before, or deal with different suppliers.
• Third, the resources on which the firm draws - raw materials, human resources,
technologies and so on - may shift, so that the character of the firm as a buyer of
these resources may change with increases in diversification.
Overall, in this chapter diversification is understood in the sense of product 
diversification. It should be pointed out that other authors use different definitions of 
diversification. Patel and Pavitt (1994) for instance show that a majority of large 
European firms, in particular in chemicals, mining/petroleum, and machinery, have 
increased their degree of ‘technological diversity’ (as indicated by their patenting 
activities) between 1969-74 and 1985-90. While the exact relationship between
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difiFerent forms of diversification is unclear, it seems necessary to distinguish between 
different types of diversification.
According to the above definition of (product) diversification, two key aspects of a 
firm’s degree of diversification are
(a) the number o f  activity lines pursued by the company, 
and
(b) the relationships between these different lines of activities. Therefore, in 
determining the degree of ‘relatedness’ of different activities, it is important to take 
into account whether the products fi-om various business lines are delivered to the 
same type of customers, whether they share their distribution channels, and so on.
Many diversification indices (section 4.2.2) also take into account the relative size of 
the different activities, as measured by either their employment share or -  more 
frequently - the share of turnover that they generate. While this is a further aspect of 
diversification, it seems inappropriate to devise a diversification index with its entire 
focus on the activity shares. For example, the composition of a company’s turnover 
may shift substantially (e.g. due to changes in demand) without any accompanying 
changes in the scope of the company’s activities.
4.2.2 Conventional Diversification Measures
The basic concept used in industrial economics for measuring the degree of 
diversification of companies is the diversification curve, an analogy to the 
concentration curve (for a graphical exposition see Clarke 1985b, p. 197). A company 
that is active in n industries allocates a certain share of its employees to, or generates a 
certain share of its turnover from, each of these activities. The diversification curve 
results fi"om plotting the cumulative employment (turnover) shares on the vertical axis 
against n, ranked from the largest to the smallest one in terms of employment 
(turnover), on the horizontal axis. Firms whose activities are spread more equally 
across the industries in which they are active than other firms with the same number of 
industries will be represented by a less concave curve.
The diversification indices that have been suggested are based to a large extent on the 
Herfindahl concentration ratio used in industrial economics to measure the degree of
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monopoly power of companies? They take into account either the number o f industries 
only, or some weighting of the number of industries with their employment or turnover 
share. In particular, there are the following measures^:
(a) The number (n) o f industries, measured usually on some level of the SIC (Standard 
Industrial Classification) or a similar system. This measure is the simplest one that can 
be obtained, n is used as a diversification measure by many researchers (e.g. 
Schwalbach (1990) and Rondi, Sembenelli, and Ragazzi (1996)), as it can be 
calculated even in situations where either the share of the activities or their nature, or 
both, are unknown. Moreover, n is an appealing measure as it is non-technical and can 
be interpreted very easily. However, n takes into account neither the size nor the 
relationships between different activities of a company. Hoskisson et al. (1993, p. 225) 
find that other measures of diversification (such as the entropy measure and Rumelt's 
'subjective' categories; see below) perform much better in terms of convergent validity 
(i.e. the correlation with other indicators that measure the same underlying concept) 
and that «, ideally, should be used in conjunction with other diversification measures.
(b) The specialisation ratio is defined as the ratio between employment or turnover 
(%/) of firm i in its primary industry (the largest out of n industries in which firm i
operates) to its total employment or turnover (%), i.e. 5^, = — . Analogously, other
X
authors (e.g. Rondi, Sembenelli, and Ragazzi (1996)) use the diversification ratio DRi, 
which is the complement of 5, to 1, i.e. the share of total production or employment 
outside a firm's primary industry. Strictly speaking, and DRf are not diversification 
indices, as they do not take into account the different businesses a firm is engaged in. 
For example, a company with two businesses which allocates 60% of its employees to 
its primary activity would be regarded as having the same degree of diversification as a 
company with ten businesses, which also allocates 60% to its major activity. Therefore, 
the content validity -  the extent to which an empirical measure captures the 
phenomenon under consideration (Hoskisson et al. 1993, p. 217) - of 5 and DR is 
relatively low.
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2(c) Berry’s diversification index D is defined &s D = 1 -  '^p . , with denoting “the
i=I
ratio of the firm’s sales in the industry to the firm’s total sales in n industries” (Berry 
1975, p. 62). By taking the squares of the shares, the index is dominated by the largest 
share, i.e. by the primary industry of the firm. A similar index has been suggested by 
Montgomery (1982, p. 304), who finds that the index performs well if compared to 
Rumelt's categories. On the other hand, due to its domination by the largest activities 
of the company the index is bound to perform less well than the entropy index which 
can be calculated with exactly the same data that Berry's index requires.
n
(d) Utton's index W = 2 ' ^ ( i p . ) - l  is designed so as to equate to twice the area above
i=J
the diversification curve."  ^It is particularly useful as it is possible to "interpret any value 
of IT as a 'numbers equivalent'. For example, if W=4, it means that the firm is 
diversified to an extent equivalent to one operating in four industries" (Utton 1979, pp. 
15f). Goudie and Meeks (1982, pp. 447ff.) define four measures which apply Utton's 
index in a merger context.
k
(e) The Entropy index E  is defined as E = Ina^  ^ {sj being a firm’s share of
;=i
employment or turnover in industry j), which is derived fi"om the entropy concentration 
index (Waterson 1984, p. 169). £  is a useful measure in that it reflects both the number 
of activities and their shares in the portfolio of a company. Among two companies with 
three and four activities respectively and an equal distribution of shares across these 
activities, the one with four activities will have a higher value of E. Similarly, a 
company which allocates its resources equally across its three activities will have a 
higher entropy value than a company with the same number of businesses, two of 
which are very small as compared with its main activity.
The Entropy index is decomposable into within-sector and between-sector indices. 
Two components of E  can be calculated, one on a low-digit level of the SIC system 
(which indicates the broad industries in which a company is active), and one on a 
higher-digit level of the SIC system, indicating the degree of diversification within
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these industrial sectors. E  is then given by the sum of these two components (for 
details see Clarke 1985b, p. 200 and Hall and St. John 1994, p. 167).
Empirically, the Entropy index is rarely used, mainly because of the difficulty in 
obtaining detailed and reliable information on SIC-classified company activities and the 
shares of these activities in the portfolio of firms. The same applies to Berry's and 
Utton's indices. In the US, the Federal Trade Commission's Line o f Business program 
provided very detailed data for some time (which were not available to the general 
public, however), but has now ceased to do so.
Hoskisson et al. (1993, p. 230) find that E  performs well as compared to other indices. 
Hall and St. John (1994), however, contend that the continuous measures of 
diversification (for which E  is the chief example) have deficiencies when used in 
research on organisational structure and strategy, “because of their failure to tap the 
dimension of relatedness” (Hall and St. John 1994, p. 154) captured by the Wrigley 
and Rumelt classification schemes discussed below. As a second criticism, one could 
also argue that the continuity characteristic of E  and the other measures discussed so 
far is artificial in that it is based exclusively on the continuity of the measure of sales or 
employment shares of particular activities in a firm’s portfolio. The fact that the 
activity list in the SIC system is, by nature, a nominal variable on a discontinuous scale 
is thereby concealed. In other words, continuous diversification measures display a 
degree of precision that they actually do not have. As mentioned in section 4.2.1, E  
would reflect changes in the composition of a company’s employment or turnover 
shares which are not related to changes in diversification, but to changes in the product 
market. This can be seen, for example, in table 4.19 which presents empirical results on 
three measures of diversification («, E, and the measure r defined below), 
disaggregated by industry. When focusing on E, the five utilities companies in the 
sample appear to have experienced a slight increase in diversification (AE=+0.044), 
whereas the results on changes in n and r {An=Ar=Qi) show that the companies 
concerned have not experienced any changes in their activity portfolios.
In the empirical application of E, turnover shares rather than employment shares are 
generally used for weighting companies’ activities. The use of employment shares is 
difficult as many employees may be deployed across several activities, and others - like
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the administrative and the managerial staff - may not be working in the operating units 
at all. In particular as companies become more flexible in their use of labour with 
regards to both quantitative and functional criteria, it will be difficult to allocate an 
employee to a specific activity. However, the use of turnover shares suffers from the 
fact that sales figures in financial services are generally lower than in manufacturing 
industries. Therefore, E  may underestimate the degree of diversification of companies 
that are active in both manufacturing and financial services.
(f) Based on the four discrete diversification categories suggested by Wrigley (1970), 
Rumelt (1974; 1982) sets out a system of subjective diversification categories.^ He 
distinguishes between four broadly defined degrees of diversification, which are 
characterised principally by certain levels of the specialisation ratio as shown in table
4.1 below.
Specialisation
ratio
Broad diversification 
level
Diversification categories
(ordered from low to high diversification)
95-100% Single business (1) single business
(2) single vertical
70-94% Dominant business (3) dominant vertical
(4) dominant constrained
(5) dominant linked
(6) dominant unrelated
<70% Related business 
Unrelated business
(7) related constrained
(8) unrelated constrained
(9) multibusiness
(10) unrelated portfolio
Table 4.1: Rumelt's Diversification Categories
Source: Adapted from Montgomery 1982, p. 301
Note: The four broad diversification levels coincide with the categories developed by
Wrigley (1970).
Diversification on these four levels follows three patterns which can be exemplified 
using the following figures:
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D a
vertical pattern
constrained pattern
linked pattern
Figure 4.1: Rumelt’s Diversification Patterns
Source: Adapted from Montgomery 1982, p. 301
In these figures, squares denote businesses or activities, and filled squares the principal 
or 'core' activity o f  the company under consideration. In the vertical pattern o f 
diversification, companies integrate strictly those activities that form  the upstream  or 
downstream  parts o f the company's main business. A linked diversifier relates new 
businesses to existing ones, but not necessarily to its principal activity. A  constrained 
diversifier adds those kinds o f  businesses to its main activity which have some relation 
to it, w hether on a vertical (upstream or downstream) or on a horizontal (activities 
similar or parallel to its main activity) basis. A  family car m anufacturer that buys both 
its automobile retailer and a sports car producer provides an example.
Although Rumelt (1982, p. 360) provides a somewhat more formal definition o f  some 
o f  these 'patterns', it is still necessary to apply one's own judgem ent if  one wishes to 
assess which pattern a particular company follows. Rumelt's categories, which result 
from combining these patterns with the broad groups o f diversification, are therefore 
subjective.
The strength o f  Rumelt's categories lies in the fact that they shed light on the strategic 
direction that companies take in their diversification moves. His scheme has therefore 
been used primarily in the context o f strategy research. Rumelt w as also one o f  the first 
to develop the concept o f the 'core business' o f  companies, which underlies his scheme. 
The notion o f  the 'core competence', put forward by Hamel and Prahalad (1989) and 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) and others, is based on his concept.
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Despite its subjectivity, empirically the measure appears to perform reasonably well. 
Montgomery (1982, p. 303) finds high inter-rater-agreement for Rumelt's system. 
Hoskisson et al. (1993, pp. 226-230), who apply confirmatory factor analysis, find that 
quantitative measures of diversification such as the entropy index form clusters 
identical with Rumelt's categories, whereas this is disputed by Hall and St. John (1994,
p. 160).
The Wrigley and Rumelt categories have a number of disadvantages. First, their 
application requires very detailed information on companies, which normally is not 
available for a large number of firms. If information is sparse, one must expect the 
subjective element in the categories to influence the outcome more strongly. 
Quantitative information on turnover shares is also necessary. Second, assessing 
company activities is a time-consuming process, which cannot be done for large data 
sets. Third, the Wrigley and Rumelt diversification measure is a discrete (and rather 
coarse) variable on an ordinal scale, which makes those types of quantitative analysis 
impossible that require continuous variables. Fourth, the Wrigley and Rumelt schemes 
rely on a particular conceptualisation of the historical development process of 
companies, and may become obsolete once the direction of this process changes. In 
particular, it can be argued that the Wrigley and Rumelt categories are more apt to 
reflect increases rather than decreases in diversification, partly because the scheme is 
built so as to discern better between lower diversification categories than between 
higher ones. Consider the example of a conglomerate with ten unrelated businesses of 
roughly equal size. If the company tried to de-diversify by selling, for example, five out 
of its ten businesses, this ‘refocusing process’ would not be reflected by a change in its 
diversification category (‘unrelated portfolio’) in Rumelt’s scheme. Moreover, discrete 
diversification categories of the Wrigley / Rumelt type are not very sensitive to year- 
to-year changes in diversification; they are more appropriate to depict relatively 
permanent diversification levels of companies. For these reasons, the Wrigley and 
Rumelt categories will not be used below.
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4.2.3 Diversification Indices Based on Accounting Data
In this section, diversification indices are defined that can be used with the SIC codes 
which are assigned to companies on the basis of their trade descriptions in the annual 
reports. First, a brief overview of the SIC system is given. Second, the indices are 
defined, their properties examined, and an example for their calculation is provided.
4.2.3.1 The SIC System
The SIC system is a numerical classification scheme used to describe the activities of 
companies. It "starts with a small number of broad groups of activities which are then 
subdivided into progressively narrower groups so that the classification can be used 
with varying amounts of detail for different purposes" (Central Statistical Office 1979, 
p. 2). The British SIC system is therefore a strictly hierarchical classification system. 
The 1980 version of the SIC code that replaced the earlier versions of 1948, 1958 and 
1968 is a five-digit numerical system with a decimal structure:
jsi 2"^ * 3"^  4* 5* digit
11
‘divisions’  ^^
‘classes’ ^r
‘groups’ ' r
‘activities’ v
‘sub-divisions’
Figure 4.2: The 1980 SIC System
The first digit classifies all activities into ten different divisions, which are:
0 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
1 Energy and water supply industries
2 Extraction of minerals and ores other than fijels; manufacture of 
metals, mineral products and chemicals
3 Metal goods, engineering and vehicle industries
4 Other manufacturing industries
5 Construction
6 Distribution, hotels and catering; repairs
7 Transport and Communication
8 Banking, finance, insurance, business services and leasing
9 Other services
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Beyond the divisional level, the classification system distinguishes between 60 classes, 
222 groups, and 334 activity headings, which describe any activity of a particular 
company with increasing degree of detail. The 'descriptive sub-divisions' which make 
up the fifth digit "are intended primarily for ease of exposition. Their use for statistical 
purposes will be limited" (Central Statistical Office 1979, p. 3). In many cases, 
activities are not broken down into these sub-divisions (in this case the resulting fifth 
digit is 0) and, if they are, there are usually only two or three different activities on the 
sub-divisionary level. Therefore, the diversification indices constructed below rely on a 
decomposition of the different levels of SIC codes mainly on the basis of the first three 
or four digits (r  ^and Vd respectively). A supplementary index Ve taking into account the 
fifth digit is provided in addition.
SIC codes are assigned according to each type ofproduct which is mainly produced in 
one industry (Central Statistical Office 1979, pp. 17ff ). Beyond this, the assignment of 
the codes takes into account the following criteria: The nature of the process of the 
work done, the main raw material used, the type or intended use of goods produced or 
handled, or the type of service rendered. Therefore, it can be argued that SIC codes 
within a particular digit-level (i.e. with the same preceeding digits) describe activities 
that are more closely related than activities identified by codes that differ in a higher 
level of the 5-digit-system, so that the former represent a lower degree of 
diversification than the latter.
A general problem with the use of SIC codes arises from the fact that the legal 
disclosure requirements for company accounts with respect to different business lines 
are vague. British law leaves the decision about the detail of disaggregation in 
published accounts to the directors of companies. "If in the course of the financial year 
the company has carried on business of two or more classes that, in the opinion of the 
directors, differ substantially from each other, there shall be stated in respect of each 
class (describing it) (a) the amount of the turnover attributable to that class; and (b) the 
amount of profit or loss of the company before taxation which is in the opinion of the 
directors attributable to that class" (Companies Act 1985, Schedule 4, Part III, para 
55). Hadden (1983, p. 9) points out that the activity descriptions of holding companies 
are often much less detailed than the reports of their subsidiaries. The use of
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information from subsidiaries, however, is complicated by the large number of 
subsidiaries of many British holding companies. With respect to Germany, para 285 
section 4 of the Code of Commercial Law (Handelsgesetzbuch HOB) stipulates that 
the appendix to the Annual Statement of Accounts (Jahresabschlufi) shall specify “the 
breakdown of revenues by activity and by geographic markets, as far as [...] the 
activities and geographic markets are significantly different” (translation A.R.). The 
code does not define what ‘significantly different’ activities are, and provides 
exceptions from the stipulation for those companies that would be disadvantaged by 
the disclosure requirement (para 286 section 2 HGB). In sum, both British and German 
law are very vague with respect to the detail of the disclosure requirements for the 
activities of companies. Any diversification measure based on accounting data will 
therefore reflect differences in the degree of accuracy with which companies report on 
their activities. This, of course, poses the same problem to all techniques of measuring 
diversification described above.
4.2.3.2 Definition of a SIC-Based Diversification Index
SIC codes can be thought of as hierarchies of descriptors in a descending order. Tiers 
in these hierarchies are defined by / e [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]; i.e. the first tier is denoted by 1, 
the second tier by 2 and so forth. In the terminology of the Central Statistical Office, 
the first tier (^=1) indicates the 'division' into which any economic activity falls, the 
second tier (t=2) indicates the 'class', and so on. Let kt denote any generic digit on tier 
t.
Consider any tier  ^in a particular SIC code attached to a company. All generic digits kt 
in a SIC code with the same higher-ranking level digits (such as kt.j, kt-2 etc. depending 
on the level t considered) shall be said to belong to the same common parent. Let all 
generic digits kt with the same common parent at any given level t form the class® Ct. 
For example, the digits 4 and 6 in the SIC codes 23401 and 23688 of any one company 
shall belong to the same class Cj, which means that these two SIC codes have the same 
digits k2 and kj on the left-hand side of the tier (/=3) under consideration. Let the digits 
that belong to a particular class be called the elements of this class.
Note that according to this definition, the elements of a class are generic digits, not 
entire SIC codes. This means that the class C3 in the case of the company with the two
154
SIC codes given above has two elements, but its class C2 has only one element: For cj, 
there are two SIC codes with both the same 'left-hand' digit kj and the same digit k2 . 
This in turn means that there is only one generic digit on tier 2, so that the number of 
elements in class C2 is but one. In addition, there are two distinct classes C4 in this 
example, each with one element IC4 (k4 = 0  in the case of SIC code 23401 and Ar/=8 in the 
case of SIC code 23688). This is because the three digits kj, k2, and ks of the two SIC 
codes are not all identical - namely, they differ with respect to tier 3, as shown above.
In line with what has been said in the last paragraph, all classes cj contain but one 
element. This is because different first digits of several SIC codes do not have a higher- 
level (left-hand side) predecessor.
Note that, in this denotation, there can be several classes on any tier t even if the 
preceding digits are not all identical. Consider, for example, a company with the SIC 
codes 23401 and 23688 (as in the above case) and, in addition, with SIC codes 57643 
and 57791. Let the digits 4 and 6 on tier 3 of the first two SIC codes form a class c\ 
(because they belong to the same common parent), while digits 6 and 7 on tier 3 of the 
other two codes form another class . In other words: Let the number of classes 
formed at any level t of the SIC codes of a company be denoted by a superscript 
number /, i e{l,2,...,z) attached to Ct.
Furthermore, let be defined as the number of elements (generic digits) that 
constitute class c \ . For example, n\{c\) in the above example of the two SIC codes 
23401 and 23688 is 2, while n\(c\) and nj(cl) are both 1. Consequently, 
l«i(ci)-l] = 0 = [ n l { c l ) - \ ] . It is set out below why it is useful to subtract 1 from any 
nj(ci) in the definitions that follow.
In the next step, let the indices a, b, c, d, and e be defined as
a = i n i ( c \ ) - \
i-1
c=i[n;r4;-i]
i=l
d=ZWc'4)- l ]
i=l
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i=]
with a, 6, c, 6^  g e N .
If SIC codes on companies are only available up to any particular tier (in the case of 
the first data set used below only three-digit SIC codes are given), one can simply 
calculate, say, indices a, 6, and c, and leave d  and e out of consideration.
The non-technical interpretation of the indices ûr to g is as follows. Indices a to e 
represent measures of diversification at a particular tier of the SIC system. Any 
company has at least one activity, i.e. the minimum number of SIC codes attached to 
any company is 1. Such a company with but one activity is not diversified at all, so that 
the degree of ‘zero-diversification’ is attached to it. With respect to index a, a 
company with but one activity will, by definition, be active in but one 'division' (in the 
terminology of the CSO). Therefore, its degree of diversification on the first level (tier 
t=l of the SIC system) is a=(l-l)=0. If, however, a company is active in three 
divisions (as measured by the number of different digits on the first tier of the SIC 
system), it would have two activities more than it would have if it was not diversified 
at all, therefore a=(3-l)=2.
With respect to the following tiers 2, 3 and so on, these tiers can be thought of as 
branches of a tree. One has to go down each branch (sub-branch, sub-sub-branch etc.) 
and calculate the degree of diversification on each branch-level, applying the same 
logic as above: At the second level, each company must have at least one activity, so 
that the resulting index 6=(1-1)=0. If a company has two SIC codes in the same 
division (indicated by the first digit) but with different digits on the class-level (in the 
terminology of the CSO), its degree of diversification on this particular level consists 
of one activity more than it would have if it was not diversified at all on this level 
(therefore ô=[2-l]=l), and so on.
As an example, the following data is taken from the FAME data set for 1989 (see 
section 4.3.2.2) for the company Bunzl pic. Figure 4.3 displays its 'tree of activities':
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activities subdivisicnsdivisions classes groups 47106
47231
47280
48320
.48350
61900
83962
Figure 4.3; Activity Tree for Bunzl pic (1989)
The company is active in three divisions, therefore a=(3-l)=2. The logic behind this 
assignment is that, on this level, Bunzl is active in two more divisions than it would be 
if it had zero-diversification (i.e. if it was active in a single division only). On the two 
branches on the bottom there is no further differentiation, so these do not have to be 
taken into account any further. This is because all codes are regarded as equally valid, 
i.e. the 83962-code in Bunzl's case is considered to express the same degree of 
differentiation of activities as the 61900-code.
On the upper branch, the degree of differentiation on the second tier can be expressed 
as 6=(2-l)=l. On the group level, only the branches leading to the 471xx- and 472xx - 
codes show farther differentiation, so c=(2-l)=l. Further down on the level of 
different activities, the company is differentiated twice: There are two codes starting 
with 472 and two codes starting with 483, so ^^=(2-l)+(2-l)=2. Bunzl's SIC codes are 
not differentiated on the sub-divisionary level (the fifth tier), hence e=0 .
In this way, diversification indices are defined for every tier of the SIC system. The 
empirical results on a, b, c, d  and e give the most detailed overview on the 
diversification of companies, as they are disaggregated by the level on which
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diversification actually takes place. For the interpretation of the indices a  to e it is 
important to bear in mind that diversification can be regarded as a gradual process. It 
ranges fi*om completely unrelated (‘high’) diversification to the integration of few, and 
very closely related activities (‘low’ diversification), a indicates completely unrelated 
diversification, while d  and e represent a kind of diversification with more integrated 
features.
The scope of these indices is as follows ;
Scope of a, b, c, d, e in any 
potential decimal SIC system
Scope of a, b, c, d, e in the 
British SIC system of 1980
ae{(0;9)} a€{(0;9)}
6 e{(0;90)} b 6{(0;51)}
ce{(0;900)} ce{(0;121)}
J6{(0;9000)} ^e{(0;112}
e6{(0; 90000)} ee{(0;221)}
Table 4.2: Scope of the Diversification Indices a to e
The scope of the indices in any potential decimal SIC system refers to the maximum 
value that the indices could take if a company was active in all possible divisions, 
classes, groups and so on. For example, there are ten 'divisions' in any decimal notation 
system, so that the maximum value of a is a=(l0-l)=9, while the minimum value of 
any of the indices is generally (1-1)=0. A company that was active in all ten divisions 
and in all of the ten classes (as denoted by the next tier of the SIC system) would be 
active in ten divisions with ten classes each, i.e. the theoretical maximum value of b is 
= 10 X (10 -1) = 90. The same consideration applies to all other indices c to e. e would 
therefore reach its theoretical maximum of 90000 if (a) all possible 100000 SIC codes 
were existent and (b) a company was active in each of the sectors.
However, condition (a) in particular does not hold true. Many positions in the British 
SIC scheme, in particular on the tiers c, d, and e, are not filled. Even if a company was 
active in all businesses that the SIC system describes, the maximum value of the indices 
would be well below their potential value.
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Having discussed the diversification indices on each level of the SIC system, in the 
next step these indices are combined into one single indicator in order to obtain an 
aggregate measure of diversification. This is achieved by weighting the partial 
indicators a  to e in an appropriate manner. Higher-level diversification indices obtain a 
higher weight than lower-level indices, so that, for example, a company active in two 
completely different divisions receives a larger aggregate index than a company that 
has two narrowly related fields of activities with a close relationship between them. 
However, beyond this rule there is no general criterion to decide which weighting 
factors to apply to the constituents of such an aggregate index, which shall be called r. 
Therefore, two indices r and r' are defined which apply two different weighting factors. 
It will be argued below that the weighting system of r is superior to the one of r \
Let r' be defined as follows:
a b e d  e— 1 1 1 1  (1)
'  10 100 1000 10000 100000 ^ ^
In this context, the subscript e in Ve shall refer to the level in the SIC system which is 
taken into account. The empirical analysis below will use primarily Tc and (and Vc 
and Td respectively) as the availability of empirical data on the fifth-digit level of the 
SIC system is limited.
r' is designed so as to combine a, b etc. in a way by which one can immediately see the 
degree of diversification that a company has on each particular level in the SIC 
hierarchy, i.e. it has the 'numbers-equivalent property': A value of naught behind the 
decimal point means, for example, that the company is not diversified on the division 
level of the SIC system, 1 means that it is active in one division more than it would be 
if it was not diversified at all, and so on.
However, in r' the first digit is weighted heavily, while the following digits are 
neglected. One degree of diversification at the division-level is weighted 10000 times 
more important than a degree of diversification on the e-level. This is not realistic, as 
the maximum number of SIC codes allocated to a company is 14 in the relatively 
detailed FAME sample.
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Hence, f  should be interpreted merely as a code which allows over-time comparisons 
with respect to individual firms, rather than as indicators which are useful for further 
statistical calculations.
In order to obtain an aggregate diversification index that takes into account the 
different levels (a, b, c, etc.) in a more realistic way a weighting along a reverse 
geometric progression line is suggested’:
1 1 . 1  1 . 1
— — O + — D  C +  M 4 B
* 2 4 8 16 32 (2)
In this mode of weighting the different levels of the SIC system, each level of 
diversification counts twice the level of diversification following next to it. Again, r 
could be defined as Tc or r* depending on which level of the SIC system is taken into 
consideration.
From these definitions, the potential and the actual scope of r and r' can be calculated 
easily, which result from the scopes of cr to e as given in table 4.2 above*:
Potential scope of r and r* in 
any decimal SIC system
Potential scope of r and r ’ in 
the British SIC system of 1980
r,E((0;139.5)) r,e  f(0;32.375))
rje  |(0;702)} r ,e  ((0;39.375)}
T-.e {(0;3514.5)} r .e  ((0;46.28125)}
f(0;2.7)> r/6((0 ;1 .531)>
r/e ((0 ;3 .6 )} r/e{(0;1 .5422)}
r . ' s  f(0;4.5)} r.'ef(0 ;1 .5643))
Table 4.3: Scope of the Diversification Indices to and rc' to r /
Further to the properties of the indices thus defined, both r and r ’ are categorical 
(discontinuous) variables on an ordinal scale. However, r is very finely grained -  in fact 
much more so than n -, so that for the purpose of quantitative analysis it can be 
interpreted as a quasi-continuous variable. On the basis of this assumption, Shapiro- 
Wilk W  and Shapiro-Francia W  tests have been applied to the two data sets used 
below to test whether r and r ’ produce normally distributed results.^ The findings 
indicate that
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• the application of r can produce normally distributed results, whereas r ’ does not;
• for r to produce normally distributed results the activity descriptions of companies 
have to be accurate and detailed in level.
To summarise, r can be used as the aggregate diversification measure for inter-firm 
comparisons, r ’ is to be used only as a code that gives a quick overview of 
diversification on the within-firm level. Using the above empirical example o f Bunzl pic
(FAME data for 1989), = = —  — +— -—  = 0.2112 and
^ 10 100 1000 10000 100000
r, = r .  = —x 2 + —x i + - x l + — x 2 + — xO = 15, which is very close to  the average fo r 
2 4 8 16 32
1989.
In the empirical section 4.3.2 of this chapter, three diversification measures are used: 
The number of activities (77), the newly defined indices r and r ’ respectively, and, 
where possible, the Entropy index E. A complementary use of these measures yields a 
detailed insight into the degree of diversification of firms.
4.3 Empirical Evidence on Changes in Diversification
4.3.1 Literature Review on Changes in Diversification Since 1980
The general finding of the literature reviewed in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 is that there 
has been a general increase in diversification in British and German industry between 
1950 and 1980. In addition, most authors (e.g. Dyas and Thanheiser, and Schwalbach) 
find that this post-war diversification process has been slower in Germany than in the 
UK, and that in Germany a ‘bifiircation’ between some highly diversified companies 
and a large number of relatively specialised companies took place.
Rondi et al. (1996, see in particular p. 174), using data collected by Davies and Lyons 
(1996; for a data description see pp. 34-46), find that, as of 1987, leading British 
companies, with an average of 5.7 three-digit industries, were significantly more 
diversified than the EU average with 4.9 industries, and that leading German 
companies, with 4.6 industries, ranked slightly below the EU average. It is interesting
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to note that companies from the USA and Canada show an even lower degree of 
diversification, with 4.5 three-digit industries on average. The difference between 
German and British companies becomes even clearer if one uses the diversification 
ratio DR and Berry's index which they also compute. On the other hand, they find that 
the 30 or so largest German firms are relatively diversified, thereby corroborating the 
above thesis regarding the ‘bifurcation’ of German industry with respect to 
diversification.
With respect to changes in diversification, the scene for the European companies is set 
by clear evidence of a reduction in diversification in the US from the early 1980s 
onwards. Lichtenberg (1990) uses the Compustat sample of about 17000 
manufacturing establishments in the US, finding that the mean number of American 
SIC codes attached to the companies dropped by about 14% from 5.46 in January 
1985 to 4.70 in November 1989. He also finds that the number of highly diversified 
companies (with 20 SIC codes or more) declined substantially over this period of time. 
While he admits that the measure of diversification used (n) is a crude one, the results 
turn out to be highly significant in magnitude. Lichtenberg concludes that, in the US, 
the diversification wave had peaked already during the mid-1970s, and that 
diversification decreased continuously throughout the 1980s.
Markides’ (1993, p. 3; 1995^°, Ch. 4) work on the US qualifies Lichtenberg’s results. 
Analysing 250 of the large Fortune 500 companies he finds that whereas during each 
of the two successive periods of 1949-1959 and 1959-1969 little more than 1% of 
these companies had reduced their degree of diversification, this figure went up to 
20.4% between the 1981-1987 period (for an analysis of the characteristics of de- 
diversifying firms see Markides 1992b, pp. 91-100). Also, while in the two earlier 
periods up to a quarter of the companies became more diversified, this figure dropped 
to less than 10% during the 1980s. However, the latter finding also indicates that the 
refocusing trend in the US has not been universal. Based on the notion that the 
marginal returns to diversification decrease the more firms diversify (section 2.3.2), 
Markides (1992a, pp. 398-412) argues that every company has a firm-specific, optimal 
degree of diversification. While he maintains that this degree, in tendency, has become 
lower over the past 15 years or so, his argument implies that companies which for any 
reason were below this point in the early 1980s may still have found it worthwhile to
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diversify. Contrary to Lichtenberg, Markides finds little change in the average degree 
of diversification of the largest American firms.
Davies and Petts (1997) compare the degree of diversification and of 
multinationalisation of 65 British and 75 German leading manufacturing firms as of 
1987 and 1993. Using a Herfindahl index, they confirm the finding by Rondi et al. 
(1996) that British firms had a higher average degree of diversification than German 
firms in 1987. They also apply an entropy index to the same data for 1987 and 1993, 
finding that the British companies reduced their degree of diversification during that 
period by 7.9%, while the German firms saw a large increase in diversification by 
31.2%. Due to these opposite developments, they find the 75 German companies in 
their study to be slightly more diversified than their British counterparts as of 1993, as 
table 4.4 shows.
1987 1993 Change (%)
Britain 2.72 2.50 -7.9%
Germany 1.97 2.59 +31.2%
Table 4.4: Entropy Measure of Diversification for British and German 
Companies 
Source: Davis and Petts 1997, p. 21.
In interpreting Davies’ and Petts’ results on Germany, which, at first sight, seem to 
contradict the results of the questionnaire survey reported in chapter 3, one has to take 
account of two factors. First, Davies’ and Petts’ study of ‘market leaders’ includes a 
substantial number of German companies which traditionally had been relatively 
specialised, so that these had more potential for increases than for decreases in 
diversification. Second, their results refer to the period fi'om 1987 to 1993, whereas 
the questionnaire survey covers the ten-year period up to 1996. In fact, the results 
fi'om the questionnaire survey (section 3.3.1) suggest that those German companies 
which stated that they had refocused had started these refocusing processes only 
towards the end or after the period studied by Davies and Petts.
With respect to Germany, analysts at the investment bank JP Morgan (1996, pp. 27-29 
and 1997a), using a self-defined ‘corporate clarity index’, find that among a sample of
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36 large multi-business firms diversification increased slightly between 1990 and 1992, 
but that from 1992 to 1995 this process was reversed. They attribute this latter 
development to a refocusing process among five companies (Schering, Altana, Gehe, 
Mannesmann, and Degussa) of the sample and state that since 1995 more companies 
(e.g. Daimler, Thyssen) have begun to refocus. They also maintain that reductions in 
diversification have begun earlier, and have been more far-reaching, among British 
than among German companies. JP Morgan’s findings are consistent with the results 
from the questionnaire survey and with the findings reported in section 4.3.2 below.
Davies’ and Petts’ (1997) finding of a reduction in diversification with respect to 
British industry is corroborated by results from a questionnaire survey that Gerosld and 
Gregg (1993; 1994; 1997) have carried out to review the effects of the 1991/92 
recession on British companies. In the questionnaire, the participating companies were 
asked which strategies they have pursued in order to cope with the slack in demand 
during that period. They find that the decision to refocus and to concentrate on 'core' 
activities was one of the most widely adopted strategies to cope with the slump in 
demand: 312 out of 614 responding companies said that they had refocused on their 
'core' business. In addition, policies that can be related to refocusing (such as closure 
of plants and the disposal of assets) were also very popular. However, it is not clear 
whether the refocusing decision was just a short-term reaction to the recession, or 
whether it indicates a long-term trend.
In distinction to Davies and Petts, Gregg and Geroski, and to the findings presented in 
chapter 3, Whittington, Mayer and Curto (1997) and Whittington and Mayer (1997) 
report increases in diversification for the top 100 industrial firms in both the UK and 
Germany for the period between 1983 and 1993. Their work attempts to continue the 
line of investigation taken by the ‘Harvard Group’ of scholars (Channon, Dyas and 
Thanheiser and others), so that they use the Rumelt and Wrigley diversification 
categories. They find that the proportion of unrelated diversifiers among the top 100 
UK companies has increased by 9.4 percentage points, whereas the increase has been 
less strong in Germany (4.8 percentage points).
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Wrigley /  Rumelt 
Category
UK Germany
1983 1993 1983 1993
Single 6.7 4.5 17.2 12.7
Dominant 22.3 13.4 17.2 9.5
Related 54.7 56.7 44.8 55.9
Unrelated 16.0 25.4 19.0 23.8
Table 4.5: Wrigley and Rumelt Classifications for the Top 100
Industrial Finns in the UK and Germany
Source: Whittington and Mayer 1997, Tables 2 and 3;
Whittington et al. 1997, p. 11
In sum, the extant literature on changes in diversification in British and German 
industry during the period since 1980 is not as clear-cut as it is for the US, where there 
has been a clear refocusing trend. Methodological differences make it difficult to 
compare the results of various authors directly. Most authors - Whittington and his co­
authors being an exception -  find that large industrial companies in Britain have 
reduced their degree of diversification; this can be stated more clearly for the period 
since the late 1980s to which Davies’ and Petts’ and Gregg and Geroski’s findings 
refer. For Germany, the evidence is conflicting. While Davies and Petts, and 
Whittington et al. find diversifying tendencies in German industry, their results refer 
only to the period up to 1993. JP Morgan reports decreases in diversification since 
1992. It seems possible, therefore, that large German companies may have taken 
various directions. Any de-diversifying tendencies seem to have taken place only after 
1992.
4.3.2 Empirical Evidence from Two Data Sets on Companies from the UK and 
West Germany
In this section, empirical findings from the application of the three indices n, E, and r 
discussed above on two different data sets, the CEP Data Set on Company Activities 
(based on data from Datastream), and a data set drawn fi'om FAME, are presented. 
Before that, a brief description of the two data sets is provided.
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4.3.2.1 The CEP Data Set on Company Activities
The CEP Data Set on Company Activities consists of two data files, one with a total of 
745 British companies, and the other one with a total of 368 German companies. The 
data set was compiled by the author for the purpose of research on diversification, and 
a separate paper with a detailed description of the data set is available upon request. 
Therefore, the discussion may concentrate on the following issues:
The original provider of the data is Datastream, which reports on large, stock-market 
quoted companies worldwide since the 1970s. Data on activity segments, as measured 
by three-digit SIC codes, has been available since 1988. Datastream assigns these 
codes to companies on the basis of their annual reports. The CEP Data Set on 
Company Activities contains data for the 1988-94 period.
For the purposes of this chapter, restrictive criteria for the inclusion of companies were 
applied. First, companies with activity descriptions that appeared to be insufficient or 
unclear were excluded fi'om the sample. Second, only those companies were included 
for which data were continuously available. This left 476 British and 75 German 
companies. An exception from this rule was made for the analysis of diversification 
levels by industry, which necessitates a larger sample size; therefore, table 4.20 
includes all 306 German companies for which consistent data is available as of 1994 
only. Third, ‘catch-all’ SIC categories denoting ‘miscellaneous activities’ and the like 
were excluded from the analysis. The CEP Data Set on Company Activities also 
contains additional information on most of the companies included in it, in particular 
data on size measures (employment, total capital employed, turnover) and industry 
codes, denoting the broad industrial sector in which the companies are primarily active. 
Descriptive results on the means of the three size measures are reported in table 4.6. 
The data show that both samples capture a significant proportion of the respective 
economies of the two countries. The UK sample represents the equivalent of around 
20% (between 18.7% in 1994 and 20.4% in 1992) of the total population in 
employment in the UK. The average number of employees per company is consistently 
above 10,000. The German sample is far smaller than the UK one, but the 75 
companies in the sample are extremely large (e.g. companies such as Siemens, Daimler 
and Volkswagen with more than 200,000 employees are included). The 75 companies 
represent an equivalent of about 11% (between 10.7% in 1988 and 11.5% in 1992) of
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Description of Samples (CEP Data Set on Company Activities)
year UK Sample
(Arithmetic Means, 476 obs.)
German Sample
(Arithmetic Means, 75 obs.)
empl. tee Sales empl. tee sales
1988 11209 493.5 738.7 39036 5672.1 8461.7
1989 11558 584.1 871.0 40444 6575.1 9194.9
1990 11554 643.5 910.6 41909 6991.3 9804.1
1991 11173 689.9 921.5 44485 7207.2 10671.0
1992 11898 749.8 967.3 45294 7969.5 10979.6
1993 10898 789.9 1032.2 43769 8158.9 10927.0
1994 10610 805.7 1075.8 43439 8772.6 12171.9
Table 4.6: Mean Size Data for the Samples from the UK and West Germany
Note: Total Capital Employed (tee) and sales are measured in million units of the respective
currency
Correlation Between Employment and Diversification
year UK Sample
(476 obs.)
German Sample
(n=75 obs.)
/7c<->empl Eoempl TcOempl Wc<^ empl «c<^empl «c<->empl
1988 0.355 0.326 0.300 0.440 0.349 0.247
1989 0.345 0.315 0.292 0.392 0.371 0.238
1990 0.340 0.303 0.286 0.374 0.349 0.288
1991 0.339 0.293 0.289 0.369 0.351 0.286
1992 0.367 0.310 0.314 0.316 0.328 0.241
1993 0.390 0.324 0.337 0.338 0.360 0.273
1994 0.373 0.308 0.328 0.431 0.386 0.333
Table 4.7: Correlation between Employment and Diversification Measures
Note: All correlation coefficients are statistically significant at at least 95 percent
significance level.
year /ic^^E nc<r>rc Tc^ -^ E
1988 0.892 0.915 0.812
1989 0.898 0.917 0.812
1990 0.882 0.917 0.789
1991 0.897 0.918 0.802
1992 0.905 0.916 0.808
1993 0.905 0.916 0.810
1994 0.908 0.910 0.810
Table 4.8: Correlation among the three Diversification 
Measures n„ E, and
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the total population in employment in West Germany. The data on sales and total 
capital employed also indicate the large size of the companies in both samples.
4.3.2.2 The FAME Data Set
The second data set is drawn from FAME (‘Financial Analysis Made Easy’), a CD 
ROM containing accounting information for some 160,000, mainly British, companies. 
JORDAN, the publisher of FAME, assigns five-digit SIC codes to the companies on 
the basis of their annual reports that are filed with Company House. In the December 
1995 edition of FAME, JORDAN still used the 1980 version of the SIC codes, 
although a new version of the SIC was published in 1992. Since then, JORDAN has 
started to switch over to the new version of the SIC system. While old SIC codes are 
still reported, indications are that they are not updated any longer in a systematic 
fashion, but that their use is being phased out.
Using FAME the 78 largest British non-financial companies for 1989 were selected. 
FAME selects non-financial companies on the basis of a primary code that is attached 
internally to the company. For the same 78 companies, data was extracted from the 
1995 version of FAME, so as to obtain an exact match of the two samples. Five 
companies have merged or were acquired over this 6-year period (for example Glaxo - 
Wellcome), but this does not afreet the assignment of SIC codes to the companies. For 
example, even in the 1995 sample, Wellcome is assigned its own SIC codes. For 
comparisons between SIC codes and factors like employment, age and so on, however, 
these five companies have to be excluded, so that a sample of 73 companies remains. 
With average employment of 46336 as of 1989 and 44418 as of 1995, the companies 
are extremely large as compared to the sample from the CEP Data Set on Company 
Activities; they represent an equivalent of between 13.5% (1989) and 12.6% of the 
total UK labour force in employment.
A special remark has to be made regarding the 1995 data: For this year, the database 
shows the primary SIC code on the four-digit level that aims to describe the main 
business of the company. Using this code, the sample can be disaggregated by industry. 
On the other hand, this change in reporting policy makes it difficult to take into 
account the fifth digit level of the SIC system. If e is to be calculated, the only
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possibility is to assume that naught has to be added to the four-digit, primary code. 
Therefore, e and the derived measures re and rè have to be treated with caution, the 
more so as the fifth digit level adds little information to the preceding four SIC digits. 
It is safer to use Vd and r j  respectively, and the evidence below will be based entirely 
on these measures.
In sum, both data sets have particular advantages and disadvantages. The CEP Data 
Set on Company Activities contains information on a relatively large number of 
companies from both the UK and West Germany for all years from 1988 to 1994, and 
the turnover shares are attached to the activity codes. On the other hand, only three- 
digit SIC codes are given, so that only ric, E, and Tc can be calculated. The FAME data 
set is relatively small and limited to the veiy largest UK non-financial companies. In 
addition, no turnover or employment shares are attached to the SIC codes. These, 
however, are very accurate in level and detail, so that at least rid and r* and even rie 
and Te (under the limitations discussed above) can be calculated.
4.3.2.3 Results from the CEP Data Set on Company Activities
In the following, the results are first discussed by country (sections a  and h) and by 
industry (section c), before determinants of diversification levels (section d) and of 
changes in diversification (section e) are analysed.
(a) Diversification in the Sample o f  UK Companies
Table 4.9 presents descriptive statistics for the three main diversification indices nc, E, 
and rc for the 476 companies from the UK for which data is continuously available for 
all years between 1988 and 1994.
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year rte E Tc
mean std.
dev.
range mean std.
dev.
max. mean std.
dev.
max.
1988 2.105 1.406 1-11 0.405 0.483 1.883 0.393 0.500 3.000
1989 2.067 1.309 1-9 0.402 0.470 1.698 0.381 0.477 2.750
1990 2.019 1.232 1-9 0.392 0.443 1.587 0.362 0.456 2.750
1991 2.002 1.223 1-8 0.395 0.449 1.667 0.357 0.453 2.625
1992 1.983 1.231 1-8 0.381 0.451 1.707 0.351 0.455 2.875
1993 1.960 1.218 1-8 0.373 0.448 1.613 0.338 0.442 2.625
1994 1.887 1.112 1-7 0.357 0.431 1.639 0.316 0.404 2.375
Table 4.9: Descriptive Statistics on Diversification Indices, 476 UK Companies 
Note: The minimum values of E and are 0 in ail cases, so that here and in table 4.14
only the maximum values of the two indices are given.
Each of the three main measures for diversification (Wc, E, and shows a decrease in 
diversification between 1988 and 1994. The average number of activities in which the 
companies were engaged (w^ ) dropped by 10.4% fi'om 2.1 in 1988 to less than 1.9 in 
1994. The maximum number of activities in which any particular company (Inchcape 
pic) was involved decreased from 11 to 7. The decrease in mean diversification levels 
was particularly marked from 1988 to 1990 and from 1992 to 1994, whereas between 
1990 and 1992 the decrease in diversification took place more slowly.
In order to test whether the changes in diversification reported in table 4.9 are 
statistically significant, mean comparison tests can be applied to each of the three key 
measures of diversification, comparing the mean for each year with the corresponding 
mean for each other year. Significance levels resulting from these tests are given in 
tables 4.10-4.12. It is shown that the decrease in each of the three measures of 
diversification over the overall period 1988-1994 is statistically significant at at least 
99.5% significance level, ric and Vc show this change more clearly than the entropy 
index E. In addition, the mean comparison tests confirm the particular 'timing' of the 
changes that has been suggested above: The changes from 1988 to 1990 and from 
1992 to 1994 turn out to be significant, whereas the changes in diversification between 
1990 and 1992 are too small to gain statistical significance.
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Mean comparison tests: Uc 
(476 observations)
year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1989 as.
1990 p<0.05 p<0.05
1991 p<0.05 p<0.1 as.
1992 p<0.01 p<0.05 as. as.
1993 p<0.005 p<0.01 p<0.1 as. n.s.
1994 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p«0.0001 p<0.0005 p«0.001 p<0.0005
Table 4.10: Significance Levels of Year-to-Year Mean Comparison Tests on Diversification
Index He (476 UK Companies)
Mean comparison tests: E  
(476 observations)
year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1989 as.
1990 as. as.
1991 as. as. as.
1992 as. as. a s . p<0.1
1993 p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.1 p<0.05 as.
1994 p<0.005 p<0.005 p<0.005 p<0.001 p<0.05 p<0.05
Table 4.11: Significance Levels of Year-to-Year Mean Comparison Tests on Diversification
Index E (476 UK Companies)
Mean comparison tests:
(476 observations)
Tc
year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1989 n.s.
1990 p<0.05 p<0.05
1991 p<0.05 p<0.1 as.
1992 p<0.01 p<0.05 n.s. n.s.
1993 p«0.001 p<0.005 p<0.1 p<0.1 n.s.
1994 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.001 p<0.005 p<0.005 p<0.01
Table 4.12: Significance Levels of Year-to-Year Mean Comparison Tests on Diversification
Index Tc (476 UK Companies)
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An analysis of the indices a, b, and c, which constitute shows at which level the 
reduction in diversification has taken place. The arithmetic means of these indices are 
displayed in table 4.13.
Arithmel ic Means
year a b c
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
0.603
0.590
0.559
0.548
0.542
0.517
0.487
0.225
0.210
0.202
0.204
0.193
0.191
0.181
0.279
0.269
0.261
0.252
0.250
0.254
0.221
Table 4.13: Arithmetic Means of Diversification 
Indices (476 UK Firms)
According to these data, de-diversification has taken place at each of the three levels, 
i.e.
• companies have left divisions in the Standard Industrial Classification altogether 
(drop in a)\ this change has been the largest in size of all three changes.
• some companies have left classes of businesses within the same division (drop in b)\
• some companies have left groups of businesses within the same classes (drop in c). 
Index a  is a measure for the number of different divisions in which a company is active; 
they represent the least related activities within the SIC system. The fact that the 
largest drop has occurred in a (rather than in b or c) suggests that companies have left 
in particular those industries which are least related.
In sum, the data from the CEP Data Set on Company Activities suggest that a marked, 
and statistically significant, decrease in diversification has taken place during the 1988- 
1994 period among large UK companies.
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(b) Diversification in the Sample of West German Companies
The results on the 75 German companies for which continuous data are available are as 
follows:
year rte E Tc
mean std.
dev.
range mean std.
dev.
max. mean std.
dev.
max.
1988 2.827 1.631 1-9 0.624 0.478 1.687 0.507 0.481 2.375
1989 2.800 1.602 1-9 0.638 0.477 1.692 0.517 0.507 2.375
1990 2.853 1.674 1-10 0.648 0.480 1.703 0.530 0.537 2.875
1991 2.840 1.669 1-10 0.667 0.497 1.750 0.528 0.542 2.875
1992 2.867 1.687 1-10 0.664 0.510 1.682 0.538 0.549 2.875
1993 2.800 1.716 1-10 0.649 0.519 1.790 0.515 0.564 2.875
1994 2.627 1.487 1-7 0.604 0.505 1.771 0.452 0.481 2.125
Table 4.14: Descriptive Statistics on Diversification Indices, 75 West German Companies
These data show a slight increase in mean diversification levels fi'om 1988 to 1991/92, 
followed by a decrease that was particularly marked between 1993 and 1994. The 
maximum number of activities by any one company was 9 in 1988/89 (Karstadt), this 
increased to 10 in the years from 1990 to 1993 (Karstadt), but decreased to 7 in 1994 
(VIAG and RWE, as Karstadt had reduced the number of its activities to 4). Mean 
comparison tests (tables 4.15-4.17) show that the changes in diversification reach 
statistical significance only when the years with high diversification levels (1990 to 
1992) are compared with the low diversification levels of 1994. In sum, over the 1988- 
1994 period mixed developments have taken place among the 75 German companies 
reviewed. While during the first few years a slight (albeit not a significant) increase in 
diversification took place, this trend was reversed between 1992 and 1994.
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Mean comparison tests: nc 
(75 observations)
year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1989 n.s.
1990 n.s. n.s.
1991 n.s. n.s. n.s.
1992 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1993 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1994 n.s. n.s. p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.1
Table 4.15: Significance Levels of Year-to-Year Mean Comparison Tests on Diversification 
Index He (75 West German Companies)
Mean comparison tests: E  
(75 observations)
year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1989 n.s.
1990 n.s. n.s.
1991
1992
p<0.05
p<0.1
n.s.
n.s.
p<0.1
n.s. n.s.
1993 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1994 n.s. n.s. n.s. p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.01
Table 4.16: Significance Levels of Year-to-Year Mean Comparison Tests on Diversification
Index E  (75 West German Companies)
Mean comparison tests:
(75 observations)
rc
year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1989 n.s.
1990 n.s. n.s.
1991 n.s. n.s. n.s.
1992 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1993 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1994 n.s. n.s. p<0.1 p<0.1 p<0.05 p<0.1
Table 4.17: Significance Levels of Year-to-Year Mean Comparison Tests on Diversification
Index Tc (75 West German Companies)
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Table 4.18 shows mean levels of indices a, h and c for each year from 1988 to 1994.
Arithmet ic Means
year a h c
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
0.627
0.667
0.667
0.667
0.693
0.653
0.547
0.347
0.333
0.387
0.387
0.360
0.360
0.347
0.853
0.800
0.800
0.787
0.813
0.787
0.733
Table 4.18: Arithmetic Means of Diversification 
Indices (75 West German Firms)
The data show that the decline in diversification from 1992 to 1994 was due primarily 
to companies leaving unrelated divisions of activities in the SIC system. As compared 
to the UK sample, the German companies are notable for their large average number of 
groups of activities (index c) within classes (index b \  although this has decreased in 
the 1988-1994 period.
(c) Analysis by Industry
Due to the large sample size for the UK firms, the data set can be used to analyse both 
levels and changes in diversification on an industry-by-industry basis. In this context, 
the definition of 'industry' is taken from Datastream which assigns all companies to a 
total of 16 broadly defined industrial branches". Table 4.19 provides an overview of 
mean diversification levels for 1994 and mean changes in diversification from 1988 to 
1994 by industry.
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Industry obs. Level of diversification in 
1994 (means)
Changes in diversification 
(means)
Wc E Arte AE Ar,
Chemical industry 18 1.722 0.350 0.181 -0.389 -0.124 -0.153
Constmction industry, 
incl. building materials
49 1.918 0.343 0.327 -0.Î84 -0.064 -0.084
Electrical /  electronics 
industry
26 1.846 0.325 0.226 -0.154 -0.070 -0.014
Engineering ^ 67 2.194 0.561 0.384 -0.269 -0.057 -0.073
Paper, packaging, 
printing
21 1.857 0.401 0.304 +0.041 +0.048 +0.030
Textiles, apparel 15 1.733 0.292 0.258 -0.467 -0.078 -0.175
Consumer goods 27 2.222 0.498 0.403 -0.667 -0.168 -0.218
Pharmaceuticals / health 
care
11 1.818 0.262 0.239 +0.091 -0.021 +0.045
Household goods, 
furniture
9 1.667 0.296 0.264 -0.667 -0.177 -0.208
Other manufacturing ° 33 2.727 0.656 0.674 -0.485 -0.124 -0.220
All manufacturing 276 2.065 0.444 0.360 -0.301 -0.079 -0.104
Distributors, retailers 63 1.762 0.251 0.290 -0.127 -0.031 -0.048
Transport 8 2.250 0.461 0.563 -0.125 -0.044 -0.031
Utilities 5 2.000 0.225 0.450 0 +0.044 0
Media + 14 1.571 0.286 0.286 -0.571 -0.144 -0.188
Financial 41 1.146 0.053 0.067 -0.146 -0.055 -0.064
Other Services 69 1.739 0.297 0.284 +0.029 +0.077 +0.013
All non-manufacturing 200 1.640 0.237 -0.257 -0.105 -0.006 -0.038
All non-financial 436 1.954 0.385 0.339 -0.225 -0.047 -0.077
Table 4.19: Diversification Levels and Changes by Lidustry, 476 UK Firms
Note:  ^Including vehicle assembly and steel producers,
° Including mineral extractors.
 ^Thom EMI is included under ‘other manufacturing’.
With respect to diversification levels  as of 1994, the 276 manufacturing companies are 
considerably more diversified than the 200 non-manufacturing companies. The 
differences are statistically significant at at least 95% significance level for every year 
from 1988 to 1994, regardless of the diversification measure used.
Among the manufacturing companies, engineering firms (e.g. Glynwed International, 
Vickers pic) and consumer goods companies (e.g. Dalgety pic. Northern Foods pic) 
are the most diversified^^, whereas firms in the chemicals, electrical / electronics, 
textiles, pharmaceuticals and household goods industries show a low degree of 
diversification. Among the non-manufacturing industries, the eight transport 
companies^^ in the sample (e.g. P&O, the Transport Development Group pic and 
Ocean Group pic) are very diversified, as are the utilities. The industry with the lowest 
degree of diversification in the UK sample is the financial industry, which includes both
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banks and insurance companies. Broadly speaking -  and necessarily simplifying -, 
companies in the relatively ‘traditional’ and mature industries (e.g. in engineering, 
transport, utilities) are more likely to be diversified than companies in more ‘modem’ 
industries such as in pharmaceuticals and finance. Construction appears to be an 
industry with a traditionally low degree of diversification. The high degree of 
diversification among engineering companies exemplifies the prevalence of integrated 
engineering groups, such as FKI, GKN, I I , and T&N in Britain. In addition, the 
evidence suggests that sectors in which UK firms have held a long-standing 
involvement (i.e. consumer goods) tend to be relatively diversified.
The data on changes in diversification show that not all UK companies have followed 
the general 'refocusing' trend. Among the manufacturing companies, de-diversification 
has been strongest in the consumer goods (e.g. Tate & Lyle, Hazlewood Foods) and 
household goods (e.g. Paterson Zochonis) industries. Companies in the chemicals (e.g. 
Courtaulds) and textiles industries (e.g. Lamont Holdings) have also decreased their 
degree of diversification. Little has changed with respect to the pharmaceuticals / 
health care and paper / packaging / printing industries, both of which were already 
relatively focused as of 1988. Among non-manufacturing companies, changes in 
diversification have generally been less significant than among manufacturing 
companies. An exception to this is the media industry (e.g. Pearson) where de­
diversification has been strong. No change in diversification can be observed among 
the group of ‘other service companies’ and among the utilities.
Table 4.20 presents the results on those 306 German companies for which data is 
available as of 1994.
177
Industry obs. Level of diversification in 
1994 (means)
He Ec Tc
Chemical industry 14 2.786 0.753 0.455
Construction industry 29 1.931 0.391 0.263
Electrical / electronics 
industry
19 2.053 0.410 0.263
Engineering ^ 70 2.357 0.512 0.382
Paper, packaging, 
printing
8 1.875 0.386 0.250
Textiles, apparel 22 1.909 0.339 0.239
Consumer goods 27 1.778 0.236 0.194
Pharmaceuticals /  health 
care
10 1.800 0.584 0.446
Household goods, 
furniture
7 2.286 0.584 0.446
Other manufacturing ° 36 2.472 0.542 0.514
All manufacturing 242 2.178 0.448 0.343
Distributors, retailers 20 2.400 0.466 0.531
Transport 8 2.875 0.424 0.531
Utilities 19 2.000 0.313 0.303
Financial 9 1.111 0.004 0.056
Other Services, incl. 
media
8 1.625 0.330 0.266
All non-manufacturing 64 2.063 0.333 0.305
All non-financial 297 2.185 0.436 0.344
All companies 306 2.154 0.424 0.335
Table 4.20:
Note:
Diversification Levels by Industry, 306 West 
German Firms 
 ^Including vehicle assembly.
° Including mineral extractors.
As of 1994, most German industries show higher average diversification levels than the 
respective UK industries, the exception being the consumer goods industries and the 
financial service companies (of which there are few in the German sample, however). 
Among the manufacturing companies, the 14 companies in the chemical industry (e.g. 
BASF, Bayer, Hoechst) show the highest average diversification level; pharmaceuticals 
(e.g. Altana) and household goods companies (e.g. the furniture producer DLW) are 
also relatively diversified. This contrasts starkly with the results for the UK. German 
consumer goods companies appear to have a relatively low degree of diversification. 
Among the non-manufacturing industries, companies in the transport industry (e.g. 
Lufthansa) have an extremely high degree of diversification; distributors / retailers (e.g. 
Karstadt, Asko) are also relatively diversified. Financial services companies show a 
low degree of diversification. Overall, the differences between manufacturing and non­
manufacturing companies with respect to diversification are not as great as in the UK.
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Determinants o f Diversification Levels
The results of sections (a) and (b) suggest that the 476 companies in the UK sample 
had a lower average degree of diversification than the 75 German companies for every 
year during the 1988-1994 period. This finding may, however, result fi*om the fact that 
the UK sample, being far larger than the German one, contains a large number of 
comparatively small companies which, due to the positive correlation of company size 
and diversification (table 4.7) can be expected to have a relatively low degree of 
diversification. Moreover, the two samples differ with respect to their industrial 
composition (tables 4.19-4.20), which can influence the degree of diversification 
significantly. In order to control for differences in company size and industry 
composition, the following OLS regression is carried out:
( 1 ) div^  t~  Po'  ^Pi employments +^ P2 ind +^ p  ^country^+ e
where
diVi^  t = diversification variable for company i in year t
(«C, E  and Tc are being used as diversification measures) 
employmenti, t = number of employees of company z in year t (in 0,000s)
ind = industry dummies for the 15 industries listed in table
4.20
country = country dummy (0 for UK, 1 for Germany)
s  = error term
If, industry and company size held constant, the companies in the German sample have 
a larger degree of diversification than their UK counterparts, the coefficients p 3 should 
take on positive and significant values. Moreover, the regression function makes it 
possible to isolate the effect of company size on diversification, controlling for the 
effects of industry and country background.
The results which are reported in table 4.21 can be summarised as follows:
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dependent
variable
(div)
year Po
(t-values)
Pi
(t-values)
Pb
(t-values)
R^ F-
statistics
obs.
1988 2.012"'
(7.348)
0.125*"
(7.77)
0.308'
(1670)
0.217 9.00 538
1989 1.908' ' 
(7.298)
0.113 " 
(7.44)
0.374'
(2.191)
0.203 8.40 544
1990 1.787' ' 
(7.068)
0.108"'
(7.52)
0.449
(2.742)
0.198 8.20 547
ttc 1991 1.714'"
(6.819)
0.105'"
(7.392)
0.457'"
(2.803)
0.196 8.08 548
1992 1.884' ' 
(7.456)
0.104'"
(7.209)
0.512' ' 
(3.103)
0.201 8.33 548
1993 1.854'"
(7.457)
0.114'"
(7.699)
0.435' ' 
(2.675)
0.213 8.96 547
1994 1.823'"
(8.294)
0.112' ' 
(8.378)
0.309"
(2.146)
0.242 10.60 548
1988 0.492'"
(5.345)
0.035'"
(6.418)
0.098
(1.584)
0.222 9.27 538
1989 0.449'"
(4.979)
0.034' ' 
(6.545)
0.101
(1.709)
0.213 8.93 544
1990 0.438'"
(5.052)
0.032'"
(6.388)
0.113"
(2.016)
0.199 8.22 547
E 1991 0.394'"
(4.449)
0.031'"
(6.238)
0.134"
(2.327)
0.193 7.95 548
1992 0.404'"
(4.524)
0.032'"
(6.288)
0.146"
(2.501)
0.194 8.01 548
1993 0.404'"
(4.588)
0.035'"
(6.703)
0.128'
(2.231)
0.212 8.89 547
1994 0.430'"
(5.124)
0.035'"
(6.819)
0.093'
(1.686)
0.223 9.51 548
1988 0.316'"
(3.278)
0.030*"'
(5.245)
0.031
(0.480)
0.173 6.79 538
1989 0.271'"
(2.869)
0.029'"
(5.287)
0.053
(0.853)
0.156 6.09 544
1990 0.212"
(2.305)
0.030'"
(5.791)
0.072
(1.214)
0.153 5.98 547
rc 1991 0.191”
(2.079)
0.030'"
(5.778)
0.078
(1.312)
0.146 5.66 548
1992 0.231"
(2.509)
0.030'"
(5.716)
0.102'
(1.705)
0.155 6.08 548
1993 0.219"
(2.468)
0.033'"
(6.232)
0.077
(1.324)
0.172 6.89 547
1994 0.225'"
(2.841)
0.032'"
(6.545)
0.023
(0.436)
0.191 7.84 548
Table 4.21: Regression Results: Determinants of Diversification Levels
Notes: Significance levels of F-values (all cases): Prob > F=0.0000
Significance levels of coefficients: * p ^ 0.1
" p^O.05
*’*p<0.01
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•  The three independent variables in the regression explain between 15 and 24 
percent in the variation of diversification levels, depending on the year and the 
diversification measure considered. Generally speaking, using ric and E  as 
independent variables produces more significant results than when Vc is used. Also, 
the R^-values and the coefficients on the country dummies are lower when Tc is 
used as the independent variable than when ric or E  are used.
• As is suggested by the correlation coefficients reported in table 4.7, company size, 
as measured by the number of employees, is positively associated with 
diversification. The coefficients on employment are highly significant (at p<0.01) 
for every year fi*om 1988 to 1994. Ceteris paribus, an additional 10,000 employees 
increase the number of activity lines (wj of companies by a margin of about 10-12 
percent on average.
• The coefficients on the country dummies are positive in all cases. If  diversification 
is measured by ric orE , coefficient Ps reaches significance in all years except 1988; 
if diversification is measured by 7*^  Pa takes on a significant value only for 1992. 
Based on these results, it is not possible to draw an unambiguous conclusion 
regarding the question of whether, during the period under consideration, German 
companies had a higher degree of diversification than their counterparts in the UK. 
The results do confirm, however, marked differences in the timing o f changes in 
diversification between companies fi"om the two countries, as suggested in tables 
4.9 and 4.14. The companies in the UK sample reduced their average degree of 
diversification throughout the period from 1988 to 1994. The German companies 
did not follow this trend until 1992, but rather increased their degree of 
diversification, so that in this particular year they were significantly more 
diversified than the companies in the UK sample. After 1992, German companies 
began to de-diversify, moderately at first, and more decisively after 1993, so for 
1993/94 it is unclear whether the differences between the two samples reach 
statistical significance.
Overall, the results of regression (1) allow to identify important determinants of 
diversification levels. Company size is positively and significantly associated with 
diversification. In addition, the results confirm that the trends in diversification have 
been different in the UK and West Germany: A continuous de-diversification in the
181
former country between 1988 and 1994, whereas in the latter de-diversification has 
started only after 1992.
(e) Determinants of Changes in Diversification
Furthermore, it is possible to isolate various determinants of changes in diversification. 
Following Markides (1992a, pp. 398ff.; 1993, pp. 2fF. et passim), it is arguable that 
those companies reduced their degree of diversification which, relative to their industry 
average, had a high degree of diversification (i.e., in his language, were ‘over­
diversified’) until the beginning of their refocusing process. Moreover, it is worthwhile 
testing whether changes in the degree of diversification in individual companies were 
accompanied by employment changes. In order to test these two arguments, the 
following OLS regression is carried out:
where
indavi^  t=s8 = average degree of diversification of the industry in which 
company / is operating, as of 1988 (using the 15 
industries given in table 4.20)
The other notations are as in regression (1).
A country dummy is not included as the regression is carried out separately for the UK 
and West Germany.
If  Markides’ argument holds true, coefficient Pi should take on negative and significant 
values. With respect to /?2, one should expect the coefficient to take on positive and 
significant values if any changes in diversification were associated with employment 
changes in the same direction, i.e. decreases in diversification by reductions in 
employment, and increases in diversification by expansions in employment. If, 
however, p i took on negative and significant values, any reductions in diversification 
would have been associated with employment increases. This would suggest that 
companies that de-diversified replaced their earlier diversification by an expansion of 
their remaining (‘core’) businesses (i.e. horizontal integration).
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The results on regression (2) are displayed in table 4.22.
Diversification 
measure used
Po
(t-values)
P i
(t-values)
P i
(t-values)
F-
statistics
obs.
UK sample:
nc 0.754*" -0.794*** -0.0001 0.349 125.59 471
(10.385) (-15.836) (-0.114)
E 0.073*" -0.121*** -5.32x10^ 0.205 60.15 471
(4.043) (-10.955) (-0.019)
Tc 0.083*** -0.159*** -0.0001 0.314 107.19 471
(4.596) (-14.632) (-0.193)
German sample:
nc 0.326 -1.040*** 0.377" 0.280 12.43 67
(0.972) (-4.698) (2.088)
E -0.087 -0.082* 0.103" 0.101 3.48^ 65
(-1.004) (-1.867) (2.002)
rc -0.052 -0.224*** 0.169*** 0.334 15.54 65
(-0.523) (-5.118) (2.697)
Table 4.22: Regression Results: Determinants of Changes in Diversification
Notes: Significance levels of F-values: ^Prob > F=0.0369; Prob > F=0.0000 otherwise
SigniGcance levels of coefGcients: p^O.l 
p ^ 0.05
’ p ^ 0.01
The results can be summarised as follows:
• In the regressions using either sample, ric and Tc perform better than E. Judging by 
the R^-values of the regressions when ric or Tc are used as diversification measures, 
the independent variables explain 28-35% of the variation in the dependent 
variable.
• The results on coefficient Pi provide strong support for the hypothesis that those 
companies that were diversified relative to their respective industry averages 
decreased their degree of diversification. In other words, over-diversification has 
given way to a return to the ‘middle’, here perceived as the industry-specific 
average.
• With respect to the German sample, there is clear evidence that changes in 
diversification were associated with changes in employment in the same direction 
(i.e. reductions in diversification with reductions in employment, increases in 
diversification with increases in employment). For the sample of UK companies, 
the coefficient on employment changes {P^ is extremely small and statistically 
insignificant regardless of the diversification measure used, so that no clear
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relationship between changes in employment and changes in diversification can be 
established/"^
To summarise, the results of regression (2) confirm that extensive diversification 
relative to the respective industry average as of 1988 has been a significant determinant 
of decreases in diversification during the 1988-1994 period.
4.3.2.4 Results from the FAME Data Set
The FAME data concern the 78 largest non-financial companies in the UK as of 1989 
and 1995. Descriptive statistics on the various diversification indices that can be 
calculated from FAME are given in table 4.23.
1989 1995 Mean
Vari­
able
mean std. dev. range mean std. dev. range compa­
rison test
a 2.01 1.23 0-5 1.38 1.05 0-4 p<0.001
b 1.00 0.97 0-4 0.78 0.98 0-5 p<0.1
c 1.18 1.17 0-5 1.03 1.04 0-4 n.s.
d 0.46 0.78 0-3 0.31 0.61 0-2 p<0.1
e 0.26 0.65 0-3 0.67 0.80 0-3 p<0.0001
ftd 5.60 2.50 2-11 4.49 2.13 1-10 p<0.01
ne 5.85 2.62 2-14 5.15 2.30 1-11 p<0.1
Td 1.43 0.74 0.06-3.19 1.04 0.64 0-2.88 p<0.0005
Te 1.44 0.74 0.16-3.19 1.06 0.64 0-2.88 p<0.0005
r/Hd 0.25 0.07 0.03-0.5 0.21 0.09 0-0.38 p<0.005
rjne 0.25 0.08 0.04-0.5 0.19 0.08 0-0.38 p<0.0001
Table 4.23: Descriptive Statistics on Diversification Indices, 78 Non-Financial Companies in
the UK
Note: Correlation coefficients between and rid (and between r, and respectively) are
between 0.818 and 0.897 and are statistically significant at p<0.0001.
The results confirm that, between 1989 and 1995, the largest non-financial companies 
became significantly less diversified. The companies reduced the average number of 
their activity lines, as measured on the four-digit SIC level from 5.6 in 1989 to 
4.49 in 1995, a reduction of about 20%. This trend is even more clearly shown by a 
27% reduction in Vd, which decreased from 1.43 to 1.04, and a similar reduction in Vg. 
The maximum number of business lines, as measured by rid (We), decreased from 11 
(14) to 10 (11). The changes in the various diversification measures are, with the 
exception of c, statistically significant, as mean comparison tests show.
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An analysis of a, b, c, d  and e shows at which levels the reductions in diversification 
have taken place. The results in table 4.23 show that, in particular, the reduction on the 
first ('divisionary-'), the second ('class-'), and fourth (‘activity-’) levels are statistically 
significant. The companies also appear to have become less diversified on the third 
(‘group’-) level of the SIC codes, but the reduction does not stand the relevant 
significance tests. In this respect, the FAME data set differs fi*om the CEP Data Set on 
Company Activities, as the latter shows a significant reduction in c from 1988 to 1994 
(table 4.13), whereas according to the FAME data the reduction in c (between 1989 
and 1995) is not significant. On the other hand, the data sets agree in that they show 
that companies have left complete divisions of activities (reduction in a) and, within 
divisions, classes of businesses (reduction in b).
The significant increase in e is accounted for by the change in JORDAN'S reporting 
practices. This shows that the appropriate level of analysis is r j (and, on the firm level, 
r j\ see below) rather than and re respectively.
It can also be asked whether the decrease of r j and r® is due only to the reduced 
number of business lines of companies, or whether, controlling for changes in the 
number of business lines, companies have become engaged in more closely related 
businesses. Dividing rj by rij and by respectively and comparing the means of 
these ratios for the two points in time shows that this is not the case: decreased
from, on average, 0.25 in 1989 to 0.21 in 1995 and r/ne from 0.25 to 0.19. Both 
reductions are statistically highly significant. This shows that the companies have not 
only reduced the number of activities they are engaged in, but have also concentrated 
their activities within fewer groups of the SIC system. Therefore, in 1995, they tended 
to engage in more closely related businesses than in 1989.
In sum, the results reported in table 4.23 show that the largest non-financial companies 
in the UK tended to leave primarily those businesses which were most unrelated, as 
measured by the two highest levels of the SIC codes. The degree of unrelated 
diversification of non-financial companies in the UK has decreased substantially.
Table 4.24 details the distribution of the changes in the number of business lines of the 
78 companies concerned.
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Changes in the number of business 
lines
% of companies
(78 obs.; 1.28% represent 
one company)
left 8 business lines 3.85
left 7 business lines 1.28
left 6 business lines 7.69
left 5 business lines 2.56
left 4 business lines 8.97
left 3 business lines 1.28
left 2 business lines 8.97
left 1 business line 16.67
no change in number of business lines 20.51
Added 1 business line 11.54
Added 2 business lines 8.97
Added 3 business lines 2.56
Added 4 business lines 2.56
Added 5 business lines 1.28
Added 6 business lines 1.28
Summary statistics:
% of companies which added 
business lines: 28.19
% of companies which left business 
lines: 51.27
Table 4.24: Distribution of Changes in the Number of Business Lines
The data confirm that far more companies have reduced than increased the number of 
their business lines. In addition, it is noteworthy that companies have left up to eight 
business lines within the six-year period, while even the most expansive ones in the 
group drawn from FAME did not add more than six new lines.
Table 4.25 presents a sector breakdown of mean values of Vd for 1989 and 1995. In 
this context, 'sector' refers to the first digit of the primary SIC code of the companies 
in 1995.
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SIC Obs. Mean value of ra M ean compa­
Division 1989 1995 rison test
2 (mineral extraction, 
steel, chemicals)
20 1.47 1.33 n.s.
3 (metal 
manufacturing)
14 1.10 0.91 n.s.
4 (clothing, consumer 
goods)
21 1.41 1.14 n.s.
6 (retail, hotels, 
catering)
10 1.61 0.58 p<0.005
other 13 1.64 0.90 p<0.05
Table 4.25: Changes in Diversification by Lidustry
For ail five sectors listed in table 4.25 the mean values of ra have decreased. The 
reduction has been particularly marked in sector 6 (retail, hotels, catering) and in the 
category 'others' which represents three companies in sector 1 (energy / water supply), 
four companies in sector 5 (construction), five companies in sector 8 (business 
services) and one company in sector 9 (other services). It should be noted that the 
companies in these two groups have changed not only their degree of diversification, 
but also their main business area, because they have left their primary manufacturing 
base by which they were classified in the 1989 sample. What has happened, therefore, 
is that highly diversified ('conglomerate') non-financial companies in the early 1990s 
altered their business strategy fundamentally and went into different industries in which 
they engaged in new, more narrowly defined activities.
If  one switches the focus of analysis to the firm-level (table 4.26), using in particular 
Vd\ one sees that the maximum value of ra reduces from 0.5131 (Lonrho) as of 1989 
to 0.4121 (Dalgety) as of 1995. It is particularly the very diversified companies in 1989 
(BET, Lonrho, Pearson; all three with ra > 0.5) that have reduced their diversity 
substantially: In 1995, their r^-values are 0, 0.1001 and 0.2 respectively. Many other 
firms with an r^'-value in 1989 larger than 0.4 have reduced their degree of diversity as 
well (BICC, British Petroleum, Burmah Oil, Tate & Lyle). The examples given here 
illustrate the findings of the statistical analysis reported above.
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Company r/(1989) r/(1995) r/(1989) r/(1995)
ALLIED-LYONS .00202 .11101 .002 .111
AMEC .21201 .21101 .212 .211
ARGYLL GROUP .121 .11 .121 .11
ASDA GROUP .2 .103 .2 .103
B.A.T INDUSTRIES .24 .11 .24 .11
BASS .21201 .21401 .212 .214
BEAZER .2 .001 .2 .001
BERISFORD .21112 .22001 .2111 .22
BET .51 .00001 .51 0
BICC .405 .202 .405 .202
BLUE CIRCLE .202 .202 .202 .202
BOC .3231 .223 .3231 .223
BOOKER .211 .30001 .211 .3
BOOTS 111 .211 111 .211
BOWATERI. .30001 .1012 .3 .1012
BRITISH AEROSPACE .03 .13001 .03 .13
BRITISH PETROLEUM .4201 I .4201 .1
BRITISH STEEL .0021 .1031 .0021 .1031
BTR .21 .21201 .21 .212
BUNZL .2112 .21121 .2112 .2112
BURMAH OIL .401 .201 .401 .201
BURTON GROUP .2 .001 .2 .001
CADBURY SCHWEPPES .101 .10101 .101 .101
COATS VIYELLA .1121 .11211 .1121 .1121
COOKSON GROUP .11211 .12112 .1121 .1211
COURTAULD .212 .12 .212 .12
DALGETY .11 .41213 .11 .4121
DAVY CORP. .21321 .01001 .2132 .01
HSONS .2 .201 .2 .201
FITCH LOVELL .112 .01001 .112 .01
GEC .1111 .0112 .1111 .0112
GEORGE WESTON .1 .10001 .1 .1
GEORGE WIMPEY .311 .30101 .311 .301
GKN .2111 .01001 .2111 .01
GLAXO HOLDING .3001 .3 .3001 .3
GRAND MET .32301 .10001 .323 .1
GUINNESS .101 .11101 .101 111
HANSON .21 .351 .21 .351
HARRISONS .423 .4021 .423 .4021
HAWKER SI .22202 .00102 .222 .001
IMI .3121 .312 .3121 .312
ICI .4311 .2021 .4311 .2021
J. SAINSBURY .2 .011 .2 .011
JOHNMOWLEM .211 .102 .211 .102
JOHNSON MATTHEY .121 .21101 .121 .211
KWIKSAVE .1 0 .1 0
LEX SERVICE .331 .12001 .331 .12
LONRHO .5131 .1001 .5131 .1001
LUCAS INDUSTRIES .01 .01 .01 .01
NORTHERN FOOD .00201 .10103 .002 .101
PEARSON .5111 .20001 .5111 .2
PILKINGTON .00013 .10013 .0001 .1001
RACAL ELECTRONICS .1 .202 .1 .202
RANK ORGANISATION .2 .20403 .2 .204
RANKS HOVELL .312 .11201 .312 .112
RECKITT & COLMAN .202 .204 .202 .204
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REED INT. .2111 .10001 .2111 .1
RMC GROUP .1 .30101 .1 .301
ROLLS-ROYCE .01001 .01002 .01 .01
S& N .221 .22101 .221 .221
SEARS .23233 .121 .2323 .121
SIEBE .1102 0.00001 .1102 0
T & N .211 .1212 .211 .1212
T I GROUP .312 .3101 .312 .3101
TARMAC .101 .20101 .101 .201
TATE & LYLE .414 0 .414 0
TAYLOR WOODROW .3 .12 .3 .12
THE RTZ CORP. .2 .211 .2 .211
THORN EMI .1053 .1 .1053 .1
TOMKINS .22 .14212 .22 .1421
TRAFALGAR HOUSE .411 .401 .411 .401
UNIGATE .3111 .21111 .3111 .2111
UNILEVER .1222 .11111 .1222 .1111
VICKERS .1422 .0212 .1422 .0212
WELLCOME .11 .11 .11 .11
WHITBREAD .122 .12201 .122 .122
WOLSELEY .3213 .31321 .3213 .3132
WPP GROUP .3121 .00101 .3121 .001
Table 4.26: Diversification Values (r /  and r«') for Individual Companies
(Data from FAME)
The case evidence coincides with the above findings in that particularly the companies 
with a high degree of diversification in the highest levels of the SIC system have 
become substantially less diversified between 1989 and 1995.
4.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to provide empirical evidence on recent diversification 
trends in large companies in the UK and West Germany, using appropriate 
diversification measures that reflect important aspects of corporate diversification such 
as the number of activities, their ‘relatedness’ and, where possible, the relative size of 
different activity lines. A number of conventional diversification measures were 
reviewed first. Thereafter, the SIC system was discussed and an index r defined that 
builds upon the activity descriptions of companies to which SIC codes are assigned. 
The particular advantage of the new index (and its constituents a to e) is seen in the 
fact that they take into account the degree of ‘relatedness’ of a company’s various 
business lines, an important aspect of diversification. Moreover, the measures can be 
used even in those situations where data on activity shares of companies are not
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available, so that many conventional diversification measures, such as entropy indices, 
are not applicable.
In the empirical part of the chapter, evidence on levels of and changes in the degree of 
diversification of large companies in the UK and West Germany since the second half 
of the 1980s is provided. Most of the extant literature, which is reviewed in section 
4.3,1, suggests that diversification among large UK companies has decreased during 
this period, although the exact timing of any such changes remains unclear. Less 
evidence on diversification among West German companies is available, and the 
existing information is inconclusive.
In section 4.3.2, empirical evidence on diversification among large companies in the 
UK and West Germany is provided, using two data sets compiled by the author. The 
main findings from an analysis of the CEP Data Set on Company Activities are that
• diversification levels among large UK companies have declined significantly during 
the 1988-1994 period. There are significant differences in diversification levels 
across industries. As of 1994, average diversification levels are higher among 
manufacturing than among non-manufacturing companies, and diversification 
among non-financial companies exceeds the degree of diversification among 
financial services companies. On the other hand, by 1994 manufacturing companies 
had already undergone a significant de-diversification process that had been 
stronger than in non-manufacturing companies.
• among large companies in West Germany, various developments with respect to 
diversification have taken place. From 1988 to 1991/92, average diversification 
levels have increased rather than decreased, although these changes were not 
statistically significant. After that, a -  first moderate, then more pronounced -  
decline in diversification has taken place. As in the UK, highly diversified 
companies in West Germany are concentrated in particular sectors, such as the 
transport and the engineering industries.
• comparisons between the samples from the UK and West Germany point primarily 
towards differences in the timing of de-diversification trends in the two countries. 
While a number of large, highly diversified companies exist in both countries, de­
diversification trends seem to have been underway in the UK already during the 
second half of the 1980s, whereas in West Germany any such changes started only
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after about 1992. From roughly comparable starting points - if 1988 can be taken 
as a benchmark -  de-diversification in West Germany has started later, and has so 
far been less pronounced, than in the UK.
• de-diversification during the 1988-1994 period has been, at least in part, a reaction 
to over-diversification (as compared to the industry average) before 1988. In 
particular in the UK, unrelated diversification has given way to a focus on more 
closely related activities.
The findings fi*om the analysis of a data set drawn fi*om FAME on the 78 largest non- 
financial companies in the UK confirm that
• a significant de-diversification process has taken place among these companies in 
the 1989-1995 period. Companies have not only become engaged in fewer business 
lines, but have concentrated their activities in businesses that are more closely 
related.
• more than half (51.27%) of the 78 companies concerned have left business lines, 
while less than a third (28.19%) have added business lines. Case evidence shows 
that in particular those companies that were most diversified in 1989 have 
thereafter decreased their degree of diversification. This supports the econometric 
evidence presented before that de-diversification can be understood as a reaction to 
over-diversification.
The findings help re-evaluate and partly reconcile the empirical literature on 
diversification in the UK and West Germany summarised in section 4.3.1. With respect 
to the UK, the empirical results support the findings of most earlier authors -  
Whittington, Mayer et al. (1997) being the exception -  that a pronounced de­
diversification process has taken place since the second half of the 1980s. This is also 
consistent with the results of the questionnaire survey (section 3.3.1). With respect to 
West Germany, the data provide evidence for an incipient de-diversification trend as of 
1992, up to which point diversification had increased. This is consistent with the 
results by Davies and Petts (1997), while it confirms the findings of the JP Morgan 
studies (1996, 1997) which -  using a small sample -  suggest 1992 to be the ‘turning 
point’ with respect to corporate diversification trends in Germany. The findings also
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help re-interpret the results of the questionnaire survey, according to which a majority 
of German companies had refocused, while on the other hand a considerable 
proportion had increased diversification. Given that the survey refers to 1986-1996, 
the responses are likely to reflect the various trends that have, taken place during this 
period, according to the statistical analysis presented in this chapter.
Overall, the chapter has provided evidence for significant changes in diversification, an 
important dimension of the boundaries of firms. Judged by this measure, corporate 
restructuring has taken place in both the UK and West Germany, but has started earlier 
and has been more pronounced in the former than in the latter country.
' Kanter (1989, pp. 88ff.) also seems to suggest that American companies would benefit from greater 
‘focus’. - For a critique of this literature see Guest (1983).
 ^ A more comprehensive concentration index is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) which is 
defined as the sum of the squared values of all firms’ market shares in a given market (for details see 
Hirschman 1964, pp. 761-762).
 ^ The following overview draws on Clarke (1985b, pp. 197-201).
 ^ In Utton’s index, the notations given under (c) are used, although. Utton (1979, p. 15) suggests to 
measure the activity shares in terms of employment, rather than turnover.
 ^The two classification schemes are similar, so that it has become customary to refer to them as the 
‘Wrigley and Rumelt categories’. Whittington and Mayer (1997, without page) state that “the actual 
approach to classification differs slightly between the Wrigley and Rumelt traditions, the first being 
more historically-sensitive and the second highlighting vertical integration” (for a more detailed 
outline of the differences see Whittington and Mayer 1997, Appendix I).
® In the following, the term 'class' does not refer to the 'class' in the terminology of the Central 
Statistical Office.
 ^ It would have been ideal to weight the observed a, b, c etc. with the inverse factor of the maximum 
values that they could take. The problem with this is that, because of the design of the SIC system, 
there are fewer digits on the fourth than on the third tier of the system [max(<f)=112, whereas 
max(c)=121], so that the fourth tier would have obtained more weight than its preceding tier.
* In this table, the scopes of to r, and of rJ to r*' respectively are given, as these are the indices that 
are applied in the empirical analyses (sections 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.2.4).
® To be precise, the data show a truncated normal distribution between the limits denoted by the 
scopes of the two indicators. The Shapiro-Franica W test for normality can be used for both truncated 
and non-truncated distributions.
For a detailed review of Markides’ 1995 book see Richter and Owen (1997c).
" Datastream assigns to companies a total of 74 industry codes within 16 industrial branches, which, 
with a few modifications to warrant sufficient group size and consistency, are used here. - The 
industry assignments do not change over time.
The group of 'other manufacturing' is the most diversified one; however, this includes companies 
which Datastream describes as ‘conglomerate’, so that these companies are by definition very 
diversified.
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The transport industry (according to Datastream's assignment) is not a very homogenous group. For 
the purpose of research on diversification it may not be appropriate to group shipping companies 
(which are, in many cases, large and diversified) together with specialised airline operators and the 
like.
Nevertheless, it may be noted that P2 takes on negative values in all cases which suggests that, if  
anything  ^ employment increases in primary activities have substituted for the loss of businesses 
through de-diversification.
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5. A Case Study of Corporate Restructuring in the German
Company Hoechst in Comparison to the British Company ICI^
5.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters, an overview of recent corporate restructuring trends in the 
UK and West Germany from 1986 to 1996 (ch. 3), and of changes in diversification in 
these two countries (ch. 4), was provided. This chapter presents a case study of 
corporate restructuring in a German company, Hoechst AG, and compares Hoechst’s 
case with the restructuring process that has been taking place at ICI pic in the UK. The 
aims of the chapter are as follows:
• First, to provide an illustration o f corporate restructuring processes in two large 
industrial companies, using the concepts and analytical tools developed in chapter 
2. In that chapter, it was argued that corporate restructuring involves changes in 
two respects: The firm’s boundaries, and its internal organisation, and five crucial 
elements of each of these two dimensions of corporate structure were outlined (see 
the summary in section 2.4). In the application of this conceptual scheme in the 
case study, it is possible to identify potential linkages between the two key 
dimensions of corporate structure, thereby capturing the complexity of corporate 
restructuring processes. Also, the case study provides detail on particular aspects 
o f corporate restructuring (in particular concerning the internal organisation of 
firms) which are difficult to investigate in settings where larger numbers of 
companies are analysed.
• Second, to furnish further evidence on the cross-national differences in the timing 
and the extent o f corporate restructuring suggested in chapters 3 and 4. The 
results of the comparative case study are consistent with the findings of the earlier 
chapters. Detail on the sequence of corporate restructuring processes is provided.
• Third, to develop -  not to test -  working hypotheses about factors that help 
explain these differences in the timing and the extent o f corporate restructuring, 
based on the observations as to which factors caused or hindered ICI and Hoechst 
to restructure. The working hypotheses developed here will be taken up in chapter
194
6, where they are integrated into a wider theory of the cross-national differences in 
corporate restructuring between the UK and West Germany.
In order to achieve these aims, the focus of the chapter is on two companies that share 
many basic features, so as to facilitate comparisons between their recent restructuring 
processes. For much of the post-war history, Hoechst and ICI have been the largest 
companies in the German and British chemical industry respectively^, and the histories 
of the two companies show many similarities (sections 5.3.1 and 5.4.1). Their 
respective restructuring processes have been addressing comparable situations, namely 
excessive diversification, the combination of chemical and pharmaceutical activities in 
the same organisation, and overly large and cumbersome administrative structures. 
Also, the restructuring of the two companies has taken place on the background of the 
maturing of the chemical industry, as detailed below.
The chemical industry is primarily an intermediate industry, supplying mainly firms in 
other manufacturing industries. Therefore, much of the chemical industry is highly 
dependent on the general state of the manufacturing and construction industries, 
making the chemical industry very cyclical. Since the two oil shocks of 1973/74 and 
1979/80, the chemical industry has suffered from high input prices, low growth in the 
demand for manufactured goods, and a declining share of manufacturing in GNP. From 
1980 to 1993, turnover of basic industrial chemicals in the EU, in inflation-adjusted 
prices, has declined (European Commission 1997, p. 13). A second characteristic of 
the chemical industry is that many chemical processes require high initial investments 
into R&D and production capacities which often have very large minimum efficient 
scales (Chapman 1991, pp. 118-143). However, the resulting scale economies do not 
necessarily provide protection against new entrants, as increased competition in 
upstream petrochemicals from the emerging countries (e.g. in the Middle East, 
Mexico, South-East Asia) over the past 20-30 years shows.^ Thirdly, the past 2-3 
decades have not seen the fundamental innovations that -  as they provided knowledge- 
based economies of scope -  have shaped today’s chemical industry (Arora and 
Gambardella 1998, pp. 390-399 and Arora et al. 1997, pp. 3-8):
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(1) the commercialisation of organic chemistry, exemplified by the success of organic 
dyestuffs and related products (e.g. the early pharmaceuticals, photographic 
materials, etc.) from around 1860 onwards;
(2) the development of polymer chemistry in the 1930s and its commercial exploitation 
in the 1950s and 1960s;
(3) the rise of chemical engineering, i.e. scientific plant design that allows to capture 
the ‘economics’ of chemical processes.
Many chemical processes (see figure 5.1^) are highly interrelated, so that during the 
1950s and 1960s a high degree of vertical integration (the German 
Verbundproduktion, still pursued by BASF) was widely regarded as an advantage. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, competition in basic petrochemicals and intermediates 
increased from two main sources. Firstly, as the technologies described above became 
widely available, new producers in the emerging markets began to build large 
production capacities, supplying the target markets of the export-oriented companies 
in the West. Secondly, the oil shocks gave a strategic advantage to oil producers that 
moved downstream into basic petrochemicals (Fayad and Motamen 1986, pp. 56-59). 
As a result of these pressures, many of the existing companies in basic chemicals have 
opted to move further downstream in the production chain, and to focus on areas 
where they see opportunities for product differentiation based on a better 
understanding of chemical applications, and of customer needs (Teltschik 1992, pp. 
263-266).^ Others have moved into pharmaceuticals and biochemistry, an area which is 
becoming increasingly distinct from chemicals due to the ‘biotechnological revolution’ 
(a series of innovations, many of which are centered around the newly-developed 
capability to analyse and manipulate the gene sequences in cells). Consequently, the 
1980s and 1990s have been a period of heavy restructuring for much of the world's 
chemical industry (Lane 1992, pp. 239-287). Hoechst and ICI alike have been facing 
the same industry conditions set out above, and the comparative case study shows how 
the two companies have responded to these, thereby ‘holding industry constant’.
The chapter focuses in greater depth on Hoechst than on ICI The reason for this is 
that a substantial literature on ICI’s restructuring over the past 10 to 15 years exists 
already^, which, however, had to be updated and synthesised in a new way.
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 gives a brief overview of the 
methodology used to ascertain the data on which the case study is based. Section 5.3 
focuses on ICI, giving an overview of its restructuring process since the early 1980s in 
addition to a brief outline of ICI’s history. Section 5.4. investigates corporate 
restructuring processes at Hoechst, starting again with a historical section which 
facihtates a better understanding of the situation which Hoechst’s restructuring was 
designed to address. Section 5.5 provides a direct comparison of ICI and Hoechst, 
focusing in particular on the factors that have caused or hindered restructuring in the 
two companies. Finally, the results of the chapter are summarised.
5.2 Data Collection Methodology
The case study draws on information from the following three types of sources:
(1) Written documents, including the results of the questionnaire survey^: Following 
the survey, we approached the responsible officers at ICI and Hoechst who had 
identified themselves in the questionnaire survey in which they had taken part. They 
kindly offered us assistance in elaborating on the information they had given and in 
providing further material. This gave us access to valuable internal documentation from 
the two companies, including manuscripts of speeches, organisation charts and the like, 
and the permission to visit Hoechst’s archive. External information was collected from 
the business press, analysts’ reports, corporate histories, electronic sources (e.g. 
Datastream, the Internet), annual reports, and other publicly available material.
(2) Interviews with companv representatives: From October to December 1997, we 
conducted a series of unstructured interviews with senior Hoechst and ICI managers 
who had taken an active role in their companies’ restructuring processes. Before the 
interviews, we sent a note to our interview partners to set out our main topics of 
interest. We first asked the interview participants to give an overview of the corporate 
restructuring process that had been taking place at their company since the beginning 
of the 1990s. These brief presentations, plus the fact that plenty of information on the 
companies’ acquisitions, divestments, and the like is publicly available, provided us
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with much of the factual information on changes in the boundaries of the two firms. 
More detailed information fi"om the interview participants was requested on:
• Changes in the internal organisation of the two firms (e.g. changes in the role of 
the head office; centralisation / decentralisation of decision making processes, etc.);
• Rationales for the restructuring of the boundaries of the two firms (e.g. potential 
synergies among the various businesses; contribution of the head office in 
exploiting any linkages, etc.);
• Key factors that were perceived to have either caused / facilitated or hindered / 
decelerated the restructuring processes of the two companies.
Our interview partners provided valuable information on these issues. Unattributed 
quotes in the main sections of the chapter represent their statements.
(3) Other sources: Firstly, interviews were conducted with several outside consultants 
and analysts with respect to both companies, so as to ascertain independent opinions of 
the companies’ restructuring processes. Secondly, we bought a token share in Hoechst 
which allowed us to take part in its annual general meeting on 6 May 1997 where the 
progress of the restructuring was discussed and the establishment of the 'Strategic 
Management Holding', a key element in Hoechst's reorganisation, was agreed. Thirdly, 
we met Mr. Stefan Sommer, Hoechst's officer in charge of controlling and strategy 
development, who gave insightful presentations at workshops at the Social Science 
Centre (WZB) in Berlin on 9-10 May and in London on 10 December 1997.
5.3 Corporate Restructuring at ICI
In the following section, ICI’s history up to 1982 is sketched briefly, so as to provide 
the background for the analysis of the company’s restructuring process since then in 
section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Brief Overview of ICI s History
ICI was founded in 1926 through the merger of four British companies, the British 
Dyestuffs Corporation, Brunner, Mond & Co, Nobel Industries, and United Alkali Co.
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(see Hardie and Pratt 1966, pp. 299-301; on the formation of ICI see Reader 1970, ch. 
19, and on its general development Reader 1975). The foundation of ICI was a 
reaction to the formation of IG Farben in Germany (section 5.4.1). IG Farben in 
particular, but also Du Pont in the US, held many of the crucial patents and exerted 
extreme pressures on prices, which the four British companies could not withstand on 
their own. As a result of the four-way merger, ICI came into existence as a very 
diversified company. ICI’s 1971 Information Handbook lists 14 major product areas 
for the time of its foundation: “heavy chemicals; explosives and accessories; fertilisers; 
insecticides; dyestuflfs; domestic chemicals; leathercloth; printing; sporting 
ammunitions; non-ferrous metals; paints; gas mantles; lamps and accessories; and 
welding plant and equipment" (quoted from Clarke 1985a, p. 97). In the 1930s it also 
became, however hesitantly, involved in pharmaceuticals, an activity field that saw 
major additions during WW II (Cunliffe 1985, pp. 42f). Similar to the German and 
American chemical companies, the wartime efforts led to further increases in ICI’s 
diversification. From a geographical perspective, ICI’s focus on the British and the 
commonwealth markets resulted fi-om the dominance of cartels in the industry (Mirow 
and Maurer 1982, ch. 5). In 1929, ICI struck the ‘Patents and Processes Agreement’ 
with Du Pont to divide the markets up, with Du Pont covering Central America and 
the US, and ICI the British colonial markets (Hounshell and Smith 1988, pp. 191-205). 
During the 1950s and 1960s, ICI’s performance lagged behind its German competitors 
(IG Farben’s successor companies) which moved into capital-intensive, high value- 
added production (see Grant et al. 1988, pp. 8-9 and p. 43; Cox and Kriegbaum 1980, 
p. 30). As a result of its diversification, “rather than specializing in a few products that 
it could have eflhciently manufactured in large plants, ICI manufactured hundreds of 
products inefiSciently” (Derdak [ed.] 1988, p. 352). During the second half of the 
1960s efficiency improved, but fell behind ICI’s competitors again during the 1970s 
(Broadberry 1997, pp. 293-298).
In 1951, a US court forbade the further division of markets, so that ICI was 
confronted with increasing competition from foreign manufacturers in the British and 
the colonial markets where hitherto it had been the dominant supplier. At the same 
time, it was isolated from the strong economic growth in the continental European 
countries that began a process of economic and political integration.
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In the post-war period, ICI also integrated vertically. It had established its first 
naphtha-crackers as early as 1951. In 1976/77 it invested directly into North Sea oil, 
partly in response to the oil crisis*, so as to supply its large petrochemicals activities 
(Grant et al. 1988, p. 41).
With respect to ICFs geographical orientation, while ICI had always been a 
multinational company (for details see Clarke 1985a, ch. 4), it long maintained its 
distinctively ‘British character’ (see Pettigrew 1985, p. 387) that originated fi-om its 
early orientation towards the colonial markets. “It took ICI twenty years after 1947 to 
develop significant European and American businesses” (Stopford and Turner 1985, p. 
57), and the share of its sales generated outside the UK persistently lagged behind the 
respective figure for its German competitors. It began to address this situation during 
the mid-1960s when it made (mainly ‘organic’) investments into continental Europe, 
followed by several large acquisitions in the US during the first half of the 1970s and 
again in Europe during the late 1970s. It also reduced the share of its employment in 
the UK and increased its sales abroad (Clarke 1985a, pp. 125ff.). Despite this, as of 
1980, I d ’s share of sales generated outside the UK was, with 58% (Clarke 1985a, p. 
117), still markedly lower than the comparable figure for Hoechst at 69% (Hoechst’s 
German Annual Report 1986, p. 72), a situation that was reversed during the 1980s. 
Since the four-way merger, ICI has had a divisional hierarchy^ (More 1989, p. 293), 
managed fi-om a large corporate head office in London. During the mid-1950s, the 
head office had about 2500 employees; this was reduced during the 1970s and reached 
about 1000 in the mid-1980s. Until 1981, when the central research laboratory was 
closed, R&D had been carried out on a mixed basis as the divisions had their own 
research functions, too. As of the mid-1970s, ICI distinguished between 14 divisions 
(based on product categories), centrally-provided functions, and administrative 
structures distinguished by geographical location (i.e. regional /  country offices, in 
addition to the semi-independent activities in the former colonies, many of which have 
never been integrated into the group’s structure). This often led to the problem of 
administrative referral (i.e. various units taking part in decision-making processes 
referred to each other before decisions could be reached), and ambiguous authority 
structures. In sum, ICI had a complex and large administrative body, resulting in slow 
decision-making processes.
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One of ICI’s major problem was its dependence on bulk chemicals, prices o f which 
came under increasing pressure during the 1970s as a result o f the maturing of the 
industry and general over-capacity. In addition to its poor operating performance, ICI 
suffered heavily from the 1980/81 recession and the weakness, of the British economy 
(e.g. gradual decline of the British car industry, to which ICI had been an important 
supplier), and the strength of Sterling.
In sum, the situation of the company before the beginning of the restructuring can be 
described as follows:
• high degree of diversification;
• high degree of vertical integration;
• multinational activities, although ICI remained firmly British-based;
• a complex and cumbersome administrative structure;
• poor financial and operating performance.
5.3.2 Corporate Restructuring at ICI since 1982
In this section, ICI’s restructuring process since 1982 is analysed, distinguishing 
between four restructuring phases. The emphasis is on the period since the beginning 
of the second restructuring phase, i.e. since about 1990, when ICI began to make a 
clearer break from its history of diversification than it had done before. The aim of the 
section is to outline the changes that have taken place with respect to both the 
boundaries of the firm and its internal organisation, to ascertain the timing of the 
restructuring process, and to describe the forces underlying it.
Since 1982, when Sir John Harvey-Jones became chairman, ICI has undergone four 
phases of restructuring:
(1) During the first phase, Harvey-Jones set in train the company’s orientation 
towards higher value-added goods, in particular speciality chemicals^® and 
biotechnological products, in an attempt to offset the weaknesses of ICI’s 
petrochemicals operations that had become apparent during the 1980/81 recession. 
This strategy involved a combination of some divestments and a number of 
acquisitions. In 1982, ICI swapped its polythene production (which it had invented in
201
1935) against BP’s PVC activities (Bower 1986, pp. 130-135). However, reducing the 
degree of vertical integration proved difficult as knock-on effects on other processes in 
the highly integrated production chain were feared (Grant 1991b, pp. 256-258). In
1985 it acquired Garst Seeds and Beatrice's chemicals division (this turned out to be a 
big failure, as ICI had overpaid for an under-performing company), Glidden Paint in
1986 and Stauffer (Agrochemicals) in 1987. ICI also considered further acquisitions in 
the pharmaceuticals industry (Beecham, Wellcome) which did not materialise for 
various reasons.
On balance, the first restructuring led to a further increase in ICI’s degree of 
diversification and of vertical integration (Owen and Harrison 1995, pp. 133f). The 
company’s acquisitions were strongly geared towards the North American and, to a 
lesser extent, to the European market. Data on the geographical distribution o f ICI’s 
workforce (table 5.1 and graph 5.1) show a strong increase in the company’s degree of 
‘multinationalisation’ between 1986 and 1989. ICI also considered investing into Asia, 
but found itself unable to do so as its low share price restricted its ability to raise 
further funds in the external capital market.
Harvey-Jones also initiated changes in ICI’s internal organisation, e.g. by reducing 
staffing levels at the company’s corporate centre (even a move out of its Millbank 
headquarter was being planned). He also addressed the role of the board that had been 
described as a consensus-oriented ‘debating club’ (Pettigrew 1985, pp. 377ff), and 
reduced its size.
(2) The second phase of restructuring started in 1990. Sir Denys Henderson, 
chairman since 1987, abolished the BCG-matrix portfolio planning (Lynch 1997, pp. 
1 lOff.) that had guided ICI’s policy during the first restructuring wave, and set up two 
task forces to analyse the company’s strategy and structure (Kennedy ^1993, Ch. 12). 
These teams identified seven ‘core’ businesses; the resolve was to divest all other 
activities. Under the added impact of the recession (see section 6.3.4) practical steps 
were taken from 1990 onwards, when ICI withdrew fi’om its overseas fertilizer 
business and some other activities (e.g. the speciality compounds division), and sold its 
stake in Enterprise Oil (Timbrell and Tweedie [eds.] ^1998, Vol. I, p. 754). The 
restructuring also involved organisational changes. Charles Miller Smith, ICI’s Chief 
Executive since 1995, describes the background to the changes that took place in 1991
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as follows: “Throughout the 1980s, ICI had a complicated structure trying to manage a 
diversified product portfolio with a wide geographical spread. It was a cumbersome 
matrix with little focus on ICI’s competitive businesses. There was a lot of cross­
subsidisation of the poor businesses by the good. In short, ICI’s position as 
competition strengthened was increasingly untenable. Recognising this, ICI initiated a 
major restructuring programme. The number of international businesses was halved 
fi*om 14 to seven. The geographical offices in individual countries were reduced in size 
and authority. The businesses were, for the first time, made fully accountable for their 
performances. Costs were cut substantially with employee numbers falling by 20 per 
cent”.^  ^The restructuring was given a further impetus through the oil price hike during 
the gulf war in early 1991.
(3) Taking advantage of ICI’s low share price in early 1991, the Hanson Group, 
which had become famous for its activities as a corporate raider, bought quietly into 
ICI’s shares to acquire a 2.8% stake in the company. When this became known in May 
1991, it was widely seen as a takeover attempt, although Hanson never officially 
announced a takeover bid. The threat of hostile takeover first led to an intensification 
of the existing restructuring plans in the context of an aggressive takeover defense. At 
the end of 1991, while Hanson’s takeover was still a possibility, a fresh look on ICI’s 
restructuring was taken by John Mayo, then with ICI’s advising bank SG Warburg. He 
found ICI’s step-by-step restructuring too slow and -  based on ideas that had already 
been developed more vaguely inside the company (see The Economist, 28 April 1990, 
p. 25) -  proposed a demerger of ICI into two parts^^. The preparation of the demerger 
and its implementation in 1993 mark ICI’s third wave of restructuring. Building on the 
perception that ICI had become overly large and diversified, a “technological fault line 
within ICI” (Owen and Harrison 1995, p. 137) was recognised: The pharmaceuticals 
and agro-chemicals showed synergies in biotechnology research and development, 
whereas no synergies existed between them and the more traditional chemicals 
businesses. Technological synergies were also found between the pharmaceuticals and 
the dyestuffs businesses. The three businesses (pharmaceuticals and healthcare, agro­
chemicals and seeds, and dyestuffs) were considered to be a ‘natural group’ and were 
put into a separate legal entity that was named Zeneca. ICI demerged itself from 
Zeneca on 1 January 1993. As many of the activities split off ICI were performed in
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Western countries (e.g. US, UK), the share of ICFs employees in Asia and other 
regions increased substantially from 1992 to 1993 (table 5.1 and graph 5.1).
(4) The fourth phase of ICFs restructuring has been taking place since the 
completion of the demerger in 1993, with most of the decisive steps taken since mid- 
1997. The break-up left the company smaller and less diversified than it had been 
before. As of 1993/94, it had four major business lines (industrial chemicals [by far the 
biggest business], materials, explosives, paints), in addition to a sizeable set of 
separately run regional businesses (e.g. ICI Australia, ICI South Africa, etc.). For the 
first 12-18 months after the demerger, the focus was on improving the financial 
performance of the company by cutting costs and improving operating efficiency. A 
thorough analysis of the portfolio was only started in late 1994, revealing that the 
weaknesses already apparent during the 1980s remained unresolved in the chemical 
businesses with which ICI was left^ :^
• exposure to the cyclicality of the industrial chemicals businesses;
• strong price competition and low margins in commodity chemicals (e.g. PVC);
• while the portfolio had been reduced through the demerger, the remaining 
businesses still were essentially unrelated and offered little scope for synergies;
• the portfolio was fragmented in that many businesses were small as compared to 
their largest competitors, so that (relatively speaking) they were less-well 
positioned to exploit economies of scale;
• the combination of businesses in certain product categories on the one hand and 
independently-run regional businesses on the other hand in the ICI group;
• great environmental liabilities (e.g. in the Tioxide business);
• an unclear role of the corporate centre.
Since 1995, rumours about a potential takeover in connection with its low share price 
emerged again, so that ICI was under renewed capital market pressures^" .^ In order to 
overcome the above weaknesses, ICI decided to shift into particular speciality 
chemicals with a greater consumer focus, and to leave its earlier industrial chemicals, 
explosives, plastics, and regional businesses. The underlying rationale for this move 
was that the company would not be able to attain sufficient scale economies in all o f its 
businesses, so as to withstand competition in the price-sensitive commodity and
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pseudo-commodity markets. It should best add to those activities that allowed higher 
margins due to their lower price elasticity of demand (as is generally the case in 
speciality chemicals; Stobaugh 1988, p. 162), and greater growth potential. 
Furthermore, it was argued that those activities should be given up where a high 
degree of backward vertical integration was a strategic advantage (especially the heavy 
chemicals businesses, themselves primarily upstream businesses, which rely on 
particular raw materials, e.g. oil). Instead, the company should focus selectively on 
more marketing-intensive specialities (Chemical Insight No. 622, January 1998, p. 7) 
with greater scope for product differentiation acting as entry barriers against 
competition.
In order to achieve these aims, the company had to restructure, implying a large 
number of acquisitions and organic investments on the one hand, and divestments on 
the other hand; an overview of these transactions is provided in table 5.3. Practical 
steps to strengthen the paints and acrylics businesses were taken from 1995 onwards 
(acquisition of Crow’s paint business in the US in 1995), while a strong focus on 
speciality chemicals followed only after 1996. By far the most decisive step, taken in 
1997, was the acquisition of Unilever’s^  ^ speciality chemicals division for £4.9bn. This 
consisted of four discrete businesses, namely National Starch, a US-based producer of 
industrial adhesives and speciality starches; Quest (Netherlands), a fragrance and food 
ingredients company; Unichema (Netherlands), which produces fatty acids; and 
Crosfield (silicates, zeolites and silicas) which is now being sold on. At the same time, 
ICI divested many explosives and industrial chemicals businesses, particularly its 
polyester and Tioxide activities to Du Pont, and the largest of its regional businesses 
(e.g. its South Afiican and Australian holdings). Its declared aim is to sell all of its 
remaining industrial chemicals and regional businesses (see figure 5.2), although this is 
proving more difficult than expected, and the time frame for completing these disposals 
had to be extended for another three years (FT, 2 July 1998, p. 30; see also FT, 25 
September 1998, p. 27 on ICI’s difficulties in obtaining regulatory approval for its 
deals).
From a geographical perspective, the fourth phase of corporate restructuring has been 
marked by ICI’s orientation towards Asia and other emerging markets, where the bulk 
of ICI’s organic investments (partly through entry joint ventures) has been located. In 
particular, ICI has built up several paint factories in China, where it has become the
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largest paint producer, and has invested in India. The sale of the ‘old’ regional 
businesses means that the data on the geographical spread of activities (see table 5.1 
and graph 5.1) since 1995 may conceal ICI’s attempt to become more international in 
its outlook during the fourth restructuring phase.
In sum, during the fourth phase of ICI’s restructuring process, substantial changes to 
the boundaries of ICl have taken place. The company is becoming less diversified, 
while at the same time integrating its chosen core businesses on a horizontal basis. This 
also implies changes with respect to the geographical spread of its operations, although 
due to the simultaneous abandonment of its regional businesses an even greater 
‘globalisation’ of the company than had been achieved already may not immediately be 
obvious. Moreover, as the company focuses on speciality chemicals it is moving 
downstream in the chemical production chain (figure 5.1), thus implying changes 
regarding its degree of vertical integration.
In conjunction with the restructuring of ICl’s ‘boundaries’, the company has also 
transformed its internal organisation. The main changes in this area can be summarised 
as follows:
• Both the size and the functions of the head office have changed substantially. 
According to the results of the questionnaire survey, the number of head ofiBce 
employees declined from 961 in 1986 to 263 in 1996 (with the most significant 
reductions having taken place in conjunction with the demerger), and to less than 
250 in 1997/98.^^ This overall reduction has affected all head office functions. As 
of 1997/98, the main head office activities are in accounting, finance and taxation, 
legal matters, human resources, and public and investor relations (see figure 5.2). 
The executive team -  a group of executive managers below board level -  has the 
overall task of devising optimal exit and entry strategies.
• ICI’s management structure has become more decentralised. ICI’s core businesses, 
strengthened by their consolidation during the latest phase of restructuring, have 
developed or are currently developing their own administrative structures (e.g. a 
multidivisional structure at National Starch, with its own headquarters in the US), 
enabling them to make key decisions independent from the London head office.
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Financial discretion of line managers has increased. Research & development 
activities have now been fully devolved from the centre and integrated into the 
operating businesses.
• Due to the rapid change in the composition of the portfolio it is difiBcult to track 
changes within the operating businesses over longer periods of time, but changes 
have been taking place there as well. In general, the company has reduced the 
number of managerial lavers in its operating businesses, and decreased staffing 
levels in administration.
• The company has disintegrated many of its support services through the use of 
outsourcing and contracting-out. This has included IT services and property 
management. In 1997, it transferred 124 IT staff and IT contractors to IBM. As 
part of a global property initiative involving similar transactions, it has sold its own 
head office in London to a property management group from which it has leased 
back the building and procures maintenance services.
In sum, the restructuring of ICI’s internal organisation has involved a decentralisation 
of the company, with a smaller administrative centre from which fewer services are 
provided, and more self-sufficient and independent operating businesses.
However, it should be pointed out that the role of the ICI group as a whole, beyond 
the completion of the current restructuring program, is unclear. The potential for 
synergies from the sharing of operations, research and know-how, and distribution 
channels among I d ’s chosen speciality chemicals businesses is questionable. Also, 
many of the operating businesses (in particular Paints, National Starch and Quest) are 
sufficiently large to act as stand-alone units or as parts of even larger specialised 
companies. With a small head office, and no involvement of head office staff in either 
R&D or operational management, the role of the head office appears to be primarily in 
the area of accounting and financial controlling. However, Miller Smith (ICI Annual 
Report 1997, p. 9) argues that ICI would make “an excellent parent” for its businesses 
by exploiting synergies that would arise from the shared knowledge of customer needs 
and applications in ‘sensory products’ (e.g. flavours, fragrances and paints), and from 
the experience in project management. Also, many of the group’s businesses would
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share in specialist expertise in marketing and brand management, which the group has 
been aiming to acquire through the hiring of top managers (most importantly Chief 
Executive Charles Miller Smith from Unilever and Chief Operating OflBcer Brendan 
O’Neill from Guinness /  Diageo). The various operating businesses would also benefit 
from the group’s ability to attract scientists (through university contacts etc.). 
Whether, beyond the current restructuring, these considerations are sufficient to justify 
the existence of the combined group, remains unclear.
To summarise, four phases in ICI’s restructuring since 1982 can be distinguished. 
Decisive steps to decrease its earlier diversification and vertical integration have been 
taken since 1990/91, marked by the demerger of its pharmaceuticals activities in 1993 
and the orientation of the company towards speciality chemicals (and away from 
commodity chemicals) since 1995/96. Underlying the restructuring process have been 
various company- and industry-specific pressures, such as ICI’s complex 
administrative structure, and strong competition in bulk chemicals. Importantly, 
however, these pressures on their own effected only a moderate and protracted 
reorganisation programme. More vigorous restructuring took place only when the 
firm- and industry-specific difficulties were mediated by capital market pressures 
(perceived threat of hostile takeover) and economy-wide pressures (recession). The 
ensuing restructuring has implied changes with respect to both the boundaries of the 
firm (e.g. reduced diversification, increased horizontal integration of activities) and its 
internal organisation (e.g. changes in head office size and functions, etc.).
5.4 Corporate Restructuring at Hoechst
In the following, a brief overview of Hoechst’s general history is provided first, 
focusing in particular on the evolution of the firm’s boundaries. Section 5.4.2 outlines 
the central features of Hoechst’s internal organisation before the beginning of the 
restructuring process, which is then analysed in section 5.4.3.
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5.4.1 Historical Background
Hoechst was founded in 1863 under the name Offene Hcmdelsgesellschaft M eister 
Lucius & Co. to produce synthetic fuschia dye and other dyestuffs (e.g. Aniline) in 
Frankfiirt-Hoechst. During the second half of the 19*** century, the market for organic 
dyestuflfs -  originally a British invention (Campbell 1971, ch. 9) - expanded 
substantially, and Hoechst grew rapidly to employ a workforce of more than 4000 by 
the turn of the century.*^
Hoechst evolved quickly into a technologically advanced company in its field. While 
dyestuflfs remained its main product for forty years fi"om its foundation, Hoechst 
became also involved in the development of drugs. The chemical composition of dyes 
and of many of the early drugs -  general rather than illness-specific remedies -  had 
similarities (Derdak [ed.] 1988, pp. 346-348). Hoechst also moved into other chemical 
products (e.g. fertilizers).
During the two world wars, the German chemicals companies were required to provide 
a broad range of chemicals and pharmaceuticals for war-related purposes. Therefore, 
both war periods led to a wide-ranging diversification of Hoechst's activities (e.g. 
engagement in photographic chemicals). The first world war also led to a co-ordination 
of the activities of different chemical companies, and these arrangements were not 
dismantled after 1918.** In 1925, the Interessengemeinschaft Farbenindustrie AG (IG 
Farben) was formed through a merger of Hoechst, Bayer, and BASF and the other 
members of the 'small IG'. The member companies lost their legal independence in the 
IG Farben, yet remained largely separate entities fi*om an operational point of view.*^ 
After WW H, the allied powers decided to break up IG Farben in order to reduce its 
power. Although the US initially favoured a breakup into smaller units, the 
organisation was dismantled into eight smaller and three large units which roughly 
coincided with the pre-war organisations of Hoechst, Bayer, and BASF. Hoechst was 
're-founded' as a public limited company in 1951. With "a workforce of almost 15.000 
- or just under 27.000 including the associated companies" (Hoechst AG 1991, p. 18), 
the new Hoechst AG was the smallest of the three large German chemical companies, 
yet its size was sufficient to play an active role in the world chemical industry.^® The 
re-allocation of assets was largely concluded by 1953. Hoechst received a diversified 
portfolio (see Hoechst’s 1955 product list in Krohn et al. 1984, p. 130).
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The history of Hoechst after WW H is characterised by rapid growth, spurred by three, 
closely interrelated developments:
(1) Diversification: Hoechst diversified substantially and evolved into a broadly-based 
chemical company in the following fields: inorganic chemicals, petrochemicals and 
intermediates, plastics, fibers, paints, glosses and dyes, fertilizers, agricultural 
chemicals, plant machinery, industrial gases and welding technology, surfactants and 
detergents, printing materials, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics^\ Hoechst's diversified 
portfolio was not centered around a dominant product or business line. The high 
degree of diversification suited the company well during the 1970s when the 
petrochemical activities were hit by the oil crisis and the competitive pressures 
described in section 5.1.
(2) Vertical integration: Hoechst followed a policy of highly integrated production 
(yerbundproduktion) where intermediate products generated in one step of the 
production process would be fed into other production steps. For example, Hoechst’s 
acquisition of Chemische Werke Albert in 1964, which produced (amongst others) 
synthetic resins -  in itself a diversifying move for Hoechst -  led it into the production 
of glosses, with the acquisitions of Flamuco in 1969, Berger, Jenson & Nicholson in 
the UK in 1970 (Winnacker 1971, pp. 376-379), and Herberts in 1972.
While many of Hoechst’s investments were into areas relatively far ‘downstream’ in 
the production chain displayed in figure 5.1, it also moved into some upstream 
processes and products. During the 1950s, Hoechst developed technologies for both 
crude-oil cracking and chemical intermediates, but in 1961, partly for the disadvantage 
of its geographical location, gave up the oil cracking business and opted instead for 
supply agreements with other producers (Stokes 1994, p. 177). The involvement in 
olefin-unsaturates (e.g. ethylene, propylene etc.), however, was maintained (Winnacker 
1971, pp. 239ff), so as to supply the production of plastics (e.g. polyethylene, 
polypropylene) and other products requiring the input of petrochemicals (Teltschik 
1992, pp. 213-220). In order to secure its raw material supplies after the 1973/74 oil 
crisis (Schreier and Wex 1990, p. 309), Hoechst in 1975 acquired a 25% ‘foothold’ 
stake in Union Rheinische Braunkohlen Kraftstoff AG, Wesseling (UK Wesseling) 
which was exchanged against a share in Ruhrchemie in a 1983 asset swap. At the 
whole, Hoechst did not integrate as far upstream as BASF (see Derdak [ed.] 1988, pp. 
305-308) or ICI with its naphtha crackers; in comparison with the latter company, it
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had a higher degree of integration in downstream activities. One of the reasons for this 
was Hoechst’s general policy during the 1960s not to compete directly with or to 
acquire its main suppliers and customers (Winnacker 1971, p. 373; Teltschik 1992, p. 
223), although this principle was not always followed strictly. However, the 
technological innovations in organic chemistry, combined with general economic 
growth, enabled Hoechst to move into downstream activities and applications which 
had not been occupied before at all.
(3) Internationalisation: As early as 1953/54 Hoechst started to rebuild and extend its 
pre-war connections in research and development. Factories were built abroad, and the 
company extended its international sales network and its transport and distribution 
facilities (including ships and a port in the Netherlands). By 1957, "Hoechst was ... 
represented in 68 countries" (Hoechst AG 1991, p. 19), and by 1965, "in 119 
countries" (ibid., p. 22). This development is further underlined by the increasing 
proportion of Hoechst's turnover achieved outside Germany, which was 29% in 1953 
and 46% in 1966. Hoechst's internationalisation was achieved by both organic growth 
and by acquisitions. It invested in particular into foreign downstream chemical and 
pharmaceutical businesses, e.g. the acquisition of a 40% share in the French 
pharmaceutical company Roussel Uclaf in 1968 (the stake was later increased). 
Hoechst also attempted to consolidate its worldwide pharmaceutical activities during 
the 1970s. According to company representatives, this acquisition marks Hoechst's 
first orientation to what it now calls the 'life sciences', although one industry analyst 
remarked that before the formation of HMR (see below) Hoechst did not really 
integrate Roussel Uclaf into its own structure.
One factor behind Hoechst’s international expansion was its strong position in 
agricultural chemicals, which it aimed to exploit in more rural economies. A second 
factor was the exploitation of patent rights - in particular in pharmaceuticals - across as 
many economies as possible, so as to recoup the large initial investments into research 
and development and achieve economies of scale in distribution. This included its 
leading position in the market for diabetics medication. Hoechst decided in particular 
to invest in the USA, which was the largest market for these drugs. In sum, Hoechst’s 
internationalisation revolved around the exploitation of economies of scale and scope. 
For example, in order to benefit from large production batches generated in a limited 
domestic market, Hoechst had to guarantee a steady sales stream of its products.
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leading to the establishment of international sales representatives. These, in turn, would 
have had enough capacities to market a variety of products, providing further impetus 
to Hoechst's diversification move.
Hoechst's expansion during the late 1950s and 1960s was fiinded by an increasing 
revenue stream on the back of a strongly growing economy. The two oil shocks during 
the 1970s hit the company hard, so that the years fi’om 1975 to 1977 and fi’om 1980 to 
1982 marked a crisis for Hoechst. As compared to other chemical companies, 
however, Hoechst’s diversification and its integration of downstream activities that 
were relatively independent fi’om petrochemicals (e.g. pharmaceuticals, 
agrochemicals), offset the impact of the oil price hikes to some extent. As a result, 
during the 1970s and 1980s Hoechst did not reshape its portfolio fundamentally, but 
continued its earlier policies with further moves into speciality chemicals, applications 
and secondary processing industries (often on an international basis), without 
abandoning its upstream activities. It invested in particular into the following business 
lines:
• printing, reprographics and information technology (production of photocopiers 
and tele-copiers started in 1972 and 1974 respectively; acquisition of a stake in the 
printing machines producer Sixt in 1980; launch of the ‘computer-to-plate’ newspaper 
printing technology in 1982; etc.);
• cosmetics and body care (acquisition of Jade [1970], of Mouson Cosmetic GmbH 
and the perfume company Balenciaga S. A. [1978]; creation of the consumer products 
division in 1980 to consolidate the activities in this area; etc.);
• pharmaceuticals (significant expansion through organic growth and acquisitions, 
both in pharmaceuticals research and production [e.g. acquisition of Optrex in 1975] 
and in retailing / distribution [e.g. establishment of Cassella-med]) and other medical 
products [e.g. diagnostics]);
• insecticides; animal health products (i.e. veterinary drugs such as vaccines and 
animal foods);
• fibres (e.g. polyester fibres such as Trevira and polyacrylic fibres such as Dolan). 
The most important step in this context was its acquisition in 1987 of the American 
company Celanese, which earlier ICI had considered buying. Celanese is a large
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producer of basic chemicals, petrochemicals and fibres with know-how in the area of 
high-performance polymers (Teltschik 1992, pp. 294f);
• technical ceramics (e.g. the 1985 acquisition of Rosenthal); graphite and carbon 
fibres for technical applications through its Sigri subsidiary.
As a result of Hoechst’s investment into knowledge-intensive and high-value added 
activities^, from 1983 onwards until the late 1980s it achieved high profitability which 
enabled it to carry even those businesses in its diversified portfolio which proved less 
profitable. In sum, the post-war history of Hoechst until about 1990 can be 
characterised by extensive diversification^, increasingly international operations, and a 
high degree of vertical integration, in particular in activities that were relatively far 
‘downstream’ from the perspective of the main chemical production chain.
5.4.2 Hoechst's Internal Structure since 1969
Hoechst’s development from a fiinctional organisation to a mixed structure with some 
multi-divisional features had taken place in an evolutionary way in the 1950s and 
1960s. During this period, businesses had been assigned to activity fields on the basis 
of broadly defined product groups. Some of these activity fields received a degree of 
independence from the central office, while others remained under direct control of the 
management board. As a result of the growth and international expansion of the 
company (Hoechst AG  1991, p. 23), in 1969 Hoechst created a new organisational 
structure that remained in place until 1996/1997. The central feature of the new 
structure (figure 5.3) was the product line-based divisionalisation of the company, 
with the divisions being run by their own management with a considerable degree of 
autonomy from the head office. The basic elements of the structure were
• the Management Board (Vorstand) with 14 members as of 1976, all of whom 
reported on between one and three of the units below board level. However, 
management board members were not involved in the day-to-day running of the 
businesses. The Management Board devised general policies that were to be put 
into practice by managers further down the hierarchy. This examplifies the 
separation of policy making from execution that Sloan (1963, chs. 3 and 23),
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Williamson (1971, pp. 343-386) and Chandler (1996, pp. 345-376) describe as a 
key attribute of the multi-divisional corporation.
five Central Departments (Zentrale Ahteilungen), which, together with the 
management board itself, formed the head ofiBce of the company in a narrower 
sense, fulfilling mainly internal tasks (e.g. internal audits);
nine Central Functions (Ressorts) which, together with the Management Board and 
the Central Departments, formed the head office of the company in a wider sense. 
The Central Functions acted as internal service providers (e.g. in R&D) to the 
Management Board, the Central Departments, and the Divisions, charging internal 
transfer prices for their services, although apparently not always on a rigorous 
basis;
14 product category-based Divisions (Geschaftshereiche) as of 1976, managed by 
a team consisting of a director, and the heads of five functions within each Division 
(production, sales, research, technology, and controlling). The Divisions were 
responsible for their product policies including marketing and pricing strategies, 
research and development, quality standards, and patenting issues. However, the 
Divisions did not have authority over the day-to-day running of the operating units, 
with which they were to negotiate performance targets and costs; 
the actual operating units, which operated on behalf of one or several Divisions, 
but had their own management. The operating units were divided into plants (i.e. 
immediate assets of Hoechst) and joint ventures (i.e. companies in which Hoechst 
held a share). Some of the plants were legally independent, while others were 
under direct control of Hoechst^" ;^
two other consultative bodies, namely the Central Area Conference and the Central 
Regional Conference. Both 'Conferences' were basically committees in which the 
members of the management board met regularly with representatives of selected 
Functions, Divisions and operating units to gather performance data and discuss 
strategic issues. While the Central Area Conference was concerned with strategic 
issues along the lines of product areas and divisions, the Central Regional 
Conference addressed policies relevant primarily to the non-domestic activities.
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The basic structure remained in place throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Several 
divisions were consolidated, while others were renamed to reflect changes in 
technology or business emphasis, but Hoechst's macro-organisational structure as a 
whole remained unaltered. In sum, Hoechst’s internal structure from 1969 onwards 
was characterised by a high degree of complexity and an extensive administrative 
organisation. Many administrative frmctions were provided from the centre, yet were 
also existent on lower hierarchical levels, leading to duplication. Decision-making 
processes were deferred by the involvement of a multiplicity of participants, who had 
to refer back to each other before decisions could be taken. The organisational centre 
was large, with the head office, as of 1986, comprising 14148 employees, 1262 of 
whom were classified as managers (information from the questionnaire survey). One 
interview participant said that Hoechst’s problem of the 1980s was “central thinking”.
Plans to address these problems were developed in the late 1980s under the influence 
of Jurgen Dormann, a full member of the management board since 1986. The intention 
was to produce a more transparent overview of costs and profits in individual 
activities, to give the operating businesses more independence and self-sufficiency, and 
to reduce the problem of cross-subsidies. To this end, in 1991 Hoechst introduced a 
business unit structure in its operating businesses. These business units were based on 
a matrix system that combined regional and functional criteria: "Many of the divisions 
into which our company has been organized since 1970 have now come to resemble 
large companies in their own right. In order to react fast and flexibly to our customers' 
wishes, we have formed business units that run their operational business 
autonomously. Each looks after a particular product range in a specified region" 
(Management Board Chairman Wolfgang Hilger, Annual Report 1990, p. 3). This 
initiative, however, did not address Hoechst’s central organisation.
5.4.3 Corporate Restructuring at Hoechst Since 1994
The Restructuring Decision
On the background of a downturn in the company’s financial situation after 1992, the 
general plan to restructure was developed by Hoechst’s management after Dormann
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had become board chairman in April 1994. The restructuring decision was taken in 
response to a combination of general economic, industry-specific and firm-specific 
factors:
• A general recession that hit the West German manufacturing industry in 1993 
(section 6.3.4) and thus lowered the demand for chemicals from the industry’s main 
customers (e.g. the car and the construction industries), followed by further years of 
weak economic growth. The recession had started earlier in other countries (e.g. in the 
UK in 1990), but its onset was deferred in Germany, partly by the catch-up effect 
following unification.
• On the industry level, competition increased as new producers (see above section 
5.1) moved further downstream into chemical intermediates and end products such as 
fibres, plastics and films. This affected Hoechst more severely than had been the case in 
the 1970s and early 1980s when competition firom new suppliers had been largely 
confined to petrochemicals. Hoechst representatives said in the interviews that the new 
producers had built up large-scale production capacities at geographically 
advantageous locations, producing “everything from the oil to the final product”, and 
were therefore able to add value in many steps of the production chain.^^
• Specific to Hoechst was its above-described diversification. Many of its activities 
required major investments. Our interview partners estimated that, in the face of 
increased competition, over a period of five to ten years, approximately 100 billion 
DM would have been required to make Hoechst’s industrial chemicals businesses 
internationally competitive.
Against this background in industrial chemicals, the longer-term perspectives for the 
pharmaceuticals and some other businesses in which Hoechst had been active^^ were 
regarded as more promising for the following reasons:
• The market for research-based, patent-protected drugs -  as against generics -  is 
divided by therapeutic groupings into a number of sub-markets. The near-impossibility 
of substitution among these sub-markets leads to very low cross-elasticity of demand. 
Within these sub-markets, price competition is restrained. Even if there are several 
drugs within a therapeutic group, the price elasticity of demand is often relatively low 
(Reekie 1975, Ch. 2). Where this is the case, companies can set prices above the
216
marginal cost of production, marketing and distribution (Garber 1993, p. 19). As a 
result, while pharmaceutical research is very risky, the resulting products are profit­
intensive, and first-mover gains are substantial. The US market is particularly 
attractive, firstly because of its size, and secondly -  in contrast to some European 
countries (Le Pen 1995, pp. 48-53) - because of the absence of price regulation in 
most therapeutic sub-markets (Bogner and Thomas 1992, p. 207).
• Entry barriers to the various drug markets are high, due to the high risks associated 
with, and the investments and the time fi*ame required for, drug development. Entry 
barriers are also created by patent protection and product differentiation (e.g. 
branding). Some authors suggest that economies of scale and scope in research and in 
distribution (but not so much in drug production; Hancher 1990, pp. 5 Iff.) give the 
large firms an advantage over smaller companies, while others question the extent of 
this advantage. While numerous ‘biotech-startups’ have emerged in recent years, these 
usually have to license their research to the bigger firms, and the strategic advantage of 
the group of 15 or so big international pharmaceutical companies is relatively difficult 
to contest fi*om outside this group.^^ Our interview partners said that they would not 
expect Hoechst to be challenged in pharmaceuticals in the way it had happened in 
chemicals. However, while entry barriers may make it difficult for ‘newcomers’ to 
build up fully-fledged pharmaceuticals operations that include both drug R&D and 
drug distribution, it is possible to drop out of the group of the leading pharmaceuticals 
companies, in particular if a company fails to launch new products.
• Many of Hoechst’s drugs have been related to conditions such as Alzheimer, 
diabetics, and cardiovascular diseases. The aging of the populations of the Western 
societies with sufficient purchasing power was forecast to generate further growth for 
these pharmaceuticals, despite attempts to reduce health care costs.
However, in order to take advantage of the growth that it expected in research-based 
pharmaceuticals, Hoechst had to make significant investments into both drug research 
and distribution, where it lacked important capabilities. With respect to drug R&D, 
during the 1980s and early 1990s Hoechst had fallen behind the advances in 
biotechnology, drug design, screening technology, and so on (Gambardella 1995, pp. 
21-41). With respect to drug marketing, which is important in an industry where
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product and promotional competition, rather than price competition, are fierce, 
Hoechst’s position in particular in the US market (where it had licensed many of its 
products; Bogner and Thomas 1992, pp. 207f.) was insufficient.
In sum, Hoechst had to make major investments into two broadly conceived business 
areas -  industrial chemicals and pharmaceuticals (together with some other businesses; 
see below), for which, in a situation of poor financial performance, it could not 
generate sufficient internal funds. At the same time, while there were no obvious direct 
capital market pressures (e.g. threat of hostile takeover, etc.), general capital market 
conditions made it difficult for Hoechst to raise external fimds for such major 
investments. At the beginning of the 1990s, interest rates in Germany were high (tables 
6.6 and 6.7), while Hoechst’s low share price made it disadvantageous to issue further 
equity.
As a result, in 1994/95 Hoechst’s management decided to adopt a twofold strategy:
(1) to extend, integrate and consolidate a set of 'life science activities' (see below), 
building on its existing activities in this area;
(2) to discontinue the operative involvement in all businesses outside the remit of the 
‘life sciences’. While a variety of exit mechanisms would be chosen, proceeds from 
the sale of the former businesses would help finance investments in the latter.
The ‘life science activities’ targeted by Hoechst fall into two broad groups, which are 
further disaggregated into two businesses each (figure 5.4):
• Products for human health care: This group consists of (a) pharmaceuticals, the 
largest business in its ‘new’ portfolio, and (b) diagnostics. With respect to 
pharmaceuticals, Hoechst’s focus is on research-based, ‘ethical’ products in selected 
drug sub-markets (e.g. cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, etc.).
• A set of agro-businesses, comprising (c) Hoechst’s animal health products (feed 
additives, animal vaccines, etc.) and (d) its nutritional businesses. Most of the latter 
category are crop-related, e.g. seeds production and protection (herbicides, fungicides, 
but only some fertilizers).
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During the interviews, the choice of these four businesses was not rationalised on the 
grounds of potential synergies among them, but on the basis of their longer-term 
prospects. Apart from some commonalities with respect to the recruitment of 
scientists, little overlap between the four business fields was perceived. Any existing 
synergies among them were thought to be diminishing as a result o f specialisation (e.g. 
reduced commonality of crop protection and animal health products, as crop 
production and livestock rearing become less widely combined on farms), and Hoechst 
would not try to ‘force’ synergies.^* However, economies of scale and scope were 
considered important within the four business fields (e.g. through joint drug 
distribution, experience /  knowledge in the area of patent protection, licensing 
procedures, etc.), and even more so within the sub-markets for particular products.
The restructuring that has followed from the above-described strategy has involved 
changes with respect to both the boundaries of the firm and its internal organisation. In 
the following, these two dimensions of Hoechst’s corporate restructuring are analysed 
in greater detail.
The Restructuring of Hoechst*s Boundaries
The effect of the twofold strategy decision on Hoechst’s boundaries can be 
summarised under five headings:
(1) Horizontal integration: Since 1995, Hoechst has aimed at expanding and 
consolidating each of the four activity fields that constitute its designated ‘life science 
businesses’. This has involved a combination of acquisitions, joint ventures and organic 
growth. The most significant investments include its acquisition of the large American 
drugs company Marion Merrell Dow (MMD; itself the result of Merrell Dow’s 
acquisition of Marion Labs) in 1995 and its buy-out of the minority shareholders 
(among them the French govemment^^ in Roussel-Uclaf in 1996. Subsequently, it 
merged its existing pharmaceutical operations with MMD's into Hoechst Marion 
Roussel (HMR). In order to strengthen its drug research and testing activities, HMR 
has formed numerous strategic alliances and joint ventures with universities, hospitals, 
and smaller biotech-companies that offer access to particular, difficult-to-contract-
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upon capabilities in pharmaceutical research/^ These are mainly based in the US, 
although since 1996 - following the partial relaxation of genetic research legislation in 
Germany - Hoechst has also started to co-operate with German biotech firms, mainly 
in the Munich area.
In a similar way, Hoechst has aimed at expanding and integrating its other 'life science 
businesses’. For example, it consolidated the diagnostics activities in its Behring 
Diagnostics subsidiary (earlier: Behringwerke AG), made several acquisitions, and 
engaged in joint ventures (for an overview of these transactions see table 5.4). Similar 
to its strategy in pharmaceuticals, Hoechst aims at exploiting economies of scale and 
scope within diagnostic systems, e.g. through the provision of encompassing diagnostic 
‘packages’ to health care providers. The crop protection business was consolidated in
1994 in a Joint venture with Schering called AgrEvo. Biotechnological expertise in this 
area was gained through the acquisition of the American company Plant Genetic 
Systems in 1996. In the same year, it consolidated the veterinary drugs businesses of 
Hoechst and Roussel Uclaf in Hoechst Roussel Vet, which it expanded subsequently 
through acquisitions and joint ventures (table 5.4).
(2) De-diversification: In 1995, Hoechst began a successive process of discontinuing 
its operative involvement in all businesses outside the ‘life science activities’ described 
above. To this end, a variety of restructuring mechanisms has been used. These include 
partial and full divestments of businesses through trade sales, initial public offerings, 
and exit joint ventures. One of the first significant divestments concerned its cosmetics 
division (subsidiaries Schwarzkopf, Jade and Marbert) in 1995. Further divestments in 
speciality chemicals, carbon and graphite production, ceramics, printing plates, 
speciality phosphates, engineering and polystyrene production took effect between
1995 and 1997. Hoechst has also been selling its generic drugs businesses'^ and some 
non-core health care businesses (e.g. Roussel Uclaf s contraceptives business). 
Unusual for the German market, in August 1998 Hoechst sold its coatings subsidiary 
Herberts in an agreed to takeover to the American financial investor Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts which had become famous for its activities as a corporate raider. However, a 
variety of significant industrial businesses (figure 5.5) could not be sold as quickly as 
planned, so that, according to Dormann, the completion of the divestment programme 
will take until 2000 or 2001.
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(3) Reduction in vertical integration: Hoechst’s abandonment of the diverse field of 
industrial chemicals businesses and its focus on 'life science activities’ implies that its 
earlier strategy of an integrated chemicals production (^Verhundproduktioif) was 
given up. Even the relationships among the industrial businesses still remaining have 
become more closely aligned with market transactions, as the consolidated business 
units have received greater autonomy and accountability for their activities (see 
below). The degree of vertical integration has also decreased due to a reduced in- 
house provision of support activities, and the sale of the engineering company Uhde in 
1996 which had produced plant machinery for both Hoechst businesses and outside 
customers.
With respect to the issue of vertical integration in Hoechst’s ‘life science businesses’, it 
may be noted that the physical production of drugs (for both human and veterinary 
purposes) takes place primarily in two stages (Hancher 1990, pp. 40fif.): firstly, the 
manufacture of the active ingredients; secondly, a downstream production phase 
(tableting, packaging, etc.). In both steps, standardised routines can be used, and 
quantities of output are small, so that “production is not a critical competitive factor” 
in pharmaceuticals (Gambardella 1995, p. 15).^  ^Also, physical inputs into 'life science 
products' are fairly standardised and widely available, so that the incentive to integrate 
backwards into raw materials procurement is low. Value is added primarily in R&D 
and in distribution. Therefore, Hoechst’s strategy implies that relatively long 
production chains in industrial chemicals (figure 5.1), in which high degrees of vertical 
integration were perceived to be advantageous, have been replaced with the shorter 
production chains in many ‘life science activities’, as measured by the number of 
identifiable, successive steps in physical production.
(4) Increased international involvement: Hoechst’s focus on 'life science products’ has 
involved an orientation towards those markets where the demand for these products is 
greatest. With respect to many agro-products, the West European markets are 
relatively stagnant, and supplies shift increasingly towards the Americas. Also, the US 
represents the largest and most attractive market for research-based health care 
products (Cueni 1995, pp. 60-63). However, with growing purchasing power, some 
Asian countries may gain greater importance in future. With respect to Hoechst’s
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operations, the geographic location of its workforce follows, broadly speaking, jfrom 
the nature of its two major value-adding activities. Research and development is 
primarily located in Western Europe and the US, where highly skilled staff is available, 
while the personnel-intensive distribution activities are concentrated around the 
locations of Hoechst’s customers. As a result, the share of the Americas (primarily the 
US) in the geographical breakdown of Hoechst’s sales and employment data is 
increasing (table 5.2 and graph 5.1). The importance of the German base is 
diminishing. While a trend towards a greater international spread of activities has been 
taking place before Hoechst’s restructuring, this has accelerated in connection with 
Hoechst’s investments abroad since 1994.
(5) Use of hvbrid modes of organisation: In the context of Hoechst’s restructuring, it 
has been using a large number of joint ventures and strategic alliances, both for the 
purposes of entering new, and for exiting ‘old’ activities.^^ There are several reasons 
for this. First, as was pointed out by an interview participant (see endnote 28), the 
integration of scientists and researchers into extensive administrative hierarchies can 
prove difficult, so that a financial stake in an otherwise independent organisation may 
be preferable to an outright acquisition. Second, the use of equity joint ventures helps 
spread the risk involved in research-based activities across the venture partners. 
Conversely, in the case of exit joint ventures, the keeping of a financial stake in former 
businesses secures a relatively predictable income stream for Hoechst, without 
necessitating its operational involvement. (The most significant case concerns the sale 
of Hoechst’s speciality chemicals business to the Swiss Clariant, As part of the deal, 
Hoechst has received a stake of 45% in Clariant's shares, which carry, however, only 
10% of the voting rights. Similar exit joint ventures involve its European rigid films, its 
textile polyester, polypropylene-plastics and its acrylic fibres businesses). Third, many 
entry joint-ventures concern knowledge-intensive assets, the valuation of which is 
impeded by the ‘information impactedness’ problem (see section 2.3.1). The continued 
financial participation of the original owner can help reduce the problem of 
opportunistic behaviour in contracting upon the assets concerned. Therefore, 
Hoechst’s strategy of expanding its ‘life science activities’ and abandoning its 
operational involvement in the industrial businesses made the use of hybrid modes of 
organisation appear advantageous in many cases.
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Restructuring o f Hoechst's Internal Organisation
As described on page 215, initial steps towards internal restructuring, taken in 1991, 
had been targeted towards the operating businesses, rather than Hoechst’s central 
organisation. However, with the greater self-sufficiency and independence of the 
operating units and the duplication of the fiinctional / regional structure on the 
operating level, the functional and regional services that were centrally provided 
became superfluous. As a result, Hoechst’s large corporate functions came under 
scrutiny firom 1991 onwards. The restructuring became an official, concern-wide 
programme (the 'Strategic Management Process') in 1994, when the centrally 
organised functions and regions were abolished, and the redesign of Hoechst's macro- 
organisational structure began. The restructuring process culminated in 1997 with the 
introduction of a new organisational setup, called the ‘Strategic Management Holding’ 
(SMH), following approval by the annual general meeting. The reorganisation process 
is scheduled to continue throughout the next three to four years. In sum, the 
restructuring of Hoechst’s internal organisation has been taking place in parallel with 
the restructuring of the company’s boundaries.
Hoechst's new macro-organisational structure (figure 5.5) differs fi'om its earlier 
structure in two major respects:
(1) A new setup of Hoechst's corporate centre, implying a re-definition of the head 
office and of the centrally provided functions;
(2) The reassignment of Hoechst's businesses into legally and operationally 
independent companies.
These two aspects are analysed in turn.
(1) The corporate centre has been 'downsized' extensively. Staff in centrally provided 
services - the head office, corporate R&D, and other central services included - was 
reduced by 40% from almost 14000 in 1991 to some 8300 in 1996, while employees in 
central managerial functions saw a reduction by 35% from around 1200 in 1991 to 800 
in 1996. Since 1996, a further reduction has been taking place.
The SMH itself consists of a Corporate Center"^ of 200-250 employees, three quarters 
of whom are in managerial positions - the others being in administrative functions -, 
and the management board. The management board was reduced from 11 in 1993 to 9
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in 1994 and further to 7 in 1997. According to the questionnaire survey, all corporate 
head office functions except investor relationships (which have been extended), and 
public relations (which stayed level) were involved in the downsizing of the head 
office. The new Corporate Center is active in six mainly financial, accounting, strategic 
and legal fiinctions (see figure 5.5)^ .^ It also carries out corporate communications and 
investor relationships, and it has a few employees concerned with executive 
development, health, safety and environmental issues, and with government 
relationships. These various functions are staffed very sparsely, and many activities 
which in earlier years were carried out at corporate level have been integrated into the 
operating businesses (e.g. patenting). Many of the functions of the Corporate Center 
are so small that outside consultants and investment bankers are regularly drawn in. 
One interview participant said that up to 90% of strategy-related projects (e.g. 
acquisitions, divestments, etc.) were carried out by outside providers, while the 22 
employees in Hoechst’s Corporate Controlling and Development function were 
primarily concerned with project evaluation and implementation.
The main function of the Corporate Center, according to interview participants, was to 
steer the company through the restructuring process and "to devise optimal exit 
strategies". It was also said that the SMH would have to be rethought after the 
completion of the restructuring process, although Hoechst would maintain a small 
corporate head office even thereafter.
The reorganisation of Hoechst's Corporate Center, combined with the legal 
independence of all operating businesses, also means that the holding company is not 
any longer able to offset potential losses of individual operations against the profits of 
others for tax purposes. Thereby, Hoechst's new organisational structure provides 
incentives for the rigorous financial control of the operating businesses by the 
Corporate Center (Dormann in an interview with Manager Magazin 8/1997, pp. 42- 
49). In order to achieve this, Hoechst has been strengthening the performance- 
orientation of employees. Incentive payment schemes for its entire workforce have 
been implemented since 1994. For managers, bonus payments are made on the basis of 
pre-negotiated performance targets on business unit level, replacing an earlier system 
that had put more emphasis on seniority.^^ In addition, a reward scheme for employee 
suggestions has been put into operation. Project groups have been implemented, and 
greater responsibilities and decision-making powers have been given to shop floor
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employees.^^ Hoechst has also taken steps to make its compensation systems 
internationally comparable, and has adopted the International Accounting Standards in 
1994 to enhance financial transparency.
In connection with the setup of the Corporate Center as Hoechst’s new head ofiBce, 
functions and services which earlier had been provided from the centre of the 
organisation have been devolved in the following way:
• In order to decentralise R&D activities -  in the mid-1980s, about 8000 of its R&D 
staff of 14000 were working in Hoechst's central laboratories - , the company has been 
integrating R&D services into the operating businesses as far as possible. Hoechst has 
also been providing financial support for employees to set up small research-based 
firms. Other employees took up early retirement. For the remaining employees, 
however, Hoechst has set up a fully-owned subsidiary (Corporate Research and 
Technology), in which about 1000 employees were working as of October 1997; one 
interview partner described this subsidiary as "a leftover fi’om the restructuring 
process". Many of these employees have been working in business areas which 
Hoechst wants to exit altogether (e.g. chemical process engineering). According to our 
interview partners, the reassignment of these employees would take several years to 
complete. Similar to the other central service organisations. Corporate Research and 
Technology seeks to provide commercial research services to businesses both within 
and outside Hoechst. The longer-term goal is the full decentralisation of R&D.
• A similar strategy applies to the new central materials procurement organisation 
which figures as an independent subsidiary in Hoechst's new structure. The 
‘restructuring report’ (Hoechst AG 1997, p. 37) still justifies the existence of this 
subsidiary with the exploitation of potential scale and scope economies through bulk 
buying on behalf of the operating businesses. However, as the operating businesses are 
independent, it is left to them whether they use the services of the procurement 
organisation.
• All other central service organisations have been set up as legally independent 
businesses which enter contractual relationships with inside or outside customers. An 
example for this is corporate communications, which had been a Central Department 
before the restructuring process, with about 250 employees as of 1994. Around 50 of
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these took up (early) retirement. Another 20-30 were selected for the Corporate 
Communications function within the Corporate Center. For the remaining 170-180, a 
fully owned, independently operating subsidiary (‘CommServ’) was founded which 
aims to sell services (e.g. report design) to the operating businesses and to outside 
customers.
• The management of Hoechst’s infrastructure has generally been devolved to the 
operating units. On those locations where this was not possible (e.g. where several 
operating businesses shared in the use of the same site, such as in Frankfurt), parts of 
the infrastructure were consolidated in 13 limited partnerships. While Hoechst AG 
retains an interest in these service companies^*, they are being run as independent units, 
and the operating businesses have been acquiring stakes in them in proportion to their 
use of the services provided. While the service companies also aim to sell their services 
to outside businesses (by renting out plants etc.), the acquisition of customers who 
would use facilities specially designed for chemical works (e.g. pipelines) is said to be 
difficult.
The overall aim of the devolution of central services and functions has been to achieve 
a clearer assignment of costs and benefits to the operating businesses and to provide 
incentives to generate as much business as possible. Our interview partners said that 
during the 1980s, the divisions bore only about 50% of their operating costs, while the 
remainder was borne by Hoechst as a whole. As of 1997, more than 95% of the costs 
were borne by the operating businesses, thus creating incentives to contain costs at the 
operating level.
(2) The second major characteristic of Hoechst's new structure is the consolidation of 
its businesses in legally and operationally independent units (figures 5.4 and 5.5), after 
a substantial reassignment process. The aim was to consolidate all activities in four 
principal subsidiaries that would coincide with its four core ‘life science businesses’. 
To this end, Hoechst had to devolve its immediate assets to the subsidiaries concerned, 
and combine them with the assets purchased through its acquisitions in the context of 
the overall restructuring process. For example, Hoechst's original pharmaceutical 
activities were combined with the ones of Roussel Uclaf and of MMD to form HMR, 
while Roussel Uclaf s veterinary medicine activities were integrated into Hoechst
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Roussel Vet. The management boards of the subsidiaries decide on their organisational 
structure (e.g. a divisional structure at Celanese, a functional structure at HMR, or a 
combination between the two at Behring Diagnostics), and they take full management 
responsibility in every respect (e.g. employment policy, joint ventures, etc.). They also 
prepare their own reports, which will allow outside analysts to monitor the 
performance of Hoechst's subsidiaries more closely.
To summarise, Hoechst's restructuring that has been taking place since 1994 to 
culminate in 1997 has involved changes with respect to both its boundaries and its 
internal organisation. With respect to the former, the degree of horizontal integration 
and of internationalisation in its ‘life science activities' has increased, while 
diversification and the degree of vertical integration have been reduced. The company 
has also become engaged in hybrid modes of organisation, such as joint ventures. In 
conjunction with the changes regarding the boundaries of the firm, the company has 
restructured its internal organisation by moving towards a smaller corporate centre, 
including both the head ofiBce and a much reduced set of centrally provided functions. 
Decision-making has been decentralised and the operating units have been 
consolidated, while profit orientation and financial accountability have been enhanced.
It should be pointed out, however, that doubts about Hoechst's long-term strategy 
remain. In addition to the manifold problems encountered during the ongoing 
restructuring process (e.g. regarding the integration of HMR, its unexpectedly low 
operating performance^^, the strength of its ‘product pipeline', the breakdown of 
several joint ventures, etc.), to many observers it is unclear whether the combination of 
increasingly diverse ‘life-science activities' in a single organisation can be managed 
efficiently. Also, the role of the (however small) Corporate Center beyond the current 
restructuring has not been fully defined as yet. Analysts have become more critical of 
Hoechst's strategy of de-diversification and vertical disintegration, given that other 
German companies (e.g. BASF; see Manager Magazin 10/1996, pp. 64-70 and FT, 
19/8/1998, p. 26) have followed a different route.
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5.5 Comparison of Corporate Restructuring at Hoechst and ICI
This section provides a comparison of Hoechst and ICI, focusing on three aspects:
(1) The nature and the extent of their restructuring processes; .
(2) The timing of the restructuring decisions and their subsequent implementation;
(3) The factors that have either caused (advanced), or hindered (slowed down) the 
restructuring of the two companies.
The main emphasis is on the third issue.
(1) Nature and extent of restructuring: According to the analyses provided in section
5.3 and 5.4, ICI and Hoechst have been undergoing similar restructuring processes in 
many respects. Both companies have been separating their pharmaceuticals and 
agrochemicals businesses from other activities, thereby reducing their earlier 
diversification. They have become oriented towards more marketing-intensive, 
downstream activities from the perspective of the main chemical production process, 
and reduced the degree of vertical integration. On a horizontal level, they have 
integrated and consolidated their respective target businesses, and have achieved a 
greater international spread of their operations. Also, both companies have changed 
their internal organisation in conjunction with their overall restructuring processes, 
with a greater emphasis on decentralised decision-making, and a reduced corporate 
centre. Some differences between I d 's  and Hoechst's restructuring remain, however. 
For example, ICI has (at least so far) maintained a multi-product approach in 
chemicals, with only limited relationships among the constituent subsidiaries. Whether, 
in contrast, Hoechst can build a ‘life sciences group' in which the sum of the 
businesses is worth more than the individual parts, is still unclear.
Both Hoechst representatives and outside analysts reported that, during the planning of 
Hoechst's restructuring, the example of the ICI-Zeneca demerger had served as a 
constant benchmark that had been studied in detail. One interview partner said that, 
upon completion of Hoechst's restructuring programme, the company aimed at being 
even more closely focused on life science businesses than Zeneca, which still generates 
about 20% of its sales in speciality chemicals (e.g. inks).
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(2) Timing of corporate restructuring: The evidence provided in sections 5.3 and 5.4 
indicates that IC I has started its restructuring earlier^ and despite protracted decision­
making processes, has been quicker to implement restructuring decisions once they 
were taken, than has been the case at Hoechst. Disregarding the mid-1980s, when 
acquisitions and divestments led to a net-increase in diversification at both companies 
(but more so at Hoechst than at ICI), ICI drew up plans to separate its pharmaceutical 
business fi'om its other activities from about 1990 onwards, and elaborated a demerger 
proposal in 1991/92. In contrast, restructuring plans were developed at Hoechst after 
Dormann had become board chairman in 1994. However, the first practical steps, 
taken in 1995, were concerned primarily with the integration of ‘life science 
businesses’ (e.g. the acquisition of MMD), while disposals were still limited. A 
programme that explicitly proposed the separation of ‘life science’ from other activities 
was publicly announced by management in 1996, to be agreed by the Annual General 
Meeting in May 1997.
The restructuring at Hoechst might have proceeded more quickly if it had been able to 
demerge its ‘life science businesses’ from its other activities in the way ICI had done. 
This option was ruled out due to disadvantageous German capital gains tax legislation, 
so that Hoechst’s restructuring had to proceed through stepwise disposals and 
flotation of its industrial businesses, scheduled to continue until about the year 2000.
It should be emphasised that slow decision-making has been a problem at ICI as well 
as at Hoechst. For example, after its demerger, it took ICI a long time to address the 
problems in its remaining businesses. However, far-reaching decisions were taken once 
capital market pressures became imminent. Moreover, once decisions had been taken 
in principle, management was very quick to implement them, so as to signal to 
investors their determination to address the situation. In sum, the evidence does not 
suggest that managers of either company have been more effective or more willing to 
restructure than managers of the other company, but that ICI’s management has come 
under much greater capital market pressures to do so. In addition, the fact that the 
implementation of the restructuring proposals followed relatively quickly once they 
were decided suggests that ICI’s management may have had greater unilateral 
decision-making power to put their proposals into practice than management at 
Hoechst.
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(3) Causes of and obstacles to restructuring: Two sets of factors that have been 
influential in the restructuring of the two companies shall be discussed in greater detail:
(a) The role of the capital market: As emphasised above, capital market pressures in 
the form of takeover fears amidst a depressed share price have been an important 
catalyst of corporate restructuring at ICI. In Hoechst’s case, capital market pressures 
have played a role, too, but these have been less immediate. Although Hoechst’s share 
price has been low throughout much of the 1980s and early 1990s, at least until very 
recently a takeover bid for the company was unlikely for two reasons."*® First, a set of 
economic and institutional factors, analysed in detail in section 6.3.1 below, shelter 
German companies - in particular firms with a strong public profile such as Hoechst - 
firom hostile takeovers. Second, Hoechst’s shareholder base has been relatively 
fi-agmented, with the largest shareholder -  the state of Kuwait through the Kuwait 
Petroleum Corporation, which is regarded as an unlikely seller in case of a hostile bid - 
holding 24.5% of the shares. About 30% of Hoechst’s shares are held by individuals, 
many of them current or former employees, who would hardly support a takeover 
attempt. The acquisition of significant stakes in Hoechst by international institutional 
investors has taken place only since 1996, possibly in response to Hoechst’s 
restructuring plans which have been publicised as a ‘shareholder value’ initiative. 
Despite the absence of immediate takeover threats, the company faced more general 
capital market pressures in the form of difficulties with respect to the raising of capital 
during a phase when large investments needed to be made. In parallel with the 
recession in 1993, interest rates in Germany were high (tables 6.6 and 6.7), 
contributing to the high costs of external capital. At the same time, the rise of new 
competitors described above meant that investors had the opportunity to invest into 
operations with about the same class of risk, but with much higher returns. Interview 
partners at Hoechst pointed repeatedly to increased capital market demands as an 
important reason behind Hoechst’s restructuring, but also said that these pressures 
were a relatively recent phenomenon with which Hoechst had not been confronted 
during the 1980s.
(b) The role of labour representatives in decision-making processes: In I d ’s case, 
restructuring was decided unilaterally by management, without any direct interference
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from employee representatives in the decision-making processes. In contrast, 
Hoechst's restructuring constituted a ‘change in the company' (Betriebsanderung) 
according to para 111 of the German Workplace Labour Relations Act 
iBetriebsverfassungsgesetz\ and had potentially disadvantageous implications for 
employees. Under these conditions, it had to be agreed with the central works council 
(for details see section 6.3.2). The internal discussions and negotiations, which took 
place primarily in 1996, are estimated to have taken 1-116 years. Employee 
representatives were concerned primarily about redundancies, and about the 
implications of the restructuring on the system of employee representation at Hoechst 
through works councils and the supervisory board. The latter issue could be resolved 
relatively easily in that Hoechst's supervisory board is unaffected by the restructuring, 
and the individual operating companies establish their own statutory representative 
bodies. With respect to employment policies, Hoechst has aimed at avoiding 
compulsory redundancies, using voluntary early retirement schemes instead. It has also 
tried to maintain its image as a ‘socially responsible employer' by maintaining its highly 
regarded apprenticeship programs. Under these conditions, the central works council 
agreed to the restructuring which it ultimately could not have prevented. Nevertheless, 
the restructuring has been criticised harshly by employees, in particular since the end of 
1997 when it became clear that the restructuring process did not deliver the rapid gains 
that had been hoped for" \^
In sum, two sets of factors can be identified that help explain the differences in the 
timing and the speed of implementation of the restructuring processes at ICI and 
Hoechst. First, ICI has been confronted with capital market pressures earlier and more 
directly than has been the case at Hoechst. Second, the restructuring process at 
Hoechst has been prolonged by the involvement of labour representatives. This gave 
management less unilateral decision-making powers, in particular in those decisions 
which did not relate to the expansion of the company (e.g. the acquisition of MMD), 
but to its separation from its industrial activities, and its internal reorganisation.
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5.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, a comparative case study of corporate restructuring processes at two 
large chemical companies, Hoechst AG in Germany and ICI pic in the UK, has been 
presented. The particular focus of the chapter has been on the following three aspects:
(1) First, by providing qualitative detail on structural changes in two companies, the 
case study has shown that corporate restructuring is a multi-dimensional process, 
which involves inter-related changes with respect to both the boundaries of firms, and 
their internal organisation. Changes in particular respects (e.g., diversification), or 
through particular events (e.g., acquisitions or divestments), are part of a company’s 
restructuring, but they do not provide a comprehensive picture of corporate 
restructuring as a whole. It has been shown, for example, that the de-diversification 
that has been taking place in both companies has been closely related to a concomitant 
reduction in vertical integration, and also to increases in horizontal integration in the 
companies’ respective target businesses. Also, in both cases were changes with respect 
to the firms’ boundaries accompanied by a restructuring of their internal organisation. 
The analytical scheme developed in chapter 2, in which the various elements of 
corporate structure were identified, has been a valuable set of tools in the context of 
the comparative case study.
(2) Second, the chapter has provided evidence on the timing and the extent of 
corporate restructuring in two companies from the UK and West Germany respectively 
which is consistent with the findings in chapters 3 and 4. In particular, it has been 
found that corporate restructuring has started later at Hoechst than at ICI, and that, 
once restructuring decisions were taken, they were implemented more quickly at ICI 
than at Hoechst. These findings raise the question as to how these differences can be 
explained, given that the two companies have experienced not only the same industry- 
specific pressures, but also similar organisational characteristics.
(3) Third, the chapter has analysed the underlying causes of corporate restructuring at 
the two companies, showing that, in both cases, firm-, industry- and country-specific 
factors have been at work. The latter set of factors include the general macro- 
economic conditions in the UK and West Germany, and also the legal-institutional 
environment in the two countries: the tax implications of demergers, which ruled out 
this option at Hoechst, and the less unilateral decision-making powers of Hoechst’s
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managers in the face of co-determination provisions which gave employee 
representatives a say in the transformation of the company. Most importantly, it has 
been shown that capital market pressures have been more demanding at ICI than at 
Hoechst, resulting in a rapid restructuring of the former company.^^ While such 
pressures are directed towards particular firms, it will be argued in section 6.3.1 below 
that, due to a complex set of economic and institutional factors, the capital market 
cultures of the two countries in general are markedly different. In sum, the findings of 
the comparative case study would be consistent with the hypothesis that cross-national 
differences in the timing and the extent of corporate restructuring reflect differences 
with respect to the economic and institutional environments in the UK and West 
Germany. This theme will be elaborated upon in the following chapter.
 ^ This chapter, including tables 5.3 and 5.4, is based on information available as of September 1998. 
More recent events, such as Hoechst’s proposed merger with Rhône-Poulenc to create Aventis, could 
not be taken into account in this analysis. The author believes, however, that these events are in line 
with the thrust of the argument presented here.
 ^The chemical industry, in turn, represents about the same proportion of the total economy of each of 
the two countries. As of 1992, the chemical and pharmaceutical industry (ISIC codes 351 and 352) 
represents the fifth largest manufacturing industry by employment in both countries, employing 8% 
and 7% of total manufacturing employment in Germany and Britain respectively (information source: 
UNIDO International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, Vienna 1995).
 ^ Grant et al. (1988, pp. 233ff) provide a list of such new producers of ethylene, polyethylene and 
PVC firom 1980 to 1986. Nadarajah (1997, p. 7) provides data on capacity editions in ethylene fi'om 
1990 to 1995, showing that most capacity has been added outside the Western countries (see Tandy 
1997, p. 1, for forecasts until 2010). The data by Fayad and Motamen (1986, p. 128) show the 
continually increasing share of the developing countries in the production of petrochemicals and 
thermoplastics. See Barnett and Bubley (1994, pp. 10-17) on the overcapacity problem in the world 
petrochemical market.
 ^For ease of presentation, all figures, graphs and tables are presented at chapter end.
 ^ It should be emphasised that moving into downstream activities is not the only possible strategy 
(Arora and Gambardella 1996, p. 24). Some Western companies (e.g. Huntsman, Quantum, Borealis) 
have been focusing strongly on particular commodity chemicals, increasing operating efficiency and 
production volumes, and cutting costs as decisively as possible (e.g. cutting out R&D, etc.). Also, 
there are still particular market niches in basic chemicals where firms can gain competitive advantage 
through technological leadership (e.g. BP in Acrylonitrile).
® See in particular Owen and Harrison (1995), but also Pettigrew (1985) and the more popular account 
by Kennedy (^1993).
 ^Both companies have kindly allowed us to publish the results of their questionnaires in the context of 
this case study.
* I d ’s North Sea oil activities were later sold to Enterprise Oil in which it held a 25% stake. The 
disposal of this stake in 1990 ended I d ’s involvement in the oil industry.
 ^Hannah (1983, p. 83) states that in the late 1920s I d ’s divisional structure was “in germ”. It was 
clarified and developed in a McKinsey-led reorganisation in 1965.
The notion of speciality chemicals refers to a variety of differentiated chemical products which are 
designed to solve specific customer problems and are therefore 'application intensive' (Chemical 
Insight, November 1997, p. 5), such as in the case of glues, detergents, pigments, and food
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ingredients. Apart from speciality chemicals, Wei et al. (1979, pp. 252-259) list three types of 
chemicals:
• Commodi^ chemicals: i.e. undifferentiated chemicals produced in large quantities to uniform 
standards (e.g. ethylene). Competition is based primarily on price.
• Pseudo-commodities: differentiated products produced in large quantities (e.g. synthetic fibres). 
Competition is based on price, but also on product performance. However, as production technologies 
become more widely available, the scope for product differentiation through quality decreases.
• Fine chemicals: undifferentiated products made in low volumes, but at high quality specifications 
(e.g. vitamins). Fine chemicals represent the smallest market segment, with commodities and pseudo­
commodities being the largest segments, and speciality chemicals a medium-sized market segment
" C. Miller Smith: A View from the Top as Seen from Europe. Address to the World Chemical 
Congress in August 1997. Typescript, p. 5.
ICI’s demerger followed two role models: Courtauld’s demerger in 1990 (R. Hampel in a speech in 
December 1992, mimeo, p. 12), and the ‘unbundling’ of the conglomerate BAT under the threat of the 
corporate raider Sir John Goldsmith, also in 1990. One of the questions that guided the strategists 
who planned ICI’s demerger was what Hanson would have done with ICI. Judging from Hanson’s 
general raiding technique (Goold et al. 1994, pp. 227-233), a breakup would have been a probable 
solution, combined with a marked reorganisation of the group through decentralisation, reduction in 
administrative staff, abolition of cross-subsidies etc. (Ireland 1990, pp. I-I2).
See Sir Ronald Hampel’s speech 'Beyond the Millenium’ at the SCI meeting, 23 April 1997 
typescript), and his address to ICI’s Extraordinary General Meeting on 16 June 1997 (typescript).
See Sunday Telegraph (Business Section), 31 May 1998, p. 6.
It should also be mentioned that the deal marks an important step in Unilever’s own refocusing 
program.
Sir Ronald Hampel in his address to I d ’s Aimual General Meeting, 23 April 1998.
On the dominance of the German dyestuffs industry before WWI see Landes 1969, pp. 275f. - 
Historical data on Hoechst's workforce, capital, turnover, and profit are contained in Hoechst's 
corporate history by Schreier and Wex (1990, pp. 353-358).
In I9I8, the 'small IG' (Kleine IG\ ofGcial name: Interessengemeinschaft der deutschen 
Teerfabriken) was founded out of the combination of the already existing cartels Hoechst-Cassella- 
Kalle and Bayer-BASF-AGFA with the companies Griesheim-Elektron and Weiler-ter Meer. In 
contrast to the 'large IG', during the lifetime of the 'small IG' the individual companies remained 
legally independent.
For details on IG Farben’s internal structure see Kreutle (1991, pp. 155-235) and the organisation 
charts in Hayes (1987, pp. 388-391).
The documents about the dissolution of the IG Farben and the history of Hoechst between 1945 and 
1953 are contained in Dokumente aus Hoechst-Archiven, Vol. 48-50 by K. Trouet (1976 and 1978a 
and 1978b). For the decision to re-establish Hoechst as a company which would be sufficiently large 
to compete on the world market and to represent a serious competitor to Bayer in pharmaceuticals and 
to BASF in fertilizers and petrochemicals see in particular the 1950 report of the Tripartite 
Investigation Team (Trouet 1978a, pp. 100-106).
The following statement by Hoechst’s management board chairman K. Wirmacker (I97I, p. 373; 
translation and emphasis A.R.) on acquisition policies shows that diversification was regarded as a 
positive aim: “Acquisitions and mergers make sense only if th^  open up for the company an activity 
area which presents a valuable and desirable addition” (sc. to the company’s existing activities; A.R.).
During the 1980s, Hoechst's strategy was expressed in its logo "Hoechst HighChem"; see Harvard 
Business School Case Study 9-390-146 (1990), p. 10.
^ In an article in Manager Magazin (1995, No. 5, p. 36) it was estimated that Hoechst had 40000 
different products.
According to both Hoechst representatives and outside analysts, the mixed structure described above 
resulted in insufficient transparency and hindered the implementation of stringent financial controls, 
thereby giving rise to cross-subsidisation among the businesses.
“Look at the role of the Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia and their investment plans. 
Look at the Shells, Exxons and BPs of this world, going upstream and downstream. Should Hoechst 
invest heavily to create an integrated production facility in China? That is not our priority. There are 
other areas where we are more competent. [...]. Chemicals are an excellent option for others, not 
necessarily for us" (Jürgen Dormann in an interview with the Hoechst magazine Future 3/97, p. 8).
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The pharmaceuticals group is the major one of four business areas on which Hoechst is focusing in 
the context of its restructuring; these will be analysed below in more detail. The general economic 
conditions in some of the other areas (e.g. in animal health products) bear some similarities to the 
pharmaceutical market (with respect to research intensity, patent protection etc.), as described here.
These companies include Abbott Laboratories, Bayer, Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol Myers Squibb, 
GlaxoWellcome, Hoechst, Hoffinann LaRoche, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, Pharmacia & Upjohn, Rhone 
Poulenc, Scherlng, SmithKline Beecham, and Zeneca (see Owen 1994b for a list as of 1991). While 
many movements within this group of Top players' have taken place, partly through mergers and 
acquisitions (including Hoechst’s acquisition of Roussel Uclaf and Marion Merrell Dow, and many 
others), no new players have entered this group in recent years. “It is possible to look upon the various 
sub-markets as merely a large number of simultaneous games of musical chairs being played by one 
unchanging group of large drug firms” (Reekie 1975, p. 45).
^ "If synergies exist to a limited extent, our decision in the present situation is to ignore them, 
because apparent synergies can prevent us from taking a clear view. So, unless there are tremendous 
arguments for synergies - and I do not see those today - there are no synergies. In the future, there 
could be potential synergies in a life sciences company. [...] In the past, if  one business was losing 
money it was subsidized from elsewhere in the Group. Blowing away the fog of synergies will help 
everyone have a clear understanding of the future." (Jürgen Dormann in an interview with the 
Hoechst magazine Future 3/97, p. 10)
Hoechst decided to biy out the minority interests in RU in order to safeguard its long-term interest 
in RUs pharmaceuticals business, in the face of political uncertainty in France.
One of our interview partners, referring to the 17 joint ventures that Hoechst had engaged in by the 
time of the interview, said that, in his opinion, Hoechst had alrearty too many joint ventures, for the 
managerial problems of control and coordination. On the other hand, he described the difhculty of 
integrating biotech firms as a "problem of fluctuating minds": "The people in the biotech fiTms want 
to work hard, but they don't want to be told to work hard". It was therefore difficult to integrate these 
mostly young, irmovative scientists into the administrative hierarchies of larger companies.
The generic drug markets is far more price competitive than the market for ethical drugs. Industry 
analysts estimated that Hoechst’s generic drug subsidiaries had been performing poorly.
However, there are exceptions to this rule, e.g. the importance of quality controls in the physical 
production of drugs. -  As of 1995, Hoechst aimed at reducing "the number of sites involved in the 
production of pharmaceutical intermediates and active ingredients [...] firom 16 to 10" (Armual 
Report 1995, p. 32).
Hoechst managers even describe the future of the group, without being too specific, as an 
"international network of companies" (see Dormarm's interview in 3/97, p. 10).
The term Corporate Center (printed in italics) refers specifically to Hoechst's new head office, 
using Hoechst's own terminology (Hoechst 1997, p. 37 et passim), while the term 'corporate centre' is 
used here in an inclusive sense, refering to all centrally provided services.
This emerges from an organisation chart drawn up by Hoechst's Corporate Controlling & 
Development function in October 1997.
"I couldn't believe that the way you got more pay at Hoechst before was by getting older" (E. Drew, 
former board member of Hoechst, quoted in Hoechst, Supplement to Chemical Week, 26/6/1996, p. 
s2).
Hoechst's Armual Reports (e.g. 1994, p. 12) also report the adoption of 'leaner organisational 
structures' and 'flatter hierarchies'. However, it has not been possible in the questionnaire and the 
interviews to ascertain these developments quantitatively. One difficulty in this respect might be that 
with the greater independence of Hoechst's operating businesses, the Corporate Center may not be as 
well-informed about such changes as it used to be. Also, while in 1994 persormel policies were still 
devised at the centre, this is not any longer the case, so that particular practices in the individual 
businesses might already diverge.
This setup was chosen partly because of Hoechst’s legal and environmental liabilities for its old 
sites; for details see Hoechst AG 1997, pp. 34-36.
The performance of pharmaceuticals companies is widely measured in terms of return on sales 
(ROS), which was 11.8% in 1997 for HMR. This is considerably lower than the ROS of many big 
pharmaceuticals companies (e.g. Zeneca: 20.9%).
However, it is worthwhile noting that the Financial Times (9/6/1993) commented the appointment 
of Dormann as board chairman with the words “Mr Dormann is [...] credited with strengthening the
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group’s anti-takeover defenses.” This seems to indicate that, while unlikely, a takeover could not any 
longer be ruled out completely.
See Die ZEIT, 22/1/1998, p. 21.
The comparative case stu(fy confirms the hypothesis by Chandler et al. (1998, p. 417) who suggest 
that corporate restructuring among the world’s largest chemical companies, while serving similar 
strategic purposes (reduced exposure to commodity chemicals, etc.), reflects cross-national difierences 
in corporate governance ^stems.
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Year Greographical Distribution of Sales 
(by location of final customer)
Geographical Distribution of 
Employment
Europe
(%)
The 
Ameri­
cas (%)
Other
(%)
Europe
(%)
The 
Ameri­
cas (%)
Other
(%)
AL
1986 50.0 25.3 24.7 1:039 58.9 18.7 22.3 0.960
1987 49.6 27.4 23.0 1.040 55.8 23.1 21.1 0.992
1988 48.7 27.6 23.7 1.047 54.5 24.5 20.9 1.003
1989 46.9 29.4 23.8 1.056 53.4 25.3 21.3 1.012
1990 49.2 28.3 22.5 1.042 53.8 24.7 21.5 1.009
1991 46.3 30.7 23.0 1.057 54.1 24.1 21.8 1.007
1992 45.5 31.0 23.5 1.062 53.1 24.6 22.2 1.016
1993 33.4 22.4 44.2 1.062 49.5 23.8 26.8 1.042
1994 41.7 27.4 30.9 1.082 40.7 22.2 37.0 1.068
1995 41.6 27.0 31.4 1.082 38.6 24.1 37.3 1.078
1996 39.4 29.4 31.2 1.090 37.2 25.9 36.9 1.086
1997 45.5 31.0 23.5 1.062 41.5 34.7 23.8 1.074
Table 5.
Note:
Source:
1: Geographical Distribution of ICl's Sales and Its Workforce
Ms and Mw are entropy indices of multinationalisation with respect to sales and 
employment respectively, calculated as M, = -'^s^lns^ andAf^  = , with
Sk and Wk denoting the proportion of sales from and employment in the three regions 
(k) respectively (see Davies and Petts 1997, p. 21).
Own calculations, based on Annual Reports.
Year Geographical Distribution of Sales Geographical Distribution of 
Employment
Europe
(%)
The 
Ameri­
cas (%)
Other
(%)
Europe
(%)
The 
Ameri­
cas (%)
Other
(%)
Myv
1986 66.6% 18.9% 14.5% 0.865 78.9% 13.0% 8.1% 0.656
1987 60.2% 26.2% 13.6% 0.928 72.6% 20.8% 6.5% 0.737
1988 58.7% 27.1% 14.2% 0.943 72.1% 21.8% 6.1% 0.738
1989 57.8% 27.9% 14.4% 0.952 -72% -22% -6% 0.738
1990 61.9% 24.0% 14.2% 0.916 -73% -21% -6% 0.726
1991 57.5% 27.0% 15.5% 0.961 -69% -25% -6% 0.771
1992 57.6% 28.0% 14.5% 0.954 -68% -26% -6% 0.781
1993 52.8% 31.6% 15.6% 0.991 -67% -26% -7% 0.805
1994 53.2% 30.7% 16.1% 0.992 64.7% 26.0% 9.4% 0.854
1995 53.3% 30.1% 16.5% 0.994 60.0% 30.7% 10.3% 0.902
1996 49.9% 34.0% 16.1% 1.007 57.6% 30.7% 11.8% 0.932
1997 48.9% 36.3% 14.8% 1.001 57.3% 31.3% 11.4% 0.930
Table 5.2: Geographical Distribution of Hoechst's Sales and Its Workforce
Note: Notes to table 5.1 apply.
Source: Own calculations, based on Annual Reports.
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Year Acquisitions Divestments Joint Ventures
1994 • Reduction of ICI’s 
share in several exit joint 
ventures
• Sale of the Monckton 
Coke & Chemical 
Company (UK)
• Disposal of two
businesses in the US
1995 • Acquisition of Crow’s 
paint business in the US
• Acquisition of Fuller 
O’Brien (paints) in the US
• Acquisition of the 
Corona decorative business 
in France
• Acquisition of
Kloeckner Pentatec
(acrylics, Germany)______
• Sale of the European 
ethylene oxide and
derivatives operations
• Some other, minor 
disposals
• Joint venture between 
Tioxide and a Korean 
pigment producer
• Agrochemicals joint 
venture between ICI India 
and Zeneca
1996 • Acquisition of Bunge 
Paints (South America)
• Acquisition of a 
controlling stake in Thai 
Poly Acrylic PCL
• ICI South Africa buys 
Expert Explosives (Pty) 
Ltd
• Disposal of some fixed 
assets (e.g. the Teesside 
Gas Transportation Ltd.)
• Joint venture with The 
Ensign-Bickford Company 
(US) in explosives
1997 • Acquisition of the 
Speciality Chemicals 
businesses (National 
Starch, Quest, Unichema, 
Crosfield) from Unilever
• Acquisition of a 
minority stake (9.1%) in 
Kotak Mahindra (paints, 
India)
• Acquisition of Superior 
Paint Manufacturing Co. 
(Puerto Rico)
• Acquisition of a Polish 
paints company
• Acquisition of BASF’s 
Syngas business
• Acquisition of a 
Canadian distributor of
• Sale of the polyester, 
Tioxide and films 
businesses to DuPont 
(completed in 1998)
• Sale of ICI’s 62.4% 
stake in ICI Australia
• Sale of ICI’s Canadian 
forest products business
• Sale of ICI’s UK 
fertilizer business
• Sale of ICI’s 51% stake 
in its South African 
explosives business
• Sale of the London 
Headquarter (to be leased 
back)
• Sale of the American 
and European explosives
• Joint venture with
Coates Italia SpA
(coatings)
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decorative materials 
• Acquisition of Ritz & 
Huber, Switzerland (car 
paints)_________________
activities (completed in 
1998)
1998 • Acquisition of selected 
home improvement
businesses from Williams 
pic
• Acquisition of Acheson 
Industries (speciality 
electronics materials)
• Acquisition of Mona 
Industries (speciality and 
personal care ingredients)
• Acquisition of Mydrin 
AGS (hnbH (adhesives) in 
Germany by National 
Starch
• Announcement to float 
ICi’s Eutech engineering 
consultancy on the stock 
market
• Sale of ICi’s
methylamines and
derivatives business
• Sale of ICi’s
polypropylene films 
business
• Sale of most of ICi’s 
global explosives 
businesses
• Sale of Crosfield 
(subject to regulatory 
approval)
• Sale of the US Tioxide 
business to NL Industries
• Two paint production 
joint ventures with Swire 
Pacific in China, with ICI 
taking majority stakes
• ICI India to form a 
joint venture with GSFC in 
acrylics
•  Exit joint venture with 
BF Goodrich in 
Thermoplastic Polyure­
thanes
Table 5.3: ICPs Major Acquisitions, Divestments and Joint Ventures since 1994
Source: Data from Annual Reports, press releases, Internet Websites.
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1994 • Capital increases 
several subsidiaries
m • Formation of the 
AgrEvo joint venture 
between Hoechst (60%) 
and Schering (40%)______
1995 • Acquisition of 71% of 
Marion Merrell Dow 
(pharmaceuticals)
• Acquisition of Syva 
(diagnostics)
• Sale of Schwarzkopf, 
Jade and Marbert 
(cosmetics);
• Sale of Riedel-de Haën 
(specialty chemicals) to 
AUiedSignal
• Sale of some shares in 
SGL Carbon in connection 
with its IPO
• Sale of Soekami 
Lefrancq and of the 
majority in Camillo Corvi
• Sale of the printing 
division to Agfa-Gevaert, 
effective 1996
• Formation of the 
Centeon joint venture 
(plasma products) with 
Armour Pharmaceuticals 
(US) (effective as of 1996)
• Transfer of the 
polypropylene business to a 
joint venture with 
Courtaulds (effective as of 
1996)
1996 • Buy-out of minority 
shares (43% of the total 
shares) in Roussel-Uclaf 
for DM5.4bn ($3.22bn)
• Acquisition of Plant 
Genetic Systems (US) 
(agricultural 
biotechnology)
• Sale of the speciality
chemicals business to
Clariant, in which Hoechst 
receives a 45% financial 
stake
• Sale of Uhde
(engineering) to Krupp / 
Hoesch
• Sale of CeramTec 
(ceramics) to Dynamit
Nobel
• Sale of BK Ladenburg, 
Lutsia and Henning;
• Sale of the remaining 
shares in SGL Carbon and 
of 49% of the vaccines 
businesses
• Transfer of Kalle 
Pentaplast (rigid films) to a 
joint venture with Klockner
1997 • Acquisition of the 
Indian company BAIF 
(vaccines and veterinary 
drugs)
• Sale of the Rugby 
Group (generic drugs) to 
Watson Pharmaceuticals
• Sale of the Dutch 
polystyrene producer 
Depron
• Polyester joint venture 
with P.T. Multikarsa 
Investama from Indonesia, 
vyith P.T. Multikarsa 
holding the majority stake
• Fibres joint venture with 
Courtaulds, with
Courtaulds owning the 
majority stake___________
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• Veterinary products 
joint venture with Asahi 
Chemicals Industry (Japan)
• Joint venture with Dade 
International (US) 
(diagnostics)
1998 • AgrEvo acquires 
Cargill Hybrid Seeds North 
America
• Sale of Herberts to 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts
• IPOs planned for 
Messer, Celanese and 
Ticona
• Sale of Hoechst’s 
Japanese generic drug unit 
to Germany’s Hexal
• Sale of the European 
generic drug business to 
Alpharma
Table 5.4: Hoechst's Major Acquisitions, Divestments and Joint Ventures since 1994
Source; Data from Annual Reports, press releases, Internet Websites.
241
Feedstocks
Petroleum
Naphtha 
Raffinate 
Reformate 
Gas Oil 
Still Gas
to
Ethane
Propane
Butane
Natural Gas
Basic petrochemicals 
(primaries)
Intermediates
Aromatics; Aromatic / cyclic:
Benzene Ethylbenzene
Toluene Styrene
Xylenes Phenol
Naphthalene Phthalic Anhydride
Olefins-
Aniline
Cyclohexane
Unsaturates; Caprolactam
Ethylene
Propylene Aliphatic / acyclic:
. Butylene Acetic acid
Butadiene Ethylene Oxide
Acetylene Ethylene Glycol
Isoprene Ethylene Dichloride
Methanol
Vinyl Chloride Monomer 
Acrylonitrile
Ammonia
Formaldehyde
Butanol
Carbon Black
Dodecylbenzene 
Propylene Oxide
End products Processing industries
Plastic resins (1) Fabricated plastics
Synthetic resins Coatings
Synthetic fibres (2) Textile mill productior
Surfactants Soaps, detergents
Synthetic rubber (3) Rubber products
Medicinals Pharmaceuticals
Nitrogen fertilizers (4'
Mixed fertilizers
Phosphatic fertilizers /
Figure 5.1: 
Notes:
Source:
P ro d u c tio n  C hain  in th e  P e tro ch em ica l Industry
(1) Plastic resins include HD polyethylene, LD polyethylene, polypropylene, polystyrene, PVC ABS vinyl aceta te
(2) Synthetic fibres include acrylic fibres, nylon (polyamide) fibres and polyester fibres
(3) Synthetic rubbers include polybutadiene, SBR, polyisoprene, butyl rubber
(4) Nitrogen fertilizers include urea, am m onia nitrate, etc.
Fayad and M otamen 1986, p. 16, substantially adapted  on the basis of information from Stobaugh 1988, p. 165.
ICI Board
Head Office 
(<250 employees)
Executive Team
S J
w Specialty
chemicals:
National Starch: 
5 Divisions (e.g. 
Adhesives, etc.)
Central Functions:
(1) Accounting & Finance
(2) Legai
(3) Human Resources
(4) Pubiic Affairs
Quest 
(Flavours, Food Ingre- 
dients. Fragrances)
Coatings 
& Materials:
Coatings
(Paints)
ICI Acrylics ICI Poly­
urethanes
Industrial Specialties 
(4/5 indepdt. businesses): 
- Unichema
- Surfactants
- Lubricants
- Enterprise
(- Crosfield, being sold on)
Materials
Regional Businesses / 
Industrial Chemicals:
ICI Argentina 
(100%)
ICI India 
(51%)
ICI Pakistan 
(61%)
Explosives Busi- 
lesses (UK & US)
ICI Petro­
chemicals
ICI Halo- 
îhemicals
IndüsMàJ'Cïïénvcèys
Figure 5.2: ICl's Organisational Structure as of June 1998
Source: Information from Annual Reports and the ICI Factbook 1998.
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Source: Information from Annual Reports, B rochures, Interview Data.
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6. An Interpretative Approach to the Cross-National Differences 
in Corporate Restructuring Between the UK and West 
Germany
6.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters have provided evidence on corporate restructuring in large 
non-financial companies in the UK and West Germany since the mid-1980s. The 
general finding has been that, while in both countries a considerable number of 
companies have engaged in restructuring, this development has started earlier, and has 
been more far-reaching, in the UK than in West Germany. Without neglecting the 
similarities between companies in the two countries, the focus of this chapter is on 
these cross-national differences in the extent and the timing o f corporate 
restructuring. Its aim is to identify a set of country-specific factors that help explain 
these differences.
One can distinguish between three sets of determinants of corporate restructuring (for 
a related argument see Fligstein 1987, p. 45). Firstly, corporate restructuring, as 
conceived in chapter 2, is a firm-level phenomenon and is therefore likely to be partly 
driven by firm-specific factors.^ Secondly, firms compete with other firms in their 
particular industries, and industry-specific factors -  as analysed in industrial 
organisation theory - are therefore of importance. Thirdly, country-specific factors 
relate the national environment of economic activity to organisational structures and 
their changes over time, as Zysman (1994) argues.^ As this study consists of a 
comparison of firms in two countries, this chapter is confined to the country-specific 
determinants o f corporate restructuring. This does not imply that the two other sets of 
factors are irrelevant.
The chapter proceeds in two steps. On a theoretical level, section 6.2 develops the 
argument that corporate structures are affected by two sets of factors in the country- 
specific environment, namely particular institutional^ and economic settings. A model 
of the firm as a nexus of contractual relationships among various classes of ‘patrons’ 
is set out and the effect of the institutional and economic environment on these 
contractual relationships is discussed. The underlying idea of the section is that
248
corporate restructuring can be interpreted as the result of explicit or implicit 
recontracting processes among the various classes of patrons (see also Gilson 1998, 
pp. 2-3). It is argued that changes in the institutional and economic environment, 
mainly in the UK, have enhanced the position of shareholders to the disadvantage of 
other classes of patrons during the 1980s and 1990s, and that companies were forced 
to align their organisational structures more closely with shareholder preferences. 
Section 6.3 identifies four sets of factors in the British and German institutional and 
economic environment which help explain why the above-mentioned shifts in the 
balance of power have started to take place earlier and have so far been more 
pronounced in the UK than in West Germany. It is argued that the cross-national 
differences in corporate restructuring reflect the particular institutional and economic 
settings of the two countries. The findings of the chapter are summarised in section 
6.4.
6.2 Analytical Framework: The Firm and Its Environment
6.2.1 The Firm as a Nexus of Contractual Relationships
The following section builds upon Reve’s (1990, pp. 133-161) and Williamson's 
(1990, pp. 1-8) conception of the firm as a ‘nexus of contractual relationships’."^ The 
parties which transact with the firm are called its patrons (the term ‘stakeholders' is 
avoided due to its political connotations). As depicted in figure 6.1, the chief classes 
of a firm's patrons are
• Employees as the providers of labour. It will be useful below to distinguish 
between three classes of employees: operating personnel, administrative and 
managerial staff at lower and middle level, and top managers, meant to include the 
executive directors of the company concerned;
• External suppliers of intermediate goods and services;
• Customers',
• Providers o f financial capital.^
The owners of a firm are those entities who share two formal rights: (1) “the right to 
control the firm", and (2) “the right to appropriate the firm's profits", i.e. the residual
249
Employees:
• Top management
• Middle management / 
administration
• Operative staff
Wages / 
Salaries
Shareholders:
• individual
• institutional
• corporate
• governments
' etc.
Equity
capital
Dividends
Labour
Debt capital 
i-------------------
Interest ' 
payments
Lenders
Market price
Goods / 
Services
Market price
Suppliers Customers
Figure 6.1: The Firm as a Nexus of Contractual Relationships
Source; Blair 1995, pp. 31 and 47, substantially adapted.
earnings (Hansmann 1996, p. 11). Ownership rests often, but not necessarily, with one 
class of patron, as the ownership relation may reduce transaction costs between the 
firm and its patrons. If  the allocation of ownership rights is to be optimal, in addition 
to the transaction cost effects of ownership the costs of ownership itself (i.e. the costs 
of controlling the firm in its operations) have to be taken into account. Hansmann 
(1996, p. 47) argues that “the efficient assignment of ownership minimizes the sum, 
over all the patrons of the firm, of the costs of market contracting and the costs of 
ownership”.
Despite some exceptions, ownership of most large industrial firms in the Western 
countries rests with a subclass of the investors of financial capital. In firms that issue 
stock (public limited companies in the UK and Aktiengesellschaften in Germany), 
these investor-owners are the shareholders. Hansmann (1996, Ch. 4) puts forward a 
variety of reasons why the assignment of ownership rights to investors of financial 
capital often fulfils the above efficiency criterion. He thinks that it would be 
transaction cost inefficient if companies were to borrow all the financial capital they 
need. Furthermore, he argues that the governance costs for shareholders are generally 
low as compared to other classes of patrons. The governance costs of controlling the 
firm arise primarily from the agency relationship between the owners as principals 
and managers as their agents (Sappington 1991, p. 45-66), which results from the 
separation of ownership and control as observed by Berle and Means (1932). If 
principals and agents try to maximise their private utilities, their interests will not be 
perfectly aligned. As a result, principals and potentially also agents incur agency costs 
which Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define as “the sum of (1) the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditure by the agent, (3) the 
residual loss”, the latter being the monetary value “of the reduction in welfare 
experienced by the principal due to this divergence” of interests.^
For example, Jensen (1986, pp. 323-329) strongly argues that managers, in the 
absence of controls by principals, exhibit a tendency to build ‘managerial empires’ 
through sub-optimal acquisition and diversification policies and the creation of 
unnecessarily large managerial hierarchies. The reason for this is that such empire- 
building can increase managers’ utility in that it raises managerial status, promotion 
opportunities, and pay (see Nelson and Winter 1982, pp. 53-59; for empirical studies 
see Jensen and Murphy 1990; Gregg et al. 1993; Khalaf 1997, Ch. 8). Mueller (1986, 
Ch. 5) compares a managerial model of the firm, in which managers pursue their
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private goals on the expense of shareholders, with a ‘stockholder welfare 
maximization model’, and finds strong empirical support for the former rather than 
the latter model. Williamson (1964, Ch. 1) argues that the extent to which managerial 
discretionary behaviour is possible depends on the stringency of the selection 
environment, which he sees as constituted by competition fi*om both product and 
capital markets.
6.2.2 The Firm in Its Institutional and Economic Environment
In this section, it is argued that the power of the various classes of patrons, and 
therefore the balance of power among them, is affected by a combination o f 
institutional and economic factors. This concept is first developed in general terms. In 
section 6.2.3 it is applied to particular classes of patrons.
A wide variety of theories that conceive the interaction among organisations and their 
environments have been suggested in the literature (for an overview see Nohria and 
Gulati 1994, pp. 529-555). Following North (1981; 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996), in 
pointing towards institutional and economic factors as important determinants of firm 
structure, a specifically economic perspective on the firm-environment relationship is 
taken. This approach overcomes the criticism by Granovetter (1985) that the 
transaction-cost economic theory of the firm, as developed in section 2.3, neglects the 
‘embeddedness’ of firms in their societal environment.
(a) The Role o f the Institutional Environment
North (1991, p. 97; see also 1992, p. 5) defines institutions as “the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction”. He distinguishes 
institutions from organisations^, although the latter may decisively influence the 
formation, alteration or abandonment of institutions. Organisations are defined as 
“groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives” (North 
1990, p. 5), including political, social and economic objectives.
North (1990, Chs. 5-6) distinguishes between informal and formal institutions. 
Informal institutions are part of the socially transmitted culture in which individuals 
live. They originate from conventions among actors and from internally enforced 
codes of conduct, e.g. internalised rules of behaviour. In contrast to formal
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institutions, informal ones cannot be changed at short notice by intentional action. 
They evolve gradually and thereby link the behaviour of past and present actors even 
if  formal institutions have changed. In this way, informal institutions provide for the 
path-dependent evolution of behaviour (Nelson 1994, pp. 13 If).
By formal constraints. North refers to political, judicial and economic rules. Formal 
institutions are characterised by a higher degree of explicitness and standardisation 
than informal ones, although the distinction between these two classes is somewhat 
fluid.
The key function of institutions is that, by giving a structure to social interaction, they 
reduce uncertainty and limit the choice set of actors. Within a particular institutional 
framework, the range of acceptable ways of behaviour is narrowed down. Institutions 
reduce the costs of favourable types of behaviour and raise the costs of less favourable 
ones. In this way, institutions provide an incentive structure for economic behaviour 
(see North and Thomas [1970] 1998, pp. 147ff). Following Parsons ([I960] 1988, pp. 
80f), North puts particular emphasis on the incentive structure provided by the 
prevalent system of property rights. For example, commercial and tax laws have a 
strong influence on the degree to which the owners of capital can appropriate the rents 
from their investments.
Within the context of economic exchange, the general function of institutions consists 
of the fact that they provide a framework for transactions among contractual partners.* 
With respect to firms, institutions increase (decrease) the costs of unacceptable 
(acceptable) behaviour by the various classes of patrons, and, therefore, their relative 
power. Institutions affect
(1) the level of
(a) the costs of contracting (transaction costs) to the various classes of patrons 
within the ‘nexus of contractual relationships’;
(b) the governance costs incurred by the various parties to ensure that their 
contractual rights are fulfilled;
(2) the distribution of both transaction and governance costs among the various 
classes of patrons.^
For example, it will be shown below that the legal institutions in Germany provide for 
the existence of formal means of employee representation. Such legally enshrined 
rights provide a basis of employees’ bargaining power with respect to corporate
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decisions. Therefore, institutional settings shape the structural features of 
organisations by defining the relative basis of power of the various classes of patrons. 
“Changes in bargaining power lead to efforts to restructure contracts, political as well 
as economic” (North 1990, p. 84).
Following Commons’ (1931, pp. 656-657) suggestion that institutional economics 
should deal primarily with legal control, in section 6.3 below particular emphasis is 
placed on formal institutions, mainly of the legal kind. This is not to neglect informal 
institutions, but to provide examples for tangible, country-specific differences 
between the UK and Germany with respect to their respective institutional 
environments.
(b) The Role o f the Economic Environment
Apart from the institutional setting, the exchange relationship between the firm and its 
various classes of patrons is affected by economic factors. These determine the 
relative basis of power of the various classes of patrons, and thereby the extent to 
which the latter are able to press for organisational alignment in accordance with their 
interests.
In the context of this study, ‘economic factors’ include specifically the demand for the 
firm’s output, and the three cost parameters w, c, ps in the function^®
Tl = R -  w N -c K - p^S = R -  (1)
i= l
where
R  = revenue d{= factor owner z’s contractual income
# =  employment w = wage
K  = capital stock c = opportunity cost o f capital
S  -  supplies procured from outside ps= price of external supplies
n  = ‘value added’ or ‘rent’ (Kay 1993, Ch. 2), ‘supernormal profit’ (Nickell 1995, p.
3) or ‘economic profit’ (Besanko et al. 1996, p. 115)
In addition, total income (7) of factor owner / is given by
(2)
n
where a; is the share of the rent accruing to factor owner /, and =7
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Economie factors affect
(1) the level of rents (II) generated by the firm (equation 1);
(2) the distribution of rents among the factor owners as the principle classes of the 
patrons set out in figure 6.1 (equation 2).^  ^ Thereby, economic factors determine 
the resources that underpin the power position of particular classes of patrons, 
relative to others.
However, economic factors translate into changes in the structure of firms only to the 
extent that (a) the factors of production are mobile^^ and (b) there is substitutability 
between the different factors of production. As an example, it is argued in section 
6.3.4 that the power of shareholders over other classes of patrons (in particular 
employees) has increased in recent years due to their greater ability to move capital to 
high-yield investment projects, regardless of their geographical location.
‘Economic factors’, as conceived here, result from a wide array of firm-, industry- and 
country-specific determinants. Input prices, for example, are determined by the supply 
and demand conditions in the respective factor markets. The focus in section 6.3.4 is 
on two sets of macroeconomic factors (general demand conditions, capital costs) that 
are specific to the two countries investigated here.
To summarise sections (a) and (b), it is argued that the balance of power among the 
various classes of patrons is determined by a combination of institutional and 
economic factors.
6.2.3 Shareholder Power and Corporate Restructuring
The preceding sections have analysed the firm as a nexus of contractual relationships 
among various classes of patrons, and institutional and economic factors as key 
country-specific factors determining the balance of power among them. This section 
puts forward the argument that in recent years there have been shifts in the balance of 
power to the advantage of some classes of patrons, mainly shareholders, to the 
disadvantage of others, such as administrative and middle-management personnel. 
The literature identifies this shift in power for the American context during the 1980s. 
In the application of the argument to the situation in the UK and West Germany in 
section 6.3 it will become clear that this shift has been much stronger in the former 
than in the latter.
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The section proceeds in three steps. First, the reasons underlying the shift in power 
towards shareholders are set out. Second, the potential benefits of corporate 
restructuring to shareholders, i.e. the incentives for investors to press for restructuring, 
are discussed. Finally, the situation of other classes of patrons apart from shareholders 
and employees is reviewed.
(1) The Shift in Power towards Shareholders
Following Shleifer and Summers (1988), Useem (1992; 1993) and Donaldson (1994) 
identify the wealth transfer from ‘jobholders’ - to use Donaldson’s term - to 
shareholders as the fiindamental reason for the restructuring of American corporations 
during the 1980s. While the ‘corporate agenda’ during the 1960s and 1970s had been 
dominated by the “investors of human capital”, during the 1980s it became 
increasingly dominated by the “investors of financial capital” (Donaldson 1994, p. 
12).
Shleifer and Summers (1988) explore the wealth transfer argument in the context of 
hostile takeovers, although the approach can be applied to other corporate 
restructuring measures as well.^^ They argue that hostile takeovers enable the 
acquirers to renege on implicit or explicit promises made to employees by their firms 
regarding job security, high wages and the like. Employees have to accept these 
changes to the extent that they have made firm-specific investments into human 
capital which are not perfectly redeployable and would therefore be lost upon leaving 
the firm. One could also add that rising unemployment throughout the 1980s has 
increased the dependency of workers on their companies. Due to cuts in wages and 
benefits, average production costs decrease from ACi to AC2 (graph 6.1). As long as 
the average cost function (ACi) of other firms is unaffected, the firm concerned is not 
forced to reduce prices to P2, but can continue selling at Pi. Area Ai, which reflects 
investments made by employees for which the firm is not any longer willing to pay in 
form of high wages, represents wealth transferred from employees to shareholders. 
According to Shleifer and Summers, shareholder gains following hostile takeovers are 
due to wealth transfer effects without corresponding efficiency gains. In the long run, 
efficiency might even decline due to workers’ reduced willingness to make firm- 
specific investments into human capital.
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Graph 6.1: The Welfare Consequences of Hostile Takeover
Source; Adapted from Williamson (1988b, p. 65) and Martin and Kensinger (1990, p. 97).
Williamson (1988b, pp. 61-67) presents a different interpretation of graph 6.1. In his 
view, wealth transfers from employees (a) accrue only in the short run to 
shareholders, but in the longer run to consumers, and (b) are matched by efficiency 
improvements in the form of reductions in managerial discretion. He argues that 
managers tend to maximise their own utility by over-paying workers and 
unnecessarily inflating administrative bureaucracies, in order to gain status, labour 
peace, and to buy themselves a ‘quiet life’. Following corporate control contests, 
managerial discretion is reduced through wage cuts and slimming-down of 
administrative hierarchies. As a result, average costs decrease from ACi to AC: Area 
Ai, formerly a ‘quiet life premium’, is temporarily transferred from employees to 
shareholders, until product-market competition erodes these gains and forces the firm 
to reduce prices to In the longer run, gains (amounting to area A:) accrue to 
customers in the form of lower prices, allowing them to buy quantity Q: rather than
Qi.
While Shleifer and Summer interpret gains from hostile takeover as the result of 
wealth transfer effects without corresponding efficiency gains, and Williamson 
interprets them as result of wealth transfer with efficiency gains, a third possibility is 
to interpret them as the result of efficiency gains without accompanying wealth 
transfer effects. This would obtain if wealth increases from efficiency gains would be 
distributed proportionately to the various classes of patrons concerned. If, for 
example, in the case of hostile takeover, incumbent management would be replaced 
by a better management team which pursues more innovative activities, the resulting 
value increases could be distributed appropriately to shareholders, workers and 
managers alike.
It is an empirical matter which of the above three approaches to the effects of hostile 
takeovers and other forms of corporate restructuring apply (Martin and Kensinger 
1990, pp. 98-99). Disregarding the issue of efficiency gains, most authors support the 
view in which both Shleifer / Summers, and Williamson agree, namely that a wealth 
transfer away from employees has taken place in recent years, and that at least for the 
shorter run shareholders have gained from this development. Behind this development 
they see a fiindamental shift in power due to the following reasons.
(1) In line with Mueller’s (1986, pp. 17-19) argument that power rests with the most 
mobile factor in the economy, Donaldson (1994, Ch. 1) suggests that the mobility of 
the investors of capital has increased in recent years. Behind this development he sees
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the emergence of a global securities market with large, internationally active players 
(e.g. investment banks). At the same time, the mobility o f employees had at best 
remained unchanged or even declined due to the increase in dual-income 
households.
(2) Steams and Allan (1996, pp. 704-706) argue that through deregulation and the 
growth of mutual and pension funds, in combination with the invention of junk bond 
finance, increased amounts of capital were available for takeovers by corporate 
raiders. This increased the takeover threat to poorly performing companies and led 
them to engage in pre-emptive restmcturing, or to be restructured by corporate raiders 
such as T. Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn, and, in the UK, Sir John Goldsmith and Lord 
Hanson (Stonham 1997a, pp. 267). Also, the re-concentration of ownership in the 
hands of institutional investors led to a greater participation of investors in corporate 
governance (Gaved 1995, pp. 15ff.).
(3) Enhanced information on companies through information technology and 
improved analytical methods reduced the costs of governance incurred by financial 
institutions in monitoring non-financial companies (Stewart HI and Glassman 1988a, 
p. 89). Investors were able to identify more easily companies whose market value was 
below their potential level and to realise gains by acquiring them, improving their 
market value through restructuring, or selling their assets. Jensen (1996 [^1989], p. 
325) argues that “with its vast increases in data, talent and technology. Wall Street can 
allocate capital among competing businesses and discipline management more 
effectively than the CEO and headquarters staff of the typical diversified company”. 
This meant that central management lost its comparative advantage in running an 
‘internal capital market’ (Williamson 1975, Ch. 8), namely its superior knowledge of 
the business, to the external capital market. Thereby, the locus of diversification 
moved from companies to shareholders, “for whom the market was the portfolio and 
the individual firm an incidental data point” (Donaldson 1992, p. 81).
(4) The US recession in 1980-82 and the bad financial performance of firms in the 
following years widened the gap between shareholders’ demands and corporate 
returns on capital. Donaldson (1994, Chs. 2-3) argues that increases in size and 
diversification, strategies that benefited primarily managers, had been accepted by 
investors in times of high profitability and sufficient returns to investment. As these 
were low during the 1980s, shareholders were probing into potentials for efficiency
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improvements that could lift the value of their investments, and managerial actions 
became subjected to greater scrutiny.
(5) Winter (1992, pp. 59ff.) regards high real interest rates in the climate of low 
inflation during the 1980s as a crucial factor that had increased the power of investors. 
With increased costs of capital, competition for finance became harder, and 
companies had to liquidate assets and search for efficiency reserves to satisfy 
investors' demands. He also asserts that under increased capital market pressures 
companies invested less into ‘unconventional assets' such as employee skills and 
knowledge. However, the latter argument is inconsistent with Hall's (1991a, p. 7) 
finding that corporate restructuring in the form of leveraged buy-outs and acquisitions 
has little impact on R&D investment (see also Coffee 1992, pp. 83-86).
According to the economic literature, the move towards greater shareholder power has 
not been to the detriment of all types of employees. The ‘losers' of corporate 
restructuring were primarily middle management and administrative staff, rather than 
top management on the one hand and operative staff on the other. According to Yago 
(1993, p. 218), corporate restructuring in the US has been directed primarily against 
overly large managerial hierarchies and the overhead costs generated by them. 
Employment losses with respect to operative staff in the wake of acquisitions were, in 
his opinion, often followed by employment increases later on, and the initial losses 
were smaller than in cases where takeover bids were defeated. Similarly, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1991, pp. 49-56) find that takeovers during the 1980s were followed 
primarily by reductions in corporate head office staff, whereas the effects on operative 
employees -  both in terms of employment and of their wages -  were insignificant. 
Their results are supported by Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990, p. 192). However, other 
authors (e.g. Kanter 1989, Ch. 3) describe the disruptive effects that corporate 
restructuring can have on organisations as a whole, leading to feelings of insecurity 
and lower commitment among the workforce.
Initial shareholder gains from corporate restructuring also help explain why corporate 
restructuring occurs in a wave-like fashion. Steams and Allan (1996, pp. 706-715) 
present a leader-follower model of corporate restructuring, according to which the 
success of a group of ‘challengers’, in the form of corporate raiders, invited the
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imitation of their techniques by the larger financial players. Thereby, the increase in 
power in the hands of shareholders became a self-reinforcing development.
(2) The Benefit o f Corporate Restructuring to Shareholders
With respect to the potential benefits of corporate restructuring to shareholders, one 
can distinguish between the effects of changes in corporate boundaries (e.g. through 
changes in diversification), and the effects of changes in the internal organisation of 
firms, thus using the conception of corporate restructuring developed in chapter 2.
With respect to the restructuring of corporate boundaries, many authors follow 
Jensen’s argument that the aim of corporate restructuring during the 1980s has been to 
return fi-ee cash flow fi'om managers to shareholders. Changes in the boundaries of 
firms through divestitures, demergers and contracting-out are regarded as indicators of 
this reversal. Firstly, in order to put their financial resources to best use, companies 
had to review their operations and separate themselves fi*om activities that would 
yield higher returns in the hands of other companies. This had led to reductions in 
diversification and vertical integration. Therefore, “businesses trimmed back on less 
profitable peripheral activities, refocused on core competence, returned excess 
resources to the capital markets for alternative investment, managed resources more 
aggressively, and garnered a larger share of value-added for the owners” (Donaldson 
1994, p. 159). Secondly, on the receiving end, companies had to look for operations in 
which they would have unique advantages over other businesses, so that mergers and 
acquisitions, primarily on a horizontal basis, were also among the techniques resorted 
to in order to raise shareholder value. For the period 1979-1988 in the US, Bowman 
and Singh (1990, pp. 12-15) find that divestitures by large companies even 
outnumbered their acquisitions, whereas according to section 3.3.5 these 
developments seem to have been somewhat less strong in the UK and least strong in 
Germany. Thirdly, in order to exploit existing assets and competencies best and to 
yield scale economies that would also raise entrance barriers to competitors, 
companies became increasingly active on a global scale (Dunning 1993b, pp. 128- 
132). Fourthly, Bleeke et ai. (1992, pp. 103-110) argue that the primary aim of joint 
ventures and strategic alliances has been to raise shareholder value, and that, 
empirically, many alliances have been successful in achieving this. In sum, corporate
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restructuring for the purpose of reducing free cash flow and raising returns to equity 
involved all the dimensions of corporate boundaries identified in Ch. 2.
Black and Grundfest (1988, pp. 5-15) calculate the shareholder gains from takeovers, 
divestitures, and leveraged recapitalisations in the US from 1981 to 1986 to amount to 
$162bn. Similarly, McTaggart (1990, pp. 56-66) argues that restructuring during the 
1980s has helped to close the ‘value gap’ between the actual and the potential value of 
companies. Martin and Kensinger (1990, pp. 30-38) show that most changes in the 
composition of corporate assets have resulted in statistically significant, positive 
abnormal returns. In contrast, Nickell (1995, pp. 33ff.; similarly Pêne 1995, p. 932) 
summarises evidence according to which the gains from takeover accrue primarily to 
the shareholders of the acquired companies rather than to the bidder. It should also be 
pointed out that results from the US are not necessarily transferable to other countries. 
In an analysis of the German M&A market, Buhner (1990a, pp. 41ff.) finds that gains 
by shareholders of acquired companies represent at least in part losses by shareholders 
of the acquiring company, with total shareholder value remaining at best level. Also, 
acquisitions were not followed by improvements in financial performance.
With respect to the shareholder gains from internal restructuring, Useem (1993) 
describes the restructuring of American companies during the 1980s as 
“organisational alignment with shareholder value” (p. 8). Ownership-disciplined 
alignment increasingly replaced management-controlled alignment. Based on seven 
case studies, he argues that this process was indicated by
• Reductions in central managerial and professional staff, in particular at head office 
level, as more responsibilities were pushed down to the operating units. Head 
offices became smaller, and while some decisions and functions stayed at head 
office level (e.g. decisions regarding acquisitions and divestments, and investor 
relations), many other functions (e.g. human resources management) were moved 
out of the head office. The function of head offices moved towards financial 
controlling, which became more geared towards measures of shareholder value. 
Cibin’s and Grant’s (1996, p. 297) study of the oil industry confirms that 
reductions in head office personnel have been an important characteristic of 
corporate restructuring in the industry. They also argue that “the desire for 
improved returns to shareholders was the primary objective which unified the
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various aspects of the strategic and organizational changes during 1982-1990” 
(Cibin and Grant 1996, p. 294).
• Decreasing numbers of managerial layers, so that the number of employees per 
corporate manager increased and “the traditional Weberian pyramid gave way to a 
leaner and flatter organisational chart” (Useem 1993, p. 84). This is echoed by 
Kanter (1991, pp. 66-69) who argues that during the 1980s American companies 
reduced the number o f ‘interveners’, i.e. employees whose primary function was to 
monitor others rather than carry out operative tasks.
• Decentralisation of decision-making. Operating units gained more autonomy from 
the head office and the amounts of finance over which they could dispose without 
authorisation from the head office increased. At the same time, operating managers 
came under much greater pressure to manage resources effectively. More 
information on managers themselves became available, allowing companies to 
dismiss ineffective managers more easily. At the same time, companies made 
increasing use of incentive schemes (e.g. stock options), so that managers received 
greater inducement to pursue policies to raise shareholder value (Stewart m  and 
Glassman 1988a, pp. 92-94). Sesil (forthcoming. Ch. 4) reports that the use of 
executive share option schemes has risen substantially in the US and, more 
recently, in the UK.
• Useem (1993, Ch. 5) also argues that companies began to manage their shareholder 
relations much more aggressively. They expanded their investor relations 
departments, and became more active in informing shareholders and mobilising 
their support (see also Chapman [1994, pp. 146-148] who describes ICI’s extensive 
investor relations activities). In Useem’s view, this shows that companies learned 
to regard shareholders as their ‘ultimate constituency’, to which they had to 
communicate their efforts to align organisational structures.
Little evidence is available as to whether changes in the internal organisation of 
companies have actually delivered the improvements in shareholder value that they 
were expected to produce. Bowman et al. (1996, pp. 17ff.) summarise studies which 
find no or only minor effects of organisational changes on corporate performance. On 
the other hand, these studies look at isolated types of changes (e.g. changes in the 
divisional structure of firms), rather than to evaluate the various parameters of 
corporate organisation in their entirety. In sum, it can be said that changes with
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respect to both the boundaries of firms and their internal organisation represent 
responses to greater investor demands, in an attempt to increase shareholder value.
(3) The Effects o f Restructuring on Other Classes o f Patrons and on the Wider Public
The literature discussed focuses primarily on the effects of restructuring on 
shareholders and employees. The position of other classes of patrons is less widely 
considered.
Debtholders are often subsumed jointly with shareholders under the heading 
‘investors of capital’, although conflicts between shareholders and debtholders may 
well arise in corporate restructuring. Kudla and Mclnish (1984, pp. 53-56) point out 
that shareholder wealth gains in demergers and divestitures may be due to wealth 
transfer effects from debtholders. When a subsidiary is spun off from its parent 
company, its cash flow cannot support the debt payments of its parent, which reduces 
the value of the parent’s bonds and increases the wealth of the parent’s shareholders. 
Wealth transfer effects could be avoided if the spun-off subsidiary would take on a 
share of the parent company’s debt that equals its share in the combined cash flows of 
the two entities, but in practice it is often difficult to estimate the cash flow of the two 
entities, and in particular the one of the demerged subsidiary, before the split.
Also, increases in leverage which accompany many forms of corporate restructuring 
can be to the detriment of debtholders if loans are not fully protected, e.g. through 
collateral or debt covenants. Bowman and Singh (1990, p. 20) argue that corporate 
restructuring has increased the riskiness of debtholders’ investment, as could be seen 
from the crash of the US junk bond market in 1989.
Very little is known about the effect of restructuring on supplier relations. However, it 
has been suggested that a more drastic approach by German companies to cost 
reductions might lead to the dissolution of the system of ‘relational contracting’ that 
has been attributed to many German companies (Lane 1996, pp. 288ff). Goodhart 
(1994, pp. 54-57) warns against the spreading of the ‘Lopez-phenomenon’^^  in 
German companies, but also thinks that the closely-knit system of supplier relations 
might facilitate corporate restructuring in the form of reliable outsourcing and 
contracting-out (see also Semlinger 1993, pp. 161-178).
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The effect of corporate restructuring on the wider public is even less clear. Much of 
the literature that takes a critical stance towards restructuring suggests that corporate 
restructuring, in the form of ‘downsizing', has detrimental effects on the families and 
communities of displaced employees (Bluestone and Harrison 1987, pp. 72-104). 
Useem (1993, Ch. 6) maintains that, through the organisational alignment with 
shareholder preferences, companies became more ‘private’ entities that reduced those 
types of political involvement which were of no immediate benefit in their dealings 
with shareholders. He finds, for example, that since the middle of the 1980s 
companies reduced their donations to charities and political action committees which 
they had increased during the 1970s and early 1980s (see Useem 1984, p. 133, with 
data on the UK).
To summarise the results of section 6.2.3, the available evidence (which refers 
primarily to the US) suggests that corporate restructuring during the 1980s and 1990s 
has been a response to the demands of shareholders whose power, relative to other 
classes of firms’ patrons, increased. This enabled shareholders to press for the 
limitation of free cash flow at managerial discretion and for the alignment of 
organisational structures with their preferences. The primary ‘losers’ of this 
restructuring process have been non-operative staff, such as administrative employees 
and middle management.
6.3 Application: The Effects of Institutional and Economic Factors on 
Corporate Restructuring in the UK and West Germany since the mid- 
1980s
6.3.1 Shareholder Pressure and the Threat of Hostile Takeover
This section details the following argument: In the UK, an active market for corporate 
control “restrains managerial independence” (Marris 1964, p. 45) in that it presents a 
considerable threat to top management, forcing them to pay close consideration to 
shareholder preferences. Hostile bids have been important catalysts for corporate 
restructuring in two ways: First, hostile takeovers have often been followed by 
corporate restructuring. Second, their mere threat has led many companies to engage 
in pre-emptive organisational alignment with supposed shareholder preferences. Apart
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from the threat of hostile takeover, in recent years shareholder power has also been 
enhanced through the re-concentration of ownership in the hands of institutional 
investors which are reported to engage increasingly actively (although usually through 
informal means) in the governance of British corporations (see Graved 1995, pp. 
84ff).
In Germany, a combination of institutional and economic factors shelters top 
managers from hostile takeovers, and with only four hostile bids having taken place 
so far, the threat of hostile takeover is low. In addition, despite an increase in the 
shareholdings of institutional investors in German companies, their power is still 
considerably more limited than is the case in the UK. Thus, capital market pressures 
to align corporate structures with shareholder preferences have been lower in 
Germany than in the UK. Only during the first half of the 1990s have a few German 
companies begun to pay more attention to shareholder value.
In the UK, hostile takeover bids are a relatively frequent phenomenon. Jenkinson and 
Mayer (1994, pp. 6-8) estimate that, from 1984 to 1989, an average of 26% of all 
takeover bids for publicly listed companies were hostile in that they were initially 
rejected by the management of the target companies concerned. They also find that 
hostile bids are particularly frequent in the case of large takeovers, with about two 
thirds of the 10 largest UK takeovers being of a hostile nature. While in more than 
50% of all cases the targets’ managements succeed in rejecting the bid initially, in 
most instances they eventually succumb to the first or to another bidder. With targets’ 
directors having to leave in 70-80% of all hostile takeovers, hostile bids present a 
considerable threat to top management.
Jenkinson and Mayer (1994, p. 12) also find that hostile takeovers are usually 
followed by a radical restructuring of the acquired company, mostly through asset 
disposals and significant reductions in size. They also find that the mere threat of 
hostile takeover exerts a strong pressure on companies to restructure: “Even if hostile 
bids are successfully repelled, rationalisations still occur in nearly 90% of target 
firms” (Jenkinson and Mayer 1994, p. 12). They state that in 21% of the hostile bids 
investigated by them, pre-emptive restructurings were employed as takeover defenses 
(ibid., p. 40). According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 515), management buy­
outs have often been used to prevent takeovers (ibid., p. 484). More generally 
speaking, the threat of hostile takeover exerts a strong pressure on the management of
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publicly quoted companies in the UK to keep the share price of their companies high 
and to conform to shareholders’ expectations/^
In Germany, five hostile takeover bids have occurred since 1988; before this date, 
they had been absent from Germany. Franks and Mayer (1997a) analyse the first four 
of these, to which the one by Krupp Hoesch against Thyssen has to be added:
Year Bidder Target
1988 Flick family Feldmühle
1989 Veba Feldmühle
1990 Krupp Hoesch
1990 Pirelli Continental
1997 Krupp Hoesch Thyssen
Outcome 
Bid failed 
Bid failed
Hoesch was forced into discussions about a 
merger which was agreed in 1992.
Bid failed
Bid was withdrawn under the condition that 
the two companies would engage in 
discussions about merging their steel 
interests. The merger is currently taking 
place.
These data show that hostile takeover bids are extremely rare in Germany. Only one 
of the bids (Krupp - Hoesch) succeeded in the form envisioned by the bidder’s 
management. In the four other cases, the bid was rejected by the target’s management, 
although in one case (Krupp Hoesch -  Thyssen) a partial merger took place 
eventually. In all five cases the behaviour of banks was crucial to the outcome of the 
respective bid (Franks and Mayer 1997a, pp. 12-13). In sum, the threat of a hostile bid 
for German companies is very low.^^
Three sets of factors help explain these differences between the two countries:
(1) Hostile takeovers are concentrated in countries in which companies are highly 
dependent on the stock market. The British stock market is far larger than the German 
one.
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Year UK Germany
Number of 
domestic (all) 
quoted 
companies
Market 
capitalisation 
(million US$)
Number of 
domestic (all) 
quoted 
companies
Market 
capitalisation 
(million US$)
1990 1946 (2559) 850011.8 649 (n.a.) 355310.8
1991 1852 (2572) 986107.2 662 (1243) 392470.1
1992 1918(2440) 928392.6 665 (1259) 346891.0
1993 1927 (2412) 1150557.3 664 (1297) 460753.6
1994 1747 (2416) 1145290.4 666 (1467) 499278.4
1995 1971 (2502) 1346640.7 678 (1622) 577364.8
1996 2091 (2623) 1642582.4 681 (1971) 664913.2
Table 6.1: Size of the British and German Stock Markets (figures refer to year-end)
Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut e.V.
This table shows that there are more than three times as many British companies 
quoted at the London Stock Exchange than there are German companies quoted in 
Germany. The sharp increase since 1993 in the number of companies quoted in 
Germany is mainly due to foreign companies seeking listing in Germany. The overall 
stock market capitalisation is lower, and the average stock market capitalisation per 
company is US$337m in Germany as compared to US$626m in the UK. As of March 
1997, stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP was 31.4% in Germany and 
154.4% in Great Britain, up from 14% and 81% respectively in 1985 (Prowse 1994, p. 
30). The difference between the British and the German situation is even starker once 
market capitalisation is calculated net of cross-holdings (Wenger and Kaserer 1997b, 
p. 7). Among the reasons for the low number of quoted companies are high listing 
costs and rigid ex ante publicity laws in Germany. Whereas the average age of 
companies that decide to go public is 8 years in Britain, in Germany it is 55 years 
(Baums 1996b, p. 3). Data from the Deutsches Aktieninstitut e.V. also show that, in 
1996, the turnover of equities in Britain was, at DM 8684362m, more than 3.5 times 
as high than in Germany with DM 2441848m.
(2) Even for those German companies which are quoted on the stock exchange, the 
importance of equity as a source of finance is typically lower than for companies in 
the UK, as the following data show.
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Germany 1980 1985 1990 1995
Retained earnings and other 58.1 67.3 60.8 66.9
Debt 39.6 30.2 34.5 27.5
Short-term 20.6 9.7 14.6 13.9
Long-term 19.0 20.5 19.9 13.6
Share capital 2.3 2.5 4.8 5.6
Table 6^: Financial Structure of Non-Financial Companies in Germany in %
(1980-1990: West Germany; 1995: all Germany); flow of funds.
Source: OECD 1996b, p. 204.
UK 1980 1985 1990 1995
Retained earnings and other 28.4 41.0 41.1 55.3
Debt 53.4 51.0 51.6 21.3
Short-term 42.7 42.5 31.7 15.7
Long-term 10.7 8.5 19.9 5.6
Share capital 18.2 8.0 7.3 23.4
Table 6.3: Financial Structure of Non-Financial Companies in the UK in %
(flow of funds).
Source: 1980-1990: OECD 1994b, p. 138; 1995: own calculations, based on Central
Statistical Office: Financial Statistics, January 1998, No. 429, p. 204.
A comparison of tables 6.2 and 6.3 shows that
• German companies rely to a much greater extent on retained earnings than their 
counterparts in the UK (see also Prowse 1994, p. 32). The German tax and 
accounting system allows to build up substantial reserves at preferential tax rates 
and encourages thereby self-financing of companies. In addition, the system of 
corporate pensions means that many large companies hold reserves for their future 
pension liabilities on their balance sheets, and finance investments out of these 
reserves (Edwards and Fischer 1994, pp. 53ff).
• British companies rely more on short-term debt, e.g. supplier credits and short­
term bank loans, than German firms. Long-term debt, when calculated as a 
percentage of all external liabilities, plays a much greater role in Germany (see 
also Marklew 1995, pp. 23-34).
• The importance of equity as a source of finance for German firms is low, although 
it has been increasing slowly since the mid-1980s.
(3) The system of corporate ownership, and the role of banks in the governance of 
companies: In comparison with the UK, in Germany corporate ownership of the 
quoted sector is highly concentrated. Franks and Mayer (1997b, p. 8), using a sample
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of 171 quoted companies, find that “for 85% of the companies there is at least one 
large shareholder owning more than 25% of voting shares; for 57% of companies 
there is a majority shareholder and for 22% the holding is sufficiently large to prevent 
a blocking minority”. The most important shareholders in quoted industrial companies 
in Germany are other industrial and commercial companies. Many of the largest 
German corporations are linked with each other in a system o f cross-shareholdings 
(Wenger and Kaserer 1997b, figure 1). German law hardly restricts direct mutual 
shareholdings (see para 328 AktG), while indirect holdings are not regulated at all. 
Windolf (1996, p. 13) shows that cross-shareholdings are frequently supported by 
personal relationships through the membership of executives on other companies’ 
supervisory boards. The close interweaving of large German companies through both 
ownership and personal relationships acts as a protection against the threat of hostile 
takeover. The second largest shareholders of German corporations are a small number 
of families, often with historical links to ‘their’ companies. Equity ownership by 
private households is relatively uncommon, with only about 5% of German 
households’ financial assets held in equities (Deutsche Bundesbank 1997, pp. 27-40). 
Institutional investors (pension funds, investment funds, etc.) play only a subordinate 
role in the ownership structure of German companies, although their role has been 
increasing slowly. Against the widespread perception that banks are significant 
owners of industrial companies, their share stakes are actually relatively small, and 
some high-profile German banks (e.g. Deutsche Bank) have publicly expressed their 
intention to reduce their share stakes further. The influence of the large banks on 
German industrial corporations originates mainly from four sources. First, banks, 
together with families, are often on the top of corporate holding pyramids, a position 
which gives them large control rights at low cost in relation to their shareholdings and 
dilutes the control rights of shareholders further down the pyramidal hierarchy 
(Franks and Mayer 1997b, pp. 14 ff). Second, German banks exert proxy votes on 
behalf of smaller shareholders, although since 1965 the banks have to follow the 
shareholders’ voting instructions. About two thirds of the voting rights from bank- 
deposited shares are permanently transferred to the banks (Wenger 1992, pp. 77ff. ; 
Wenger and Kaserer 1997a, pp. 28-34). Third, bank representatives often sit on the 
supervisory boards of large corporations in connection with their functions as 
corporate lenders. Although according to para 93(1) in connection with para 116 
AktG bank representatives on supervisory boards are required to maintain secrecy as
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against their bank, this rule is hardly enforceable. Fourth, banks have substantial 
influence through their mere operational involvement with German companies. As 
German companies ‘go public’ rather late, and as small and medium-sized firms are 
generally financed through long-term debt, companies develop long-standing 
relationships with their lenders and in particular with their ‘house bank’ (Hausbank). 
Furthermore, the system of ‘universal banks’ (JJniversalbanken) in Germany which 
provide the entire range of banking services means that customer information used to 
be available to all departments in a bank (Mülbert 1997, pp. 7ff.). This has changed 
through the Securities Trading Act {Wertpcq)ierhandelsgesetz WpHG) in 1995 which 
substantially restricted access to information within banks. The German financial 
system has been described as bank-based (Zysman 1983, pp. 260-265), in contrast 
with the market-based system in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Coates 1994, p. 157; 
Lazonick 1997, pp. 1-34).
In sum, a closely-knit system of inter-corporate ownership, control, and personal 
relationships shields German companies from the threat of hostile takeovers that is 
characteristic of the more anonymous, market-based system in the UK.
There has been an extensive debate of the comparative efficiency of the German and 
the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance. Carney (1992, p. 74) argues that 
the monitoring through a few, large banks is less efficient than monitoring through a 
multiplicity of stock market investors (see also Hansmann 1996, p. 59). Others find 
that the German system has its own control mechanisms, including the dismissal of 
managers in the case of under-performance (Kaplan 1997, pp. 88-92). In the context 
of this study, however, the efficiency debate is less crucial than the mere observation 
that the two corporate governance systems give power to different classes o f patrons. 
The threat of hostile takeover in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and the increased 
availability of acquisition capital (Steams and Allan 1996, pp. 703ff.) have shifted the 
balance of power in favour of shareholders, who became able to press for leaner and 
more focused companies. This power shift has been much less pronounced in the 
German environment.
Within the UK, however, capital market pressures have increased due to the re­
concentration of ownership in the hands of institutional investors in recent years. This
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has reduced the free-rider problem that exists if ownership is dispersed and 
monitoring by owners is costly. With more concentrated shareholdings, large 
shareholders are more likely to monitor their holdings and, if necessary, to use ‘voice’ 
mechanisms^^, i.e. to engage in active corporate governance.
In a report compiled by Gaved, the Conference Board (1997b, p. 17) shows that 
institutional investors own 60.2% of the total outstanding equity (of domestic 
companies) in the UK stock market, as compared to 30.3% in Germany. The report (p. 
15) also shows that German institutional investors, with 12% of their assets in equities 
and 83% in bonds and loans, follow a more cautious investment strategy than their 
British counterparts, which hold 69% of their assets in equities. In addition, whereas 
involvement by institutional investors in corporate control has traditionally been low 
(see Gaved 1997, pp. 27ff.), this has increased in recent years. This may partly be due 
to greater public interest in corporate governance following the Cadbury, Greenbury 
and Hampel committees, the exhortation by the Cadbury committee to exercise voting 
rights (Potter 1995, p. 288)^°, and the concerns about executive pay (Riley and Ryland 
1995, pp. 181-197). With greater involvement by professional analysts, and more 
regular meetings between investors and corporate managers, the latter are more likely 
to adjust pre-emptively to the preferences of the owners of their corporations.^^
To summarise section 6.3.1, British companies are typically under far greater pressure 
from the stock market than German companies. In the former country, the threat of 
hostile takeover exerts considerable pressure on management to pay attention to 
shareholders’ preferences, and this pressure has even increased in recent years. In 
Germany, a combination of economic and institutional factors attenuate stock market 
pressures. Companies are generally less dependent on the stock market. Even if they 
are quoted, the pattern of corporate ownership makes hostile bids difficult to conduct. 
On the other hand, changes in the German economic and institutional environment 
means that the pressure on German companies to reduce costs and to align their 
organisations with shareholder preferences may increase in future.
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6.3.2 Labour Market Regulation and the Position of Employees
In this section, two arguments are put forward:
• First, a more firmly institutionalised industrial relations framework means that top 
management in German companies has less unilateral power in aligning corporate 
structures with shareholder preferences than management in British firms. In the 
UK, the ability of employees to influence corporate structures depends primarily 
on the relative bargaining power of labour versus management.
• Due to a combination of economic factors and the removal of institutional barriers 
since 1979 in the UK, the bargaining power of labour has diminished substantially 
during the 1980s. This has given management greater freedom to restructure and 
to use even those measures (e.g. layoffs, workplace transfers) which strongly 
affected employees. The high degree of institutionalisation of labour relations in 
Germany means that economic pressures had little effect on labour’s ability to 
mitigate the effects of restructuring on employees. In contrast to the UK, the 
institutional framework itself has changed little over the past two decades.
According to British law, the public corporation is defined by a private contract 
between the shareholders as principals and their agents, i.e. the executives who are 
hired to run the corporation on behalf of its owners (Kay and Silberston 1995, pp. 84- 
86). The law makes hardly any mention of employee interests, except that companies 
are encouraged to engage in employee involvement programmes, and that in 
companies with more than 250 employees the annual report shall contain a description 
of the company’s employee involvement policies during the financial year 
(Companies Act 1985, Schedule 7, Part V, para 11(3)). Companies decide whether 
and to what extent they engage in collective bargaining and in general co-operation 
with trade unions or whether to run their personnel policies largely on an 
individualised basis. This, in turn, depends crucially on the ability of collective 
interest organisation (e.g. trade unions, professional bodies) to organise the interests 
of employees, as in large corporations individual employees will hardly be able to 
check or alter managerial decisions to align organisational structures.
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During the 1980s, the UK has seen a fundamental transformation of industrial 
relations. Union membership has declined significantly (Millward 1990, p. 30). From 
1984 to 1990, “the number of establishments recognising unions for collective 
bargaining fell from two thirds to one half’ (Metcalf 1994, p. 128). This process has 
been due both to de-recognition of unions and, more importantly, to the lack o f new 
recognitions (Femie, Metcalf and Woodland 1994, p. 2). The number o f joint 
consultative committees, the British analogue to the continental works councils, has 
also decreased. Collective bargaining has become far more decentralised (Gregg and 
Machin 1994). Membership of employers’ organisations has also decreased. Through 
the decline of pluralist practices on both sides of the employment relation, managerial 
bargaining power and management’s ability to initiate change has increased 
substantially (Metcalf 1994, pp. 131-132).
A variety of factors help explain the demise of collective industrial relations, which 
has involved a power shift from labour towards employers. Important among these 
have been legal changes (Brown and Wadhwani 1990, pp. 58-60) and the general 
retreat of the State from industrial relations (Clark 1996, p. 55), in combination with 
economic factors such as product market competition and high unemployment. As an 
example for the legal changes, the 1988 Employment Act restored the 1971 Act which 
forbade the dismissal of non-union members, thus rendering post-entry ‘closed shops’ 
unlawful. Preferential hiring of union members (the arrangement on which pre-entry 
‘closed shops’ depended) were outlawed by the government in 1990, following EU 
legislation (Dunn and Metcalf 1994, pp. 11-12 and 18-21). An addition to the 1993 
Employment Act allowed employers to treat union members differently from non­
union members, so that it became less attractive for the latter to engage in collective 
action. “The State’s industrial strategy really boils down to one of encouraging 
employers to pursue extra flexibility at all costs. As Crouch [...] argues, this 
essentially encourages employers to follow any industrial relations policy they like” 
(Clark 1996, p. 55).
One of the key mechanisms through which employees can exercise pressure on 
management is the strike threat. Although most strike action in Britain occurs in the 
context of disputes about wages (Millward et al. 1992, p. 285), the ability of workers 
and their labour unions to initiate industrial action can be regarded as an indicator for 
their general bargaining power in relation to employers, and therefore for the potential 
resistance which employers may face if they initiate unilateral changes. Since the
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miners' strike in 1982/83, in which the unions failed to accomplish their goals, strike 
activity in Britain has decreased sharply (Ingram, Metcalf and Wadsworth 1993, p. 
712 and Milner and Metcalf 1993, pp. 236-262), and the strike threat to employers has 
receded. A combination of economic and legal-institutional factors account for this 
phenomenon. The macro-level strike literature (Wheeler 1984, p. 263, drawing on 
Paldam and Pedersen 1982) argues that macroeconomic conditions have a strong 
impact on the level of strike activity. However, the negative relationship between the 
unemployment rate and strike incidence which Ashenfelter and Johnson found for the 
US has not been confirmed for the UK (Kennan 1986, pp. 1122-1123). The decline of 
traditionally strike-prone sectors, such as the shipbuilding and coal industries, is 
another major factor that accounts for the reduction in strikes. With respect to legal- 
institutional factors, Clark (1996, p. 45) and Dunn and Metcalf (1996, p. 70), 
following Freeman and Pelletier (1990, p. 153) and McConnell and Takla (1990), 
argue that the following changes in the legal environment have made it more difficult 
to organise strikes:
• The Employment Act of 1980 outlawed secondary picketing, and the 1990 Act 
forbade all secondary strikes and boycotts;
• The 1982 Employment Act restored the legal personality of trade unions and
made them liable for any damages arising from strikes. This raised the
financial risks involved in strikes;
• The introduction of compulsory pre-strike ballots in 1984;
• The 1990 Employment Act allowed employers to dismiss unofficial strikers
selectively.
These legal changes, in addition to the general weakening of trade unions for legal 
and economic reasons, mean that union power to exert pressure on employers through 
strikes has eroded substantially since 1979. Non-strike forms of industrial action (e.g. 
overtime bans) have actually been more prevalent than strikes during the 1980s, but 
their impact and deterrence effect is very low as compared to strikes (Milner 1994, p. 
522).
In sum, de jure employees in British companies have a very limited say in the 
organisation and management of their companies. Their de facto  ability to 
counterbalance managerial and shareholder power depends critically on their ability to
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organise their interests on a collective basis, on the employers' behaviour, and on the 
resources of the parties involved which underpin their positions. Through changes in 
the legal-institutional and in the economic environment, the balance of power between 
organised labour on the one hand and shareholders and their corporate-level 
representatives (i.e. top managers) on the other has shifted significantly towards the 
latter party. Shareholders became therefore better able to press for greater 
organisational alignment with their own preferences in the form of corporate 
restructuring.
In contrast to the situation in the UK, German law regards companies as ‘public 
entities’ in which, in addition to owners, other parties have certain decision-making 
rights. The employees of larger German companies have two formal means of 
representation, which are discussed in tum.^^
(1) The most important representative body is the works council (Betriebsrat) which 
is elected by the employees in companies with a workforce of five or more. The costs 
of the works council, mainly in terms of working time lost and salaries of professional 
employee representatives, are borne by the company (para 40 BetrVG). In larger 
companies, around one third of the works councillors are full-time, professional 
employee representatives (for details see para 38 BetrVG). Works councils represent 
the workforce in all respects of concern. In addition to wide-ranging consultation 
rights, they also have co-determination rights in certain areas. With respect to 
corporate restructuring, the following areas of co-determination are worth detailing: 
First, the works council partakes in all decisions regarding personnel planning, both 
with respect to the hiring of employees (para 92-95 BetrVG), and, more importantly, 
with respect to dismissals (para 99-105 BetrVG). The works council can object to 
dismissals if social considerations were not taken into account by management. In 
case of irreconcilable disagreement between employer and works council the issue 
will be taken to the industrial tribunal (Arbeitsgericht). The works council also has 
wide-ranging co-determination rights with respect to issues of social concern, e.g. 
overtime work or the installation of monitoring devices (para 87 BetrVG).
Second, para 111 BetrVG (translation A.R.) states that “(1) in companies with [...] 
more than 20 [...] employees, the employer has to inform in a timely and 
comprehensive manner the works council about planned changes in the company
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which may lead to considerable disadvantages for the workforce o f for considerable 
parts of the workforce. (2) ‘Changes in the company’ in the sense o f sentence (1) are
1. Reduction or closure of the entire company or of considerable parts thereof,
2. Transfer of the entire company or of considerable parts thereof,
3. Merger with other companies or the demerger of companies,
4. Fundamental changes in the organisation of the company, the purpose o f the 
company, or of its installation,
5. The introduction of largely new work methods and production processes” .
If these forms of restructuring involve disadvantages for the workforce, the employer 
and the works council have to negotiate a binding agreement regarding the alleviation 
of disadvantages. In case of redundancies of 10 to 20% of the workforce or more 
(depending on the overall size of the company; see para 112 BetrVG), the agreement 
takes the form of a ‘social plan’ {Sozialplan) which specifies for example 
compensation payments for dismissals and employee transfers (Brox ^^1993, p. 252). 
Redundancies are also regulated by the Dismissal Protection Act 
(Kiindigungsschutzgesetz) of 1969. Through its regional employment office, and 
ultimately through the industrial tribunals, the state provides arbitration services in 
cases of irreconcilable differences between works councils and employers.
In practice, the relationship between the works councils and the employers is often co­
operative. Works councils do not usually attempt to block managerial decisions, but 
rather to transform them so as to attenuate potential disadvantages for employees. On 
the other hand, management is less likely to present the works council with ‘radical’ 
proposals which it would probably reject. Also, negotiations with the works council 
can substantially defer decision-making on restructuring. It should be pointed out that 
the co-determination system is linked to other features of the German corporate 
governance system that can restrain corporate restructuring. Wenger and Kaserer 
(1997b, p. 6), for example, argue that “the German codetermination system has 
undoubtedly supported the emergence of cross-holdings. Employees tend to collude 
with management in this regard, because they have a strong bias against distributing a 
company’s profits and any other kind of down-sizing.”
(2) The second company-level body in which employees are represented is the 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). Supervisory boards exist in all companies with 2000 
employees and more (para 1 MitbestG), and in smaller public limited companies 
{Aktiengesellschaften) and companies limited by shares with one ore more general
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partners (Kommanditgesellschqften auJAktieri) by virtue of their legal form (para 95- 
116 and para 287 AktG). In companies with 10000 employees and more the 
supervisory board consists of 12-20 members. Half of these are elected by the Annual 
General Meeting and represent the equity-owners. The other half consists of labour 
representatives, namely of current employees (often members of the works council) 
and of a minority of union representatives (for details see para 7 MitbestG). Despite 
their numeric equality, the representatives of the equity-owners have a slim majority 
over the labour representatives, as the former elect the chairman of the supervisory 
board who has a casting vote in case of a tie (see para 27 and 29 MitbestG). This is 
not the case, however, in the coal and steel industry (Montanindustrie), where equity- 
owners and labour representatives are on a par.
The general function o f the supervisory board is to monitor the company's 
performance and to appoint the members of the management board (para 84, 90 and 
111 AktG). The supervisory board is not allowed to make individual policy decisions, 
but it can make particular classes of managerial decisions (e.g. divestments) 
contingent on its approval (para 111(4) AktG). Additional regulations concern 
acquisitions and the subsequent restructuring of acquired companies (through asset 
transfers, etc.) which require the explicit approval of the equity-holders' 
representatives on the supervisory board (para 32 MitbestG). Also, the supervisory 
board appoints a labour director to the management board (para 33 MitbestG). This 
means that industrial relations and personnel management are functions which are 
regularly carried out at head office level in German companies (see section 3.3.12).
In sum, the institutional industrial relations system in Germany gives employees 
substantial power to counterbalance pressures for organisational alignment with 
shareholder preferences. This does not mean that the German co-determination 
legislation makes the restructuring of companies impossible. Employee 
representatives are hardly in the position to block restructuring, nor do they always 
intend to do so, given the generally less adversarial shop floor level industrial 
relations in Germany than has been traditionally the case in the UK (Dore 1996a, p. 
170, quoting Streeck’s notion of occasional ‘wildcat co-operation’ between works 
councils and individual employers against the will of the wider unions and the 
employers’ organisations respectively). If management is able to persuade the works 
council that a reorganisation is necessary, an agreement with employee
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representatives can even mean that decisions are implemented effectively due to 
greater support from the shop floor. Turner (1992, pp. 226ff.) provides evidence that 
this has been the case at Volkswagen, although he also quotes counter-examples (e.g. 
Opel Bochum). However, the institutions of employee representation are often able to 
defer restructuring decisions and to reduce potentially negative impacts on workers. 
For example, where management aims at reducing the workforce, works councils 
often negotiate agreements to avoid compulsory redundancies, in return for early 
retirement schemes, greater flexibility, and lower wages. Ad-hoc mass redundancies 
are therefore less likely. The limited ability of an acquirer to restructure an acquired 
company according to his preferences makes it less attractive to pursue these kinds of 
acquisitions in the first place, and thereby reduces potential bid premiums.
Germany’s institutional industrial relations framework has not changed fundamentally 
during the 1980s and 1990s. The decline in union membership and the fact that many 
employers, in particular in East Germany, have been leaving the employers’ 
association, has had an impact mainly in the area of wage negotiations. Katz (1993, p. 
8) finds that there has been a general shift from industry-level to plant- and company- 
level negotiations between employers and works councils. Rising unemployment may 
have made the employees’ side somewhat more cautious in pursuing their demands, 
but the institutional framework that underpins their ability to counterbalance 
managerial power in corporate decision-making has not weakened.
To summarise, the highly juridified corporate governance system in Germany gives 
substantial power to employees to attenuate potentially disadvantageous effects of 
organisational alignment. These institutional provisions have not been affected by the 
general weakening of the trade union movement, nor has the conservative government 
in Germany from 1982 to 1998 sought to alter them. British corporate and industrial 
relations legislation grants less power to organisations for employee representation. 
Through a combination of economic and institutional factors, the ability of trade 
unions and other organisations for employee representation to counterbalance 
employers’ unilateral decision-making power has diminished substantially.
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6.3.3 Privatisation Policy
In this section, two arguments are put forward. First, it is argued that during the 1980s 
and 1990s the British government has engaged in privatisation activities to a much 
greater extent than has been the case in West Germany. It has to be taken into account 
that during the 1970s more businesses in the UK were in public ownership than in 
West Germany, so that the scope for privatisation in the former country was greater. 
Second, evidence is summarised which shows that privatisation is often followed by 
the restructuring of the companies concerned and that in many cases companies have 
been prepared for privatisation through restructuring. Emphasis is placed on the fact 
that cross-national differences in policies on state-ownership do not only reflect the 
political preferences of individual governments, but underlying differences in the 
legal-institutional and economic settings between countries.
Overview o f Privatisation Activities in the UK and West Germany
While during the 1980s and 1990s the governments of many industrialised countries 
have reduced their business ownership, nowhere has this movement been as strong as 
in the UK. Between 1979 and 1991, £44.5bn worth of private assets were taken out of 
public ownership in the UK, as compared to just £3.34bn in West Germany between 
1979 and 1990 (Stevens 1992, p. 6). The privatisation wave in the UK reversed the 
policies of the Wilson, Heath and Callaghan governments during the 1960s and 1970s 
which had brought a great number of economic activities into public ownership. As of 
1979, more than 9% of the British workforce was employed in the state sector. This 
proportion had halved to less than 5% by 1991 already (Stevens 1992, p. 4), and has 
reduced further since then.
The British privatisation programme is intimately linked with the election of the 
conservative government in 1979. Although Thatcher’s election campaign was 
centred around the promise to ‘roll back the frontiers of the State’ (Fine and Poletti 
1992, pp. 315f), it did not declare specific policies on privatisation. An ambitious 
privatisation campaign started in 1983. Two phases of the privatisation programme 
can be distinguished.^"^ During the first phase from 1983 to 1988, most of the 
companies sold by the government were in steel production and manufacturing, and in
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transport, gas and oil exploration. After almost all of its assets in manufacturing had 
been sold, from 1989 onwards the government concentrated on the networked 
industries, i.e. mainly water and electricity companies, but also on the remaining 
businesses in transport and communications. Apart froni the outright sale of 
businesses, mostly through stock market flotation, the government also engaged in 
privatisation through extensive outsourcing and contracting-out of public services, 
and through the sale of real estate holdings.
In West Germany during the post-war period, despite substantial public ownership in 
utilities and infrastructure such as transport and communication, private ownership of 
business has been essential to the state's self-identity (Owen Smith 1994, p. 462). 
Therefore, few companies in manufacturing and the like have been in the ownership 
of the Federal State in West Germany.
Similar to the situation in the UK, when the conservative government in Germany 
came into power in October 1982 its promise was to reconsider the role of the state in 
general, but it did not have an explicit privatisation policy. A decision to privatise 
some of the industrial holdings was taken in March 1985. This policy was put into 
practise from 1986 to 1991, with most of the initial objectives achieved by 1989 
(Tofaute 1994, chs. 1 and 5). In comparison with the situation in the UK, the 
privatisation activities during these years were relatively small-scale. First, in some of 
the companies that were ‘privatised’ (e.g. VEBA, VW), the Federal State had held 
only minority stakes before the privatisation. Second, the Federal State often used 
‘piecemeal’ privatisation techniques, for example the reduction of its holdings through 
the non-participation in share issues (e.g. Lufthansa 1987-89). Smaller companies 
were sold directly to particular bidders, whereas large-scale flotation on the stock 
market, as has often been the case in the UK, was less frequently used. Flotation is 
made more difficult by the mandatory 2-year preparation period (Owen Smith 1994, 
p. 474). Third, many of the companies that were privatised in West Germany were 
smaller than the large companies in the UK that were concerned by privatisation 
during the 1980s. In view of this, Esser (1989, pp. 66-69) speaks of the first phase of 
the Federal privatisation programme as largely ‘symbolic’.
In 1991/92 the Federal government decided to take privatisation further (see 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen 1996, pp. 42fF.) and to consider the following types 
of holdings;
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• its remaining direct and indirect holdings in industrial, and commercial 
companies, most of which were comparatively small;
• its big monopolistic organisations in communications (Deutsche Bundespost, 
Deutsche Telekom) and transport (Deutsche Bahn AG);
• its holdings in real estate.
Since 1992 these privatisation policies have been put into practise, with 17 mostly 
smaller holdings sold until 1995. A major step towards privatisation was taken in 
1996 when the flotation of Deutsche Telekom began. Other companies (e.g. Deutsche 
Bahn AG) have been restructured to prepare for privatisation, but shares have not 
been sold as yet.
In sum, the privatisation programme of the Federal State in West Germany has (a) 
started later and (b) taken place much more slowly than has been the case in the UK. 
Apart from the above-described fact that there has been much greater scope for 
privatisation in the UK, the prime reason for these differences consist of the legal- 
constitutional differences between the two countries. In contrast with the ‘unitary’ 
state in the UK, Germany has a federalist structure according to articles 20-37 of the 
German constitution {Grundgesetz\ with power resting with the Federal government, 
the Lander governments, and the municipalities. The latter two pursue their own 
policies, including on issues such as privatisation. Both the Lander and the 
municipalities have significant stakes in a variety of businesses with regional and 
local importance. These include regional banks, housing associations, gas, water and 
electricity companies and regional or local transport companies. In addition, some 
Lander -  notably Lower Saxony and Bavaria -  have holdings in industrial companies 
which are of high importance to the region. However, majority stakes in industrial 
companies are very rare. As of 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany had 11 Lander 
and 7565 independent municipalities; through unification, this has increased to 16 and 
14458 respectively. This constitutional set-up means that there is no common policy 
on public ownership and privatisation. Wellenstein (1992, Ch. 4.3) provides case 
studies of the privatisation policies of four Lander (Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland- 
Palatinate, Hesse, Lower Saxony) during the 1980s, showing that in none of these 
decisive steps towards privatisation were taken, even under conservative 
governments. This means that the Lander and, to a lesser extent, the municipalities.
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have maintained their holdings in exactly those kinds of utility companies which have 
been privatised in the UK by the central government. For the 1990s, Owen Smith 
(1994, p. 464) argues that the then mostly SPD-govemed Lander have even been 
increasing public ownership. With respect to the municipalities, Reidenbach (1997, p. 
83) shows that the manifold businesses owned by the municipalities are generally 
smaller and more decentralised than their counterparts in the UK, but also that the 
privatisation debate on the local level has started only very recently and has not led to 
a significant number of practical steps towards privatisation.
Apart from the reasons outlined above, the following factors help explain the 
differences between the UK and Germany with respect to privatisation (Bos 1993, pp. 
100-101);
• Privatisation in many Western countries has taken place to reduce public debt. 
Stevens (1992, p. 11) shows that in the two countries opposite developments have 
taken place since 1985. Whereas central government budget deficit, as a 
percentage of GNP, was significantly higher in the UK in the mid-1980s than in 
West Germany, it reduced significantly in the decade thereafter. Partly due to 
unification, Germany’s federal budget deficit has increased substantially 
throughout the 1990s. This means that budgetary pressures hit the UK much 
earlier than Germany. The fact that privatisation started earlier in the UK than in 
Germany can partly be attributed to these differences in the build-up of economic 
pressures. There is also evidence that companies in the state sector have generally 
increased the UK’s Public Sector Borrowing Requirements in the mid-1980s 
(Vickers and Yarrow 1988, p. 144), and that privatisation occurred at a time when 
many utilities and other privatised businesses required substantial investments 
(Helm et al. 1992, p. 34).
• Even on the federal level, the particular political set-up of Germany means that the 
government is almost inevitably formed by a coalition of several parties. This fact 
can make it more difficult to unite the various parties involved in a coalition in a 
common privatisation policy, especially when particular parties have strong 
regional ties. This has been the case during the 1980s when the CSU, as a member 
of the Federal government, opposed privatisation of the national airline 
(Lufthansa) for fear of job losses in Bavaria where its constituency is based. In
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contrast, “the advantage enjoyed by Mrs Thatcher was that she did not need the 
support of other political parties to push through the programme. Throughout the 
1980s, the Thatcher administration possessed an absolute majority in Parliament, 
and hence were able to steamroller through their privatisation programme” 
(Curwen and Hartley "*1997, p. 482).
• Many authors argue that it had been an implicit aim of privatisation in the UK to 
reduce the power of the trade unions and to give the new owners greater autonomy 
over the companies concerned than the state could have. Without developing this 
argument in detail here, shifting the balance of power among the various classes 
o f patrons has not been the prime rationale for privatisation in West Germany. 
Even Lander with conservative governments have aimed at preserving jobs in 
their privatisation activities, which may account for their ‘piecemeal’ privatisation 
strategies. In the UK, the government has been criticised for having given away 
many assets too cheaply to the benefit of the new shareholders and financial 
intermediaries (Curwen and Hartley "^1997, p. 479). Union representatives have 
argued that privatisation was to enable the new owners to cut employment and 
alter working conditions to an extent not possible under state ownership (see 
Trade Union Congress 1986). In this view, the privatisation wave in the UK has 
contributed to the general shift in power towards shareholders, whereas this has 
not happened to the same extent in Germany.
The Relationship between Privatisation and Corporate Restructuring
Primarily with respect to the British experience, casual evidence is available which 
suggests that privatisation is related to corporate restructuring. Fine and Poletti (1992, 
p. 319) assert that “privatisation has contributed to the restructuring of productive 
capital”. In the following, post-privatisation restructuring is discussed first. 
Thereafter, pre-privatisation restructuring is briefly analysed.
In the UK, it has been a declared aim of privatisation in general to improve efficiency 
and performance (Vickers and Yarrow 1988, p. 157). This implies that the corporate 
strategies and structures in place under state ownership were not optimal and needed 
change, although the extent of post-privatisation restructuring seems to depend on 
whether the companies concerned were already under competitive pressures before 
their privatisation or not (Parker 1994, p. 21). Although the differences between the
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private and the public sector are to be taken into account (Allison ^1996, pp. 291-307; 
Williamson 1997), the general finding has been that private companies perform better 
than nationalised companies (e.g. Boardman and Vining 1989, pp. 1-33). The 
following three sets of factors indicate that privatisation has often been followed by 
the restructuring of the companies concerned:
• Parker (1993, pp. 16-18) shows that privatisation has in many cases been followed 
by changes in the internal organisation of British companies. He points in 
particular to the adoption of more decentralised decision-making structures (often 
through the replacement of U-form by M-form structures, as confirmed by Bishop 
and Thompson 1994, pp. 355-361), reduction in bureaucracy and administration, 
and the scaling-down of corporate head offices.
• Helm et al. (1992) provide evidence that the privatised utilities have engaged in 
substantial restructuring of their ‘corporate borders’ after privatisation. Under 
state ownership, they had been confined to work exclusively in a particular 
business and in a particular geographical area. With these constraints being 
removed, the privatised utilities engaged in wide-ranging acquisition policies, 
often on a diversifying basis. Parker (1994, p. 21) agrees that all o f the 
organisations studied by him “have taken advantage of the new freedom that 
comes from being in the private sector to make acquisitions and enter joint 
ventures, both at home and overseas”. These trends are confirmed by the findings 
of the questionnaire survey (section 3.3.1) according to which four out of the ten 
British companies which increased their diversity during the survey period were 
privatised utilities. These responses represent exceptions to the general trend 
towards greater focus and reduced diversification.
• O f the 44 large British companies privatised between 1979 and 1996, 12 were 
taken over during this period, in many cases very soon after privatisation (Curwen 
and Hartley "^ 1997, p. 485). Half of these takeovers were by foreign companies. 
Other privatised companies came under the threat of hostile takeover, which 
forced them to restructure (e.g. the attempted takeover of British Aerospace by 
GEC in 1991; see Field and Whittington 1992, p. 103). Privatised companies both 
engaged in restructuring through own acquisitions and the like, and also enlarged 
the pool of potential acquisition targets to other companies.
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With respect to pre-privatisation restructuring of companies. Fine and Poletti (1992, 
pp. 319) argue that the British government often initiated extensive re-organisation 
programmes in the ‘run-up’ to privatisation. A main aim of these programmes was to 
achieve a better price in the eventual sale. As an example, the pre-privatisation 
restructuring of the water companies included substantial job cuts and organisational 
reforms.
Systematic evidence on the pre-privatisation programme of British Steel is provided 
by Beauman (1996), Aylen (1994) and others. Beauman (1996, pp. 26-27) shows that 
restructuring started already during the 1970s under the Labour government, and was 
initially not related to the prospect of privatisation, but was driven by the aim to 
improve efficiency and to become independent of state funding. Between 1979 and 
1988, employment was reduced by more than two thirds, performance targets were 
set, and internal changes initiated. The restructuring programme, which led to British 
Steel’s return to profitability in 1985/86, then became the pre-condition for the 
company’s privatisation in 1988.
To summarise the argument of this section, the privatisation of businesses has given 
additional impetus to the restructuring of companies and has contributed to the 
corporate restructuring waves in the countries concerned. On the background of 
extensive ownership of businesses by the central state, the conservative government in 
the UK throughout the 1980s and early 1990s has followed a rigorous privatisation 
policy. The fact that privatisation has often been followed by restructuring, and that 
the restructuring of companies has in many cases preceded privatisation, helps explain 
the intensity of corporate restructuring in the UK from the mid-1980s onwards. Due to 
its legal-constitutional set-up and economic conditions, privatisation in West 
Germany has taken place much more slowly than in the UK, giving less impetus to 
corporate restructuring.
6.3.4 Macroeconomic Factors
Finally, the relationship between two sets of macroeconomic variables and corporate 
restructuring is considered. First, it is argued that slumps in the economic cycle 
induce corporate restructuring by forcing companies to eliminate waste and improve 
efficiency. British business engaged heavily in cost-cutting measures in the wake of
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the 1991/92 recession. In West Germany, the recession was delayed due to the 
increase in domestic demand in 1990/91, in connection with German unification. The 
1993 recession in Germany, and weak economic conditions thereafter, helps explain 
the increase in corporate restructuring activity in Germany since then.
Second, the relationship between the costs of capital and corporate restructuring is 
considered. High real interest rates, taken as an indicator for capital costs, exert 
pressure on companies to improve performance in two ways: For once, they make it 
more expensive for companies to borrow, and thereby create an incentive to use 
under-utilised resources more fully, or to liquidate them. This latter approach includes 
the disposal of assets which have a higher value in the hands of other companies. 
Secondly, following Blair and Schary (1992) and Winter (1992), it is argued that high 
real interest rates reinforce the incentive of equity-holders to push for higher returns 
on investment, and force companies to restructure. It is shown that interest rates are 
generally lower and less variable in Germany than in the UK. Moreover, following 
Young (1997) it is argued that the emergence of production and investment 
opportunities in the Eastern countries neighbouring Germany during the first half of 
the 1990s has given additional impetus to German companies to restructure, either by 
shifting production there, or by reducing costs and increasing productivity within 
Germany.
Movements in the Business Cycle
Implicit in Donaldson’s argument discussed in section 6.2.3 is the notion that those 
particular characteristics of the structure of American firms (e.g. diversification, 
extensive vertical integration) that were dismantled during the 1980s, had been built 
during the years of buoyant demand and general economic growth during the 1960s. 
Companies invested part of their profits into unrelated businesses and extended 
corporate hierarchies. In this view, the recession at the beginning of the 1980s forced 
American companies to reconsider their structures and strategies in place (Donaldson 
1994, p. 146).
With respect to the British situation, Geroski and Gregg (1993, 1994 and 1997) show 
that the 1991/92 recession in Britain had a profound impact on the structure of 
companies. They find that not only smaller companies were affected by the recession,
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but that even larger “holding companies proved to be surprisingly vulnerable to the 
recession” (Geroski and Gregg 1994, p. 8). As key organisational responses to 
economic pressures they identify (a) the focus on the core business, and the shedding 
of more peripheral businesses; and (b) measures for cost control, including plant 
closure, downsizing, and the reduction of head office costs and overhead costs in 
general (ibid., p. 9ff).
The mechanism which links corporate restructuring to changes in economic 
conditions consists of companies’ attempts to reduce costs in times of slack demand 
and low revenue and thereby minimise potential losses or maximise the remaining 
profits. As variable costs shift in line with changes in output, in periods o f low 
demand companies will be forced to reconsider in particular their fixed costs, so as to 
reduce their total costs. Therefore, particular attention will be paid to cost positions 
such as administrative overheads, general corporate functions, and interest payments. 
Accordingly, companies will aim to reduce their administrative component, replace 
fixed corporate functions with terminable costs^^ (e.g. through outsourcing), and 
dispose of sub-optimally used assets so as to reduce their debt burden. Moreover, 
Stonham (1997a, p. 267) argues that recessions tend to depress share prices, thus 
inviting takeover and inducing restructuring by corporate raiders. In sum, the 
argument is that downturns in the business cycle give impetus to companies to 
restructure, and that differences in the ‘timing’ and the severity of recessions help 
explain cross-national differences in the extent of corporate restructuring.
In the following, two indicators are used to shed light on the macroeconomic 
conditions in the UK and Germany. As a general indicator of the state of the overall 
economy, year-to-year percentage changes in the real gross domestic product of the 
two countries are given. Secondly, as indicators for changes in demand in the 
manufacturing industry, indices for the level of new orders from domestic and foreign 
customers and for total new orders are displayed.
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Real GDP 
Year-to-year 
percentage 
change
Volume of net new orders in 
engineering (1990=100)
Total Domestic Export
1981 -1.3 78 80 76
1982 L5 73 78 64
1983 3.6 77 81 70
1984 2.5 86 88 82
1985 3.5 86 88 81
1986 4.4 85 87 80
1987 4.8 91 93 85
1988 5.0 97 97 95
1989 2.2 103 103 102
1990 0.4 100 100 100
1991 -2.0 92 89 98
1992 -0.5 95 94 97
1993 2.2 100 99 100
1994 3.8 113 113 112
1995 2.8 111 106 118
1996 2.2 114 105 130
Table 6.4: Macroeconomic Data for the UK
Source: GDP data for 1981 to 1994: OECD 1996a, p. 50
GDP data for 1995-96: Own calculations, based on Datastream data 
Data on orders: OECD, supplied by Datastream
The table shows that, after strong growth between 1985 and 1988, the UK saw a deep 
recession between 1990 and 1992. In particular, it suffered from a serious slump in 
domestic demand, whereas exports declined less sharply. Since then, the economy has 
recovered, although it did not show growth figures comparable to those between 1985 
and 1988. In particular, domestic demand has been relatively stagnant in comparison 
with a sharp increase in export orders.
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Real GDP 
Year to year 
percentage 
change
Volume of net new orders in 
manufacturing (1990=100), 
West Germany 
Total Domestic Export
1981 0.5 76 76 75
1982 -0.6 71 72 70
1983 2.1 73 75 71
1984 3.0 78 77 80
1985 2.4 83 80 87
1986 2.5 83 82 84
1987 1.7 83 81 85
1988 3.7 89 86 94
1989 3.5 96 93 101
1990 3.2 100 100 100
1991 2.8 101 101 101
1992 2.2 96 97 94
1993 -1.2 89 88 92
1994 2.9 96 93 104
1995 1.8 97 92 105
1996 1.4 97 90 111
Table 6.5: Macroeconomic Data for Germany 
Source: GDP Data for 1981 to 1994: OECD 1996a, p. 50; GDP Data for
1995/96: own calculations, based on OECD 1998a, p. 225.
Data on orders: OECD, supplied by Datastream
As can be seen from the data on Germany, the variations in the German business 
cycle have been far less pronounced than in the UK, The West German economy 
showed strong growth in 1988/89 which was followed by the increase in domestic 
demand in 1990 in connection with German unification (Herrigel 1996, p. 178). The 
effects of the sudden demand growth were felt until 1992. By 1993 the market had 
reached the state of satiation and the economy experienced the effects of the initially 
delayed recession. Since then, domestic demand has remained depressed, and the 
modest increase in total demand is due to higher exports.
The late start of the recession in Germany means that the economic pressures 
discussed above on West German companies to restructure have affected them 2-3 
years later than comparable companies in the UK. During and immediately after 
unification. West German companies concentrated on exploiting the market that had 
suddenly arisen and on extending their business to the East, through sales 
representatives, acquisitions and investments into new establishments. Corporate 
restructuring started in the wake of the 1993 recession (Herrigel 1996, pp. 193f), 
when demand in the UK was already on the increase.
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Interest Rates, Costs o f Capital, and Investment Opportunities
Blair and Schary (1992, pp. 168ff.) and Winter (1992, pp. 59ff.) put forward the 
argument that, for a variety of reasons, corporate restructuring is more likely to occur 
in a climate of high interest rates and low inflation. First, real interest rates represent a 
measure of capital costs. With high costs of capital, firms will (a) reconsider their 
investment strategies and make only those investments which promise superior 
returns; (b) aim at improving efficiency and performance so that their existing assets 
yield returns that exceed capital costs; (c) liquidate those assets which do not fulfil 
this criterion. With fewer profitable investment opportunities, firms are also more 
likely to have excess cash on their balance sheet which, if not paid out to investors 
through special dividends, share buy-backs and the like (see Stewart HI and Glassman 
1988a, pp. 89ff.), invites takeover. Winter, following Shleifer and Summers (1988), 
argues that high real interest rates lead companies to reconsider explicit or implicit 
promises to invest into intangible assets, such as skills and routines. If  companies 
renege on such promises so as to increase the funds available for pay-outs to 
investors, a wealth transfer effect takes place. Second, from the perspective of 
shareholders, interest rates represent the opportunity costs of investing into equity. 
This means that shareholders under conditions of high real interest rates will press for 
higher returns on equity than in situations where real interest rates are low. Under 
greater shareholder pressure, companies are more likely to make changes to their 
organisation, disgorge free cash flow, and raise efficiency.
In the following two tables, data on nominal and real short- and long-term interest 
rates are presented. Nominal interest rates are given to allow comparisons with Vitols 
(1995, p. 8). Following Blair and Schary (1992, p. 170) and Winter (1992, p. 60), real 
interest rates are calculated by adjusting nominal figures by a three-year centred 
moving average of the percentage change in the GDP deflator.^^
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UK Germany
Year Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal
short-term long-term short-term long-term
interest interest interest interest
rates rates rates rates
1981 15.44 14.74 12.10 10.38
1982 10.62 12.88 8.88 8.95
1983 9.42 10.81 5.78 7.89
1984 9.82 10.69 5.99 7.78
1985 11.76 10.62 5.45 6.87
1986 11.36 9.87 4.63 5.92
1987 8.76 9.47 4.03 5.84
1988 13.15 9.36 4.33 6.10
1989 15.11 9.58 7.12 7.09
1990 13.81 11.08 8.49 8.88
1991 10.77 9.92 9.25 8.63
1992 7.15 9.12 9.52 7.96
1993 5.33 7.87 7.29 6.28
1994 6.37 8.05 5.36 6.67
1995 6.49 8.26 4.53 6.50
1996 6.34 8.10 3.31 5.63
Geometric mean 9.60 9.88 6.23 7.22
Variance^ "*^ 10.04 3.15 5.78 1.77
Table 6.6:
Notes:
Nominal Interest Rates in the UK and in Germany
3-month inter-bank loans. Source: Datastream 
3-month Fibor. Source: Datastream
Government bond yields (average yields to maturity in percent per 
annum). Source: International Monetary Fund 1997, p. 103.
(4) Variance calculated on the basis of the geometric mean
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UK Germany
Year Real Real Real Real
Short-term long-term short-term long-term
interest interest interest interest
rates rates rates • rates
1981 2.44 1.74 7.70 5.98
1982 2.52 4.78 4.98 5.05
1983 3.79 5.18 2.58 4.69
1984 4.82 5.69 3.52 5.31
1985 7.36 6.22 3.02 4.44
1986 6.66 5.17 2.20 3.49
1987 3.99 4.70 1.83 3.64
1988 7.12 3.33 2.40 4.17
1989 8.61 3.08 4.72 4.69
1990 7.14 4.41 5.36 5.75
1991 4.94 4.09 5.08 4.46
1992 2.38 4.35 5.19 3.63
1993 2.16 4.70 3.42 2.41
1994 3.87 5.55 2.59 3.90
1995 3.79 5.56 2.70 4.67
1996 2.54 4.30 2.31 4.63
Geometric mean 
(1981-1996)
4.19 4.38 3.43 4.33
Variance
(1981-1986)
4.27 1.20 2.52 0.91
Geometric mean 
(1986-1996)
4.37 4.41 3.20 4.04
Variance
(1986-1996)
4.70 0.59 1.77 0.69
Table 6.7: Real Interest Rates in the UK and in Germany
Notes: Real interest rates are calculated as nominal interest rates minus a three-year
centred moving average of the GDP deflator (source: International Monetary 
Fund 1997, pp. 148-149), For 1996, real interest rates are calculated as as 
nominal interest rates minus the GDP deflator, as data for the 1997 GDP 
deflator were not available. Notes to table 6.6 apply.
These data show that
• both short- and long-term interest rates are generally higher in the UK than in 
Germany. This is most evident with respect to nominal interest rates which are, on 
average, two to three percentage points lower in Germany. This discrepancy is 
reduced to some extent if inflation, which also has been lower in Germany than in 
the UK for most of the years concerned, is taken into account. Nevertheless, the 
finding that interest rates are generally lower in Germany than in the UK holds 
also true for real interest rates.
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• interest rate variability is considerably lower in Germany than in the UK, 
confirming the result by Vitols (1995, pp. 7-8). This means that German 
companies enjoy a higher degree of reliability and stability in making their 
investment decisions, and are less subject to short-term pressures with respect to 
capital costs.
• With respect to changes within countries over time, the years between 1984 and 
1991, with the exception of 1987, have been a period of high real short-term 
interest rates in the UK. Germany has also seen a period of high real short-term 
interest rates, namely between 1989 and 1992, but this situation (a) was much 
shorter, (b) started much later, and (c) has taken place on a lower level than in the 
UK.
In sum, if Blair’s and Schary’s, and Winter’s argument with respect to the link 
between capital market pressures and interest rates on the one hand and corporate 
restructuring on the other hand is true -  and Geroski and Gregg (1993, pp. 67-68) find 
that in the UK this has been the case -, then the later start and the lower scale of 
corporate restructuring activity in Germany may be attributed in part to the 
differences with respect to interest rates as described above. In this context, it is also 
important to mention the institutional differences with respect to the relationships 
between banks as lenders, and companies as borrowers. In a report by Midland Bank 
(1994, pp. 9-15), the combination of long-term loans and fixed rate lending at 
reasonable interest rates is described as a key characteristic of the German financial 
system. This provides much greater financial stability to German companies than is 
the case in the UK. Schneider-Lenné (1994, p. 286f.) points out that the German 
‘relationship banking’ system provides great stability and reliability for companies, 
especially in times of financial distress. Drukarczyk and Schmidt (1997, pp. 21 ff.) 
show that the German legal system, through low-cost bankruptcy provisions, gives 
greater protection to creditors than the more owner-oriented systems in the Anglo- 
Saxon countries. This leads to cheaper loans and lower capital costs in Germany, as 
creditors bear less risk. In sum, the German financial system provides for relatively 
great financial stability and low capital costs, thereby protecting firms from short-term 
financial pressures that may induce corporate restructuring.
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Young (1997, pp. 42ff.) argues that the emergence of new markets with low wage 
costs in the Far East and, following the changeover in 1989, in Central and Eastern 
Europe, have created a wealth of highly profitable investment opportunities for global 
investors. He calculates that a typical Western enterprise could produce a return on 
equity (ROE) in the range of 50-80 percent by shifting its production to these regions. 
Even if  some unanticipated costs would lower the effective return on equity and 
additional risks had to be taken into account, the expected returns would still exceed 
the comparable rate of companies located in the West considerably. This had 
increased the opportunity costs of investing into Western corporations. While he sees 
no absolute shortage of investment capital, he contends that in capital market 
environments where investors can move their capital fi*eely to far-off locations. 
Western corporations have to show much higher returns in order to satisfy investor 
demands. If  subjected to capital market pressures, firms will have to take ROE - 
increasing measures, for example withdrawing capital from sub-optimal projects, and 
increasing gearing ratios. In sum. Young argues that the combination o f two factors, 
the availability of new high-yield investment opportunities, and the ability of 
investors to move capital to these locations, has given the owners of equity capital 
increased leverage over Western corporations to force a higher return on equity 
through the means of corporate restructuring.
Young (1997, p. 42) also supplies data according to which the returns to equity of 
German businesses are substantially below the comparable US rate. Carlin and 
Soskice (1997, p. 60), using aggregate data from Glyn (1996), show that profitability 
of both the British and the German manufacturing industry is low in comparison to 
their major competitors.^^
1984-88 1989-93
West Germany 24.2 22.0
UK 22.8 20.9
Europe (10 countries) 29.1 28.6
US 26.6 28.5
OECD (15 countries) 30.1 29.6
Table 6.8: Comparative Profitability in Manufacturing
(gross profit share in gross value added, in %)
Source: Glyn (1996), quoted from Carlin and Soskice (1997, p. 60)
Companies can partially compensate for low profitability by offering lower risk than 
high-yield / high risk investment projects in other countries. Generally speaking,
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however, the arrival of new investment opportunities in South-East Asia during the 
1980s has made it more difficult for both British and German companies to attract 
capital. While this has affected British and German industry in a very similar way, the 
opening of Central and East European countries during the first half of the 1990s has 
had a much greater impact on German than on British companies. The available 
evidence shows that by far the majority of foreign direct investments in Poland, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary came from German investors, whereas the 
UK played only a minor role in this respect. With respect to foreign direct investment 
into the Czech and Slovak republics, the OECD (1994a, p. 35) states that “Germany 
led with 39.9 per cent of the cumulative foreign capital inflows at the end of 1992, 
followed by the USA (21.1 per cent), France (14.6 per cent), Austria (6.6 per cent) 
and Belgium (5.8 per cent)”. German and Austrian companies engaged in a 
substantial number of contractual joint ventures in East European countries (see 
OECD 1997, pp. 107-108). They shifted production into these areas where unit labour 
costs, as of 1995, were more than 60% lower than in their own countries (see OECD 
1997, p. 118). Due to their geographical proximity, transport costs were low, while 
the institutional settings in the four East European countries named above proved 
relatively reliable. The progress of the privatisation processes in these countries, the 
peaceful political settlement between the Czech and the Slovak Republic, and the 
general renewal of the legislative and economic framework have contributed to the 
increased confidence into the institutions of the four countries. As a result, the number 
of FDI projects increased substantially from 1991 to 1994 (see OECD 1997, p. 107).
In sum, it is argued that the availability of investment opportunities in nearby Central 
and East European countries has affected companies in Germany in a twofold way: 
First, it became possible to reduce costs in Germany by shifting production eastwards. 
German companies took advantage of this opportunity through the establishment of 
new subsidiaries, the acquisition of existing businesses, and the establishment of joint 
ventures. Second, pressures from investors on German companies increased as the 
cost gap between the high-cost production base in Germany and the lower-cost 
locations in East European countries widened, and as investments into these areas 
proved to be relatively safe. German companies reacted to these pressures by 
restructuring their organisations. This process has started slowly during the first half 
of the 1990s, and has increased since. This helps explain the increase in corporate 
restructuring activity in Germany since about 1993/94.
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6.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
The focus of this chapter has been on the country-specific reasons for the differences 
in the timing and the extent of corporate restructuring in the UK and West Germany. 
In section 6.2, firms were described as a nexus of contractual relationships among 
various classes of patrons. Furthermore, it was argued that institutional and economic 
factors determine the balance of power among these various classes o f patrons, and 
that -  according to the extant literature which refers mainly to the American context -  
shareholders have, generally speaking, increased their power relative to other classes 
of patrons.
In section 6.3, four sets of institutional and economic factors were identified which 
help explain why corporate restructuring has started earlier and has gone further in the 
UK than in West Germany. I would argue that, among these four sets of factors, those 
relating to the corporate governance system -  understood in a wide sense to include 
the institutional and economic aspects of corporate control, as well as the labour 
relations system -  are crucial for the understanding of the cross-national differences in 
corporate restructuring. This is because in the corporate governance system 
institutional and economic factors are most closely intertwined. Changes in 
macroeconomic conditions or particular privatisation activities may have a strong 
impact on corporate restructuring, but these factors are temporarily more limited than 
fundamental corporate governance structures. However, it has to be borne in mind 
that government policies in particular in the UK have significantly altered corporate 
governance structures, in particular in the area of industrial relations. While such 
discrete changes can be identified, they are nevertheless embedded in an overall 
system of corporate governance that ultimately determines the balance of power 
among the various classes of patrons involved. The power shift towards shareholders, 
as a result of which companies had to align their organisational structures more 
closely with shareholders’ preferences, has taken place earlier and to a greater extent 
in the UK than in West Germany.
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’ For example, Fligstein (1991, p. 311) emphasises the role of the existing strategy and structure of 
organisations in determining organisational changes.
 ^ One could also detail regional and even global factors of relevance to firms, for example the 
development of advanced information and transportation technologies. However, these factors are at 
least to some degree industry- or country-specific, and are therefore subsumed under these two 
categories.
 ^von Tunzelmarm (1993, p. 261) applies the argument that institutions shape organisation structures to 
the development of British firms during the early industrial revolution.
Reve (1990) uses the term ‘nexus of contracts’, while Williamson (1990, pp. 3-7) prefers the term 
nexus of treaties’ as the former term has a stronger legal coimotation, whereas he wishes to include 
informal and private orderings as expressed in the latter term.
 ^See also Mueller (1990, pp. 24f.). The four classes of patrons are related to the four types of markets 
which, according to Swedberg (1994, p. 256) developed during the industrial revolution and 
characterise modem society: the labour market, the industrial market, the consumer market, and the 
financial market
® Hansmarm (1996, pp. 35-38) conceives agency costs slightly differently.
’ For a wider conception of institutions which leaves open the possibility of describing organisations as 
institutions see Jepperson 1991, pp. 143-163, especially p. 149.
® On the stabilising role of institutions see also Soskice et al. 1992, pp. 547-560.
® This paragraph adopts Hansmarm’s rather than North’s terminology. It is, however, consistent with 
North’s approach who emphasises the effect of institutions on ‘measurement’ and ‘enforcement costs’ 
(North 1990, Ch. 4).
This paragraph draws on Nickell (1995, pp. 2-5) and Mueller (1986, Ch. 2).
" The role of customers can be disregarded here. The main argument of the chapter pertains to the 
relative power of investors and employees.
‘Mobility’ refers to the extent to which factor owners can move their factors to the highest-yield use, 
so that a factor owner’s income equals the opportunity cost of employing the factor in the chosen 
production.
For a summary of the debate between Shleifer / Summers (1988) and Williamson (1988b) see Martin 
and Kensinger (1990, Appendix B).
This argument is made with reference to the situation in the United States where labour mobility - 
under the conditions of a large market with relatively uniform institutional structures - has been 
traditionally higher than in European countries. One might argue that in Europe other factors (e.g. the 
development of the single market, and the emergence of English as an increasingly common business 
language) should have increased rather than decreased labour mobility. Also, high unemployment 
should have forced employees and job seekers to search for job opportunities on a wider geographical 
scale, making them more willing to move. In sum, it seems unlikely that Donaldson’s argument of a 
decrease in labour mobility as an explanatory factor for corporate restructuring holds true for the UK 
and Germany. On the other hand, one could argue that the lack of mobility of German employees, as 
compared to the situation in the Anglo-Saxon countries, indicates that German employees have not 
given into corporate restructuring to the same extent as their British counterparts.
 ^ The Volkswagen manager Ignacio Lopez has drastically altered the supplier relationships of his 
company.
It may be pointed out that, at least on the level of company law, the national corporate governance 
systems in European countries have not been greatly affected as yet by the ‘Europeanisation’ of 
economic policy and the event of the Single Market (Larmoo 1998b, pp. 199-203).
With respect to the US, this argument has been put forward forcefiilly by Rappaport 1986, pp. 7-10.
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996) argue that the acquisition of ‘hostile stakes’ in Germany substitutes 
for the Anglo-Saxon market for corporate control (see also Franks and Mayer 1997b, p. 5). They 
describe two cases from the construction industry in which a bidder had secretly bought into the shares 
of a target company. In both cases techniques were used which look ‘Anglo-Saxon’ in kind (white 
knights, defensive acquisitions, etc.), and the behaviour of the banks was essential for the outcome of 
the takeover attempts. While they claim that the two cases do not represent isolated instances, it is 
unclear how widespread the acquisition of hostile stakes in Germany is. Also, it is doubtfril as to 
whether the acquisition of hostile stakes presents the same threat to incumbent management as an 
outright takeover attempt. Evidence on the post-acquisition strategy of hostile stakes acquirers is 
lacking as well. The least that can be said is that the acquisition of hostile stakes is a long process, 
which can hardly be used to exert immediate pressure on management to restructure.
See Hirschman (1970, especially Chs. 1-3) on the distinction between ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ mechanisms.
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In contrast to the US, where the Employee Retirement Income Security Act requires pension funds to 
exercise their voting rights (Lannoo 1998a, pp. ISfT.), in the UK ''compulsory voting by pension funds 
was excluded from the 1995 Pensions Act” (Gaved 1998, p. 40). However, various organisations (e.g. 
the Association of British Insurers and the National Association of Pension Funds) have exhorted their 
members to engage more actively in corporate governance. Gaved (1998, pp. 36-38) and the OECD 
(1998b, pp. 137-139) report that they do so primarily through informal mechanisms.
It may be pointed out that a variety of forces are pushing the German system into a more stock 
market-based direction First, in order to secure access to capital market funds in future, since 1993 
some German companies (Daimler, Veba, Hoechst, SGL Carbon) have sought listing at the New York 
Stock Exchange, which puts them under greater observation of international investors. Second, some 
companies (e.g. Hoechst, Veba [see Hartmarm 1996 and 1997a-d]) have started to publicise a move 
towards greater shareholder value orientation (Loehr 1996, pp. 15-17), in some cases (e.g. Daimler) 
using the less exclusive German term wertorientierte Untemehmensfilhrung. Third, in line with the 
EU’s Second Company Law Directive, share buy-backs (which so far were not permitted under 
German law) of up to 10% of capital will be allowed from 1999 onwards (Vitols and Woolcock 1997, 
p. 12). Several companies (e.g. BASF, Metallgesellschaft) have announced that they will make use of 
this opportunity.
^ Representation committees (Sprecherausschûssé) for employees with supervisory and managerial 
tasks (leitende Angestellte) are omitted from the following discussion, as the legal remit of 
representation committees pertains primarily to cases of individual justice (see para 31-32 of the 
Representation Committee Act [Sprecherausschufigesetz]).
It may also be pointed out that, according to article 222 of the EU treaty (European Union 1995, p. 
384), the national governments (not the EU) have the exclusive domain over issues of public 
ownership.
Data on privatisation activities in the UK are contained in Curwen and Hartley "*1997, pp. 484f; on 
Germany see Owen Smith 1994, p. 473, Tofaute 1994, pp. 100-102, and Bundesministerium der 
Finanzen 1996, pp. 46-55.
^ Morgan (1996, p. 89) compares the UK economy during the 1980s and the 1990s, finding that 
“employment has become more variable and more higjdy correlated with changes in output”.
Blair and Schary use the GNP deflator for inflation adjustment, but comparable and time-consistent 
data on this measure of inflation were not available for the UK and Germany. Using the GDP deflator 
does not make any material difference.
For data taking into account all industries see Curwen (^1997, p. 76), confirming the above analysis.
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7. Review and Conclusion
In this chapter, the research questions set out in section 1.1 are revisited, facilitating 
an evaluation of the research undertaken in the context of this study. Section 7.2 
focuses on wider research issues that go beyond the initial aims o f the investigation, 
outlining directions of future research. Section 7.3 concludes the study. A summary o f 
the results is not presented at this point as all o f the chapters contain synopses o f the 
main findings.
7.1 The Research Questions Revisited
This study has pursued three interrelated aims; these are discussed in turn:
(1) The first aim was Vo set out a framework which makes it possible to analyse the 
structure o f firm s as a coherent whole and to identify the crucial dimensions o f firm  
structure’. This aim was deemed important as most definitions of corporate 
restructuring (section 1.2) are haphazard in that they focus on particular restructuring 
techniques, aspects or events, rather than to be based on a more complete 
understanding of corporate structure. In chapter 2, the various dimensions of the 
structure o f firms are developed from two perspectives. First, in the historical 
perspective, increases in particular dimensions of the boundaries of firms (e.g. 
diversification), as well as the emergence of complex administrative hierarchies, are 
analysed as a result of the pursuit of corporate growth strategies, facilitated by the 
development of mass production technologies, the establishment of large distribution 
networks, and so on. In the transaction cost economic framework, it is argued that 
various modes of organising economic activities have differential efficiency 
properties, and that in reasonably stringent selection environments more efficient 
organisation forms will outperform less efficient ones. Therefore, firms have to make 
strategic choices as to whether and how to integrate which activities (i.e. their 
boundaries) and how to administer their operations (i.e. their internal organisation). 
Both perspectives, which complement each other, help identify the key variables that 
have to be taken into account when analysing the structure of firms.
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This satisfies the objective set out above. Nevertheless, further work is required on the 
theory of the firm, and in particular on issues of internal organisation. While key 
variables of internal structure have been identified, the relationships between these 
variables need to be explored more fully. Also, the analysis has been confined to 
macro-organisational variables, whereas important micro-organisational aspects have 
been left aside. Further work that would apply the efficiency perspective of 
transaction cost economics to the micro-structure of firms is needed to complement 
this study.
(2) The second aim was 'to analyse and compare corporate restructuring trends and 
developments in non-financial companies in the UK and West Germany between the 
mid-1980s and the mid-I990s^ using the concepts developed before’. This objective 
was addressed in chapters 3 to 5, where distinct methodologies were used to analyse 
primary and secondary information compiled by the author. It should be pointed out 
that the various pieces of evidence, as summarised in sections 3.5, 4.4, and 5.6, are 
not only consistent with each other, but, when considered together, provide a sense of 
the overall direction of the development of large non-financial companies in the two 
countries. For example, the general tendency has been towards less diversified and 
less complex administrative structures. At the same time, many companies have been 
trying to expand and integrate their chosen core activities, often on an international 
scale.
A limitation of the study derives from the fact that the operationalisation of some of 
the variables concerning the structure of firms is still underdeveloped. This has 
become apparent for example in chapter 4, which contains a quantitative analysis of 
changes in diversification in British and German companies. It was emphasised in 
section 4.2 that various diversification measures relate to different aspects of 
diversification, without however capturing the phenomenon under consideration in its 
entirety. These difficulties are even greater in the case of aspects of firm structure that 
reflect different industry backgrounds (e.g. vertical integration), and in the case of the 
internal organisation of firms. The within-sector comparison of two cases in chapter 5 
illustrates the changes with respect to the boundaries and the internal organisation of 
the two companies in some detail, yet specific comparisons v/ith firms in other 
industries would be more difficult. The issue of the appropriate operationalisation of 
the theoretical concepts developed in chapter 2 requires further investigation.
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On an empirical level, the work begun in this thesis could be continued in many 
directions. To name but a few, information on restructuring in other European 
economies would be highly desirable, as would be an extension of the time frame and 
an inclusion of a larger number of companies in both quantitative and qualitative 
follow-up studies. Also, given the decline in the proportion of GDP generated by the 
manufacturing industry, a particular focus on the service sector, including financial 
service companies, would be a precondition for a more general assessment o f the 
institutional structure of production in the Western economies. It is clear, however, 
that these suggestions are beyond the scope of this study.
(3) The third research objective was 'to provide a partial interpretation o f the cross­
national differences in corporate restructuring'. Chapter 6 responded to this aim. 
Two limitations of the approach taken therein should be pointed out;
First, on a theoretical level, the approach taken in chapter 6 - which focuses on the 
country-specific economic and institutional environment - should be supplemented by 
models that conceive corporate restructuring in the context of firm- and industry-level 
factors. Industrial organisation theory has made great advances in explaining, for 
example, vertical integration or diversification strategies in the context of market 
structure. These theories should be surveyed and viewed in conjunction with the 
argument put forward in chapter 6, according to which changes in corporate structure 
reflect country-specific institutional and economic settings. A deeper understanding of 
corporate restructuring would be facilitated if approaches from different disciplinary 
traditions were taken to complement each other.
Second, the approach developed so far provides a post-hoc interpretation of some 
observed phenomena (which is, however, more than an ad-hoc explanation as it is 
firmly based on the theoretical framework of institutional economics). This could be 
developed further into a fully-fledged theory from which predictions about changes in 
corporate structure under different institutional and economic conditions could be 
derived. Empirical tests of such a theory are conceivable primarily on the firm level, 
whereas tests on the country level would prove more difficult. Responding to the 
above research objective, in chapter 6 an interpretation of the cross-national 
differences in corporate restructuring observed before was supplied, but deriving 
specific predictions about the structural adjustment of firms under changing 
environmental conditions, and testing such predictions, awaits further research.
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Despite the limitations outlined above, the study has satisfied the research objectives 
set out in chapter 1. On an empirical level, it has described and analysed novel 
information on recent corporate restructuring trends in large non-financial 
companies in the UK and West Germany. On a theoretical level, it has made 
contributions to the understanding o f firm  structure, and to the institutional and  
economic background in which corporate restructuring has taken place in the two 
countries.
7.2 Directions of Future Research
In this section, issues beyond the initial scope of the study are considered, and 
directions of future research outlined.
7.2.1 Identifying the Importance of Firm-, Industry- and Country-Level 
Factors
In this thesis, firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants of corporate 
restructuring have been distinguished, with the emphasis on the third set of factors. 
The three empirical chapters, in particular chs. 4 (e.g. section 4.3.2.3) and 5, suggest 
that both firm- and country-level factors have a significant influence on the extent and 
the timing of corporate restructuring. While the importance of industry-level pressures 
is less clear, the findings suggest that these factors on their own (above all, increased 
competition in an industry) cannot be interpreted as ‘predictors’ of changes in the 
structure of firms. As the multiplicity of strategic routes taken in the chemical 
industry even within the same country suggests^ firms have ample scope to address 
the challenges posed by competitors, and thereby to shape (rather than to submit to) 
the strength of competition. In addition, the argument put forward in the thesis has 
been that corporate structures (and managerial restructuring decisions) do not emerge 
in a vacuum, but reflect underlying country-specific institutional and economic 
conditions.
To illuminate these issues further, the importance of firm-, industry-, and countiy- 
level factors in determining the structure of firms should be subjected to careful
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testing. A substantive investigation into this issue is particularly important on the 
background of the ongoing debate in the economic and managerial literature about 
whether industry-level or firm-level factors (i.e. strategy and structure) determine 
corporate performance. The paradigmatic assumption out of which most of industrial 
organisation theory has worked has been that industry-level factors are of paramount 
importance, and Schmalensee (1985) finds empirical support for this assumption.^ As 
a managerial correlate, Porter (1985, Ch. 1) conceives strategy primarily as a process 
by which firms choose industries with attractive profitability characteristics or, within 
a given industry, aim at ‘positioning’ themselves to avoid the pressure of 
competition.^ Aiming at greater operating efficiency is despised on the grounds that 
such a ‘strategy’ would be open to imitation (Porter 1996 pp. 61ff.). Against this 
view, Rumelt (1991) finds that firm performance is primarily accounted for by firm- 
level (i.e. mostly business unit) factors, with industry effects being of little 
importance. Strong results are also obtained by Hansen and Wemerfelt (1989, pp. 
404ff.) who find that organisational variables account for 35.6% of inter-firm variance 
in profitability, as compared to a set of economic factors including industry 
attractiveness, with a combined explanatory power of only 14.1%. Following from 
these and other findings, Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1992, Ch. 2) argue that a firm’s 
strategy is paramount in determining its performance, even in adverse competitive 
environments.
A careful testing of firm-, industry- and country-level effects in the context of 
corporate restructuring would help illuminate this debate in the following way:
(a) It would help to widen the agenda which, until now, has been focused on any 
immediate performance effects, leaving aside the issue of how any industry (or 
other) factors would influence corporate performance. By introducing corporate 
structure, and structural changes, as managerial choice variables, such testing 
could clarify how firms can address environmental pressures in a strategic way.
(b) If  firm characteristics turn out to be important determinants of restructuring 
decisions, this would suggest that firms, in making their strategies, cannot simply 
react to the expectation of superior profit potentials in an industry, but that they 
should ask what they can bring to the industry. ‘Strategy’, then, is built upon a 
thorough analysis of a company’s capabilities (and may include a choice of an
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industry), but the sum of industry choices cannot seriously be regarded as a 
company’s strategy.
(c) If country-specifics are confirmed to be of importance in cross-national 
investigations such as the current one, this would demonstrate that companies do 
not make strategic and organisational decisions in a vacuum, but that they are tied 
back to their institutional and economic environment. It would also provide some 
assurance to policy makers in that it would indicate that, despite some signs of 
‘convergence’ of corporate strategies and structures across countries (see section 
7.2.5 below), country-level policies still matter.
The empirical material presented in this thesis would lend itself to two types of tests 
for the importance of firm-, industry-, and country-level factors in corporate 
restructuring;
(a) The data sets used in ch. 4 can be used for econometric tests on the determinants 
of changes in diversification. Following Rumelt’s (1991) methodological approach, 
such tests should aim at apportioning the variance of changes in diversification across 
firms to firm-, industry- and country-level factors. This can be achieved by using 
ANOVA (analysis of variance) and ANOCOVA (analysis of covariance) techniques. 
ANOVA is an analytical model, which decomposes the variance in a dependent 
variable into the variance in a number of independent variables, the variance in any 
interaction terms (e.g. industry-country interactions, of potentially significant value 
for the purpose of the current investigation), and the residual variance. In contrast to 
regression analysis, ANOVA is not a predictive technique in that it does not aim at 
establishing ‘causal’ relationships, but it has significant analytical power through its 
ability to attribute the variance in any phenomenon under investigation to the 
variances in other factors.
(b) Further within-industry case studies involving two or more firms from Germany 
and the UK should be conducted. This would help establish whether the observation 
made in ch. 5, that firms within comparable environments address the same 
competitive challenges in different ways (or at least at different points in time), can be 
confirmed for a larger number of cases. Comparative case studies of this kind would 
also help identify country-specific institutional and economic factors that were the 
subject of ch. 6 in an even more precise manner. ‘Holding ex ante industry factors 
constant’ would focus the attention of the observer on the way in which firms re-
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shape their industries through their competitive policies, while at the same time 
responding to the economic and institutional environment in which they are located.
7.2.2 Defining Institutional Forces that Facilitate or Oppose Change
The purpose of the final section of this thesis has been to identify institutional and 
economic factors that help explain differences in the extent and, in particular, the 
timing of corporate restructuring in the UK and West Germany. The evidence of the 
empirical chapters had been that corporate restructuring has started earlier and has 
been taken further in the former country than in the latter. Many o f the institutional 
and economic settings described for the British context are found to have favoured 
early changes in the structure of companies: The active market for corporate control, 
the substantially increased degree of discretion of management with respect to 
industrial relations and human resources management, the retreat of the State from 
public ownership of industry, to mention but a few factors. In contrast, the German 
institutional environment was found (a) to have been relatively stable over the period 
of consideration, and (b) to have opposed and delayed corporate restructuring 
decisions. This finding, however, is a descriptive account of the state of affairs, and 
should not prematurely be turned into a normative verdict about German institutional 
and industrial structures. Some of the data presented in Ch. 6 also imply that the 
German system provides for a degree of stability that can
(a) facilitate the speedy implementation of restructuring decisions, once they are 
taken, because of the relatively great consensus orientation of the various 
participants. This would, for example, concern the support of works councils for 
the implementation of policies that they have agreed to. One could also develop 
the argument that the German system of vocational training which emphasises 
multi-skilling and flexibility enhances the possibility of re-deploying workers 
across different productions in the case of changes in corporate strategies and 
structures;
(b) reduce, in some cases, the accumulation of weaknesses in the structure of firms 
which would then require a complete turnaround, at which many corporate 
restructurings are aimed. For example, low and stable interest rates in Germany 
(tables 6.6-6.7) have allowed German companies to undertake long-term
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investments into R&D and capital equipment, which may help them withstand 
competitive crises better than their UK counterparts.
It is not the point of the present discussion to draw an overall conclusion about the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of the German versus the British 
institutional and economic system in general. From the above it is clear, however, that 
opposing forces exist that, on the one hand, facilitate, and on the other, hinder or 
delay changes, and that a more elaborate analysis of these forces would be desirable.
In order to identify and test these conflicting forces more concisely, two research 
strategies can be taken:
—> First, a series of comparative case studies within countries and, preferably, within 
industries (e.g. Hoechst -  Bayer -  BASF; Glaxo Wellcome -  Zeneca; etc.) could 
be conducted. The industry background, as well as the country-specific 
institutional and economic background, would thereby held constant. An analysis 
of the different strategies taken by companies under the same background 
conditions would make it possible to draw conclusions about the type of changes 
favoured or delayed by a particular institutional environment.
—> Second, it is possible to conduct econometric studies on the impact of institutional 
factors on economic outcomes. For example. Freeman and Pelletier (1990) run 
time-series regressions that estimate the effect of changes in industrial relations 
legislation (and of other factors) on union density from 1945 to 1986. Using a 
similar research strategy, one could investigate the effect of clearly identifiable 
changes in institutional structures on particular classes of corporate restructuring 
events or combined indices of corporate restructuring activity. Such studies are 
problematic in that they require long and consistent time-series data, which are not 
normally available. Also, they often fail to ‘disentangle’ conflicting aspects of the 
same underlying forces (as has been argued above with respect to the German 
institutional system). However, they are useful in that they show that changes in 
institutional settings make a quantifiable differences for economic actors such as 
firms.
Overall, more detailed studies about the properties and the effects of the British and 
German institutional system would be highly desirable.
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7.2.3 The Issue of Performance Measurement
The focus of the thesis has not been on the performance effects of corporate 
restructuring. However, corporate performance was mentioned briefly in the context 
of the discussion of superior investment opportunities abroad as potential drivers of 
corporate restructuring in West Germany and the UK respectively (section 6.3.4; pp. 
294ff.). The argument put forward there is that the arrival of investment opportunities 
with attractive risk-retum properties in Southeast Asia, Central Europe and elsewhere 
during the 1980s and 1990s has made it harder for British and German companies to 
attract capital, thereby forcing them to re-evaluate their activities so as to optimise 
their use of funds, minimise costs and reduce slack. Therefore, corporate performance 
is hypothesised to have an impact on managerial choices regarding corporate strategy 
and structure, as performance outcomes provide an incentive structure for the various 
classes of patrons to the firm, as described in sections 6.2.1-6.2.2. In order to support 
this argument, data by Glyn (1996) on comparative profitability (defined as gross 
profit shares in gross value added) in manufacturing was presented in table 6.8.
In future research, a variety of carefully selected measures should be used in a 
complementary way in order to test the hypothesised effect of performance on the 
choice of corporate strategies and structures. A single measure of corporate 
performance (e.g. a ‘bottom line’ measure such as the one used in table 6.8) is bound 
to be inadequate, as different performance measures fulfil different purposes and 
reflect the interests of different classes of patrons. Coates et al. (1996, pp. 34-38) 
provide evidence that companies in the UK report on markedly different performance 
criteria than German companies, with the former making “much greater use of the 
EPS measure and stock market indices” (ibid., p. 34), while German companies are 
more likely to use accounting-based performance ratios. This reflects the difference 
with respect to the importance of the stock market for the financing of corporate 
activity in the two countries, as indicated in section 6.3.1.
For the purposes of academic research, simultaneous use of the following three types 
of performance measures should be made;
(a) Financial measures of performance based on accounting data, market valuation 
data, or a combination of these two:
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Accounting rates of return (ARRs) relate accounting profits, i.e. the difference 
between revenues and expenses (calculated before or after tax), to the net book 
value of assets.'* The calculation of ARRs is based on the data published in 
companies' statutory reports. Therefore, both the nonunators and the 
denominators of ARRs are open to biases from a variety of sources, of which 
cross-national differences in accounting practices (e.g. with respect to the 
treatment of reserves, depreciation rules, etc.) is a serious one in the context of 
comparisons across countries (but see also Brealey and Myers ^1996, pp. 305-313 
for a discussion of the general deficiencies of ARRs, even within countries).
An alternative to the use of ARRs is to use measures based on the market value of 
the firm. In this vein, some economists (Lindenberg and Ross 1981, Wemerfelt 
and Montgomery 1988) have argued in favour of using Tobin’s q, which is 
defined as the ratio of the market value to the replacement costs of a firm’s assets. 
A principal advantage of this measure is that it takes into account the riskiness of 
a firm’s investments which -  under standard assumptions about capital market 
conditions -  is included in the market valuation. Nevertheless, the denominator of 
Tobin’s q is affected by cross-national differences in depreciation practices. It 
should also be taken into account that a lower proportion of the 100 largest 
companies in Germany is quoted on the stock market than is the case in the UK, 
so that market valuations are not always obtainable.
(b) Sales- and marketing-based measures: Market share and sales volume growth can 
be used as an alternative to accounting-based measures of performance. The 
principal advantage of these measures is that sales data are hardly influenced by 
differences in accounting practices across countries. The measures also provide a 
good sense of a company’s development over time (e.g. from a small to a big 
‘player’ in an industry, or vice versa). On the other hand, sales-based measures on 
their own are not sufficient indicators of performance as they neglect the costs at 
which the sales were achieved (e.g. even companies with large sales and market 
shares can incur losses).
(c) Productivity measures: These relate the input of one or several production factors 
to the output of the goods produced or services provided. Thereby, productivity 
measures relate to the efficiency or speed with which input factors are converted 
into outputs. They are often used for comparisons between plants or firms within 
the same production (e.g. Broadberry 1997). Their use for comparisons across
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sectors, however, is limited as this would necessitate a translation of the input and 
output measures into monetary values, resulting in valuation problems.
In an ideal research setting, several performance measures should be used in a 
complementary way in order to yield an accurate picture of the competitive position 
of firms.
7.2.4 The Impact of Global Competition and Its Interaction with Country- 
Specific Factors
In particular chapter 6 in this thesis has focused on the way in which institutional and 
economic factors specific to the UK and West Germany have shaped corporate 
restructuring in the two countries. However, these two economies themselves have 
been exposed to competitive shifts through the impact of globalisation. Under this 
broad term, a number of significant developments are comprised which include
• the massive growth in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in particular since the 
middle of the 1980s, with FDI flows growing “three times faster than trade flows” 
(Wade 1996, p. 63);
• the further spread of multinational corporations (MNCs) and of international 
corporate arrangements (e.g. joint ventures, sourcing agreements, etc.);
• the continued growth in international trade;
• the globalisation of finance, including an immense increase in international
lending and in equities and derivatives trading;
• the increasing international spread of technologies (as indicated by international 
patenting activities, etc.);
• a more limited increase in international labour market mobility.
These developments give rise to two questions:
(a) First, to what extent can the results presented in the empirical chapters of the
thesis be interpreted as a result of the underlying global phenomena sketched 
above?
(b) Second, how can the interaction between the pressures of globalisation and the 
country-specific factors outlined in ch. 6 be conceptualised? Have the institutional 
environments of the two countries concerned enabled companies to respond
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effectively to the pressure of global competition, or are they rather designed to 
shelter them, thereby delaying any necessary adjustments?
In order to test the effect of global competition in a comprehensive manner, it would 
be useful to distinguish two groups of companies:
-> Firms in those industries in which competition has become particularly ‘global’, in 
that a major proportion of their competitors operate primarily outside of West 
Germany and the UK respectively. This would be the case, for example, for the 
automobile and the chemical industries, i.e. industries producing tradable goods in 
which the number of competitors from other countries and regions has increased 
dramatically since the beginning of the 1980s.
Firms that still compete within boundaries that, broadly speaking, coincide with 
the territories of their home country (e.g. utilities).
A systematic comparison of corporate restructuring trends between the two groups, 
using for example the findings of the questionnaire survey, should then reveal 
whether the companies in the two groups have responded differently to the distinct 
competitive pressures (and opportunities) which they have been exposed to. A further 
breakdown by home country would also reveal whether companies in the UK and 
West Germany have responded differently to the pressure of globalisation. On that 
basis, conclusions could be drawn about both, the impact of global competition on 
corporate strategy and structure, and its ‘interaction’ with institutional and economic 
factors specific to particular countries.
7.2.5 Refining the Convergence Debate
While the interpretative approach in Ch. 6 of this thesis has focused on the cross­
national differences in the timing and the extent of corporate restructuring, it should 
be emphasised that the basic empirical finding has been one of similarity, rather than 
difference between the UK and West Germany. In both countries, a corporate 
restructuring wave has taken place since the middle of the 1980s (although this has 
started earlier in the UK than in West Germany). Moreover, the direction of the 
restructuring wave in the two countries has been similar in many respects. Companies 
have generally decreased the number of managerial layers in their operating
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businesses, they have engaged increasingly in ‘hybrid modes of organisation’ such as 
joint ventures and strategic alliances, and they have made substantial use of 
outsourcing and contracting out, to mention but a few indicators of this restructuring 
activity.
This finding of a basic similarity between the directions of British and German 
companies should give rise to the question whether a wider ‘convergence’ among the 
structure of large enterprises is underway in the industrialised countries. Is it still 
meaningful to distinguish between ‘British and ‘German’ companies, thereby 
identifying them on the basis of country in which they are registered? Or are the large 
multinational companies becoming increasingly stateless and footloose, with their 
strategies and structures conforming to the pressures of global competition rather than 
to the institutional idiosyncrasies of their home countries?
These issues have ramifications beyond the corporate sector. If  corporate structures 
and policies were found to converge across countries, then the ability of states to 
shape corporate activity (e.g. through taxation, regulations, industrial relations 
provisions, etc.) beyond common minimum standards would diminish. In the extreme 
case, the convergence of business structures across countries, driven by the need to 
respond to the pressure of global competition, would force the convergence of 
hitherto ‘national’ policies and institutional structures themselves.
This neo-liberal claim that the forces of global capitalism would lead to a 
convergence of institutions across countries and ultimately to the erosion of nation 
states is by no means new. Norman Angell made the argument of the increasing 
interdependence of countries, which reduced the power of states to impose rules 
unilaterally, already in The Great Illusion (1933 [^1908], Ch. 4). Other proponents of 
the convergence hypothesis include Charles Kindleberger (1969) and Harry Johnson 
(1975).
On the other hand, many recent authors including Boyer (1996), Wade (1996) and 
Dore (1996b) caution that “reports of the death of the national economy are greatly 
exaggerated” (Wade 1996, p. 60). First, they doubt that the increasing 
internationalisation of the world economy through trade, foreign direct investment, 
greater interconnectedness of capital markets and so on would result in a convergence 
of corporate structures across countries. Second, even if they did, these authors argue 
that national institutional settings would not necessarily be driven to common
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minimum levels, as institutions were not created by efficiency considerations, but on 
political grounds (a point also made by North 1990, chs. 9 and 11).
Further detail on the convergence debate cannot be given at this point. Moreover, the 
arguments raised in this debate are difficult to test, as this would require long-term 
historical data on a host of issues, which are hard to obtain! Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the results of the thesis are relevant to the debate in that they provide directly 
comparable information about the development of corporate structures in two 
important industrialised countries. Further enquiries into the impact of globalisation 
on the sustainability of national institutional systems are therefore highly desirable.
7.3 Conclusion
The study may conclude on a wider note. The underlying motivation of the author in 
investigating corporate restructuring among large non-financial companies in the UK 
and West Germany has been to gain a clearer view of the recent development o f 
economic organisation in general. While the observations presented in this study may 
be interpreted in a variety of ways, they seem to lend support to two broad 
hypotheses:
First, the general tendency of firms at least in the UK has been to substitute greater 
specialisation and internationalisation of operations for their earlier diversification 
and vertical integration. Underlying this development have been a variety of 
pressures, most importantly increased competition from the product and capital 
markets. These pressures have forced companies to specialise in those businesses 
where their specific capabilities add most value, so that they can withstand 
competition in these fields. At the same time, investments in such capabilities favour 
an increased internationalisation of operations if they are applicable across markets, 
here understood in a geographical sense. On the other hand, companies withdraw 
from those businesses, or from those activities in the vertical chain of production, in 
which other firms can add more value.
Obviously, these simplifying generalisations do not fit every single case. Also, it is by 
no means clear the de-diversification and vertical disintegration are the only possible 
responses to increased competition. Examples such as the German conglomerate 
Mannesmann which only recently diversified successfully from its earlier base in steel
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tubes and engineering into telecommunications suggest that alternative strategies can 
be viable when managed carefully. Nevertheless, the development described above 
seem to have helped several large manufacturing companies in the UK during the 
1990s to regain some of their strengths that had been lost during the post-war period, 
albeit at the price of becoming specialist players in niche markets.
Second, the growth of ‘managerial capitalism’ which after WW II seemed to have 
supplanted the model of ‘personal capitalism’ by which Chandler (1990, part IE), 
rightly or not, had characterised the British economy since the industrial revolution, 
seems to have come to a halt. As argued above, since the mid-1980s companies in the 
UK appear to have adopted strategies that diverge markedly from their earlier 
objectives of diversification and the growth of corporate hierarchies. While Jensen’s 
(1996 [^1989]) prediction of the ‘eclipse of the public corporation’ was too narrowly 
confined to a particular legal type of company, the underlying notion that managerial 
control over corporate cash flows has been curbed by an active capital market has 
proved well-founded. In addition, increased international competition in more open 
product markets has added to the pressure on companies to organise their operations 
efficiently, and to reduce those parts of their administrative structures that add least 
value. The eventual shape of ‘global institutional capitalism’, and the problems 
inherent in it, are far from clear. However, the point to be emphasised here is that the 
corporate restructuring that has been evidenced in the UK since the mid-1980s has 
been indicative o f underlying shifts with respect to the interests that dominate the 
operation o f companies.
Clearly, these hypotheses go beyond the scope of the study, but they provide the 
wider context in which corporate restructuring has been studied here. In view of the 
marked changes in the structure of large non-financial companies in the UK and West 
Germany since the mid-1980s, a deeper understanding of both the causes and the 
consequences o f corporate restructuring is urgently needed.
 ^ I allude here to the German chemical sector, with Hoechst following in many respects the ‘Anglo- 
Saxon’ example of the likes of ICI and Monsanto, while most notably BASF, but also Bayer, have
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adhered to their traditional strategies of portfolio diversification and vertical integration, with no less 
success than Hoechst.
 ^ Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988) also find that industry effects are of major importance in 
determining firm performance, but they still detect a minor firm-level (namely a ‘focus’) effect, 
whereas Schmalensee’s (1985, p. 349) results do not concede any firm-level effects.
 ^See Rumelt et al. 1994, p. 23.
 ^This is the definition of the ‘Return on Investment’ (ROI) measure; other ARRs which suffer from 
some or all of the deficiencies as ROI include the ‘Return on Assets’ (ROA) and the ‘Return on Capital 
Employed’ (ROCE) measures.
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8.1 Appendix: The Questionnaire
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F I N A N C I A L  T IM E S
THE FT SURVEY 
INTO THE STRUCTURE OF LARGE 
BRITISH AND GERMAN 
COMPANIES
conducted in collaboration with the
Centre for Economic Performance 
and the
Interdisciplinary Institute of Management 
at the
London School of Economics
Could you please fill in your name and telephone/fax number. 
Any information provided will he treated with utmost 
confidentiality.
Name: __________________________________________
Tel.: __________________________________________
Fax: __________________________________________
Company:__________________________________________
Please send your reply lo; Sir G eoffrey O w en, Centre for E conom ic Perform ance, 
London Sch ool o f  E conom ics, H oughton Street, G B-London W C 2A  2A E
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C H A N G E S  IN THE CORPORATE STR UC TU RE
In this section we would like to ask you som e questions regarding the structure of the 
company. The first six questions in this section relate to the businesses your company 
is engaged  in, and to the relationship with other companies.
DIVERSIFICATION
1.) It is widely held that during the 1980s com panies have becom e less diversified 
and have concentrated on ‘core activities’ which they know best. Do you feel that 
this is the case regarding your company? -  P lease tick one box in the right-hand 
column of the following table;
Yes, we have reduced diversity substantially
We have reduced diversity somewhat
Diversity has stayed about the sam e
We have increased diversity somewhat
We have increased diversity substantially
OUTSOURCING
2.a) Has your company since 1986 pursued a  strategy of outsourcing and contracting 
out, i.e. substituting supply relationships with external suppliers for the production 
of goods and services that had been carried out ‘in house’ previously? P lease tick 
one box.
Yes, to a  significant extent 
Yes, somewhat
Rarely 
Not at all
2.b) If you have pursued outsourcing since 1986, has this policy included IT services?
Yes, it has included 
IT services
No, it did not include 
IT services
MBO’s
3.) Has your company since 1986 had m anagem ent buyouts of any parts of its 
operation?
Yes No If yes, how many?
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ACQUISITIONS
4.) Has the size of the organisation over the last 10 years been significantly altered 
by large-scale mergers or demergers, acquisitions or divestments? -  Tick as 
many boxes as you feel appropriate
Size has been 
increasing due to
Size has been 
decreasing due to
Mergers
Acquisitions
Demergers
Divestments
M&A STRATEGY
5.a) if you have engaged in large-scale mergers and acquisitions, has your strategy 
been to merge with/acquire companies which until then
(1) were your suppliers or customers 
(“vertical” mergers/acquisitions)
(2) were competing in the sam e line of business 
(“horizontal” mergers/acquisitions)
(3) were pursuing a business unrelated to what 
you were doing (unrelated mergers/acquisitions)
(Please tick one or more boxes as appropriate)
5.b) Has your M&A activity been mainly geared towards
(1) domestic mergers/acquisitions
(2) overseas mergers/acquisitions
(3) roughly equal weight between domestic and non-domestic 
mergers/acquisitions
(Please tick one box only)
JOINT VENTURES
6.a) Have you engaged since 1986 in a  policy of joint ventures and strategic alliances 
with other companies? -  Please tick one of the boxes
Yes, we strongly pursued joint ventures/strategic alliances I  I
We considered joint ventures/strategies alliances as options, 
but we did not pursue them strongly
We did not pursue joint ventures/strategic alliances
b) Can you tell us how many joint ventures/strategic alliances you have engaged in? 
number not known
c) Can you also please tell us what percentage of your sales is 
now represented by joint ventures (an approximation will suffice)
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MANAGERIAL
LAYERS
7.) For the following question, please consider the main operating business of your 
company (if you have several that you regard as crucial, take the largest one in 
terms of turnover). We would like to know whether the number of layers of 
management from the top to the bottom in your main operating business has 
changed over the last decade. Can you please give the number of managerial 
layers that you recognised at the following points in time:
1986 1991 1996
ADMINISTRATIVE
COSTS
8.) This question relates to the share of administrative costs of total labour costs in 
your company.
.u administrative cost . ,
How has the ratio ------- changed over time (i.e. since 1986)?
Increase
total labour cost
Decrease No change
C H A N G ES IN THE STRUCTURE OF TH E HEAD OFFICE
We would like to gain a better understanding of the structure of the corporate head 
office of your company, and its development over time.
SPAN OF 
CONTROL
1.) The following question relates to the span of control of top m anagement. In this 
context, "span of control’ m eans the number of heads of operating businesses 
(whether they are called divisions or groups or something similar) who report 
directly to the head office.
Could you please give us, for the following three points in time, the number of 
heads of operating businesses who report directly to the head office?
1986 1991 1996
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AUTONOMY
2.) We are interested in whether line m anagers now have greater autonomy from the 
head office in financial matters than they had in earlier years. Has the discretion 
of the operating businesses of your company in financial decisions (control of 
cash, capital expenditure, etc.) increased or decreased since 1986?
financial 
discretion has 
increased
financial discretion 
has not changed 
substantially
financial 
discretion has 
decreased
R & D
3.a) If you devote significant sums to research and development, is this activity
conducted mainly at the centre of the company or in the operating businesses?
in the operating 
businesses
equal
balance
at the centre of 
the company
does not 
apply
b) Has there been a significant change in the organisation of R&D in your company 
over the past ten years?
shift towards more decentralisation of R&D
shift towards more centralisation of R&D
no change
HEAD OFFICE
4.a) P lease give the total number of employees in the corporate head office of your 
company at the following three points in time, completing each box if possible:
1986 1991 1996
4.b) How many of these are or were in managerial and executive positions? 
1986 I  I  1991 1996 I
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FUNCTIONS
5.) How many of the m anagers and executives in the head office today (question 4) 
are active primarily in each of the following functions?
Function Number 
(in 1996)
Gha
(pleas
Increase
nges 1986 
e tick one 
Decrease
-1996
column)
No Change
Accounting, Finance and Control 
including Treasury
Taxation
Information Technology
Strategy development
Devising an overall strategy for the company
Legal
Marketing
Developing market strategies for the company
Investor relationships
Building up and maintaining relationships with
investors of capital (shareholders, banks ëf6.)
Public relations
Representing the company to the wider public
Human Resources and Industrial 
Relations
Other (please specify)
If you h a v e  c o p ie s  of o rg a n isa t io n  c h a r t s  for y o u r  c o m p a n y  a t  h a n d ,  w e w ould  b e  
very  gratefu l if you co u ld  s e n d  th e m  to us .  D iag ram s re fe r ing  to  bo th  1996 a n d  to  
p re v io u s  y e a r s  w ould  be  of u tm o s t  help  to  o u r  inves t iga tion .
P le a s e  feel free  to  e lab o ra te  on any  i s s u e  of th e  s t r u c tu r e  a n d  s t ru c tu ra l  c h a n g e  of 
y ou r  c o m p a n y  th a t  is w orth  m ention ing .
We w ould  like to  th a n k  you aga in  for your co -o p e ra t io n .  If you  w ould  like a f ree  
co p y  of th e  report  su m m ar is in g  th e  re su l ts  of th e  s u rv e y  p le a s e  tick th e  box below.
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